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Abstract 
 
  
In current Jewish Studies scholarship there is a broad consensus that 
the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 caused both an intense emotional response 
in Britain’s Jewish community and a change in the relationship this community 
had with the State of Israel. What this scholarship has yet to provide is either 
a detailed account of the ways that the June 1967 war impacted on this 
community or a sustained theorisation of how the intensity generated by a 
world-historical event might bring about change. 
 
 This thesis attempts to address these gaps by interviewing twelve 
British Jews who lived through their community’s response to the war and 
supplement this data with original archival research, adding detail that is 
currently missing from the historical record.  
 
It then interprets this data using a cultural studies approach grounded, 
primarily, in the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In using this 
approach this thesis reveals that it was the intense affectivity generated by the 
Zionist representation of the war as the ‘Six Day War’ that caused the 
community to change in the post-1967 conjuncture. It then identifies these 
changes as cultural – occurring on the planes of identity, representation, 
everyday life, cultural practice and, most crucially, affectivity. In revealing the 
centrality of affect in the impact of the war on the British Jewish community, 
this thesis argues that the hegemonic form of Zionism that emerges within 
that community after 1967 is ‘Popular Zionism’, defined as an intensely 
charged affective disposition towards the State of Israel that is lived out in the 
cultural identities, everyday lives and cultural practices of British Jews.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1. The origins of this thesis 
 
“The ‘internal cohesion and solidity’ of Zionism has completely ‘eluded the 
understanding of Arabs’. As has the ‘intertwined terror and exultation’ out of 
which it was born; or in other words ‘what Zionism meant for the Jews’. It is 
the affective dimension, as it exerts its pressure historically, that has been 
blocked from view.”1  
 
(Rose, 2007, p. 197) 
 
 
“I think, if cultural studies as a practice is a fairly significant departure from the 
‘normal’ and dominant practices of the western academy, it is a challenge in a 
number of ways. One: being contextual. But two is precisely because it both 
recognises ‘feeling’ as part of its study, and also because it allows feeling as 
part of its practice, so in that way it has something over many forms of 
intellectual production.”  
 
(Grossberg, 2010, p. 335) 
 
“Only … after the Six Day War in June 1967… did concern for and 
identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a Jew in 
Britain.”  
 
(Endelman, 2002, p. 235) 
 
 
 
The idea for this thesis originated at the intersection of two different 
intellectual concerns. The first was an interest in the extraordinary power a 
certain idea of the State of Israel has in contemporary British Jewish culture 
or what Jacqueline Rose calls in the above quote the “‘internal cohesion and 
solidity’ of Zionism” – what Zionism has meant for the Jews. As a British Jew 
of Israeli heritage who has fallen out of love2 with Zionism (see Chapter 3) I 
have experienced first hand the ‘intertwined terror and exultation’ out of which 
Zionism is born and wanted to get a fuller sense of how the affective 
dimension of Zionism exerted its pressure historically.  
                                            
1 Rose is quoting Edward Said’s The Question of Palestine (1992). 
2 As will soon become clear, the word ‘love’ is carefully chosen here. 
 
 
2 
 
This desire to understand Zionism’s affective dimension leads to the 
second intellectual concern governing this thesis. Over the past fifteen years 
there has been an ‘affective turn’ in humanities scholarship (Gorton, 2007; 
Blackman and Venn, 2010), in which critics have begun sustained 
explorations into the sensuous, corporeal, visceral, intensive, embodied, 
emotional, volitional, libidinal, passionate… i.e. the affective3 dimensions of 
culture. Different theorists have been used to understand affect within the 
affective turn; for reasons explained below (and at length in Chapter 2), this 
thesis uses a cultural studies approach rooted in the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari as exemplified by the work of Lawrence Grossberg 
(and others). So as much as this thesis is interested in the specificity of 
Zionism’s affective dimensions it is also interested in what cultural studies 
informed by Deleuzo-Guattarian theory can reveal about how affect operates 
in culture more generally. 
 
In a bid to explore these concerns, I have chosen the case study of the 
impact of the Arab-Israeli war of June 19674 on the British Jewish community. 
There were different reasons for choosing this as a case study. The first was 
that it is a mainstay of Jewish Studies and Jewish historiography that the 1967 
war generated a tremendous emotional response in global Jewry5 so using it 
as a case study would provide an opportunity to theorise how world-historical 
                                            
3 Different critics use different definitions of affect in the affective turn. This thesis uses Brian 
Massumi’s definition of affect outlined in his introduction of Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateau’s: “a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one 
experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that 
body’s capacity to act” (in Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. xvii). 
 
4 The war is given different names throughout the thesis: the June War, the June 1967 War, 
the third Arab Israeli-War and the Six Day War. All but the last are used for stylistic variation. 
The term the Six Day War is used specifically in reference to the Zionist representation of the 
events of the war. The term emerged in the Israeli press shortly after the Israeli victory. The 
term is imbued with Israeli triumphalism, designed to invoke the Bible’s six days of creation 
(Segev, 2005, pp. 450–451) It also suggests that the effects of the war are over, when the 
continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights and the Israeli siege of 
Gaza demonstrate that they are not. The term Six Day War is used in the thesis only in 
reference to the Zionist representation of events.  
5 The length of the following list of references indicates the consensus around this idea: 
(Alderman, 1992; Bar-Nir, 1969; Benbassa, 2007; Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007; Cohen and 
Kahn-Harris, 2004; Davidson, 1967/1968; Endelman, 2002; Gould, 1984; Gross, 1967/1968, 
Kosmin et al., 1997; Lederhendler, 2000; Mankowitz, 1967/1968; Marks, 1967, 1967/1968; 
Oren, 2002; Sacks, 1991; Schindler, 2007(b); Segev, 2005; Staub, 2004; Taft, 1974). 
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events affectively impact on communities (and their cultures) invested in these 
events in particular ways. The second was that if Endelman’s claim that it was 
only after the June 1967 war that Israel became a central feature of British 
Jewish identity is true6 then the war’s impact on British Jewry could be used to 
explore Deleuze and Guattari’s notion that surges and dissipations of affect 
are what cause cultural change. The third was based on the idea that after 
1967 British Jews began to relate to Israel in a highly affectively charged 
fashion. This is touched upon in the literature7 but rarely, if ever, as the main 
focus of scholarship and is always under-theorised. Researching the ways 
British Jews relate to Israel and Zionism post-1967 from a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
perspective – one that places a certain primacy on affect – might reveal 
something of the nature of the British Jewish relationship to Israel and 
Zionism that has not yet been revealed in the existing literature. Using this 
case study for these reasons, this thesis asks the question: ‘What role did 
affect play in the British Jewish response to the Six Day War and the changes 
that occurred in British Jewish culture as a result?’8 
 
2. Chapter outlines 
 
 This thesis answers this question in the following way. Chapter 2 
outlines the theoretical framework used in the thesis to make sense of what 
happened to the British Jewish community as a result of the war. It first makes 
the case for the benefits of a cultural studies approach to the question by 
arguing that because the empirical research demonstrates that the changes 
which occur within the British Jewish community happen in the realms of 
affectivity, identity, representation, everyday life and cultural practice (all 
                                            
6 This thesis disagrees with the detail but not the thrust of this claim. Israel did not become 
central in British Jewish identity but more prominent and it was not only British Jewish identity 
that was affected but a whole range of aspects of British Jewish culture (see Chapter 7). 
7 Chapter 2 contains a full literature review. 
8 This thesis recognises that affect is not the only form of power at play in the British Jewish 
response to the war and the changes that occurred in British Jewish culture as result. Other 
forms of power also played their part, notably discursive power and state power. These are 
touched on in this thesis e.g. in the changed discursive construction of the State of Israel in 
British Jewish culture after the war and the role of the Israeli state in shifting this discursive 
construction through its propaganda machinery. However, whilst this thesis does argue that 
multiple forms of power were at play during and after the war, it also argues that the affective 
was the most influential in terms of the way British Jewish culture changed. 
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traditional concerns of cultural studies) a cultural studies approach is best 
used to make sense of these changes. This chapter then considers three 
cultural studies paradigms that might be deployed to answer the research 
question through the work of the theorists who best exemplify these 
paradigms. The first theorist is Antonio Gramsci who emphasises the cultural 
aspects of politics and the political aspects of culture. The second is Ernesto 
Laclau who focuses on the discursive aspects of culture. The final theorists 
are Deleuze and Guattari who emphasise the affective dimensions of culture. 
Ultimately this chapter argues for the deployment of a primarily Deleuzo-
Guattarian framework because of the presence of so much affect in the 
empirical evidence collected for the thesis, although it does not dismiss 
entirely the value of the other cultural studies paradigms, aspects of which are 
also used through the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodological approach used to carry out the 
research necessary to answer the research question. It begins with a self-
reflexive section that attempts to assess the impact that the specificity of my 
positioning as a researcher may have had on the research findings. It then 
moves on to argue that the most effective method for researching affective 
states that emerged a number of years ago is a mix of original semi-structured 
in-depth interviews, archival research and secondary sociological and 
historical sources. This chapter then details the research process, the 
problems I faced and the unexpected benefits of using this methodological 
approach. This chapter finishes with a brief section of the ethics of research in 
such a politically fraught area. 
 
Chapter 4 – ‘Affect and Zionism in the British Jewish Assemblage 
1880–1967’ – attempts to detail the historical context in which the post-1967 
changes in British Jewish culture occurred. It does this by combining the two 
different Deleuzo-Guattarian analytical frameworks developed by Manuel 
DeLanda and Lawrence Grossberg to perform an assemblage analysis of the 
British Jewish community from 1880–1967. The material analysed in this 
chapter is primarily the extant sociological and historical data but is also 
interwoven with biographical information of the interview participants. This 
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chapter argues that the organisation of the British Jewish assemblage 
(socially, economically, culturally etc.) within British society on the eve of the 
June War pre-disposed it to the changes it underwent as a result of the war. 
The war itself did not produce the post-1967 cultural changes. Instead the 
intense affectivity generated by the Zionist representation of the war 
actualised potentialities that already inhered in the assemblage’s pre-1967 
organisation. 
 
Chapter 5 attempts to present an historical narrative of the June 1967 
war using a variety of secondary historical sources from across the political 
spectrum. This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to provide the reader 
with details of the events that constituted the Middle East crisis and the war it 
precipitated as a reference to use throughout the rest of the thesis. The 
second is to demonstrate how the Zionist representation of the war as the Six 
Day War differs from the versions that exist within historical scholarship. As is 
demonstrated in the following chapter it was these differences that led the 
affective response within British Jewry to be as intense as it was, generating 
the cultural changes outlined in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
Chapter 6 attempts to narrate the British Jewish experience of the war 
as what Deleuzian Clare Colebrook has called a “history of intensities” (2009) 
i.e. a narrative in which the British Jewish intensely affective response is at 
the forefront. It does this by using Manuel DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition (1968 (a)) and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
the Body-without-Organs (1980) to show how surges and dissipations of 
affectivity can change the organisation of cultural formations. Using the 
interview and archival data, this chapter argues that it was precisely the surge 
of affectivity that flowed across the British Jewish assemblage as a result of 
the war that triggered the changes in British Jewish culture after it.  
 
Chapter 7, ‘The Production of Hegemonic British Jewish Cultural 
Identity after the Six Day War’, uses Guattari’s work on subjectivity to make 
sense of the shifts in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity triggered by 
the war. It argues that the “refrains” (Guattari, 1996 (a)) of Zionism “catalyse” 
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(ibid.) a contradictory affective disposition within the subjective ecology of 
hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity. This affective disposition makes 
British Jews feel that a strong militarised Israel will protect them against the 
threat of a genocide, which, post-1945, is unlikely to occur, but they 
nevertheless feel is just beyond the horizon, in large part because of Zionism. 
Guattari’s attention to the affective dimensions of subjectivity allows us to see 
precisely how British Jewish cultural identity works in relation to Israel, post-
1967 i.e. primarily affectively. 
 
Chapter 8, ‘The Rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish 
Community after 1967’, uses the Gramscian/Deleuzo-Guattarian analytical 
framework developed by Lawrence Grossberg in We Gotta Get Out of This 
Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (1992) to argue that 
what emerges in the British Jewish community after June 1967 is Popular 
Zionism. It defines Popular Zionism as the hegemonic, and highly charged, 
affective disposition that British Jews have towards the State of Israel in the 
post-1967 conjuncture and that is lived out in their cultural identities, pop 
cultural consumption and everyday lives. This is different to classical Zionism, 
which is conventionally understood as an ideology and/or movement that is 
lived out at the levels of the state or institutions. It supports this claim with 
evidence from the interview and archival data. 
 
3. The originality of this thesis 
 
In approaching the impact of the June 1967 war on Britain’s Jewish 
community, analysing original archival and interview data from a Deleuzo-
Guattarian perspective, this thesis is an original contribution to knowledge in a 
number of ways. The first is historical. Whilst there have been historical 
accounts of the impact of the war on the British Jewish community these 
accounts have very often been cursory (Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2005) 
mainly because they have appeared in histories covering much longer periods 
than would allow for a detailed look at the British Jewish reaction to the war. 
Interestingly in the most exhaustive study of the global Diasporic Jewish 
community’s reaction to the war (Lederhandler, 2000) an in-depth analysis of 
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the British Jewish reaction is largely absent. The one place in the existing 
literature where the British Jewish reaction to the war is given in-depth 
consideration is in Gould (1984) in which London Jews were asked to reflect 
on their commitment to Israel before, during and after the war. These 
reflections, however, were part of a much broader focus on notions of Jewish 
commitment in general as opposed to a specific concern with the Jewish 
relationship with Israel per se. In order to answer the research question that 
structures this thesis I have had to address this gap in the existing literature, 
and conduct in-depth interviews (the first of their kind)9 with twelve British 
Jews that explicitly addresses their recollection of their and the British Jewish 
community’s response to the 1967 war. These interviews (the full transcripts 
of which appear in Appendix 2) add important detail to the historical record. 
 
The expansion of the historical record, however, is not the primary 
concern of this research. Instead it is an attempt to make sense of the role 
affect plays in the British Jewish relationship to Israel after the 1967 war from 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective. Deleuze and Guattari have been used in 
both the context of Palestine/Israel and Jewish studies before (Silberstein, 
2000; May, 2007; Weizman, 2007). In fact Deleuze and Guattari have both 
intervened in relatively limited ways into Palestine/Israel. Deleuze wrote a 
series of articles that were published in the French press speaking out 
politically against Zionism and in favour of the Palestinian cause but in a non-
theoretical manner (Deleuze, 1978 (b), 1983, 1988; Deleuze and Sanbar, 
1982). In Deleuze and Guattari’s most influential work, A Thousand Plateaus, 
there is a sentence long critique of Zionism in a larger discussion of the 
concept of ‘becoming’: “Even Jews must become-Jewish (it certainly takes 
more than a state)” (1980, p. 320). However, Deleuze and Guattari have yet 
to be used to account for the impact that the 1967 war had on British Jews or 
the relationship that community has had with Israel and Zionism more 
generally.  
 
                                            
9 For reasons explained in Chapter 3 I have supplemented these interviews with original 
archival research. 
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 The originality, however, does not lie simply in using Deleuze and 
Guattari to make sense of the war’s impact on the relationship that British 
Jewry has with Israel. More importantly it lies in what Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approach reveals about this relationship. By giving affect a primary role in the 
constitution of their radically complex ontology, one of the benefits of a 
cultural critic using Deleuze and Guattari is the possibility of a clearer view of 
how affect works in the operations of the cultural formation that critic is 
analysing. One of the key arguments made in this thesis is that Popular 
Zionism in post-1967 British Jewish culture (identity, representations, cultural 
practice and everyday life) operates as an intensely charged affective 
disposition. This is different to how it is conventionally understood in the 
existing literature either as an “idea” (Heller, 1947), an “ideology” (Shimoni, 
1995), a “movement” (Laqueur, 1972) or “a broad identification with Israel” 
(Schindler, 2007 (b), p. 9). By using Deleuze and Guattari as a prism, this 
thesis argues, we are able to get a more accurate sense of how Zionism 
operates in British Jewish culture than has previously been revealed by other 
methodological and theoretical approaches. 
 
A final way that this thesis is original is in its theoretical contribution to 
the literature that constitutes the “affective turn” (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and 
Venn, 2010). This body of literature is broad covering a diverse range of 
academic disciplines, theoretical perspectives, political projects, 
methodological approaches and historical contexts. However, none of this 
scholarship has theorised the way that affect can generate instances of 
cultural change, something which analysing the specific dynamics of my 
chosen case study from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective will allow.  
 
4. The politics of this thesis 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is not only to more accurately label the sort 
of Zionism that emerges in the British Jewish community after the June 1967 
war. Understanding with greater accuracy how Zionism operates in post-1967 
British Jewish culture is a step towards the successful opposition and 
resistance of Zionism in that culture. Gilbert argues that the defining purpose 
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of ‘cultural studies’ is to “put into question what is apparently fixed, to bring it 
out into the open, to de-sediment it, to make it public and to make visible its 
contingency, to put it up for discussion” (Gilbert, 2012). That has been one of 
the key intentions of this thesis – to ‘de-sediment’ the not only ‘apparently 
fixed’ but also intensely charged relationship that British Jews currently have 
with Israel. Chapter 4 shows that prior to 1967 it was acceptable for British 
Jews to be non- or anti-Zionist. Chapter 6 shows the processes by which 
these positions were expunged from British Jewish culture and Chapters 7 
and 8 show the culture that emerges as a result.10 By outlining these 
processes of ‘sedimentation’, one of the hopes of this thesis is to make visible 
Popular Zionism’s ‘contingency’ and ‘put up for discussion’ other ways of 
thinking, feeling and acting towards the State of Israel that does not involve 
devotedly supporting a form of political organisation that privileges Jewish 
existence over Palestinian existence with often brutal and devastating 
consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10  Stuart Hall defines cultural change as “a polite euphemism for the process by which some 
cultural forms and practices are driven out of the centre of popular life, actively marginalised” 
(Hall, 1998, p. 443).  
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Framework: Cultural Studies, Deleuze and Guattari 
and the Impact of the Six Day War on the British Jewish 
Community  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Leading historian of British Jewry Todd Endelman has observed that 
“only … after the Six Day War in June 1967… did concern for and 
identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a Jew in 
Britain” (2002, p. 235). This thesis is an attempt to elaborate on this 
observation in two ways: i) by arguing that it was not only a shift in British 
Jewish identification that occurred as a result of the Six Day War, but in fact 
the emergence of a whole range of identifications, cultural practices, 
ideological suppositions and, most importantly, affective dispositions that can 
be grouped together under the term ‘Popular Zionism’ and ii) detailing the 
processes by which Popular Zionism came about.  
 
What this chapter attempts is to outline the theoretical framework used 
to arrive at this conclusion. In doing so it wants to make the case for i) what 
might be called a ‘cultural studies approach’11 to understanding the impact of 
                                            
11 This is a problematic formulation because, as During argues, cultural studies “possesses 
neither a well-defined methodology nor clearly demarcated fields for investigation”. The 
broadest definition he allows is, “cultural studies is, of course, the study of culture or, more 
particularly, the study of contemporary culture. But this does not take us very far.” He then 
argues that cultural studies work can be of an economic, sociological or textual bent, but 
what its orientation emphasizes uniquely is a focus on “subjectivity” and  “political 
engagement” at a moment when objectivity and scientific detachment were the dominant 
modes of humanities research (During, 1999, pp.1–2). He also stresses its 
“multidisciplinarity” and the need “not so much to dismantle disciplinary boundaries as to be 
able to move across them” (During, 1999, p. 27). To During’s definition I would add the 
following: a cultural studies approach has tended to historicise its research object. Lawrence 
Grossberg has argued that cultural studies defining property is that it is radically contextualist 
and conjuncturalist (Grossberg, 2006) i.e. it not only attempts to situate its research object in 
all the social relations that constitute it but tries to assess how its formation changes in time. 
If it is theoretically informed, cultural studies work tends to be rooted in the theories of 
twentieth century continental philosophy (most usually French structuralism and post-
structuralism). If it is empirically based, it tends to use a qualitative approach. That research 
orientated from within other disciplines might fit into these broad (and cautious) definitions 
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the Six Day War on the British Jewish community and ii) more specifically a 
cultural studies approach that is rooted in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari. As of yet no such approach has been used to understand either 
the impact of the 1967 war on British Jewry or the more general relationship 
that this community has with the State of Israel. As is argued through the 
remainder of this chapter, the reason this perspective is being used here is 
because it reveals in-depth what the existing literature has only touched upon: 
the profoundly affective way that Zionism has operated in the identities, 
cultural practices, ideological suppositions and affective dispositions of 
‘ordinary’ Jews in their everyday lives as a result of the Middle East crisis and 
Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. All of these categories have been identified as 
key areas of research by cultural studies since the discipline emerged in the 
1960s. Attention to the affective properties of culture has increased since the 
‘affective turn’ (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010) of the past fifteen 
years of which Deleuzo-Guattarian thought has been such a key influence. It is 
for these reasons that this chapter will be arguing that a cultural studies 
approach based on Deleuzo-Guattarian thought is best placed to make sense 
of the cultural changes that occurred in the British Jewish community as a 
result of the 1967 war. 
 
It will do this in the following way: first, it will briefly survey the extant 
literature on the effect of the 1967 war on the British Jewish community, and 
the more general relationship that both British and Diaspora Jews have had 
with Zionism and Israel since the war. It will also review the existing literature 
on affect theory in order to situate this thesis’ theoretical innovation vis-à-vis 
cultural change. This chapter will then make the case for the benefits of a 
cultural studies approach to a question that has yet to be considered within the 
discipline. It will do this by outlining the ways that some of the leading theorists 
                                                                                                                             
demonstrates the influence of cultural studies and its approach to research within the 
academy. As will become clear in later chapters, the research undertaken for this thesis fits 
neatly into the above definition: i) the subjective appears in the choice of one-on-one 
interviews for the primary method of data collection and in Chapter 7’s focus on British 
Jewish cultural identity; ii) the political engagement in the thesis being informed by anti-
Zionism; iii) its use of theories and methods from cultural studies, history and sociology; iv) 
its attempt to be radically contextual and conjunctural (see Chapter 4) and v) it uses 
continental philosophy, a qualitative method and empirical data. 
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used within the discipline – Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari – have conceived of processes of cultural change. There 
are different reasons why these theorists have been chosen. The first is that 
each of them represents a different paradigm that has emerged within the 
discipline since its inception in the 1960s, each of which have value in making 
sense of the question this thesis is attempting to answer. Gramsci’s thought is 
being used here to represent the first ‘phase’ of cultural studies: the cultural 
studies of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the 
University of Birmingham during the late 1960s and 1970s. This work used a 
Gramscian approach (amongst others) to examine the political dimensions of 
culture, and the cultural dimensions of politics. Exemplary works of this period 
include Resistance Through Rituals (Hall and Jefferson, 1975), On Ideology 
(Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1978), Policing the Crisis (Hall et 
al., 1978 (b)) and The Empire Strikes Back (Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, 1982). Laclau represents the second phase from the 1980s onwards 
when cultural studies scholars began to emphasise the discursive aspects of 
culture. Deleuze and Guattari represent the most contemporary evolution in 
the theories used by cultural studies – the cultural studies of the affective turn 
(op cit.). Despite being described here chronologically, these paradigms 
overlap in a way that continues to make them all relevant in different ways 
today. Each of them, with their different emphases, have value and are used in 
different ways for this project; although, for reasons explained below Deleuze 
and Guattari have been chosen as the primary approach.  
 
A final point: any number of theorists could have been used to 
represent the different paradigms just outlined. E.P. Thompson, Richard 
Hoggart, Raymond Williams or Louis Althusser might have replaced Gramsci; 
Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida or Jacques Lacan might 
have replaced Laclau and any number of the psychoanalysts used in the 
affective turn (Gustave Le Bon, Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Silvan 
Tomkins, Daniel Stern) could have replaced Deleuze and Guattari. The 
primary reason why the final three have been chosen is because they are all 
historical materialists (of different kinds) who have elaborated theoretical 
perspectives that explicitly address the material processes of historical and 
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cultural change in complex social formations. In different ways they are all 
radically contexualist and conjuncturalist in the way that Grossberg argues is 
the defining property of the cultural studies project (2006). This is precisely the 
approach needed when looking at a community as a whole (with all the 
methodological problems that entails (see Chapter 3)) and how different 
aspects of its culture changed as a result of a world-historical event. These 
perspectives do appear in the work of the other theorists just listed but 
nowhere quite so elaborately or as in-depth (with perhaps the exception of 
Raymond Williams, who does appear in the thesis through the work of 
Lawrence Grossberg).  
 
2. Literature review 
 
 The question of how the Six Day War impacted on the British Jewish 
community has been addressed in both sociological and historical literature. 
Both Todd Endelman (2002) and Geoffrey Alderman (1992) have touched on it 
in much broader histories of British Jewry. Endelman argues it shifted Israel to 
the centre of British Jewish identity and Alderman argues that it cemented the 
place of Zionism within the community. These arguments are corroborated by 
historical work by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks and Chief Rabbi Immanuel 
Jakobovitz in (Don Yehiya, 1991). All of this work states that these changes 
occur, and suggests this is because of what British Jews felt was at stake in 
the war and its build-up (i.e. the annihilation of the State of Israel and a 
genocide of its Jewish population), but does not detail the range of changes 
that occurred, nor provide any sustained theoretical analysis of how these 
changes came about. The impact of the Six Day War is also measured in 
Julius Gould’s Jewish Commitment: A Study in London (1984), a study based 
on a survey that was undertaken in 1969. As part of the survey, participants 
were asked to measure their levels of identification with Israel before during 
and after the war and in follow-up semi-structured interviews they were asked 
to elaborate on these measurements. This data has proved invaluable to this 
thesis in giving a contemporaneous sense of how the war impacted on 
London’s Jews’ cultural identity (and is used in Chapter 7). Ronald Taft used a 
similar method to measure the effect of the war on Melbourne’s Jewish 
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community (1974). This has provided interesting comparative data, although 
because of its geographical specificity it has not been used explicitly in this 
thesis. The edited collection The Six Day War and World Jewry (Lederhendler, 
2000) uses a mixture of historical (archival research) and sociological (a mix of 
quantitative methods) approaches and so again has proved to be a rich source 
of empirical data. Although it has chapters that look at individual Jewish 
communities around the globe, the British Jewish community receives no such 
attention. Nevertheless, however rich all these studies have been as sources 
of data, none of them have engaged in any sustained theoretical manner with 
how Zionism works in British Jewish culture (identity, representations, affective 
dispositions and everyday cultural practice). The same criticism can be made 
of the sociological research being produced within the tradition of British 
Jewish sociology, which has not looked at the Six Day War as such but has 
provided extensive empiricial data about the ‘attachment’ different sections of 
British Jewry have had to Israel and Zionism since the 1960s (Krausz, 1964; 
Krausz, 1969 (a); Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and Schmool, 1968; Prais and 
Schmool, 1975; Krausz, 1981; Kosmin and Levy, 1983; Kosmin et al., 1997; 
Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 2004; Graham and Boyd, 2010). 
 
  In order to find sustained theoretical engagement with how Zionism 
functions one has to look at more general studies of the ideology and 
movement as opposed to either the way it has been practiced in Britain or in 
relation to the Six Day War. One of the first pieces of work to bring the sort of 
critical theory that has since become popular in cultural studies to bear on 
Zionism was Edward Said’s A Question of Palestine (1979). This is a mainly 
political work but its emphasis on the place of discourse in the context of 
Zionism draws on a Foucauldian methodology. This emphasis on discourse 
reveals a crucially important dynamic within Zionism, i.e. the near total 
occlusion of Palestinians and the Palestinian representation of events in 
Palestine/Israel within the West and the role this plays in strengthening 
political support for Zionism. It briefly touches on the affective dimension of 
this support – “I can understand the intertwined terror and the exultation out of 
which Zionism has been nourished, and I think I can at least grasp the 
meaning of Israel for Jews…” (Said, 1979, p. 60). It is testament to the insight 
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of this ground-breaking book that this cursory statement so incisively 
summarises Zionism’s affective economy – terror and exultation. These are 
precisely the affective states that British Jewry experiences during the war and 
which also maintain popular support for Zionism after it. This insight provides 
the basis for much of the analysis in this thesis. However, in The Question of 
Palestine precisely how Zionism functions affectively remains under-theorised 
in comparison to how it operates discursively. 
 
2.1. Psychoanalysis and Zionism: Jacqueline Rose 
  
In the book chapter ‘Continuing the Dialogue – On Edward Said’ (2007) 
Jacqueline Rose uses the above quote from Said as the springboard for her 
inquiry into Zionism. In doing so, her work stands out in the literature as the 
best attempt to understanding Zionism’s affective dimensions. However, in 
using a psychoanalytic theoretical framework Rose addresses the psychic 
dynamics of the ideology, which invariably includes the affective but does not 
treat the affective as such as a distinct category of human experience. As a 
result of her theoretical treatment being so sustained and because 
psychoanalysis offers, arguably, the most persuasive alternative to the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian approach taken in this thesis this section will look at Rose 
and psychoanalysis in some detail. 
 
 Rose, a leading psychoanalytic cultural critic, first turned her attention 
to Zionism in her book States of Fantasy (1996) but her most sustained 
engagement with Zionism appears in The Question of Zion (2005) and The 
Last Resistance (2007). What she sets out to do in these books is “to try to 
enter the imaginative mindset of Zionism in order to understand why it 
commands such passionate and seemingly intractable allegiance” (Rose, 
2005, p. 13), thereby anticipating almost entirely the broader questions 
addressed in this thesis. In keeping with psychoanalytic cultural criticism she 
conceives of Zionism as a psychic state and analyses it using mainly Freudian 
(and occasionally Lacanian) concepts. In The Question Of Zion she diagnoses 
leading Zionists Herzl and Weizmann as manic-depressive through a close 
reading of their writings. In The Last Resistance she uses ‘splitting’, 
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‘resistance’ and ‘displacement’ to analyse newspaper interviews, policies and 
literature which all deal in some way with Israel, Zionism or the Holocaust. To 
give an example: in using psychoanalysis in her essay ‘Displacement in Zion’ 
(2007) she reveals important insights into the dynamics of Zionism. Her 
definition of ‘displacement’ is “there is something you cannot bear to think 
about or remember, so you think about or remember something else.” (2007, 
p. 42). One of the examples she uses to illustrate the way in which 
displacement works in Zionism is in the following newspaper quote from an 
Israeli soldier: “I remember the Holocaust. We have a choice to fight the 
terrorists or to face being consumed by the flames again” (2007, p. 55). Rose 
argues that the solider is displacing the historical trauma of the Holocaust onto 
the suicide bombers of the second intifada, to which she retorts, “the flames 
on the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are not the flames of the Holocaust” 
(ibid). 
 
 Rose offers here (and elsewhere) a persuasive account of the psychic 
processes by which Zionist ideology generates intense affectivity but there are 
a number of problems with her approach and the psychoanalytic approach 
more generally in assessing the Jewish relationship to Israel. The first is 
methodological. Whilst textual analysis of media and literary representations 
can reveal a great deal about the culture(s) in which these representations are 
situated, this method, arguably, does not give as finer-grained insight into the 
everyday cultures of ‘ordinary’ Jewish people in the way that an ethnographic 
approach can. At the very least, textual analysis should be situated within 
some ethnographic data, if only secondary, in order to understand exactly how 
a media representation operates within the culture that produced it. However, 
when the conclusions are as persuasive as Rose’s, the deployment of this 
approach is not necessarily a problem but does lead her to some problematic 
formulations. For instance, throughout her work on Zionism, she repeatedly 
refers to the ‘Jewish people’. The ‘Jewish people’ is used most commonly in 
religious discourse (e.g. in ancient religious texts and contemporary rabbinical 
sermons drawing on these texts) and suggests an unbroken continuity 
between the ‘Jewish people’ of ancient times and the present day. This is 
profoundly ahistorical: Jewish peoples have related to Jewishness and 
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Zionism (not to mention the other aspects of their cultures and identities) in 
different ways in different societies at different points in time. For example, 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the shifting formations of British Jewry, and how 
Zionism has functioned differently within that community over the course of the 
twentieth century. Rose’s approach does not differentiate between the 
specificities of the different Jewish communities she discusses – e.g. French, 
Russian and Israeli Jewry in her displacement essay – and how Zionism and 
its representations might operate differently in these different contexts. For 
reasons made clear below, Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical approach 
requires a far more historicized methodology than Rose’s psychoanalytic 
approach allows.12 
 
 Rose’s oversight points to a broader criticism of the Freudian approach 
in general – its tendency towards ahistoricity and universalism. Freud himself 
suggested the psychic processes he formulated in his work were universal. 
Deleuze and Guattari (amongst others) offer a persuasive critique of this 
approach. Anti-Oedipus’ (1972) broader argument is that what Freud is 
actually sketching are the psychosocial processes of the cultures of industrial 
capitalism whilst imagining they are universal. This leads to a number of more 
specific criticisms of how a Freudian approach might be bought to bear on the 
Jewish relationship to Zionism. In applying a cultural theory that imagines that 
the pyschic processes specific to industrial capitalism are in fact universal, the 
scope for formulating strategies of radical cultural change is severely limited in 
a context in which they are desperately needed. His essay ‘Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego’ (1921) is a case in point. This essay lays the 
basis for much of Freud’s ‘social turn’ a decade later and as such is instructive 
for how he thinks groups of people become formed around certain 
ideas/objects. One of the key arguments implied in this essay and others that 
pursue similar themes is that “… rivalrous hostility towards the other is integral 
to the very formation of the group.” (Rose, 2007, p. 66). The Freudian Other is 
very specifically an object that is transformed by our projection of the qualities 
                                            
12 Interestingly she lauds Said’s Gramscian approach, “to make an inventory of 
the historical forces that have made anyone – a people – who they are.” (Rose, 
2007, p.195) but does not quite follow its lead. 
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we cannot bear to recognise in ourselves onto it. This is a very persuasive 
theorization of how Zionism is formed around the hostility towards the 
Palestinian/Arab/Muslim Other(s) and certainly offers insight into the structures 
of the post-1967 turn to Zionism of British Jewry. However in suggesting this is 
the only way any collective can be formed, through a relationship to an Other 
who we can only ever relate to with varying degrees of hostility, a solution to 
the conflict in Palestine/Israel – of how different cultures live peaceably and 
justly in the same territory – becomes nigh on impossible. By using Deleuze 
and Guattari we not only achieve the same level of analytic insight into the 
hostile relationship to the Zionist other through concepts such as ‘black holes’, 
‘lines of death’, ‘the cancerous body without organs of the fascist’ but we also 
are given the possibility of strategising our way out of this hostile relationship: 
‘lines of flight’ ‘becomings’ and particularly the multiple modalities of group 
formation which inhere in their concept the ‘virtual’ (these concepts are defined 
below and in other chapters) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). 
 
  The final problem with Freud’s approach is the way he conceptualises 
affect. As argued above, whilst Freud’s theories of psychic processes 
invariably involve affect he rarely, if at all, theorizes affect as a distinct 
category of human experience. The two papers in his oeuvre where affect 
appears most prominently are in ‘Repression’ (1915 (a)) and ‘The 
Unconscious’ (1915(b)). The notion of affect developed here is problematic for 
this project. Freud understands affect mainly as anxiety. As a result much of 
the psychoanalytic work within the affective turn concentrates on trauma and 
the anxiety it produces (Walkerdine and Jimenez, 2012). The empirical data 
collected for this project showed that anxiety and trauma were only part of the 
complex affective ‘assemblage’ generated in British Jewry by the war. The 
taxonomy of affect elaborated by Spinoza in The Ethics (1677) that informs the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian approach (explained below) is much better placed to 
make sense of this response than Freud’s more limited approach.  
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2.2. The affective turn and cultural change 
 
Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalysis are not the only traditions 
in which questions of affect have been explored in relation to culture. Over the 
last two decades a rich body of literature has developed which has recently 
been called “the affective turn” (Gorton, 2007; Blackman and Venn, 2010) and 
this also needs to be considered in terms of what it can and cannot offer to 
the research question governing this thesis. 
 
Despite the fact that affect and emotion have long been concerns 
within the philosophical currents that inform contemporary social sciences and 
humanities scholarship (Spinoza, 1677; Freud, 1915 (a), 1915 (b); Jameson, 
1991), according to Gorton (2007) and Blackman and Venn (2010) they only 
became the focus of a distinct theoretical tendency within the field in the mid-
1990s with the publication of Brian Massumi’s ‘Autonomy of Affect’ (1996) and 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s and Adam Frank’s ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold’ 
(Sedgwick, 2003).13 Both these essays used different theoretical frameworks 
to account for affect (Massumi used Deleuze, whilst Sedgwick and Frank 
used psychoanalyst Silvan Tomkins) but their intention was similar: to move 
away from the (post-)structuralist paradigms that had dominated cultural 
theory over the previous two decades and that tended to focus on the 
linguistic aspects of culture (Gilbert, 2004).  
 
The turn to affect initiated by these essays actualised a number of 
“lines of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) within humanities and social 
science scholarship. One of the most significant claims made about the 
affective turn’s contribution to cultural theory is summarised by Blackmann 
and Venn who argue that attention to affect reveals that “social and natural 
phenomena are complex, processual, indeterminate, relational and constantly 
open to effects from contiguous processes” (2010, p.8). Arguably, it is not 
attention to affect per se that reveals the processual, indeterminate and 
                                            
13 Lawrence Grossberg’s We Gotta Get Out Of This Place: Popular Conservatism and 
Postmodern Culture (1992), a crucial theoretical resource for this thesis, is often left out of 
literature reviews on the affective turn despite pre-figuring some of the concerns of Massumi 
and Sedgwick and Franks. 
 
 
20 
relational nature of the social and natural world rather it is the wider 
theoretical frameworks that are used in the affective turn that do this, most 
notably the work of Deleuze and Guattari.14 Arguably, the unique contribution 
of the affective turn to cultural theory is the shift in focus from the linguistic to 
the material, specifically the corporeal, aspects of culture – how culture makes 
us feel and not necessarily how we make sense of it. What attention to affect 
within relational, processual and indeterminate ontologies has enabled is the 
extension of cultural theory’s well-established deconstruction of hierarchical 
power structures that are based on binaries. Whereas, in the cultural studies 
of the 1980s and 1990s, critics tended to focus on binaries of a textual or 
discursive nature, the affective turn has enabled the deconstruction (though 
not within deconstruction’s terms) of binaries organised around questions of 
materiality – for example, material/immaterial, corporeal/incorporeal 
(Blackman and Venn, 2010), mindy/body, actual/virtual and social/asocial 
(Massumi, 1996). For cultural studies in particular this has also meant the 
extension of its interdisciplinarity from its humanities and social sciences 
focus towards natural sciences such as genetics, biology, neuro-biology 
(Blackman and Venn, 2010), biotechnology, physics and neuroscience 
(Clough, 2008); and in doing so Gilbert (2004) argues that it potentially 
contributes to a significant paradigm shift within the discipline. 
 
Some of the theoretical questions that have been addressed in the 
affective turn are as follows. The first are structured around the various 
problematics of subjectivity. Some theorists have argued that attention to 
affect enables the opening up of another front in critical theory’s attempt to de-
centre the liberal individualist notion of the discrete, autonomous subject. For 
instance, in contrast to certain strands of psychoanalysis, which argue that 
affect and emotion originate in the bounded subject, theorists of the affective 
turn have argued that affect is ontologically distinct from the subject and 
therefore can traverse its boundaries. For Deleuze affect is pre-subjective 
(Massumi, 1996); for Brennan (2004) affect transmits across social groups 
                                            
14 For instance both Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Michel Foucault (1975) 
have theorised the social as relational, processual and indeterminate but make no mention of 
affect. 
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whilst for Ahmed (2004) affect is contagious. For certain feminists emotion is 
personal (and therefore resides within a subject) whereas affect is collective, 
public and social therefore further contributing to feminism’s deconstruction of 
the binary personal/political (Cvektovich, 1992; Berlant, 2000; Riley, 2005). 
This relates to another important theoretical question addressed in the 
affective turn – its distinctiveness from emotion. Probyn (2005) argues that 
emotion is social and cultural whereas affect is biological and physiological. 
Grossberg (2010) argues emotion is the ideological attempt to make sense of 
affect. Massumi (1996) and Gilbert (2004) argue that emotion is affect 
qualified by language.  
 
These theoretical insights have been applied in the analysis of a 
number of cultural objects, processes and contexts. The scholarship is too 
wide to review in full so what follows is a brief survey of some of the key texts. 
One of the key areas that has been explored is the relationship of affect to the 
reconfigurations of culture within postmodernity. Jameson (1991) argues 
(uniquely) that affect has waned within postmodernity, specifically in the field 
of aesthetics. Most other critics disagree with Jameson on this issue. 
Massumi argues that postmodern politics operates with a surfeit of affect 
(1996). Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that “affective labor” (sic) is one of the 
three forms of “immaterial labor” that have come to define the mode of 
production in a postmodern global economy. Grossberg (1992) argues that 
affect was vital in securing the hegemony of the new right in postmodern 
America. Another important research area has been the exploration of affect 
in relation to media. Hansen (2004) explores affect in relation to new media; 
Massumi (1996) in image reception; Clough (2008) in bio-media and other 
biotechnologies; Podalsky (2011) in Latin American cinema; Gormley (2005) 
in American cinema and Paasonen (2011) in online pornography. Music is a 
key area that has been transformed by the affective turn: Grossberg (1992) in 
relation to the music of the 1960s American counterculture; Henriques in 
relation to Jamaican dancehall culture (2010); Seigworth in relation to children 
and music (2003) and Gilbert in relation to disco (2006). Gorton provides a 
comprehensive account of how the affective turn has impacted on feminism 
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(2007). Finally Gregg and Seigworth’s The Affect Theory Reader (2010) 
covers topics as diverse as race, literature, food and glamour. 
 
Despite the potentially paradigm-shifting depth of insight offered by the 
turn to affect and the breadth of research topics it has covered, it is surprising 
that affect has been so little explored in relation to processes of cultural 
change. What makes this particularly surprising is precisely the fact that, as 
already discussed, the wider theoretical frameworks deployed within the 
affective turn tend to emphasise the processual nature of the social and 
natural worlds. This oversight is particularly prominent in work carried out in a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian vein that operates on the basis that “affect is integral to a 
body’s perpetual becoming” (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010, p. 3). Indeed, this 
thesis argues that it is the intensification and dissipation of affect caused 
within the British Jewish community by witnessing the 1967 war that secured 
the hegemony of Popular Zionism within that community; in this instance this 
means that affect is a motor of cultural change. If affect is so profoundly 
related to processes and becomings it follows that cultural studies work within 
the affective turn is well placed to theorise its relation to cultural change – this 
is, after all, what cultural processes and becomings entail. 
 
The only study that approaches a theorisation of how affect relates to 
cultural change is Valerie Walkerdine and Luis Jimenez’s Gender, Work and 
Community After De-Industrialisation: A Psychosocial Approach to Affect 
(2012). This book looks at how the inhabitants of a town in South Wales 
affectively respond to the closing of its steelworks in 2002. With its attention to 
the affective impact of an historical event on a community and its culture, this 
book shares many of the concerns of this thesis. However, it takes a different 
approach to affect and cultural change, never focusing on cultural change as 
an object of analysis in itself. For Walkerdine and Jimenez, affect works in the 
context of a community by holding its members together in a sense of 
“communal beingness” (p. 50). The closing down of the steelworks served to 
“puncture … the social and affective relations that [held] the community 
together” (Walkerdine and Jimenez, 2012, p. 72). This in turn stimulated 
different affective responses that bought about change on the individual and 
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collective levels. As will become clearer in later chapters, this thesis takes a 
different approach arguing that the Zionist representation of the 1967 war 
stimulated affective responses across the community that subsequently re-
orientated its culture favourably towards Zionism. For Walkerdine and 
Jimenez affect constitutes the relationality between members of a community. 
Historical events have the capacity to disarticulate (and by implication 
rearticulate) these affective relations. This thesis conceives of affect differently 
– not as relation but as force that, through its intensification and dissipation, 
has the capacity to reorganise the relationalities of a community and its 
culture. These differences in the characterisations of affect and its relationship 
to communal and cultural change are due to the different theoretical 
frameworks used – Walkerdine and Jimenez use psychoanalysis, mainly in 
the psychoanalytic tradition, and this thesis uses cultural studies grounded in 
the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, the benefit of which has just been 
discussed in relation to approaching the specificities of this thesis’ research 
question. 
 
3. A cultural studies approach 
  
 The historical, the sociological, the post-colonial and the psychoanalytic 
all have something to offer in the understanding of how the Six Day War 
impacted on the British Jewish community’s relationship to Israel and as such 
have all contributed in different ways to the analysis in this thesis. However, 
for the reasons just stated, on their own they arguably do not provide the most 
suitable theoretical frameworks for addressing the specificities of this question. 
As evidenced by the data collected for this thesis the Six Day War impacted 
on various aspects of British Jewish culture: identity, representation, ideology, 
popular culture and everyday life – all areas which, whilst alone are the 
concerns of various disciplines, taken together, fall into the traditional 
disciplinary concerns of cultural studies. Coupled with cultural studies’ radical 
contextualism and conjuncturalism (Grossberg, 2006) i.e. the imperative to 
locate cultural formations in the context of all their constitutive relations that 
shift through time, the remainder of the chapter looks at how three highly 
influential theorists within the discipline – Gramsci, Laclau and Deleuze and 
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Guattari – have conceptualized processes of cultural change. All have their 
strengths in making sense of the cultural changes in post-1967 British Jewry 
and are used in different ways throughout the thesis. Ultimately, however, this 
chapter argues that Deleuze and Guattari provide the most suitable approach, 
primarily (though not only) through the particular emphasis that they place on 
affect within these processes. 
 
 The remainder of this chapter will be structured in the following way: 
there will be three sections each outlining how cultural change occurs 
according to Gramsci, Laclau and Deleuze and Guattari.  In order to describe 
these theories of cultural change more efficiently each of those sections will be 
divided into a further three sub-sections. Subsection i) will outline the ontology 
of a particular theorist – the way that theorist sees the world, particularly the 
social world, being put together. Subsection ii) will outline how they see 
cultural change occurring within their ontology. Subsection iii) will discuss the 
applicability of each theory of cultural change to this particular study.  
 
4. Gramsci 
  
The thought of Antonio Gramsci was one of the most important 
influences in the development of British cultural studies at the CCCS in the 
1970s. The reason for this influence is because Gramsci was one of the 
Marxists whose historical analyses shifted the emphasis away from the 
economic base and onto the superstructure, an approach that the CCCS 
argued was far more suited to making sense of the changed historical 
conditions of Britain’s advanced consumer capitalist society in the post-1945 
period than the sorts of Marxism that were dominant at the time (Hall, 1980 
(a)). In shifting the emphasis from base to superstructure, Gramsci innovated 
a rich conceptual schema to make sense of the historical arrangements of 
specific ‘conjunctures’, namely: ‘hegemony’, ‘relations of forces’, ‘historic 
blocs’, ‘ the economic-corporate phase’ and ‘the national-popular phase’ 
(Gramsci, 1971). The definitions of these concepts are outlined below. The 
fundamental problematic that Gramsci attempts to address in formulating 
these concepts is: ‘What are the material processes through which certain 
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classes or class fractions become hegemonic in particular historical 
circumstances?’ Using this problematic to frame this thesis enables a real 
depth of insight into the research question that structures it. What this thesis is 
trying to address is what role the 1967 war played in the becoming-hegemonic 
of a particular form of Zionism within the British Jewish community in the 
current conjuncture. The following section defines the concepts just listed in 
order to explain Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as a theory of cultural change. 
It then performs a purely Gramscian, thumbnail analysis of the effects of the 
Six Day War on the British Jewish relationship to Zionism and Israel. Finally it 
explains the benefits and limitations of a purely Gramscian approach to 
answering this question and how these have come to bear on the overall 
theoretical approach deployed by this thesis. 
 
4.1. Gramsci’s ontology  
 
Arguably Gramsci’s most important concept is ‘the struggle for 
hegemony’. Originating from ancient Greek, ‘hegemony’ was first used to 
denote the dominance of one nation or region over another. It first enters 
Marxism via Plekhanov and then Lenin to specifically mean that the proletariat 
should lead the peasantry in the anti-Tsarist revolution (Simon, 1982, p. 21). 
Gramsci’s use of hegemony differs from Lenin’s. First Gramsci changes it from 
a political strategy to a heuristic concept. Secondly he shifts the definition to 
mean how “a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate 
classes by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion” (ibid). The key 
difference here is in the distinction between ‘power’ and ‘leadership’. A class 
and its representatives can lead but not have power just as they can have 
power but not lead. According to Gramsci, hegemony is achieved when the 
subordinated classes consent to being led by another class, for instance, 
using Lenin’s example when the peasantry consented to being lead by the 
proletariat. (As a Marxist, Gramsci argues that groups of people only become 
politically meaningful through their relationship to the ‘means of production’ i.e. 
as a class or subsection of that class – a class fraction). 
 
 
 
26 
 Before this discussion moves on to describe the specific processes that 
constitute the Gramscian struggle for hegemony it will be useful to outline his 
theory of the material context in which Gramsci sees this struggle taking place: 
his ontology. Although Gramsci was a Marxist, his perception of how the social 
world is put together differs from the way it is constructed in classical Marxism. 
For Marx social relations can be divided up into either the economic base or 
the superstructure (Marx, 1859). The economic base refers to the complex 
socio-economic arrangements that constitute the means of production of a 
particular historical epoch. The superstructure comprises all the other forms of 
human activity that are not primarily economic – the political, the artistic, the 
ideological etc. In classical Marxism the superstructure emerges from the base 
and therefore all the activity in the former is determined by the activity in the 
latter. The precise nature between base and superstructure changes in Marx’s 
writing and is described differently by different Marxists, however, regardless 
of these variations, the base is always the privileged term in the 
base/superstructure relationship in classical Marxism. Cultural change 
(changes in ideology, in aesthetic practice, in identity), then, is a reflection of 
shifts in the way society is organized in relation to the goods and services it 
produces. For example, a classically Marxist reading would attribute the rise of 
Popular Zionism in the British Jewish community after the 1967 war to a 
change in the relationship of that community to the means of production. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates there was such a change in the 1960s: namely the 
remarkable upward socio-economic mobility of the community between 1945 
and 1967. 
 
 Gramsci’s ontology does not completely omit the terms base and 
superstructure but he complicates their relationship in the following ways: i) he 
develops new terms that he uses alongside, and sometimes instead of base 
and superstructure e.g. ‘Relation of Forces’, ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Political 
Society’ (Gramsci, 1971) and ii) argues for a more complex intertwining of the 
different forms of human praxis than classical Marxism, with its more 
deterministic relationship from base to superstructure, (what he calls 
‘economism’ (ibid.)) will allow.  
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 Two important concepts in Gramsci’s ontology are ‘civil society’ and 
‘political society’. Civil society is comprised of institutions such as trade unions, 
political parties, mass media, churches, schools etc. In the struggle for 
hegemony these institutions operate by means of persuasion, whether through 
political speeches, newspaper editorials, sermons or school lessons. Political 
society is comprised of state institutions like the army, the police, parliament 
and the courts. These institutions coerce citizens back in line with the 
prevailing ideology should they fall out of it through methods such as arrest 
and imprisonment. For the struggle for hegemony to be won, all the institutions 
of both civil and political society need to be lead by the representatives of one 
particular class or class fraction, and operated in the interests of that group.  
 
 In Gramsci’s civil society and political society it is possible to see forms 
of human praxis that classical Marxism attributes to either base and 
superstructure being dispersed by Gramsci across alternative categories.  A 
further concept into which they are dispersed is Gramsci’s ‘relations of force’, 
broadly defined as all the social forces that constitute a given society. Gramsci 
breaks down the ‘relation of forces’ into the following: “the material forces of 
production”, “ the relation of political forces” and “the relation of military forces” 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 181–3). The ‘material forces of production’ refers to the 
socio-economic conditions of a society and as such parallels Marx’s ‘base’. 
‘The relation of political forces’ refers to the political relationships between 
different social groups in a given historical moment, and ‘the relation of military 
forces’ refers to the tools and techniques of brute force that the hegemonic 
class/class fraction uses to enforce its hegemony. For Gramsci, the 
arrangement of the relation of forces specific to an historical period both 
enables and constrains the sorts of cultural formations (for Gramsci it is mainly 
political formations) that will emerge. 
 
 If the concepts ‘civil society’, ‘political society’ and ‘relation of forces’ 
offer an ontological alternative to classical Marxism’s base and superstructure 
that, in important ways still respects it, it is through the relationship between 
these concepts that Gramsci offers a more significant departure from Marxist 
orthodoxy. In classical Marxism, the relationship between base and 
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superstructure is a determining one. As described above new cultural 
formations emerge because of shifts in the base. Gramsci relieves the socio-
/economic of its privileged status in Marxism: “It may be ruled out that 
immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical 
events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination 
of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving 
questions involving the entire subsequent development of public life.” 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 184). For Gramsci the relationship between the different 
types of human activity is far more complex and intertwined than classical 
Marxism would have it, meaning that all the different types of praxis have the 
capacity to reverberate on each other in a more or less equal fashion.15  
 
4.2. Gramsci and cultural change 
 
All this provides the ground upon which the struggle for hegemony 
takes place. In the Selection from the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci is exacting 
on how hegemony is struggled for in history. First a class (or class fraction) is 
formed in relation to the material forces of production. Then the class acquires 
political consciousness of itself as a class. This is the economic-corporate 
phase whereby a class begins to act politically but only in its self-interest. At 
this stage, “a tradesmen feels obliged to stand by another tradesmen, a 
manufacturer by another manufacturer etc. but the tradesmen does not yet 
feel solidarity with the manufacturer” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 181). The second 
stage of the economic-corporate phase is when the class begins to act in 
accordance with the interests of its class i.e. tradesmen stand in solidarity with 
manufacturers. Marx spoke about ‘class consciousness’ in relation to this 
phase. This normally coincides with the development of an ideology that will 
make sense of their position in relation to the material forces of production and 
simultaneously advocate for their improved position in the political sphere – 
                                            
15 With regards to the relationship between Base and Superstructure, Gramsci 
does not rid himself of Marxism completely. As Simon says, “civil society 
consists of a complex network of relations of forces dominated by the central 
conflict between capital and labour” (1982, p. 73). The base might not determine 
the form and content of particular historical moments but it does go some way in 
framing them.  
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which will be carried out by a political party acting at the state level. iv) The 
economic corporate phase is transcended and the national-popular/hegemonic 
phase is achieved. This occurs when the class comes into conflict with other 
classes in a bid to persuade (and coerce)16 the widest possible amount of 
people that their competing ideologies best serve their interests. The most 
persuasive (and coercive) class achieves hegemony, creating what Gramsci 
calls a new ‘historic bloc’. An ‘historic bloc’ is the term given to the bloc of 
social forces across civil and political society that have been hegemonized by 
the leading class and whose new ‘hegemonized’ configuration can endure for 
a substantial historical period. Hegemony cannot be achieved at the levels of 
civil society and political society alone. Most crucially it has to be achieved at 
the level of what Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ and defines as, “the diffuse, 
uncoordinated features of a generic form of thought common to a particular 
popular environment” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 330). Common sense then is the 
spontaneous way groups of people react to, discuss and make sense of their 
life-world. If a class is able to hegemonize its ideology at the level of ‘common 
sense’ i.e. make large swathes of society live out its ideology as if it were 
natural, then total hegemony would be achieved at all levels, creating what 
Gramsci called ‘organic unity’ between all the relations of forces.  
 
 A final point: hegemony is most commonly achieved during periods 
when the relations of forces are out of balance i.e. during periods of social 
change. This is when hegemony is slipping away from the social group who 
had held together the previous historic bloc giving other groups a chance of 
securing it. Gramsci differentiates between two types of period when the 
balance of forces are out of kilter – the ‘organic’ and the ‘conjunctural’. “A[n 
organic] crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional 
duration means that incurable structural conditions have revealed themselves 
(reached maturity), and that, despite this, the political forces which are 
struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making 
every effort to cure them within certain limits, and to overcome them. These 
incessant and persistent efforts… form the terrain of the conjunctural, and it is 
                                            
16 The balance between persuasion and coercion should always heavily favour 
persuasion otherwise a class will dominate instead of lead through consent. 
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upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organized.” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
178). Organic crises occur deep within the structures of society, causing entire 
social arrangements (the relations of force, civil and political society in their 
entirety) to alter and thus have longer term effects than the conjunctural. 
Conjunctural phenomena are more superficial and therefore have limited 
historical impact. The election of a new party into power tends to be 
conjunctural. A revolution where one political system replaces another as a 
result of profound social change would be an organic phenomenon. 
 
4.3. A Gramscian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day 
War 
 
Bearing all this in mind what might a Gramscian reading of the changes 
that occurred in the British Jewish Community around the Six Day War, 
particularly the rise of Popular Zionism, look like? The first step in this reading 
would be to identify either the organic crises or the conjunctural manoeuvrings 
that set the stage for the rise of Popular Zionism. The second would be to 
identify the different classes and their struggle for hegemony in the British 
Jewish community. The third would be to identify the stages (economic 
corporate and hegemonic) by which the successful class achieved its 
hegemony. The final stages would involve extrapolating the ideology of the 
hegemonic class and demonstrating how it acts as the cement of the newly 
formed historic bloc (the post-1967 Popular Zionist British Jewish community) 
finding evidence of it across its civil society, political society and common 
sense.  
 
 The first and final stages are demonstrable in the events that lead to the 
Zionisation of British Jewry post-1967. The organic movement in this context 
would be the mass Jewish migration into Britain between 1880 and 1914 that 
saw the population of Jews in Britain rise from 50,000 to 200,000 (Bentwich, 
1960, p. 16). The structural changes that occurred in the community in this 
period were profound, changing the socio-economic make up, the ethnic 
origins, the geographical location, the political disposition and the religious 
practices of the majority of British Jewry. By the time of the 1960s the British 
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Jewish community was also engaged in various conjunctural phenomena, 
namely its upward social mobility into the middle class, its suburbanisation, , 
its decline in religious practice, and the shift of focus of British racism from 
Jews in Britain to the newer postcolonial migrants. These phenomena are 
described in great detail in Chapter 4. All this activity at the conjunctural level 
points to shifting social arrangements that opened up potential new fronts in 
the struggle for hegemony. This is achieved at the level of ideology with the 
emergence of Popular Zionism. If a defining feature of Popular Zionism is 
Jewish power, as embodied by the victorious Israeli soldiers of the Six Day 
War, there is a logic to it becoming one of the ideologies through which the 
British Jewish community makes sense of its shifting position within both the 
material forces of production and the relation of political forces in 1960s 
Britain. Put more simply: as the Jewish community enjoyed increased 
economic, cultural and political power in British society during the 1960s, they 
needed an ideology that reflected this and Popular Zionism served this 
purpose. This Gramscian reading of the shifting relation of forces of the British 
Jewish community in the 1960s informs the analysis in Chapter 4, specifically 
via the way that Lawrence Grossberg brings Deleuze and Guattari to bear on 
Gramsci in his work (1992; 2005). 
 
 More importantly this ideology becomes hegemonic during the post-
1967 conjuncture and this can be evidenced when looking at both the civil 
society and common sense of the British Jewry post-1967.17 For example, the 
editorial line of the Jewish Chronicle after the Six Day War was pro-Zionist 
when in other periods, particularly pre-1945, it had been more equivocal 
(Cesarani, 2005). Jewish institutions that had been anti- Zionist, or at least 
non- Zionist prior to the war, became pro-Zionist as a consequence of the war. 
The most notable example of this is the Liberal synagogue (Endelman, 2002). 
Finally, the interviews conducted for this research provide overwhelming 
evidence that Zionism becomes the common sense of British Jewry after the 
                                            
17 As a minority community in Britain, Jews do not have a Gramscian ‘political 
society’ as such. The Beth Din is a rabbinical court but has little jurisdiction 
beyond religious matters. For instance, the Beth Din oversees divorce 
procedures and the implementation of the laws of kashrut (kosher) in Britain’s 
Jewish butchers and meat-sellers.   
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1967 war. This use of Gramsci to demonstrate how ideology becomes 
hegemonic in a specific conjuncture forms the basis of the analysis in Chapter 
8, again via Grossberg’s uses of it.  
 
 For all this, a purely Gramscian reading of the effects of the Six Day 
War on the British Jewish community is inadequate in different ways. Firstly 
British Jews do not operate simply in class terms – the community is formed at 
the complex intersection of different social forces (class, place of habitation, 
religious practice etc.) outlined above and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It is 
the shifts across this range of forces, of which class is only one, that set the 
stage for the Zionisation of British Jewry after the Six Day War. Having said 
this, there is, according to Alderman (1992), a moment in British Jewish history 
where class plays an important role in the whole social formation in the way 
Gramsci describes. Historian of Zionism, Gideon Shimoni has written two 
articles in which he describes the Zionist “capture” of British Jewish institutions 
(1986 (a); 1986 (b)). Geoffrey Alderman adds a class dimension to this 
account when he describes the Zionists as middle-class Jews who are trying 
to access the levers of power of British Jewry, which up until 1937, were held 
by the upper class grandees of the community, the majority of whom were 
non- or anti-Zionist (1992). In 1937 the Zionist Selig Brodetsky is appointed 
the President of the British Board of Deputies, the community’s leading 
institution (this is described in more detail in Chapter 4). In Gramscian terms, 
this might be understood as the Zionists as a class fraction advancing in the 
struggle of hegemony against the non-Zionist Jewish upper classes. However, 
even if Alderman introduces class into the historical account, it is disputable 
whether Zionists in Britain, middle-class or otherwise were acting in a classed 
capacity or in their class interests. The dominant interpretation of Zionism is 
that it is a politics rooted in, what is now called, ethnicity and not class 
(Shimoni, 1995).  
 
 Another way that a purely Gramscian reading provides an inadequate 
analysis is in the connection between the civil society, political society and 
common sense of the British Jewish community. British Jewish civil and 
political society may have been captured by Zionists in 1937, but organic unity 
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with British Jewish common sense is only achieved thirty years later in 1967 
(Endleman, 2002). This is partly because despite institutions like the Board of 
Deputies claiming that it represents British Jewry to British society, the actual 
level of representation between these institutions and British Jewry is minimal. 
This is because these institutions are not democratic: who leads them is 
decided internally and not by any sort of community-wide democratic process. 
This means organic unity between the various levels of the British Jewish 
community is unachievable in the way Gramsci describes. The reason for this 
is that Gramsci formulated his theories in relation to the political structures of 
advanced capitalist western democracies, so a direct fit between these 
theories and the very different political structures of an ethnic minority 
community is not really possible. There is also the question of the intense 
affectivity generated in the community by the war and the role it played in 
transforming British Jewish culture. Gramsci does talk about affect and the 
political in his writing18 but it is left theoretically undeveloped. All the data 
gathered for this thesis overwhelmingly demonstrates that affect played a 
crucial role in the changes brought about by the war, so in order to make full 
sense of this it is necessary to use an approach that fully theorises what affect 
does to the organization of social and cultural formations, something Gramsci 
does not do.  
 
5. Laclau 
 
The theoretical inadequacies of a purely Gramscian approach to 
understanding the impact of the Six Day War on British Jewish culture – the 
emphasis on class and the political – are, to some degree addressed in the 
work of Ernesto Laclau. Laclau, a post-Marxist, is also concerned with the 
struggle for hegemony and the creation of new cultural formations (political 
positions, discourses, identities). Whereas Gramsci emphasises the struggle 
undertaken by classes and class fractions at the political level, Laclau is more 
                                            
18 “The intellectual’s error consists in believing that it is possible to know without 
understanding and especially without feeling … History and politics cannot be 
made without passion, without this emotional bond between intellectuals and the 
people-nation” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 418). 
 
 
 
34 
concerned with how social groups (not only classes) struggle for hegemony at 
the level of the discursive. He understands all cultural formations as 
discursively constructed, examining their constitution, how they emerge in 
society, and how they become and remain hegemonic. There is obvious value 
in this approach when examining the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day 
War and how it becomes the hegemonic position of British Jews in relation to 
Israel after 1967. What follows is an exposition of the sophisticated way that 
Laclau builds on Gramsci (amongst others) and the benefits and limits of 
applying his approach to the rise of Popular Zionism.  
 
5.1. Laclau’s ontology 
 
 Laclau’s description of the way society is put together is a significant 
departure from how it had been previously described in Marxist theory. In the 
long essay ‘New Reflections On The Revolution of Our Time’ (1990) he not 
only develops Gramsci’s critique of base and superstructure but, more 
substantially, radically revises the metaphysical grounds upon which Marxist 
thought is based. Laclau begins the essay with the claim, “negativity is part of 
any identity and… the rationalist project to determine the ultimate objective or 
positive meaning of social processes was ultimately doomed to failure.” 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 4). Here he is referring to nineteenth century Enlightenment 
thought in general but the essay itself is specifically a critique of Marxism. For 
Laclau, the rationalist, positivist, totalizing Marxist view of the social world as 
comprised of ultimately knowable, discrete and self-defined objects is a 
mistake. ‘New reflections…’ instead argues for a social world that is structured 
fundamentally by ‘negativity’ and he deploys a range of concepts that stem 
from this insight: ‘antagonism’, ‘contradiction’, ‘dislocation’ and ‘contingency’.  
 
 To illustrate how negativity appears in Laclau’s ontology it will be useful 
to demonstrate how it plays out at the level of the social. In Marxism the social 
is often referred to as both ‘structure’ and ‘social totality’. As described above, 
this structure is split into the base and superstructure (with base determining 
superstructure) and both being split further into autonomous levels of human 
praxis e.g. the economic, the political and the ideological. In the essay, Laclau 
 
 
35 
retains the use of the word ‘structure’ but disputes the idea that it can be 
conceived of as a ‘totality’ with self-contained levels, straightforwardly 
determining one another. He argues this by using the notion of the ‘constitutive 
outside’ that claims that objects are only constituted by their relationships to 
other objects that exist externally to them. Laclau gives this concept a Marxist 
twist by arguing that this constitutive relationship must always be 
‘antagonistic’. He evidences this using the classic Marxist example of class 
struggle saying that it is only through the network of antagonistic relations that 
workers and capitalists enter into as a result of capitalism that a person 
becomes either a worker or a capitalist at all. But as much as these 
relationships produce identity, because they are antagonistic they are only 
able to do so through denial. To give an example: a person only becomes a 
worker when, for instance, s/he has surplus value extracted from her/him by a 
capitalist. This denies her/him a fair wage for his labour. In this case the 
identity, ‘worker’ has emerged as a result of a denial, meaning its constitution 
will only ever be partial. If this is the case for every object that constitutes the 
social world this means that the picture that emerges of the social in Laclau’s 
thought is a field of partially constituted objects whose conditions of 
emergence are all contingent upon webs of other partially constituted objects 
in the field. What this means in terms of the post-Marxist critique of base and 
superstructure is as follows: 
 
"What we find then is not an interaction or determination between fully 
constituted areas of the social, but a field of relational semi-identities in which 
‘political’, ‘economic’ and ‘ideological’ elements enter into unstable relations of 
imbrication without ever managing to constitute themselves as separate 
objects.”  
 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 24) 
 
This renders both the notion of ‘social totality’ and economic determinism 
redundant. 
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5.2. Laclau and cultural change 
 
Laclau’s claim that the ‘economic instance’ is a myth provokes the 
question, ‘what, then, brings about historical change?’ If Laclau conceives the 
structure as a complex aggregate of partially formed objects whose 
constitutions are contingent upon the antagonistic relationships they have with 
the other partially formed objects in the field, it follows that the relationships 
are themselves only partial. This means the structure is in a permanent state 
of dislocation, and as it evolves through time the state of dislocation between 
the various objects becomes more or less dislocated depending on where they 
exist in relation to other objects in the structure. To illustrate ‘dislocation’ 
Laclau gives the real world example of emerging capitalism and lists its 
dislocatory effects on the working class: “the destruction of traditional 
communities, the brutal and exhausting discipline of the factory, low wages 
and insecurity of work” (Laclau, 1990, p. 39). For Laclau the temporality of 
capitalism (particularly late capitalism) moves at such an intense pace that it 
possesses an “uncontrolled dislocatory rhythm” (ibid.) that causes a series of 
dislocations across many different parts of the structure. He calls these 
dislocated areas ‘power centres’: “the vision of the social emerging from this 
description is that of a plurality of power centres, each with a different capacity 
to irradiate and structure” (Laclau, 1990, p. 40). In the late twentieth century 
Laclau implies that power centres opened up around the issues of gender, 
sexuality and ethnicity as a result of capitalism’s dislocatory effects (moving 
him away from the economism of earlier forms of Marxism). 
 
 An important point to be made before we continue expounding Laclau’s 
theory of historical change is that when he conceives his ontology, he not only 
draws on Marx, Gramsci and Derrida but also Jacques Lacan particularly the 
seminal notion of the ‘lack’ (1966). For Lacan, all human experience is defined 
by the lack and so appears in his thought in different ways. One of the ways 
Lacan conceives of the lack (that can be used to illustrate how it is deployed 
by Laclau) is the role the lack plays in subject formation. When an infant is 
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born he19 does not yet experience himself as an autonomous subject, rather 
as existing as one entity with his mother. The union with the mother provides 
the infant with a sense of highly pleasurable completeness (what Freud called 
an ‘oceanic feeling’ (1930)). When, through different psychic processes, the 
infant begins to assume an autonomous self separate from the sense he is 
connected to the mother, this completeness is shattered. The infant 
experiences this loss of completeness as the lack. For Lacan, subjectivity can 
only ever emerge in a state of lack, which the subject will spend the rest of his 
existence trying to fill. Lacan calls the attempt to fill the lack, ‘desire’; and 
because lack fundamentally structures subjectivity it can never be filled without 
the subject entering into psychosis meaning that Lacanian desire is always 
unsatisfiable. 
 
Lack can be seen throughout Laclau’s ontology: in his insistence that 
negativity is what structures the field of objectivity, in his partially formed 
objects and in his dislocated structure. How the lack plays out in reference to 
the dislocated power centres just discussed is that there is always the desire 
on the part of social actors inhabiting the structure to resolve these 
dislocations i.e. close them up. This desire is what constitutes political struggle 
(this is why ‘power centres’ are so called). So if a power centre is dislocated 
around gender in the late twentieth century, feminism is the political struggle 
that seeks to close it up. For Laclau this struggle is largely carried out 
discursively in what he has called “the hegemonic-discursive construction of 
the social” (Laclau, 1990, p. 28). It is his insistence on the discursive that 
Laclau departs most significantly from Gramsci. Gramsci does touch on the 
discursive in his discussions of the ideological but it is only one front amongst 
many upon which the struggle for hegemony is carried out. For Laclau, the 
discursive is paramount in this struggle.  
 
 In ‘New Reflections…’ Laclau argues that what happens at the newly 
opened power centres of the social structure as a result of dislocation is the 
breaking up of the relationships that had previously held the objects together: 
                                            
19 The Lacanian subject is invariably male. 
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“The basic hegemonic articulations weaken and an increasing number of 
social elements assume the character of floating signifiers.” (Laclau, 1990, p. 
28). The specific nature of a Laclauian political struggle then is the attempt by 
a social group to establish connections between these newly freed signifiers 
and the signifieds of the group’s political project. By re-establishing fixity 
between these signifiers the dislocation that freed them appears to be 
resolved. If they are successful in this, the social group not only creates a new 
discourse but also make that discourse hegemonic: “to ‘hegemonize’ a content 
would therefore amount to fixing its meaning around a nodal point. The field of 
the social could thus be regarded as a trench war in which different political 
projects strive to articulate a greater number of social signifiers around 
themselves” (ibid.). The struggle for hegemony then becomes a struggle over 
meaning: the ability for one social group to persuade other social groups that 
their newly articulated discourse is best placed to make sense of a given 
historical situation. An example that Laclau gives is the ability for the Nazi 
party to persuade large swathes of the German public in the early 1930s that 
Nazism was the most appropriate discourse to make sense of the dislocations 
caused by the Great Depression in Weimar Germany. They did this by 
establishing a chain of equivalence between, amongst other things, 
Germany’s post-Versailles shame, the Great Depression and anti-Semitism. 
 
 There is a final stage in making a discourse hegemonic. For a 
discourse to be hegemonic it must achieve the status of a “myth” that 
establishes the limit of the structure’s “imaginative horizon”. For Laclau ‘myth’ 
is another name for discourse, but understood specifically in terms of the way 
a discourse functions within his ontology. In this respect, a myth has two 
defining features: i) its literal content and ii) its, ultimately unachievable, 
promise of fullness. Every discourse has a literal content i.e. the specific 
configuration of the signs that constitute its chain of equivalence. For a 
discourse to achieve the status of myth it must appear to close the dislocated 
spaces of the social structure. But because Laclau’s structure is always 
dislocated and partially formed it would be impossible to close these spaces 
up. The myth here is the myth of fullness that the discourse promises in 
closing the open spaces of the dislocated structure. For Laclau, the literal 
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content resides inside the myth whereas its capacity to promise 
(unachievable) fullness operates on its surface. The surface is what’s called “a 
surface of inscription” and the more social groups who are able to inscribe 
their demands on the surface of the myth, the closer the myth comes to 
hegemonizing the social field. When a critical mass of demands are inscribed 
upon the surface of the myth, it achieves hegemony, becoming an ‘imaginary 
horizon’ which structures the entire social field. “The imaginary is an horizon: it 
is not one among other objects but an absolute limit which structures a field of 
intelligibility and is thus the condition of possibility for the emergence of any 
object” (Laclau, 1990, p. 64). What this means in simple terms is that one 
particular discourse becomes the dominant way for a society to make sense of 
its material conditions at a given moment, structuring all the other discourses 
that emerge at that moment.  
 
 To summarize a Laclauian approach to cultural change: society is not 
totality comprised of autonomous levels of human praxis straightforwardly 
determining one another; instead society is a structure conceived of as a 
complex web of partially formed objects all of which are constituted by the 
antagonistic relationships they have with one another. One way in which the 
structure changes is through dislocation. As it moves through time, external 
dislocatory forces perpetually disfigure the structure, destroying the relations 
that form its objects, setting these objects free. The areas of the structure 
where these relations are destroyed become power centres – sites of political 
struggle. This struggle consists of attempts to re-articulate these floating 
signifiers into a coherent discourse that is able to make sense of the 
dislocation that produced them. This is essentially a struggle for meaning. The 
discourse that is able to present the most persuasive strategy for closing up 
the dislocated space (an ontological impossibility), in a way that occludes the 
possibility that other discourses that could have done the same even existed, 
achieves the status of a myth that establishes the imaginative horizon of the 
social field in a given historical moment. This imaginative horizon establishes 
the limits of the dominant way of thinking in a given historical moment i.e. the 
myth becomes hegemonic. This is how new social conditions are bought 
about, how discourses emerge to make sense of these conditions and how 
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these discourses become popular. It is in this way that it becomes possible to 
use Laclau to make sense of the rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish 
community around the Six Day War. A Laclauian analysis would first need to 
understand the key objects of the case study in Laclau’s terms. It would then 
have to identify the dislocations of the British Jewish community around the 
war, the power centres that open up as a result, and the discourses that 
emerge to resolve this. This is possible but only partially persuasive. 
 
5.3. A Laclauian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day 
War 
 
  The major object in this research to be understood in Laclauian terms 
would be British Jewish identity and how the community is discursively 
constructed around and through it. This would have to be understood through 
antagonism. It is clear from the interviews that the major antagonism that 
produces British Jewishness at the discursive level is anti-Semitism.20 The 
people interviewed with the strongest sense of Jewish identity were those who 
grew up with the strongest sense of anti-Semitism in Britain before and during 
the 1960s (Evelyn, Jeremy, Stephen). Those with the weakest sense of anti-
Semitism had a weaker sense of identification with the British Jewish 
community (Brian, Harvey). Another area where an antagonistic sense of anti-
Semitism was keenly felt in the research was in the interviewee’s perception 
that it motivated the Arab nations when the fought the war. All the interviewees 
but one felt the Arabs fought against Israel in the 1967 war because of a 
genocidal sense born of anti-Semitism. This in turn produced a stronger 
identification not only with the Israelis but also as Jews in Britain. The 
Laclauian insight that identity is produced in antagonism would appear to 
apply here.  
 
 The question of dislocation is where a Laclauian analysis becomes less 
persuasive. Part of the reason Laclau wrote ‘New Reflections…’ was in order 
                                            
20 This coincides with Gilroy’s argument that western modernity’s racialised 
subjects are only produced in relation to racism and the discourses of racial 
science from which racism emerges (1987, 1993). 
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to make sense the new social movements that emerged in the late 1960s. He 
argues that contemporary capitalism21 produces more power centres than 
earlier forms of capitalism – power centres around ‘gender’, ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘sexuality’ as opposed to just ‘class’ – and that these all have their own 
attendant political struggles broadly understood as identity politics. Can 
capitalism, in its late twentieth century, disorganized form, be said to have 
opened up a power centre in Diasporic Jewishness with (Popular) Zionism, the 
political struggle designed to close it up? As detailed above, there were 
certainly important shifts in the British social structure in relation to the Jewish 
community during this period but it is disputable that they are dislocatory in the 
Laclauian sense. There is little in the way of lack occurring in the 
embourgeoisement of British Jews that occurred after 1945. They enjoy 
increasing status both socio-economically and terms of their position in 
Britain’s racial hierarchies. Perhaps dislocation can be more specifically 
located in the gap between this increased socio-economic position and the 
lack of any suitable discourse that reflect this. Even in the growth of Jewish 
representation in popular culture that occurs during the 1960s and 1970s – the 
literature of Saul Bellow and Philip Roth, the films of Woody Allen, the musical 
and film Fiddler on The Roof (1964, 1971), the television plays of Jack 
Rosenthal, particularly Bar Mitzvah Boy (1976) – the familiar archetypes of 
Jewishness which are rooted in the ‘Ghetto Jew’ are explored; sexually 
neurotic, intellectual, bookish men and overbearing Jewish mothers. Zionism, 
on the other hand offers a self-conscious inversion of those archetypes: the 
strong, powerful and sexually desirable Jew in control of his own destiny. The 
Zionist archetype had existed since the days of Herzl, specifically in his 
colleague’s Max Nordau’s ‘Muscular Jew’ (Presner, 2007). It is possible to 
argue that it only begins to take root and achieve popularity in the late 1960s 
in Britain because of the need for Jews to have their socio-economic 
conditions reflected back to them in their cultural texts and practices. Their 
perception of the war as the Zionist Six Day War provides this. However, the 
notion that all these processes coalesce specifically because of capitalism’s 
dislocatory effects is less convincing. 
                                            
21 Here he adopts Lash and Urry’s term ‘disorganised capitalism’ (1987). 
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 According to Laclau, the next stage in the historical process would be 
the struggle to re-articulate this relationship into a discourse that is persuasive 
enough to establish a new imaginative horizon for British Jewry. It is quite 
plausible to think of Popular Zionism as a discourse that does this, 
establishing a chain of equivalence between concepts such as ‘Jewishness’, 
‘nation’, ‘security’, ‘Holocaust’, ‘anti-Semitism’ etc.. Throughout the interview 
process it became apparent that Popular Zionism was still the imaginative 
horizon that governs the British Jewish community. It was the dominant 
‘principle of intelligibility’ (Laclau, 1990) through which they were able to make 
sense not only of their own relationship to Israel, but their position in Britain as 
well. When asked questions that put across an anti-Zionist perspective, the 
interviewees became confused or defensive. They could not imagine any other 
way of thinking about Israel unless it was in terms set out by Popular Zionism. 
 
Where Laclau’s thesis ceases to work quite as effectively is in that it is 
difficult to characterize the emergence of Popular Zionism as a result of a 
struggle between conflicting factions of the British Jewish community to 
articulate the signifiers freed by the war into a more persuasive chain of 
equivalence than the other. This is perhaps one of the problems of applying 
Marxism in general, not only Gramsci and Laclau, to this case study: the 
reification of ‘struggle’ as the basis for all political activity. As described in the 
discussion on the applicability of Gramsci, there was a struggle between 
Zionists and Assimilationists over the institutions of British Jewry in the period 
1910–1937. This was settled in 1937 by the Zionist capture of these 
institutions. However the connection between these institutions and British 
Jewry is so weak, that any attempts that British Zionists might have made to 
win over the hearts and minds of British Jews in the subsequent thirty years 
could only ever have been severely limited. That is not to say that the Zionist 
‘struggle’ does not play its part, there are just other more influential, and very 
often unconscious forces at play, namely the dominant way that the 
community experienced the Six Day War.  
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The same criticism of Gramsci, with his lack of attention to the affective, 
also applies to Laclau. Though there was substantial activity occurring on the 
discursive level in the British Jewish community as a result of the Six Day War 
– the shifting discursive construction of British Jewish identity in order to 
include Israel, and the discourse Popular Zionism is created – to focus 
exclusively on this level at the expense of the affective misses a crucial (this 
thesis will go on to argue the crucial) element in what occurs to British Jewish 
identity and its relationship to Israel as mediated through Popular Zionism as a 
result. Having undertaken the interviews and sifted through archival material it 
is impossible to analyse the cultural processes initiated by war without talking 
about intensity, desire and emotion all under the broad umbrella term ‘affect’, 
as seen in the tremendous anxiety both before and during the war, the 
euphoria after Israel’s victory and in the affective intensity with which British 
Jews invest in Israel as a result.  
 
6. Deleuze and Guattari 
   
 Whilst Deleuze and Guattari are not (post) Marxists like Gramsci and 
Laclau, their approach does parallel some Marxist concerns, if only in the way 
it forces the consideration of social and cultural formations as complexly 
constituted and contingent upon constantly changing historical circumstances. 
In Anti-Oedipus (1972), Deleuze and Guattari praise Wilhelm Reich’s attempts 
at bringing psychoanalysis and Marxism together to answer the question, “why 
did the masses desire fascism?” (Reich, 1946). Arguably, Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia addresses the same problematic but in extending its theoretical 
repertoire to include Nietszche, Bergson, Spinoza (amongst many others) as 
well as Freud and Marx, Deleuze and Guattari are able to address Reich’s 
question in a more sophisticated and persuasive manner. In bringing together 
questions of ‘desire’ ‘masses’ and ‘fascism’, the thought of Deleuze and 
Guattari redresses both the (post–) Marxist emphasis on social structures over 
psychic/libidinal agencies and the psychoanalytic tendency to emphasise 
psychic/libidinal agencies over social structures. Therefore this, arguably, 
enables a fuller account of the different human and non-human forces at play 
in the production of social and cultural formations. As is explained in detail in 
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the following section, in affording affect a central place in the constitution of 
the social, Deleuze and Guattari are better placed to understand how the Six 
Day War impacted on post-1967 British Jewish culture.  
 
6.1. Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology 
  
 The structuring principle from which most of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts and ideas are derived is Spinoza’s interpretation of Duns Scotus’ 
‘Univocity of Being’ – the idea that all matter is comprised of the same 
substance and that substance is God. This ‘pantheistic monism’ was 
profoundly heretical in the seventeenth century undermining traditional 
Judaeo-Christian theology, which held that God did not comprise nature, 
rather ‘he’ transcended and organised it. For Spinoza, God is not 
transcendental of nature but immanent to it. Furthermore the substance ‘God’ 
does not just compose the so-called physical world, it also constitutes the 
realm of consciousness – meaning thoughts and feelings are composed of the 
same substance as human beings, flora and fauna etc.. The duality between 
the physical and mental worlds, between mind and body, is therefore false, 
hence pantheistic monism. Spinoza breaks substance down into essence and 
expression. Essence is substance itself whilst all the attributes of nature 
(people, flora, thoughts etc.) are expressions of this essence. 
 
 God does not appear in Deleuze and Guattari’s work but they still fully 
appropriate the Spinozist idea of monism. As Rosi Braidotti notes: “[Deleuze] 
retains philosophical monism from Spinoza but only to hijack it away from the 
concept of a divinely ruled, rational substance” (Braidotti, 2002, p. 66). They 
agree, therefore, that nature is constituted from a single substance but for 
Deleuze and Guattari that substance is not God, it is Desire.22 In A Thousand 
Plateaus essence is described as an infinite multitude of elements which, in 
keeping with Spinoza, are defined by relations “distinguished by movement 
and rest, slowness and speed.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 280) as 
                                            
22 Desire should not be confused with its everyday usage: erotic or sexual 
desire, i.e. libido. As the substance of which all life is produced it can be more 
closely likened to ‘force of existing’. 
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opposed to form and function. These relations of movement and rest, 
slowness and speed give the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology its defining feature 
– its perpetual dynamism. Nature (and here ‘nature’ includes culture and the 
social) is in constant movement, flux and change. This means that the 
elements that comprise nature barely ever (if at all) exist in solitude. Their 
perpetual movement draws them together into multiplicities (a key Deleuzo-
Guattarian concept). So, in fact, it is more accurate to describe the attributes 
of nature as not being composed simply of elements but as multiplicities of 
these elements.  
 
 Deleuze and Guattari more commonly call these multiplicities either 
bodies or machinic assemblages and both terms have their merits in 
describing the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology. ‘Bodies’ is being used in its 
Spinozist sense and therefore emphasizes the capacity for multiplicities to 
affect other ‘bodies’ and be affected by them. ‘Machinic assemblages’ draws 
attention to the constructed nature of multiplicities and the fact that they can 
be broken down and built back up into other machinic assemblages or be 
connected to machinic assemblages to form highly complex aggregates of 
machinic assemblages. So a body or machinic assemblage is any attribute of 
nature. As Deleuze writes, “a body can be anything; it can be an animal, a 
body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a social body, 
a collectivity” (Deleuze, 1970, p. 127). 
 
 The final step in the construction of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology 
culminates in the Plane of Immanence, the field, or plane, where all reality, 
both ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, exists. The Plane of Immanence is the infinitely 
complex assemblage of all the machinic assemblages (“there are only 
multiplicities of multiplicities forming a single assemblage, operating in the 
same assemblage” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 38)) and because this 
whole system is defined by its internal relations of movement and rest “the 
Plane of Immanence… is always variable and is constantly being altered, 
composed and recomposed, by individuals and collectivities” (Deleuze, 1970, 
p. 128). Because machinic assemblages are constantly being made and 
unmade, connecting, disconnecting and re-connecting, the ‘architecture’ of the 
 
 
46 
‘Plane of Immanence’ is in constant flux. The reason it is called the Plane of 
Immanence is because, in keeping with Spinoza’s pantheism, there is no 
organizing entity or principle that is transcendent to it. The Plane of 
Immanence is auto-poeisitic, self-constructing and self-organising; its 
‘architecture’ determined by the movement and rest of the elements that 
compose it and the various multiplicities they form; it is organised by forces 
that are immanent to it.  
 
6.1.1. Affect in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology 
  
 Perhaps the most straightforward exposition of affect in the combined 
work of Deleuze and Guattari is in a lecture that Deleuze delivered at the 
Cours de Vincennes in 1978 on Spinoza’s concept of affect. In the lecture he 
does little to critique Spinoza’s version of the concept and it is Spinoza’s 
version that both Deleuze and Guattari use throughout their work (though read 
through Bergson and Nietzsche).  
  
 His first step in explaining affect is in opposition to an idea. An idea, in 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, is a “representational mode of thought” 
(Deleuze, 1978 (a)) or any mode of thought which represents an object. Affect, 
conversely, is “any mode of thought which doesn’t represent anything” or “non-
representational mode of thought” (ibid). Deleuze illustrates this with a 
straightforward example: you see Peter (an idea) and you feel hostile (an 
affect), you then see Paul (an idea) you then feel happy (an affect). Paul is an 
idea, because your mind uses the idea of Paul to represent the person Paul. 
Happiness is an affect because it has no external referent, it exists only in and 
of itself: “there is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of 
something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, 
strictly nothing.” (ibid.) He also notes how life is experienced as an endless 
succession of ideas i.e. as you move through a room you perceive the door, 
the wall, the book etc. This endless succession of ideas will in turn generate 
an endless succession of affects, or variations of feeling, which Spinoza has 
called our ‘force of existing’. 
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 In fact, to describe our ‘force of existing’ as a succession of different 
discrete affects is not strictly accurate. For Deleuze (and Guattari) and 
Spinoza there is no real difference between affect and the transition between 
different affects – the transition and the affect itself are ontologically identical. 
It is more accurate to use the term ‘affectivity’ in place of affect and describe it, 
as Deleuze does, as a “melodic line of variation” (ibid). Spinoza designates 
two poles to this melodic line’of affectivity – Joy and Sadness. The terms are 
not used in their common sense usage (happiness and melancholy). Rather 
they represent an increase and decrease in affectivity, an increase and 
decrease in our force of existing. An affect, then, is better thought of as our 
isolating a moment on this continuum of perpetually dynamic affectivity and 
labelling it according to the position it occupies between Joy and Sadness. 
Spinoza spends some time doing exactly this in his master work Ethics. For 
example he defines the affect ‘hope’ as “an inconstant joy, which has arisen 
from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt.” The affect 
‘fear’ is “an inconstant sadness which has also arisen from a doubtful thing” 
(Spinoza, 1677, p. 165). Deleuze, with and without Guattari, and the work that 
follows them does not follow this Spinozist taxonomy of affects or even try to 
develop an alternative taxonomy. They prefer to talk about affectivity or, more 
generally, use the term affect in the singular to delimit the spectrum of 
affectivity in a given situation. 
  
 Affect and the notion of affectivity are first fully elaborated by Deleuze 
and Guattari in the second instalment of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A 
Thousand Plateaus (1980). In the ‘Notes on Translation’ in the 1987 English 
language edition, Brian Massumi translates affect and its corollary affection in 
the following way: “Neither word denotes a personal feeling. L’affect is an 
ability to affect and be affected. It is a pre-personal intensity corresponding to 
the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an 
augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act” (1980, p. xvii). 
  
It is here we see the crucial distinction between Deleuze and Guattari’s 
affect and the various ways affect has been theorized in the ‘affective turn’. 
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For Deleuze and Guattari affect is not synonymous with emotion23 or feeling 
precisely because it is ‘pre-personal’, i.e. it exists not only pre the subject but 
independently of it.24 According to Deleuze and Guattari, emotion is produced 
when the thinking subject tries to capture and make sense of the ‘intensities’ 
they call affect. In his seminal essay ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ Massumi argues 
that, “it is crucial to theorise the difference between affect and emotion” 
(Massumi, 1996, p. 221) and goes on to define emotion as intensity qualified 
by language (ibid). Gilbert, also deploying a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework, 
similarly argues that, “an emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience” (Gilbert, 2004) and Grossberg with a 
more Gramscian approach defines emotion as “… the ideological attempt to 
make sense of some affective productions” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 316). It is in 
this distinction between emotion and affect that we begin to understand 
affect’s ontological status as pure intensity. All the other experiential states 
that have been called ‘affect’ in the affective turn – emotion, volition, passion, 
feeling, sensation, caring… –  are not ‘affect’ as such but they are all 
comprised of affect. Affect, then, is everything that we feel across our bodies 
and in our psyches, as individuals and as collectivities. Emotion, volition, 
sexual desire etc. are particular modalities of affect, or affect mobilized by a 
different facet of subjectivity. So emotion is affect mobilized by language (or 
ideology as Grossberg would have it); sexual desire is affect mobilized by the 
libido; sensation is affect mobilized by the physical body or the autonomic 
(nervous) system (Massumi, 1996). Affect is what we feel; emotion, desire and 
sensation are different ways that we feel it. So for Deleuze and Guattari, 
‘affect’ is the irreducible substance of all human experience – the raw material 
of subjectivity; the very feeling of being alive. 
 
 
 
                                            
23 Deleuze felt the mistranslation of ‘affectus’ in Spinoza’s Ethics as ‘emotion’ 
was “disastrous” (Deleuze, 1978 (a)). 
24 Seigworth says of the relationship between affect and the pre-subjective child: 
“ An infant is criss-crossed by force fields of energies and intensities, immersed 
in affect well before he or she stands up to say “I” (much less “I” think) in 
discourse” (Seigworth, 2003, p. 87). 
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6.1.2. Desire, affect and power relations in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ontology 
 
 The account thus far has missed out a defining characteristic of the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology, namely the complex ways that desire, affect and 
power are distributed across the Plane of Immanence. If the multiplicities that 
compose the Plane of Immanence are bodies in the Spinozist sense i.e. they 
have the capacity to affect and be affected, dis/empower or be 
dis/empowered, this means two things for the Plane Of Immanence: i) the 
organization of desire into affect is its defining property and ii) the multiplicities 
which compose it always, necessarily, co-exist in a complex system of power 
relations. Two or more bodies will intermingle in an encounter, affect each 
other either augmenting or diminishing their capacity to act, holding each other 
in a particular power relationship until they are affected again (which, in a 
system defined by its perpetual dynamism, they inevitably will be), changing 
the relationships of power. 
 
 This complex distribution of desire/affect and power is the main focus of 
A Thousand Plateaus and Deleuze and Guattari develop a rich conceptual 
framework in order to describe its manouvering. Rhizome/arborescent, 
molar/molecular, territorialisation/de-territorialisation (and re-territorialisation), 
smooth/striated, stratification and becomings all express in different ways the 
constant re-organisation of the Plane of Immanence in terms of power and 
affectivity. This conceptual framework emerges in response to the key set of 
problematics that govern not only A Thousand Plateaus but also Anti-Oedipus: 
namely how does one account for the successes of fascism. In France, in the 
immediate post-1968 conjuncture, this does not just mean the state Fascism 
of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco etc. but also the fascisms, as Deleuze and Guattari 
see it, of Western (particularly French intellectual) culture; Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, structuralist theories of signification, capitalism and the 
Marxism of both the USSR and the French Communist party are repeatedly 
singled out in A Thousand Plateaus as machinic assemblages that have been 
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organised into fascist structures.25 A fascist organization of the Plane of 
Immanence occurs when machinic assemblages are arranged into hierarchical 
relationships with each other, resulting in the hindered flowing of desire, an 
accumulation of ‘sad affectivity’ and an increased (but always unstable) sense 
of power of the few at the expense of the many. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari this is precisely what happens in, for instance, the process of 
Oedipalisation,26 which fascistically organizes the libido into a genital 
dominated hierarchy. In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
persistently advocate for non-hierarchical organizations of machinic 
assemblages that will allow the free-flowing of desire, the perpetual 
accumulation of joyful affects and the empowering of those machinic 
assemblages which does not rely on their dominating others. This is their 
normative ethical orientation. 
 
6.2. Deleuze and Guattari, affect and cultural change 
  
 That the Plane of Immanence is defined by its perpetual dynamism 
demonstrates the crucial place of ‘change’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, 
and as a result, they have developed a number of concepts that elaborate 
upon it. Of these concepts, this section will look at the meta-concepts of 
Deleuzo-Guattarian change: ‘becoming’, ‘the virtual’ and ‘the actual’. Arguably 
the specificity of Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology is that they do not simply 
theorise the way the world is put together, they argue that the world’s defining 
feature is how it repeatedly produces itself anew (hence the title of Deleuze’s 
book Difference and Repetition (1968 (a)). As will become clearer after the 
following section the relationship between affect and the production of the new 
is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari are best placed to theorise precisely 
how the Six Day War produced newness in the culture of British Jewry. 
 
 The key concept for understanding this is their notion of ‘becoming’, 
developed first in Difference and Repetition but used extensively in A 
                                            
25 To this list you might also add phallocentricism, hetronormativity, white-
supremacy and, in its more localised way, Zionism. 
26 Which they see as specific to the epoch of industrial capitalism and productive 
of the nuclear family that makes this socio-economic system possible. 
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Thousand Plateaus. Their notion of becoming differs from the common sense 
usage of the word. In order to understand how it is different it is useful to see 
how it works in relation to the Plane of Immanence. As described above, the 
Plane of Immanence is everything that exists in the universe – not only the 
universe as it is, but the universe as it could be. The universe as it is, is called 
the ‘actual’ in Difference and Repetition and the Plane of Organisation in A 
Thousand Plateaus. The universe as it could be is called the virtual in 
Difference and Repetition. The use of the word ‘Organisation’ here is important 
to understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual. The virtual is 
not another world (or multiple other worlds) that is materially different from the 
actual. The virtual is all the possible other ways that the matter that constitutes 
the actual can be organized. It is all the different forms the Plane of 
Organisation can take.  
 
Boundas provides the most helpful summary of the relationship 
between the virtual and the actual: “In Deleuze’s ontology, the virtual and the 
actual are two mutually exclusive, yet jointly sufficient, characterisations of the 
real.” (2005, p. 296). The real here is the Plane of Immanence. What joins the 
actual (the universe as it is) to the virtual (the different ways the universe could 
be organized) is the Deleuzian (-Guattarian) concept of becoming. Becoming 
is the process by which the virtual is actualized; or the process by which 
substance is reorganized, giving the actual a new form. Affect (intensity in 
Difference and Repetition) has a privileged place in the re-organisation of 
substance. If the elements that comprise the Plane of Immanence are 
distinguished by relations of movement and rest and desire/affect is the force 
which animates these elements then it follows that an intensification of this 
force will cause these elements to move faster and its dissipation will cause 
them to move towards a state of rest. Moreover, if these elements are always 
assembled into larger and larger multiplicities the speed at which these 
elements move will affect the fashion in which they are assembled. Fast 
moving elements can break the bonds that assemble them into a multiplicity; 
slow moving elements can coagulate into larger assemblages. Affect, 
specifically differences in intensities of affect, is the agent that drives the 
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process of becoming i.e. in the context of culture, affect is the agent of cultural 
change.  
 
It is precisely the pivotal place of affect in not only Deleuze and 
Guattari’s understanding of how the universe is put together, but also as one 
of the agencies that transforms the very constitution of the universe that 
makes it so suited to understanding the impact of witnessing the Six Day War 
on the British Jewish community. Perceiving the war in the way that it did 
triggered a highly intense affective response in the community and in doing so 
the formal constitution of their cultural identity changed as did the place of 
Zionism in the community producing a new cultural formation – Popular 
Zionism. These changes were primarily changes in affectivity: the way that a 
militarily victorious Israel made British Jews feel towards Israel and Zionism 
and how this in itself continues to make them feel empowered and 
disempowered as Jews in Britain and the world. The empirical data collected 
for this thesis therefore requires a cultural theory that places the affective and 
its relationship to (constantly changing) social and cultural formations at its 
heart, in order to fully make sense of it. That is why a cultural studies shaped 
by Deleuzo-Guattarain thought is the best approach to understanding the 
cultural changes the British Jewish community undergo as a result of the Six 
Day War and that is what the rest of the thesis will now do. 
 
6.3. Outline of Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the rise of Popular Zionism 
after the Six Day War 
 
 The remainder of this thesis performs a Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of 
the rise of Popular Zionism after the Six Day War so this subsection will 
instead provide a brief overview of how their theories are used in each 
chapter. In fact, the chapters do not take a purely Deleuzo-Guattarian 
approach in their analyses; they have had to be supplemented by Gramscian 
and Laclauian perspectives in order to make sense of the different aspects of 
how Popular Zionism emerged after the war often through other theorists who 
use these perspectives. The intention of this chapter has been to provide an 
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overview of the ontologies that the theoretical frameworks adopted in the other 
chapters are operable within. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology developed in response to the 
theoretical and empirical requirements of this thesis. Chapter 4 uses Manuel 
DeLanda’s ‘assemblage analysis’ of social formations alongside Lawrence 
Grossberg’s Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of Raymond Williams’ ‘social totality’ 
(1973) and ‘structure of feeling’ (1961) to understand the broader historical 
context of the British Jewish community in the 1960s out of which Popular 
Zionism emerged. Chapter 5 presents an historical narrative of the Arab-Israeli 
war of June 1967. In doing so, it does not use theory as such, but it is vital in 
showing how the Zionist (mis)representation of those events triggered the 
intense affective response outlined in the following chapter. Chapter 6 uses 
DeLanda’s reading of Difference and Repetition alongside Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus to analyse the British Jewish experience of 
the Six Day War as what leading Deleuzian Claire Colebrook has called a 
‘history of intensities’ (Colebrook, 2009) i.e. the intensive processes which 
produced Popular Zionism. Chapter 7 develops a Guattarian approach to 
cultural identity (in opposition to the way Stuart Hall synthesized various 
poststructuralist perspectives on cultural identity – Laclau amongst them) to 
understand the shifts in British Jewish cultural identity after the war. Finally, 
Chapter 8 uses Grossberg’s Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of the Gramscian 
‘Popular’ (by way of the CCCS) in order to demonstrate why the Zionism that 
emerged post 1967 is Popular Zionism as opposed to the various Zionisms 
that preceded it (Shimoni, 1995). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The following chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in 
this thesis. It is organised chronologically so as to both demonstrate how the 
research process unfolded and theoretically situate the decisions that 
constituted this process. The chapter begins with a short autobiographical 
section that describes my personal relation to Zionism and Israel and, in doing 
so, explains how I came to identify the research area for this project (affect 
and Zionism) and how my own position within this area of research may have 
impacted my findings. I then explain the logic of how I came to formulate a 
specific research question out of this area (what role did affect play in the 
British Jewish response to the Six Day War and the changes that occurred in 
British Jewish culture as a result?) and the research methods that I felt were 
best suited to answer this question – a mixed approach using interviews, 
archival research and extant data from British Jewish sociology. I then 
describe the experience that arose out of applying these methods: the 
problems I faced and the unexpected benefits that I discovered in deploying 
them. The chapter concludes with a short reflection on the ethics of this 
project. 
 
2. Self-reflexivity: positioning myself within the research 
 
 The following section outlines my personal relationship to Israel and 
Zionism, and my assessment of the impact it had on this thesis. Aull Davies 
argues that all researchers need to ‘self-reflexively’ position themselves in 
relation to their research, especially if it contains elements of ethnography 
(1999). She situates this claim in an epistemological position she calls ‘critical 
realism’. Critical realism sits at the intersection of materialist and idealist 
epistemologies: it believes that although the social world exists independently 
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of the human endeavour to know it, we can only ever know the social world 
through our subjective positioning within it. She then clarifies ‘subjective 
positioning’ as meaning the interconnection of a researcher’s personal history 
and the disciplinary and broader socio-cultural circumstances they find 
themselves in. Our subjective positioning within the social world effects every 
aspect of our research practice: the research areas we identify, the questions 
we ask of these areas, the general methodological approach to these 
questions (and the methods we use to answer them) and the findings that 
emerge as a result. Aull Davies also argues that our subjective positioning 
has a material effect on the research areas we want to explore. The research 
setting is changed by our presence in it, meaning our findings can never be 
transparent reflections of an objective social reality (as positivists aspire to), 
but are produced out of the specific dialogical relationship we have 
constructed with our research setting at a particular moment in time. Arguably 
the key factor for this project, in this respect, is the impact of my being a 
British Jew of Israeli heritage. For reasons discussed below, had I been a 
Palestinian, asking the same questions of the same cohort of interviewees, 
the research process would have been different. What all this means is that 
researchers need to be ‘self-reflexive’ about our research i.e. reflect upon the 
ways our subjective positioning impacts upon it. This is not so our research 
becomes ‘more objective’; that is not what is at stake in a critical realist 
epistemology. What self-reflexivity does is help give a fuller account of the 
final outcome of our research and the process of how we arrived there. That is 
the intention of the following section: to outline how my personal history, 
disciplinary and broader socio-cultural background have shaped the research 
process for this PhD. 
 
2.1. My relationship to Israel and Zionism 
 
My interest in Israel is rooted in the fact that my father is an Israeli-born 
Jew. Born in Haifa to an Egyptian Jewish father and Moroccan Jewish mother, 
they and his sister migrated to London when my father was three in 1958. He 
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has remained in Britain for the duration of his life.27 His parents and his eldest 
sister, however, returned to Israel in the late 1970s. Throughout my life I have 
had family living in Israel who we have visited approximately once a year. 
Having family in Israel is perhaps the first way that the country came to matter 
to me personally, but even had I not had family living there, I would hazard 
that I would have cared about Israel anyway. As this thesis argues, to care 
about Israel has been the hegemonic position of British Jewry through the 
course of my lifetime (I was born in 1979). That Israel should matter to me 
was communicated both consciously and unconsciously as I grew up. It 
underpinned the basis of both the everyday conversations between my 
parents, our family and friends and their specific responses to news coverage 
of the world-historical events that were occurring in Palestine/Israel. It was 
present in the synagogue services I attended, not only in the Rabbi’s sermons 
but also in the fact that every week British Jewish congregations say a prayer 
to the State of Israel. It was present in cheder (Sunday school) lessons, in the 
charity that was collected in the community and the different activities and 
events organised by the Jewish youth club I belonged to. Most importantly 
perhaps, it manifested itself in the month long trips to Israel that are organised 
by Zionist youth organisations for British Jewish sixteen year olds, colloquially 
known as ‘tours’. The majority of British Jewish teenagers go on these tours. I 
went with a group of around thirty other sixteen year olds on a tour organised 
by Zionist youth organisation Hanoar Hatzioni. It must be said that most 
Jewish teenagers go on these tours for social as opposed to explicitly political 
reasons. Only a handful have ever been involved in Zionism in any organised 
or sustained way. Nevertheless theses tours are designed to instil a love of 
Israel and Zionism into their participants. For the most part they are 
successful; mainly, I would argue, as a result of how pleasurable a month long 
trip to an exotic country that you are told you have a special claim to, in the 
company of thirty other sixteen year olds without parental supervision is. (In 
my recollection most people on the tour ignored the few Zionist history 
lessons). 
 
                                            
27 Except for a brief attempt by his family to settle in Paris in the early 1960s. 
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 Describing my exposure to Zionism in the way that I just have might 
give the impression that I was much more involved in Jewish and Zionist 
organisations and institutions than I was. This is not the case. Like most 
British Jews post-1979, my engagement with these sort of institutions was 
minimal (Kosmin and Levy, 1978). I went to synagogue twice a year (except in 
the year leading up to my bar mitzvah, when I went with my father once a 
week), I loathed going to cheder, and my minimal involvement in youth groups 
and my decision to go on tour were motivated by social, not political reasons 
(Chapter 8 shows how this is typical). Still, I cared profoundly about Israel. To 
give some examples: i) I have only kept a diary for a short period in my life 
(six months in 1999) and, one entry in that diary gushingly describes how 
much I loved Israel in implicitly Zionist terms; ii) in my mind, I likened 
holidaying in Israel to a quasi-religious experience, despite not being religious 
at all; iii) I was successfully made to feel terrified by Arabs and Palestinians, 
an ‘indistinguishable mass of terrorists’, not one of whom I had ever met. In 
other words, I was fully engaged in the complex and contradictory affective 
economy that Zionism had successfully maintained in the post-1967 
conjuncture and that I have chosen as the subject of this thesis. In Chapter 8 I 
define this affective economy in the following way: terrified and elated and 
practiced in my everyday life and pop cultural consumption as opposed to my 
engagement with Zionist institutions. In many ways I was an ideal subject of 
Popular Zionism. 
 
 This began to change after I went to the University of Sussex to do a 
BA in History and Cultural Studies. The School of Cultural and Community 
Studies (as it was 1997–2000) had strong radical tendencies and although I 
never covered Palestine/Israel in any part of my degree, I did engage with 
critical theory, mainly on post-1968 identity politics, and progressive 
approaches to history.28 I touched upon Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) but 
only became familiar with his anti-Zionist writing during my MA. The real 
turning point of my affective relationship with Israel and Zionism came about 
                                            
28 History at Sussex has strong ties with the ‘history from below’ approach formulated by 
Raphael Samuel in the 1960s and 1970s – in many ways a parallel project to British cultural 
studies. 
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through a close friendship I developed with a fellow student whose South 
African mother had been involved in the ANC’s anti-Apartheid politics. This 
friend began explaining to me the parallels between Apartheid-era South 
Africa and Palestine/Israel. Had she drawn these parallels prior to my 
university education, I imagine I would have adopted the defensive position 
that continues to be typical of Popular Zionists. As a result of my being 
engaged with the sorts of ideas and perspectives being taught at Sussex, and 
because we agreed with so much else in our politics, I entertained the notion 
that what she was telling me could have been true. My switch from Popular 
Zionism to anti-Zionism was cemented during my MA in Cultural Studies at 
the University of East London in 2002–2003. There, I did a module on 
postcolonialism that included a session on Palestine/Israel and was taught by 
an Israeli professor (my current director of studies) from an anti-Zionist 
perspective. My large piece of assessed work for this module used the 
thought of Julia Kristeva to argue that Zionist ideology functioned through 
symbolically ‘abjecting’ Diaspora Jewry and used the Popular Zionist classic 
Exodus (1960) as a case study. The research for this essay familiarized me 
far more with postcolonial critiques of Israel and Zionism, critiques I remain 
persuaded by and which influence this thesis. 
 
 My switch from Popular Zionist to anti-Zionist was, and remains a 
troubled one, not in any rational sense, but in an affective one. In a rational 
assessment of the two positions, I find anti-Zionism far more persuasive in a 
number of different ways. Though of Jewish heritage, I am an atheist and 
therefore do not have the requisite faith to believe that there is a divinely 
ordained connection between the Jewish people and ‘Eretz Israel’29 that some 
strands of Zionism make.30 I also believe that the essentialist connection 
made between peoples and territories by modern nationalisms, of which 
                                            
29 The ancient Hebrew term for the ‘Land of Israel’ according to the borders that appear in the 
Bible. 
30 I do not believe that it is possible to talk about ‘the Jewish people’ in any meaningful or 
coherent sense. Judaism, as a religion, and Jewishness, as a cultural identity and way of life, 
means different things at different times in different cultures resulting in a variety of different 
individual and collective engagements with the world. The differences between Ashkenazi 
and Sephardi, united and reform, ultra-orthodox and Zionist etc. are testament to the 
contested nature of the term ‘the Jewish people’.  
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Zionism is one (Shimoni, 1995), is unsustainable both ontologically and 
empirically: there has never been a time in human history in which territories 
have ever contained one people or culture nor do I believe that one ethnic 
group and its culture be privelleged over those who it shares territory with. 
The material effect of this nationalist myth on polities has always been the 
privileging of one group of people over the others it shares its territory with. 
This is precisely what happened during the rise of European Nationalism in 
the nineteenth century. A major by-product of this nationalism was anti-
Semitism (defined one way as the desire not to want to share European 
territory with an ‘alien’ people) which resulted in, amongst other things, the 
Nazi Holocaust. Zionism’s response to the injuries of modern nationalism to 
European Jewry was, paradoxically, the production of more European style 
nationalism, inevitably establishing a racial hierarchy, not only of Jews over 
Palestinians but also Jews living in ‘Eretz Israel’ over Diaspora Jews and 
Israeli Jews of European heritage over Israeli Jews of non-European heritage. 
This has resulted in the exile of Palestinians from their ancestral homes. For 
some this has meant a life consigned to poverty and non-citizen status in 
refugee camps, for others the misery of life under the brutal Israeli occupation 
in the West Bank and the siege in Gaza, and for those who remain within 
Israeli borders, the status of second class citizens – all for the fact they are 
not Jewish. The only rational response to nineteenth and twentieth century 
anti-Semitism, I believe, would have been resistance to nationalism per se, 
not the production of more of it, and the creation of forms of political 
organisation in Europe and its empires that are not based on racial 
hierarchies. In Palestine/Israel, I believe the most practicable solution to this 
problem is the creation of a single state that democratically reflects the 
interests of all its citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity or any other group 
identity.  
 
 Arriving at this position was not easy and neither has been trying to 
maintain it whilst wanting to participate to some degree in the life of the 
Jewish community, even simply spending time with my family. My anti-
Zionism has been a source of intense conflict with members of my family. Like 
anti-Zionist David who is interviewed for this thesis, “I’m incapable of having a 
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peaceful discourse with Zionists. Sometimes they shout first sometimes I 
shout first but I always do my share of shouting” (p. 469).31 But like Brian, 
another anti-Zionist I interviewed, I do not always want to have arguments 
with my family: “I thought, ‘I just don’t want to hurt people’s feelings. You 
might be right Brian but you don’t want to spoil…’ I’ll eat shit; I’ll let them have 
the last word because I don’t want to spoil a family gathering.” (p. 576). So 
whilst I am absolutely convinced of the ethics of anti-Zionism, my personal 
biography and current relationship with my family (not to mention how the 
British Jewish community tends to respond to anti-Zionism) means it produces 
a complicated affective response in me. To give a brief example: on a recent 
holiday to Israel an aunt explained that the kibbutz she has lived on for the 
last twenty-five years might have to close because of the success of the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement on the kibbutz’s ability 
to profitably sell the dates they farm. Whilst I remain persuaded that BDS is 
both an effective and ethical tactic to force the State of Israel to reconsider its 
position vis à vis the occupation, I am simultaneously upset by the prospect of 
my aunt and uncle’s home shutting done (even if it is a kibbutz where, I 
presume, no Palestinian has ever been able to become a member) and their 
lives being de-stabilised. 
 
 Our political engagements with the world are not always 
straightforward and I believe this complexity can be productive for the 
purposes of research. My complex and changed affective engagement with 
Zionism shaped this specific project in a number of ways. i) the most 
fundamental was that it made me want to understand how affect works in 
relation to Zionism for British Jews. I had already used Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of affect in my MA dissertation to understand the production of post-
Stonewall gay cultural identity. In researching this dissertation I began to 
relate this theory to my personal experience of Israel and surmised that 
‘affect’ might conceptually clarify Zionism. ii) My own affective engagement 
with Zionism also gave me a personal insight into this research area. The fact 
that my allegiances shifted from Popular Zionism to anti-Zionism, meant that 
                                            
31 The in-text citations for all the interviewees’ quotes refer to the page number they appear 
on in the interview transcripts in Appendix 2 of this thesis. 
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Popular Zionism had been, to some degree, de-familiarized for me and I could 
examine it with some critical distance. iii) I also think that my own affective 
engagement with Zionism provided some of the animating energy for the 
research process itself but, again, in ways that were not always 
straightforward. Its complexity provided some difficult moments. For instance, 
in my analysis I have compared Zionism to fascism. This is not an easy 
comparison to make when you consider the genocidal consequences of 
German fascism for European Jews in the twentieth century, and one that, 
unsurprisingly, Zionists vigorously resist. Nevertheless it is empirically true, 
supported by Zionist and pro-Israeli scholarship (Alderman, 1992; Shimoni, 
1995), and an important comparison to make in order to reveal the ethical 
orientation of Zionism. Overall, I believe I have not shied away from criticising 
Zionism, no matter how complicated the affectivity that is generated in doing 
so. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 Once I had identified my research area (the relationship of affect and 
Zionism), I then had to formulate a more specific research question and 
identify the appropriate methods to answer it. Bryman argues that one of the 
most effective ways of formulating a research question is to identify an 
‘exemplifying case study’ (2008, p. 51) that reveals the dynamics of that 
research area in microcosmic form. The history of Zionism has been 
punctuated by many moments of intense affectivity on a collective scale but 
from a survey of the literature on Zionist history in Britain it became clear the 
most intensely affective moment occurred during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. 
More than this, the literature concurred, the war represented a turning point in 
the fortunes of Zionism and support for the State of Israel amongst British 
Jewry, which manifested itself at the level of cultural identity. Already, a 
broadly Deleuzo-Guattarian account was taking shape (the idea that the 
increase or decrease in affectivity produces new social/cultural formations) 
and so it seemed pertinent to use the British Jewish affective response to the 
Six Day War as a case study that could point to the broader dynamics of how 
affect functioned in Zionism more generally.  
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 The next question was one of method: what would be the most 
effective research methods to use to explore the role affect played in the 
cultural dynamics of the British Jewish community before, during and after the 
1967 war? The broader methodological issue here is how does one 
empirically observe affect and the changes that Deleuze and Guattari claim it 
makes in social and cultural formations. There have been a number of recent 
ethnographic studies that have attempted to do just this. For instance, Lita 
Crociani-Windland uses participant observation so that she can observe “the 
affective processes underlying the festival culture in Siena’s Palio” (2011, p.  
18). For Crociani-Windland, “data was everywhere” (ibid.), she chose to 
gather it, “by living it, experiencing it directly”. Her methodological solution, 
was to immerse herself within the affective landscape she was studying and 
apply theoretically informed self-reflexivity (Bergson’s ‘intuition as method’) to 
this experience of immersion. A similar approach was undertaken in Julian 
Henriques’s study of affect in Kingston, Jamaica’s dancehall scene (2010). 
Like Crociani-Windland, Henriques also immersed himself in the cultural 
formation he studied by using participant observation methods supplemented 
by interviews. A final example of participant observation as a method of, not 
capturing affect per se, but of providing empirical evidence for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ontological approach is given in Saldanha (2007), in which he gives 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian account of the racial dynamics of the Goan trance 
scene. In order to do this he lived on the scene for months at a time taking 
field notes and interviewing people. In this book he makes a forceful case for 
ethnography being the most suitable general methodological approach to 
research questions formulated from a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective: “What 
matters is therefore not the representation of an event, but its actual 
unfolding. I had to be there, among other bodies, checking out what they were 
doing, what they did with mats and chillums and trees and Goa trance flowing 
through the landscape” (2007, p. 5) Sundha is persuasive in arguing that a 
researcher who is interested in using a theoretical approach that emphasises 
the affective, the sensory, the intensive, the corporeal, the lived and the 
material aspects of culture, benefits greatly from actually situating their own 
body in that culture in order to experience its affective dimensions. 
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 Saldhana’s, Crociani-Windland and Henrique’s methodological 
solutions to exploring affect all rest on the researcher being able to physically 
situate themselves within the culture they are researching. The privileged 
position that affect has with the present is theoretically substantiated by 
Callard and Papoulias: “the wager is that if we attend to affect and to how it 
courses through the body, we might edge closer to illuminating the 
elusiveness and vitality of the embodied present” (2010, p. 248). I was able to 
do this in the sense that, as outlined in the autobiographical section, I was 
bought up in the mainstream of British Jewry and therefore was immersed in 
the affective economy of post-1967 Popular Zionism.32 However, my specific 
research question was orientated towards the role that the affect triggered by 
the 1967 war plays in creating this cultural formation. For obvious reasons, I 
have no first-hand experience of this and have no way of gaining some; so 
participant observation of any kind could not be my primary form of data 
collection.  
 
Questions of affective states that used to exist are addressed in 
Walkerdine (2010) in which she, “explores the place of affect in community 
relations with respect to trauma following the closure of a steelworks from a 
working-class community in the South Wales valleys in 2002” (2010, p. 91). 
Although temporally much closer to the event whose social effects she wants 
to research than me, Walkerdine is neither part of this community nor did she 
experience the trauma of the steelworks closing, so is unable to deploy any 
form of participant observation to answer her question. Her methodological 
solution to the research question she posed was to use, “long, unstructured, 
narrative-based interviews, which aimed at engaging with feelings and 
experiences associated with the aftermath of the steelworks closure” (2010, p. 
92) as her primary form of data collection.  
 
The case for deploying a “language-based” (ibid.) form of data 
collection for a phenomenon that is ontologically non-linguistic is far more 
                                            
32 In Chapter 8 I argue that with respect to the British Jewish relationship to the State of Israel 
the post-1967 conjuncture has yet to finish. 
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problematic than the experience-based methods discussed above. 
Walkerdine duly notes this: 
 
“I need to make it clear then that what I am exploring here is a sense which 
emerged from my reading of the interviews and the whole approach could 
be much more developed if data of a more embodied kind were to be 
collected.” 
 
(2010, p. 92) 
 
Beyond reflecting on her own experiences of the interviews, Walkerdine does 
not elaborate what she means by ‘data of a more embodied kind’. (As I 
explain in detail below I have taken it to mean the affective responses of the 
interviewees during the interview.) Despite the problems she raises, her 
research produces persuasive analysis thereby suggesting that the in-depth, 
semi- or un-structured interview is the most suitable method for trying to 
measure affectivity which emerged in the past. Affect may be ontologically 
distinct from language but that does not mean language cannot be used to 
represent affective states. As with all representations, they cannot but distort 
the phenomena they seek to represent, affective or otherwise. The challenge 
for the researcher is, if not to minimize the distortion, than at least attempt to 
properly account for its distorting effects. 
 
 Like Walkerdine, I settled on one-on-one, in-depth interviews that were 
semi-structured as my primary form of data collection. Part of the reason I 
chose semi-structured over Walkerdine’s unstructured interviews was 
because there were specific questions I would have to ask in order to produce 
the data needed to address the concerns of my research question: questions 
regarding the interviewees’ biographical information and also the affective 
response to specific events that occurred during the crisis and the war. A 
semi-structured approach enabled me to do this whilst still allowing the 
flexibility needed to explore affective states in depth and pursue areas that 
came up during the interview that I had not anticipated at the planning stages. 
 
  In order to carry out the interviews I would need to find a sample of 
British Jews who remembered their ‘experience’ of the war; meaning Jews 
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who were in Britain at the time and were witnessing it through the media, or 
the way it was represented by British Jewish organisations (synagogues, 
Zionist organisations etc.). The main objective of the interviews would be quite 
simply asking these people how the war made them feel and what they 
thought changed in them and the British Jewish community as a result. This 
raised a number of issues – the relationship between language and affect 
being only one. Another issue was the relationship between affect and 
memory: even if the participants were able to transparently represent their 
affective responses, these responses occurred just over forty years prior to 
their interviews, so how could I be sure they would remember them 
accurately?33 There was also the question of representativeness: I settled on 
interviewing twelve to fifteen people for reasons explained below. If the focus 
of my research was how the British Jewish community as a whole turned to 
Zionism after the war, how could I be sure that these twelve people would be 
representative of the affective response of that community and that changes 
that occurred within it? The following section outlines the different aspects of 
the interview process and addresses these problems. 
 
3.1. The sample 
 
 The first step in the interviewing process was working out how big my 
sample needed to be. Arber (2008) argues that sample size depends on the 
specific research goal: if you are interested in “maximum theoretical 
understanding” a smaller group is sufficient and if you are interested in 
“making inferences “ which are representative “of the population” a larger 
sample is required (p. 68). Small sampling groups allow for more in-depth 
interviews and more time spent bringing theoretical analysis to bear on the 
                                            
33 A person’s description of an affective response is subjective – a sense of ‘accuracy’ as 
such can never be guaranteed in any meaningful sense. However, if we are working with a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of affect i.e. it is ‘social’ (Gilbert, 2004) and flows across the 
constitutive elements of an assemblage then each interviewee, as constitutive elements of 
the British Jewish assemblage (see Chapter 4), should have participated in the same 
affective states triggered by the war. Chapter 6 demonstrates that this is in fact what 
happened. Some degree of ‘accuracy’ becomes important if we are to build a picture of a 
shared affective state and the empirically observable impact it had on the assemblage it 
flowed across. 
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data considering the time and funding constraints of a PhD project (ibid). The 
emphasis of my project was on maximum theoretical understanding so the 
sample I aimed to achieve was between twelve and fifteen British Jews who 
had ‘lived through’ the war. However as King and Horrocks argue, even 
though qualitative research does not aim to produce statistical 
representativeness in the way quantitative studies do (which would not be 
possible with a sample size of twelve to fifteen) “qualitative research very 
often is concerned to achieve different forms of generalizability or 
transferability. […] This means that a purely ad hoc, opportunistic sampling 
strategy is not appropriate; rather the sample needs to relate in some 
systematic manner to the social world and phenomena that a study seeks to 
throw light upon.” (2010, p. 29) The Jewish community breaks down into 
sufficiently distinct sub-communities, so had my sample been drawn from only 
one of these (e.g. orthodox Jewry) my interview data would not have been at 
all representative in the way it needed to be to help me draw the conclusions 
needed to answer my research question. In an attempt to resolve this issue I 
used both primary sociological research (Krausz, 1964; Krausz, 1969 (a); 
Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and Schmool, 1968; Prais and Schmool, 1975; 
Krausz, 1981; Gould, 1984) and secondary historical literature (Bentwich, 
1960; Shimoni, 1986 (a), 1986 (b); Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2005) in order 
to help build a demographic sketch of the British Jewish community in the 
1960s. These demographics appear in detail in Chapter 4 (the chapter that 
provides the historical background for the thesis) but just to note here that 
these included: socio-economic status, family background, religious practice, 
geographical location and attitudes to Zionism. As I was interested in the 
British Jewish community as a whole, I wanted my sample to map onto as 
much as was possible given its size, the demographic profile of the 
community. Because the central focus was attitudes to Israel, I also felt it 
would be useful to interview at least one person who was anti-Zionist during 
the 1960s, an extremely atypical position for British Jews in this period. In 
doing this, the hope was to introduce a perspective that might illuminate 
aspects of Zionism in British Jewry that only interviewing Zionist Jews, either 
Classical or Popular, would not have revealed. These concerns guided me 
through the process of finding participants to build my sample. 
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3.2. Recruiting participants 
 
My primary method of recruiting participants was snowballing. Having 
grown up in the Jewish community, I was able to tap into a number of 
personal contacts as well as work colleagues, and two of my PhD 
supervisors, to see if either they would be interviewed or if they knew anyone 
who was interested in being interviewed. I found Stephen, Jeremy, Zena, 
Harry, Brian, David, Vivien and Harvey this way. There came a point when 
approaching personal contacts in this way stopped yielding interviewees so I 
pursued other means. The first was to contact ‘gatekeepers’34 in Zionist 
organisations and ask if they could contact their alumni lists. Zionist 
organisation Habonim was the most helpful, sending out a mass e-mail that 
generated approximately twenty responses all of which expressed interest in 
being interviewed. I felt having people with organised Zionism in their 
background would be useful, again to provide a contrast to those who were 
not so involved (in 1978, only 11.3% of one Redbridge’s Jewish community 
belonged to a Zionist organisation (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 26)) so, after 
having had preliminary conversations in order to work out how they would aid 
or inhibit the (albeit limited) representativeness of the overall sample, I settled 
for two Habonim alumni – Sarah and Joseph. My final method for recruiting 
participants was advertising in the classified section of the most widely read 
Jewish newspaper in Britain, The Jewish Chronicle. Two people responded to 
the advert: my interviewee Rose and an academic who stopped getting in 
touch with me after two e-mail exchanges. Rose fit in suitably with the 
requirements of my sample so she became my final interviewee. Thumbnail 
biographical profiles for all my interviewees are included in Appendix 1. These 
include discussion of how each of the interviewees fit into the demographic 
profile of the British Jewish community detailed in Chapter 4. Overall, I think, 
the sample provides the representativeness required to satisfactorily answer 
the research question set by this thesis. 
 
                                            
34 “A gatekeeper is a person who stands between the data collector and a potential 
respondent.” (Keesling, 2008) 
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3.3. Conducting the interviews 
 
The interview questions followed the same format. They began with 
some biographical questions so I could situate them within the demographic 
data I had gleaned from the extant sociological research. I then asked a 
series of open-ended questions about the events that occurred before, during 
and after the war in the Middle East and in the British Jewish community. The 
focus of these questions was to see how they perceived theses events, how 
they felt individually, how they remembered others feeling, the general 
atmosphere in the community and how they were mobilized as a result. These 
questions were designed to yield empirical evidence of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
affect as defined by Brian Massumi (see Chapter 2). The answers to these 
questions (which were recorded on a digital Dictaphone) ended up providing 
most of the data for Chapters 6 and 7. The final section of the interview asked 
the interviewees about more general attitudes, opinions, feelings and 
experiences of Israel, Israelis, Zionism and the Palestine/Israel conflict. Much 
of the data generated here was used for Chapter 8 but also supplemented the 
analysis in other chapters. All of the interviews took place in the home of the 
interviewee (except Harry and Zena), a place where I felt they would feel most 
comfortable.  
 
When it came to analysing the affective responses of my interviewees, 
I did not rely on their descriptions of these responses alone, but was also 
attentive to body language; changes in the volume, pitch and timbre of their 
voice and any affective responses that occurred within the interview. I noted 
these in a research journal as soon as was possible after the interview 
finished and many of these were picked up by the Dictaphone so I included 
descriptions of them in the transcriptions (see Appendix 2). This extra-textual, 
embodied data was particularly useful when it came to writing my analysis 
chapters. A sigh from Zena, a sense of menace in Jeremy’s voice, Stephen 
re-enacting his remembered affective responses and especially a moment 
when Sarah began to cry were all particularly revealing in where affect is most 
intense in relation to Zionism. 
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A final point to make about the interview process: on reflection, the fact 
that I am a British Jew of Israeli heritage and with an Arabic surname 
unquestionably had an impact on the data produced by the interviews. My 
surname is Hakim, a common Arabic name that is equally common with Jews 
of Mizrahi heritage. The fact it is an Arabic word caused two problems during 
the interview process that reveal a great deal about the research setting. The 
first occurred when I contacted Habonim to ask if they could send a circular e-
mail to their alumni list in a bid to find participants. At first the administrator 
expressed enthusiasm about my project and agreed to contact British 
members of Habonim who had been involved with the organisation during the 
war. A couple of days after she had agreed, she sent me a strongly worded e-
mail explaining that many alumni had got back to her questioning the 
intentions of my research. Here is an excerpt of the e-mail: 
 
“…They are concerned and sceptical as to the validity of who you claim you 
are and what you may really be doing. This must be understandable in the 
world today when there is every attempt to delegitimize us, the Jewish 
People and Israel as our home. Anti-Semitism has reared its hideous, fire 
breathing head only it hides under the cloak of anti-Israel and there is a 
world wide movement, which is preoccupied in destroying us, politically, 
economically and physically. Britain, with its huge Moslem population 
perpetrates or at least condones the most forceful and horrifying hatred 
towards us.” 
 
After I sent her an e-mail designed to assuage her fears she explained that 
the reason she had doubts about me as researcher was, “I was concerned 
about your name as Hakim is… an Arab name”. This e-mail exchange raises 
a number of important issues: i) the racism of the first e-mail, which 
demonstrates the Zionist conflation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism which, 
post-9/11, is attributed it to Britain’s ‘huge Moslem population’ (discussed at 
length in Chapter 8); ii) it also raises the ethical issue of not disclosing my 
anti-Zionism to my interviewees, which is discussed below. Both these issues 
relate to the point I want to raise specifically in this section, namely that had I 
been Arabic and interested in the same research question the data produced 
would not have been the same. If the research process had been completed 
at all (the e-mail above suggests potential interviewees would not have 
agreed to take part), one possibility is that the interviewees may have 
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responded in either a more defensive or guarded way. Another possibility is 
they may have been more belligerent. All the interviewees knew I was Jewish 
and of Israeli heritage (mainly established in pre-interview conversations) and 
so presumed I was supportive of Israel.35 This, I think, meant they were far 
more comfortable speaking to me and revealing feelings and attitudes they 
might have kept more guarded had I been Arabic. This conviction was 
strengthened when I first met Harvey, just before doing the interview. In our 
introductory conversation he let me know that my surname must mean I was 
Arabic. After I explained its origins he noticeably softened and became more 
open. This produced a particular kind of data (not just with Harvey but the 
interviewees in general): it gives a sense of how many British Jews talk to 
each other about Israel in an unguarded and undefensive way. For instance it 
is doubtful whether Zena would have claimed that ‘Muslims want to take over 
the world’ in her interview had the interviewer been Muslim, and would have 
been less revealing of Popular Zionism as a result. It also meant they 
presumed a certain degree of shared knowledge, which I tried to get them to 
articulate in the interview, though I may not always have been successful. 
These incidents also reveal a great deal about Popular Zionism itself – its 
highly defensive response to criticism, its perception of  ‘Arabs’ and Muslims, 
its conflation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, the way Popular Zionism 
limits the possibility of dialogue with its others. All of these are analysed in 
more detail throughout the thesis. 
 
3.4. Problems encountered doing the interviews 
 
Although the interviews generated substantial evidence with regards to 
the British Jewish affective response to the war and the changes it bought 
about, this evidence was not unproblematic. As stated above the first problem 
was an issue of memory. This applies to all interviews, not only these dealing 
with affect, but other issues are raised when the interviews are trying to 
access affectivity. How do affective states, intense or otherwise, impact on 
                                            
35 This was not the case with the anti-Zionists. They had been contacted through two of my 
supervisors both of whom are anti-Zionist in differing ways and so they presumed I was anti-
Zionist. 
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memory? Are the original events remembered more intensely? Do the 
affective states distort the memory of the event itself? Callard and Papoulis 
(2010) address these questions in a book chapter that surveys various 
psychoanalytic, psychological and neuroscientific positions on how affect 
impacts on the act of remembering. There are as many positions on this 
question as there are authors. At one end of the spectrum is the 
neuroscientific ‘flashbulb’ hypothesis that argues that high affective arousal in 
a person works on their memory in a flashbulb-like fashion, capturing every 
detail of the event with great clarity (Callard and Papoulis, 2010, p. 253). At 
the other end of the spectrum Callard and Papoulis posit Freud, who, focusing 
on the memory of traumatic events in hysterical patients, argues that whereas 
the unconscious can successfully repress the ideational aspect of the 
traumatic event (i.e. the details of what occurred), attempts to repress its 
affective quota (the anxiety generated by the trauma) are not fully successful. 
What can happen is that some part of the affect resists repression and enters 
consciousness attached to a different idea (this is the hysterical symptom). If 
we subscribe to Freud’s idea, this means that there potentially could be some 
disconnect between the affects that the interviewees remember feeling, and 
the events they attribute them to, undermining the validity of the interview 
data.36  
 
The question of misremembering emerges as a methodological issue 
in another way. The last thirty years has seen a rise in critical memory 
studies. As a sub-discipline located at the intersection of history and cultural 
studies it has raised many important theoretical issues around the cultural 
politics of remembering historical events, objects and people. Perhaps the 
most important issue that critical memory studies raises for this project comes 
from sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’ seminal work on collective memory 
(1925). Amongst the various insights Halbwachs had on memory as a 
collective (as opposed to individual) phenomenon, the most crucial for this 
                                            
36 For reasons explained in Chapter 2, this thesis does not use a Freudian approach to affect. 
Current work on Deleuze and memory (Radstone and Schwarz, 2010) does not focus on 
affect, but on Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and his unique approach to temporality. Freud is 
used here in order to imagine a methodological worst case scenario and consider how it 
might be surmounted. 
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thesis is his claim that “the past is… reconstructed on the basis of the 
present” (Halbwachs, 1925, p. 40). Halbwachs (and the work he inspired) 
supported this claim by arguing that institutions like the Church and the state 
commemorate iconic events, objects and historical figures in a highly selective 
way so as to serve the ideological goals of the present. For example, 
Zerubavel (1995) uses Halbwachs in order to explore how the Zionist political 
elite (both pre- and post-1948) in Palestine/Israel has officially commemorated 
events from ancient Jewish history that were considered marginal in 
traditional Jewish historiography e.g. the Bar Khokhba revolt and the events at 
Masada. Academic historians have contested the Zionist construction of these 
events as innacruate and Zerubavel argues these inaccuracies remain within 
the construction because they help reinforce the projects of Zionist nation 
building and identity formation.37  
 
The Halbwachsian focus on official state commemoration of events of 
which a social group has had no direct experience gives this work a slightly 
different emphasis to this thesis. The British Jews interviewed for this thesis 
did have direct experience of their own affective response to the 1967 war 
and so, arguably, their memory of it is less vulnerable to state manipulation. 
Nevertheless the affective response of Diaspora Jewry has been 
memorialized in popular histories of the war (though never as a central focus) 
in order to reinforce Diaspora Jewish support of the State of Israel in the 
present. It follows that the interview data could be distorted by the 
interviewees’ exposure to the Zionist commemoration of the war – a 
commemoration that, like all forms of collective memory, is more interested in 
serving Zionism’s present ideological goals than it is in transparently 
representing events as they happened (if indeed that were ever possible). As 
Halbwachs has argued “the various groups that compose society are capable 
at every moment of reconstructing their past. But, as we have seen, they most 
                                            
37 Other case studies for work rooted in Halbwachs include Halbwachs’ own study of how 
commemorative locations of sites mentioned in the Bible changed in accordance with the 
ideological demands of different historical periods (1925). Pierre Nora’s Realms of Memory 
(1992) analyses the construction of Frenchness through commemorative symbols such as 
Joan of Arc and the Eiffel Tower. Barry Schwartz (1982) investigates the shifting politics of 
commemoration in the US national context by analysing the visual art in Washington’s Capitol 
building. 
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frequently distort that past in the act of reconstructing it” (Halbwachs, 1925, 
p.182).  
 
 How is it possible to surmount the potential distortions in the interview 
data raised by these Freudian and Halbwachsian perspectives? The focus of 
this thesis is the material changes that occured in British Jewry that were 
caused by the intensification of affect triggered by the war, therefore the 
interview data needed to accurately reflect as much as possible what 
occurred at the time. A classic sociological solution to limiting the degree of 
inaccuracy in ethnographic data is ‘triangulation’. Triangulation is when three 
different methods of data collection are deployed so the various data sets they 
produce can be cross-referenced for similarities and differences (Denzin, 
1970). The two other methods of data collection I undertook so I could limit 
the inaccuracies of my interview findings were archival research and using 
extant sociological and historical data.  
 
3.5. Archival research 
 
I went to various archives during the course of the research: the British 
Newspaper Archive, the archive of the Jewish Museum in London, the Israeli 
State Archive, the Central Zionist Archive, the Wiener Collection at the 
University of Tel Aviv, and the Parkes Library at the University of 
Southampton. By far the most useful were the Israeli State Archive (ISA) and 
the Central Zionist Archive (CZA), both in Israel and both of which I utilised 
with the help of a translator.38 The ISA contains the official government 
documents of the State of Israel. The files it had from the Israeli Embassy in 
Britain were most useful. The CZA holds the files of the worldwide Zionist 
movement. The files of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, 
Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael were the most useful of these. 
The Wiener Collection contained small amounts of Zionist propaganda 
material that was produced by the State of Israel and the WZO during the war. 
                                            
38 When material from these archives is referenced in the thesis, the following format is used: 
(Name of archive (abbreviated): Folder number, Folder name (if included)). E.g., for the 
Central Zionist Archive (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall) and for the Israeli 
State Archive (ISA: 1394/18 Radio and Television). 
 
 
74 
However, I had already seen these documents in the ISA and the CZA. Time 
spent in the British Newspaper Archive gave a good impression of how the 
war was represented in the British press (much more varied than it appeared 
in British Jewish memory). All the material relating to the 1967 war in the 
Parkes Library came in the form press cuttings, so most of it exists in the 
British Newspaper Archive. The Jewish Museum’s archive was, at the time of 
visiting, small and disorganised and had nothing relating to the 1967 war. 
 
I had gone to the archives hoping to find personal documents (diaries, 
letters etc.) of British Jews written as the Middle East crisis and the war itself 
was taking place, thereby providing contemporary first hand accounts of the 
affective response of British Jewry. The archives, repositories of official 
Zionist organisations, contained no such documents. However there was 
substantial contemporary evidence of the British Jewish perception of the war, 
the affective response it triggered, the short-term mobilization and long-term 
cultural change that occurred in British Jewry as a result. These could be 
found in reports written by Zionist officials, minutes from meetings, memos 
written between Zionist bureaucrats describing their own affective responses 
to the crisis and the war and their impressions of the community’s affective 
response. When it came to writing up my analysis chapters I was able to 
confirm and add more historical detail to or dispute the claims of the 
interviewees with documentary evidence that was produced at the time, and 
thus produce a more accurate version of the affectivity the war generated and 
the cultural changes that arose as a result.  
 
The archival documents were also particularly good at providing 
detailed evidence of the Zionist propaganda effort in Britain: from the 
documents that were distributed to the debates within the Zionist 
organisations about what they should contain and where they should be 
distributed. This detail does not exist in the extant historical literature, nor did 
it emerge in the interviews. It did help answer the question of how British Jews 
came to perceive the war in the way that they did. At the beginning of the 
research process I had spent some time in British Newspaper Archive sifting 
through various newspaper accounts of the war. The events happening in the 
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Middle East were being reported from a variety of different perspectives e.g. 
The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian were relatively even-
handed; The Daily Mirror – the most widely read tabloid in 1967 – was pro-
Israel. When I conducted the interviews I was surprised that only Brian, an 
anarchist and therefore atypical of the community, claimed to perceive the war 
at the time in a different way to the Zionist version of events. This might have 
been as a result of the Zionist memorialisation of the war in histories that the 
interviewees had consumed in the past forty years, but the archival evidence 
strongly suggested that at the time the dominant interpretation of the war 
within the British Jewish community was in line with Zionist propaganda. 
Actually seeing the detail of this propaganda and the effort to disseminate it in 
the archive helped resolve a key issue in understanding what triggered the 
British Jewish affective response to the war. 
 
3.6. British Jewish sociology 
 
The other issue with using semi-structured interviews with a sample of 
twelve people is how representative the data was going to be. Twelve 
interviews could only have been suggestive of this and so I needed some 
other method for verifying how representative the interview data was. 
Fortunately, the 1960s saw the rise of British Jewish sociology, with a number 
of scholars (Krausz, 1964; Krausz, 1969 (a); Krausz, 1969 (b); Prais and 
Schmool, 1968; Kosmin and Grizzard, 1974 Prais and Schmool, 1975; 
Krausz, 1981; Gould, 1984) a journal (The Journal of Jewish Sociology) and a 
research institute (the Institute of Jewish Affairs)39 frequently producing 
quantitative (statistical) research on, if not the whole community, then local 
subdivisions of the community. The primary method of data collection in this 
tradition of British Jewish sociology has been surveys of samples averaging 
300 participants. Attitudes towards Israel, Zionism and Zionist organisations 
have been a constant reference point in this research and so it became 
possible to cross-reference what my interviewees were saying with the 
findings of this research. This was particularly useful in the discussion 
                                            
39 The institute of Jewish Affairs was established in New York in 1941 but moved to London in 
1965. 
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sections of Chapters 7 and 8, where as much as possible each interview 
quote, is checked for accuracy against relevant documents from the archive 
and representativeness against statistical data from these quantitative 
studies. No research is ever water-tight in this respect, but a degree of 
historical accuracy is important in a project that wants to understand the 
material (and therefore empirically observable) effects that intensifications and 
dissipations of affect have on collectives of people and the culture that binds 
them. 
 
4. Ethics 
 
Although the central thrust of this PhD is theoretical and not political – it 
looks at the role that affect plays in the creation of new cultural formations, 
using Zionism in British Jewry as a case study – it is still guided by political 
principles, namely wanting to provide an account of how Zionism in Britain 
functions in order that it can be successfully opposed. This political position 
was never disclosed to the participants. What ethical issues does this raise? 
 
The answer to this question is not straightforward. It is quite normal for 
researchers not to disclose their political positions to participants in a bid to 
appear neutral and elicit less ‘biased’ data from the interviews they are 
conducting. However, as mentioned above, this non-disclosure coupled with 
the fact I am a British Jew of Israeli heritage led most of the interviewees to 
believe I was a Zionist, therefore establishing a presumed complicity between 
us that undoubtedly impacted on the research process. Without carrying out a 
controlled experiment to discover what the effects of this presumed complicity 
were – i.e. keeping all the variables of the process the same except having it 
conducted by a self-disclosed anti-Zionist – I can only offer speculation. 
Possibly some participants would not have taken part, as the e-mail exchange 
with Habonim suggests. Possibly some of the participants would have given 
more guarded interviews. Possibly the more confrontational interviewees 
would have relished the opportunity to defend their position producing 
different data that was revealing in a different way. Whatever the outcome, the 
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fact remains that the interviewees agreed to participate in a project in which 
they might not have participated had they been aware of its political position. 
 
My response to this is that whilst recognising the problem, there is 
another set of ethical issues at stake that also need to be considered in this 
project, namely the ethics of what Zionism has meant, primarily, for the 
Palestinians, but also for Jews both inside and outside Israel. This is 
discussed in detail in different parts of the thesis but just to briefly summarise: 
Deleuze defines ethics as encounters between bodies that are mutually 
empowering (1968 (b)) (see Chapter 2). The ethical encounter produced by 
Zionism plainly disempowers Palestinians in often brutal ways, and though it 
has persuaded Zionist oriented Jews that it has empowered them, this thesis 
has provided ample evidence that this is actually not the case. What Zionism 
continues to do is actively perpetuate the sense that Jewry across the globe 
always faces the threat of an existential threat,40 and only a militarised Israel 
will protect them. This, I would argue, amounts to the affective 
disempowerment of the global Jewish ‘body’. The ethical commitment of this 
thesis is to different forms of political organisation that enable encounters that 
are mutually empowering to all the bodies involved in the encounter currently 
known as ‘Israel/Palestine’.  
 
One of the ways that this ethical complexity has manifested itself in the 
research process is in the decision not to show the participants their interview 
transcripts – a common practice in qualitative interview research. For 
example: there was a significant amount of data produced by the interviewees 
that described Arabs, Muslims and Palestinians in racist terms. This, I argue 
in Chapter 8, is a crucial component of Popular Zionism and reveals its 
disempowering ethical nature. Had my participants asked for these 
statements to be edited out of the transcript, the analysis would have been 
severely distorted. Therefore, I made the decision not to give them this 
opportunity. However, as a researcher I still want to protect my participants so 
                                            
40 This threat takes different forms in different historical moments. In 2010 it was the alleged 
nuclear threat form Mahmoud Admenijad’s Iran, which Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu 
implied was similar compared to the threat of another Holocaust (The Jerusalem Post, 2010). 
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have anonymised their data during the process of writing up by changing their 
names and removing revealing biographical information,41 so any politically 
sensitive opinions are completely non-attributable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
41 Although, it is important to note here that Jeremy, Stephen and Brian all explicitly stated 
they had no problem in being named in the final thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Affect and Zionism in the British Jewish Assemblage  
1880–1967 
 
“Desire is always assembled. It is what the assemblage determines it to be.” 
 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 253) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical context in which 
the rise of Popular Zionism took place after the 1967 war. In doing so it will 
argue that it was not the war alone that prompted this rise; instead the war 
occurred at a moment when the British Jewish community was configured in a 
way that pre-disposed it towards having the intensely affective relationship 
with Israel that emerged once the Middle East crisis began. The Six Day War 
acted like a catalyst, actualizing a complex cultural formation that already 
existed within the virtual. In order to make this argument, this chapter will 
analyse the British Jewish community and its development from the 1880s–
1960s, deploying a theoretical framework derived from the ideas of two 
leading Deleuze and Guattari scholars: Manuel DeLanda and Lawrence 
Grossberg, specifically the former’s assemblage theory (2006; 2010) and the 
latter’s Deleuzo-Guattarian reading of Raymond William’s structure of feeling 
(1992, 1997, 2005, 2010). In doing so it will provide empirical evidence (from 
the interviews and archives) for Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of the social in 
which, as the quote that begins this chapter suggests, desire and affect are 
determined by the organization of the assemblages that they flow across.  
 
Using these two conceptual frameworks, this chapter will attempt to 
outline the ‘arrangement’ of the British Jewish assemblage in 1967 and 
narrate the various territorialisations and codings that bring this arrangement 
into being. These include: i) the shifting location of the British Jewish 
community in Britain’s class structure; ii) the shifting location of the British 
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Jewish community in Britain’s racial hierarchies; iii) the role anti-Semitism 
plays in the self-perception of British Jewry and iv) and the types of Jewish 
representation prominent in the popular culture of the 1960s. The second part 
of this chapter will attempt to put the rise of Popular Zionism into a broader 
historical context by outlining the history of Zionism as both a movement and 
an ideology in Britain’s Jewish institutions and amongst ‘ordinary’ British 
Jews. 
 
In outlining these territorialisations and codings this chapter ultimately 
argues the following: by 1967 the British Jewish community was enjoying a 
status in British society it had yet to experience. This can be seen in its 
increased socio-economic position and its place in Britain’s racial hierarchies, 
which had seen a significant reduction in anti-Semitism (Julius, 2010). Despite 
their increased status British Jews still felt a sense of threat living in British 
society (compounded by the fact that the Holocaust was still in living 
memory). This contradictory structure of feeling was reinforced by the 
representations of Jewishness that British Jews were consuming at that time. 
On the one hand the Jew as subject to anti-Semitism (the ghetto Jew) was 
still circulating in the 1960s, but on the other a new representation of 
Jewishness had began to emerge, the defiant Jew who transcended society’s 
anti-Semitic structures. The Six Day War resolved the contradictions in this 
structure of feeling. The Zionist representation of the events of the Arab-Israeli 
1967 war as the victorious Israeli army vanquishing the threat of a genocide of 
Israeli Jews at the hands of anti-Semitic Arab ‘hordes’ is not only a powerful 
counterweight to the stereotype of the ‘ghetto’ Jew but it also persuades 
British Jewry that Jews could be powerful in ways they had just begun to 
experience. Moreover, the powerful Jew, in the form of the Zionist 
representation of the Israeli army would protect diaspora Jewry against any 
existential threat. 
 
2. DeLanda’s assemblage theory 
 
In A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity (2006) and Deleuze: History and Science (2010) Manuel DeLanda 
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develops Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological approach into a theory of how 
societies are formed and how this form changes through time. DeLanda calls 
this theory assemblage theory. As described in Chapter 2, Deleuzo-
Guattarian assemblages are the multiplicities of elements that aggregate to 
form the Plane of Organisation. For Deleuze and Guattari an ‘element’ is any 
singularity that exists on the Plane of Organisation. Their definition of an 
element ignores the ontological distinctions usually made in western 
metaphysics, so a person is an element, as much as a government, a 
mountain or a dream. As a result of this unique ontological approach, the 
basis for DeLanda’s socio-historical analyses is broad and includes such 
diverse phenomenon as cities, the natural environment in which these cities 
have developed, and the laws that are used by a city’s governing institutions. 
However, because his focus is social theory, DeLanda has tended to privilege 
human beings as the principle social actors of history (2010, p. 1). His 
analyses, therefore, have human activity in its various manifestations, as their 
central focus. It is this focus that makes his particular reading of Deleuze and 
Guattari useful in analyzing the British Jewish community through the 
twentieth century.  
 
For DeLanda society is an assemblage and one of its defining 
characteristics is its ‘relations of exteriority’. This term refers to the way an 
individual element connects to other ‘exterior’ elements to create an 
assemblage. An element has a potentially infinite number of relations of 
exteriority which means elements can combine with a potentially infinite 
number of other elements. This means two things: i) the assemblage to which 
it belongs can increase and decrease in size and ii) an element can belong to 
more than one assemblage at one time. Relations of exteriority are not fixed 
so can connect and re-connect with an infinite variety of other elements in an 
infinite variety of ways.42 Herein lies the radical anti-essentialism of Deleuze 
and Guattari; a social field in which none of its relations are inherently fixed 
and therefore can be re-configured in an infinite variety of ways. It should be 
                                            
42 This procedure parallels Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘articulation’, though they use this term in 
relation to the constructed nature of discourse i.e. to refer to the articulation of signs into 
chains of equivalence (1985). 
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made clear that it is not only elements that have relations of exteriority with 
other elements but also assemblages too (everything is an assemblage for 
Deleuze and Guattari/DeLanda, including ‘elements’) and that their 
connections with another, produce a vast network of interconnected 
assemblages that constitute the social field. For DeLanda, everything on the 
Plane of Organisation is an assemblage but the examples he uses most 
prominently in his work on assemblage theory are societies and the human 
assemblages which comprise them: people, couples, families, friendship 
groups, institutions, communities, the market, state organisations. 
 
DeLanda explains that the process by which elements are bought 
together to form an assemblage is two pronged, or what Deleuze and Guattari 
have called ‘double articulation’ (1980). The first articulation involves the 
selection of elements out of which the assemblage will be comprised. In the 
context of a community, this would be the sorting of people into insiders and 
outsiders and the insiders into those of good and bad reputation (DeLanda, 
2010). The results of this first articulation are maintained through processes of 
territorialisation. Territorialisation has two dimensions in this context. The first 
is spatial: putting the elements into close proximity of each other so the 
relations of exteriority that constitute the assemblage are easy to maintain. In 
the context of communities this would be the establishing of neighbourhoods 
(territories) in which the community lives (e.g. Hackney, Redbridge and 
Edgware for Greater London’s British Jewish community in the 1960s). The 
second aspect of territorialisation is the habitual practices that work to 
stabilize the relations of exteriority between the elements that constitute an 
assemblage. DeLanda defines these habitual practices as “the routinization of 
everyday activities”, “repetition of rituals” or the “systematic performance of 
regulated activities” (DeLanda, 2010, p.19). In the British Jewish/Zionist 
context these activities could be the regular attendance of Zionist youth clubs, 
the month long ‘Israel tour’ that numbers of sixteen year old Jews continue to 
attend in the summer or the regular discussion of events relating to Israel as 
they are reported by the press in Britain. Habitual practices such as these not 
only put people into close proximity of each other but also give them a shared 
 
 
83 
experience of the world – a culture – ultimately giving the community its 
identity.  
 
If the first articulation selects the elements out which the assemblage 
will be comprised then the second articulation takes these selected elements 
and arranges them into the configuration that gives the assemblage its 
identity. The first articulation is concerned with the ‘materiality’ of the 
assemblage – the material out of which the assemblage is constituted – and 
the second articulation is concerned with the ‘expressivity’ of the assemblage 
or how that material is expressed. Here DeLanda is building on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use of the Danish linguist Hjemslev who argues the two basic 
analytical units of linguistics are ‘content’ and ‘expression’ (with ‘content’ 
being the substance out of which language is constituted and ‘expression’ the 
fashion in which this content is expressed) (Hjemslev, 1943). As a result of 
the second articulation being to do with language and expressivity Deleuze 
and Guattari call the second articulation ‘coding’. In the context of 
communities DeLanda argues this ‘expressivity’ can take different forms: i) the 
regulations and charters, both written and un-written, in a community (Jewish 
law and custom); ii) expressions of solidarity, verbal and physical (the 
synagogue meetings held during the Six Day War); iii) the narratives that a 
community tells itself that serve to reinforce social cohesion (the Zionist 
narrative that Israel is the only place a Jew can really feel safe serves this 
function in this context). Whereas territorialisation gives a community both a 
material presence (by organizing the people into the networks that constitute 
a community) and a culture (the iterative practices that maintain these 
networks), coding only works to give a community a culture, operating on the 
level of representation.  
 
It is important to state here that just as much as assemblages are 
produced through processes of territorialisation and coding, they can be 
unmade – the elements can be set free – by processes of de-territorialisation 
and de-coding. In the context of British Jewry the most notable process of de-
territorialisation would be ‘assimilation’ (when a minority culture assimilates 
into the dominant culture). Assimilation has been a source of contention within 
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the community through most of the twentieth century.43 A spatial de-
territorialisation could be the migration of Jews into neighbourhoods that 
previously had a low density of Jewish inhabitants. A de-territorialisation of the 
order of habitual practices would be not participating in Jewish rituals like 
circumcision or bar mitzvah, or by marrying someone who is not Jewish. An 
example of de-coding is the virtual disappearance of Yiddish as a language 
spoken by British Jews in the beginning of the twenty-first century when it was 
commonly spoken by the immigrants of the twentieth century, either alone or 
mixed with English.  
 
 It is here, in the notion that cultures and communities are constantly 
being made and unmade, deterritorialised and reterritorialised, coded and de-
coded, that it is possible to see the consequences of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
radical anti-essentialism played out in the socio-cultural. It is also here that we 
begin to see the value of the Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to understanding 
Popular Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture. This approach can be used as 
both a theoretical approach to deconstruct and a political strategy to resist 
and oppose the essentialism in which Zionism is based. In the most general 
sense, this essentialism claims that there is an essential link between ‘the 
Jewish people’ and ‘Eretz Israel’. Specifically for this thesis it has also 
suggested that British Jewish support for some form of Zionism is similarly 
immutable, essential and unchangeable. As this chapter will demonstrate this 
has not always been the case: for example, between 1880 – 1914 Zionism 
was highly unpopular amongst British Jewry with many high profile British 
Jews publicly expressing hostility towards the ideology and the political 
movement acting in its name (Alderman, 1992; Shimoni,1986 (a) , 1986 (b); 
Lerman, 2008). The widespread support Zionism experiences after 1967 
came about as a result of a series of territorialisations and codings – most 
importantly the Six Day War. What this means is that the intensely affective 
relationship that Popular Zionism mediates between British Jews and the 
State of Israel is “inherently changeable: [it] may undergo destablilizing 
                                            
43 One of the driving concerns of much Jewish sociology in Britain has been to trace the 
contours of assimilatory processes in order for them to be countered. In this work 
‘assimilation’ is coded as a negative process for Britain’s Jews. See (Lipman and Lipman, 
1981) 
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processes affecting [its] materiality, [its] expressivity or both.’ (DeLanda, 2010, 
p.33) This Deleuzo-Guattarian, anti-essentialist approach which understands 
the British Jewish support of Zionism and the State of Israel as always 
tenuous (even when it appears most strong) is useful for both Zionists and 
anti-Zionists who have to constantly attempt to produce opposing 
territorialisations and codings in order to further their own political projects. 
 
 However well-suited DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari is for 
making sense of the British Jewish assemblage and the processes that 
produce it, there is an oversight in DeLanda that, if it were the only approach 
applied in this chapter, would miss a crucial aspect of the way the British 
Jewish assemblage changed after the war; that is in either of his works on 
assemblage theory there is no mention of affect. In order to find a DeLandian 
reading of affect we have to turn to an earlier book, Intensive Science and 
Virtual Philosophy (2002), in which he develops a definition of affect in the 
context of pure mathematics and thermodynamic physics. In this book he 
argues that all assemblages, “possess an indefinite number of capacities to 
affect and be affected” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 62). For DeLanda affect is defined 
purely in terms of an assemblage’s ‘capacities’. To illustrate this definition he 
uses the following example: the assemblage of a walking animal, a piece of 
solid ground and a gravitational field. The ‘capacity to affect and be affected’ 
in this context is the capacity of the animal to walk. This capacity only 
emerges in relation to the other heterogeneous elements that constitute the 
assemblage. In defining affect in this way (i.e. purely in terms of ‘capacity’) 
DeLanda misses a crucial aspect of the Massumian definition being used in 
this thesis and defined in Chapter 2. With its attention to the experiential and 
the intensive properties of affect, Massumi’s definition puts it much more in 
line with Deleuze and Guattari’s self-professed vitalism (1991). For Massumi, 
Deleuzo-Guattarian affect is akin to Spinoza’s ‘force of existing’, or energy, 
whereas for DeLanda affect is not energetic, it is functional: the acts enabled 
by an assemblage’s relationship with other assemblages (2002, p. 63). The 
shift in emphasis is important in the context of a thesis that goes onto argue 
that it was specifically the intense affective response of British Jewry’s 
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‘experience’ of the war that triggered the widespread cultural changes that 
occurred in the post-1967 conjuncture.44  
 
2.1. Lawrence Grossberg: affect, assemblage, cultural change 
 
In order to redress this oversight, this chapter now turns to the 
theoretical framework developed by Lawrence Grossberg in We Gotta Get 
Out Of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (1992). 
Grossberg not only uses a definition of affect more in line with Massumi’s but, 
importantly, he places it within approaches developed at the CCCS in the 
1970s and in doing so presents a highly persuasive account of how affect 
works in the context of social and cultural formations. 
 
 As a student of the CCCS under Stuart Hall in the 1970s, Lawrence 
Grossberg is one of the key exponents of a particular type of cultural studies, 
one that draws heavily on the work of ‘cultural Marxists’ (namely Louis 
Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart and E.P. 
Thompson). Grossberg’s unique contribution to this intellectual legacy was the 
introduction of Deleuze and Guattari to ‘cultural Marxism’.  Of this contribution, 
what matters most for this thesis are the similarities he draws out between the 
cultural Marxist and Deleuzo-Guattarian ontologies. The cultural Marxist social 
ontology is outlined in section 4.1 (‘Gramsci’s Ontology’) of Chapter 2. The 
slight difference between Gramsci’s theory of being and the ontology 
developed at the CCCS is that whereas Gramsci holds on to the notion that 
the superstructure is in some non-absolute and highly complex fashion 
determined by the base, the CCCS follows Williams (1973) in arguing that all 
the levels of base and superstructure have the capacity to determine one 
                                            
44 Intensity’ does appear in DeLanda’s ontology but he locates it in Deleuze’s ‘intensive’ as 
opposed to Deleuzo-Guattarian ‘affect’. This could be because he elaborates his Deleuzian 
approach to intensity in the context of thermodynamics as opposed to assemblage theory’s 
concern with human communities. Chapter 6 uses the DeLandian framework developed in 
Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy to make sense of how the intense affective 
response of Britain’s Jewish community to the 1967 war triggered a range of shifts in the 
formal organization of British Jewish culture. To do this the chapter deviates from DeLanda’s 
schema by arguing that in the context of human culture the ‘intensive’ is the ‘affective’ in 
Massumi’s sense. The rest of DeLanda’s approach is retained in Chapter 6 because it 
provides such a persuasive account of how the intensive alters the formal arrangements of 
Deluzo-Guattarian assemblages. 
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another, equally and unpredictably. It is here, Grossberg argues that we begin 
to see the similarity between Deleuze and Guattari and cultural Marxism 
(1997, p. 151). The Marxist ‘totality’ can be understood as all the human 
activity that occurs on the Deleuzo-Guattarian ‘Plane of Organisation’. The 
Marxist concept of ‘social formations’ parallels Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘assemblages’. The ‘relations of exteriority’ between the assemblages are 
similar to Stuart Hall’s use of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘articulations’. Finally, both 
Deleuze and Guattari and cultural Marxism share the idea that the 
assemblages/social formations that constitute the Plane of 
Organisation/totality are connected to one another in multiple, highly complex, 
constantly shifting and non-determining ways. Moreover, both agree that the 
shifting relations of exteriority/articulations are what constitute social and 
cultural change.45  
 
What is particularly useful about bringing cultural Marxism together with 
Deleuze and Guattari is the way that Marxist cultural analysis categorizes 
different types of human praxis. Grossberg calls these types of human praxis 
‘planes’ – a term he takes from Deleuze and Guattari (as in Planes of 
Immanence and Organization). The way Grossberg uses ‘plane’ here is to 
describe an aggregate of assemblages that perform similar functions. So the 
economic plane is the aggregate of the assemblages that perform an 
economic function on the Plane of Organisation. In this context it would be 
Jewish businesses and Jewish charities. If an assemblage performs more 
than one function it will constitute more than one plane. For example, the 
Zionist Federation in Britain performs multiple functions and therefore helps 
constitute a number of planes i.e. the economic, political, and the social. It is 
not just the classic Marxist categorisations of human praxis that provide the 
basis for these planes. Grossberg also writes about the “plane of desire”, the 
“plane of meaning” (1992, p. 44) and the “plane of effectivity” (1997, p. 148) 
and considering the Plane of Immanence constitutes all human and non-
                                            
45 Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia, particularly Anti-Oedipus, was 
consciously written against Marxism. Similarities such as these demonstrate that whilst 
Deleuze and Guattari represent a significant departure from Marxist thought they never 
entirely escape its influence. See (Thoburn, 2003) for an in-depth examination of the parallels 
between Deleuze (and Guattari) and Marx. 
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human activity, both virtual and actual, the scope for what planes might exist 
becomes similarly all encompassing. Ultimately, the concept of ‘the plane’ 
becomes a useful tool when analyzing the place of any assemblage in the 
context of its wider relations of exteriority (one that is lacking from DeLanda’s 
assemblage analysis). 
 
For all the similarities that Grossberg draws out between cultural 
Marxism and Deleuze and Guattari, the crucial difference is the lack of 
attention that Marxism in general has paid to affect (or any libidinal agency of 
any sort, for that matter). The key place in Marxist theory in which affect (of 
sorts) does appear, Grossberg argues, is in Raymond Williams’ concept 
‘structure of feeling’. One of the ways that Williams defined a structure of 
feeling was as the “disturbance, tension, blockage [and] emotional trouble” 
that emerges in between what is expressed in a culture and that which is lived 
but not yet expressed” (cited in Grossberg, 1992, p. 409). Grossberg’s 
ultimate assessment of Williams’ theorisation is that “to a certain extent [he] 
failed to theorise the added depth that the notion of ‘feeling’ brings” 
(Grossberg, 1997, p. 152). In order to redress this, Grossberg adds Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of affect to his otherwise cultural Marxist approach. 
 
 In a 2010 interview Grossberg explicitly addresses this move: 
 
“Stuart Hall might say isn’t it the structures of meaning that make the 
relations [of a conjuncture]? I would say: ‘but no, the difference is you could 
have ideological interpellations but people do or do not invest in them.’ The 
meaning-structures have to somehow be affectively charged for it to 
constitute your experience.” 
 
    [My emphasis] (Grossberg, 2010, p. 317) 
 
In this quote Grossberg explicitly addresses Hall’s move beyond Marxism into 
the post-structuralist concern with meaning (pre-figured by Althusser’s work 
on ideology) and its lack of attention to the affective dimensions of culture. A 
similar criticism could be made of DeLanda’s assemblage theory and the way 
it privileges the structural arrangements of society as opposed to the flows of 
affectivity these arrangements allow. Grossberg describes the relationship 
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between assemblage and affect in his description of the Plane of Organisation 
as, “a system, a particular arrangement… that could take on various forms, 
and could be reorganised; a kind of range of possibilities. A virtual realm of 
machinic assemblages that organize the energy or investment in life”. [My 
emphasis] (Grossebrg, 2010, p. 312). For Grossberg one of the key functions 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic assemblages are the flows of affectivity 
that they produce across the Plane of Organisation. Every different 
arrangement of these assemblages produces a different flow of affectivity 
both qualitatively (the type of affect) and quantitatively (the intensity or force of 
the flow) (Grossberg, 1997, p. 159). So the arrangement of assemblages that 
emerge within a particular conjuncture, in turn produce a spectrum of possible 
ways of feeling in that conjuncture.  
 
Using the various terms set out by DeLanda and Grossberg, the 
remainder of this chapter will begin by using sociological and historical data to 
outline the various territorialisations and codings that gave the British Jewish 
assemblage its 1967 configuration. In doing so it will argue that by 1967, the 
British Jewish assemblage was situated on the Plane of Organisation in such 
a way that meant it was already pre-disposed to the intensely affective 
relationship with Israel that emerged as a result of the war. It will argue this by 
demonstrating how the organisation of the British Jewish assemblage in the 
1960s produced contradictory flows of affectivity across it. The community’s 
‘improved’ position in the racial and economic hierarchies of 1960s Britain 
increased its sense of confidence and power. However, as the interview data 
suggest, they were never able to rid themselves of the threat of anti-Semitism, 
despite it being at its lowest ebb in British history (Julius, 2010). Their 
intensely affective ‘experience ‘ of the war resolved this contradiction by 
presenting them with an image of Jewish power (a victorious Israel) that not 
only reflects their changed material position in British society but also 
convinces them of the Zionist claim that the only solution to anti-Semitism in 
Britain was the existence of a strong State of Israel.  
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3. An assemblage analysis of the British Jewish community in 1960s 
Britain 
  
In order to perform an assemblage analysis of the Jewish community in 
1960s Britain this next section will identify the following aspects of the 
assemblage: the elements; the processes of territorialisation and coding that 
organise these elements into an assemblage; the relations of exteriority that it 
has with other assemblages most relevant to Popular Zionism, and finally the 
flows of affectivity that circulate across the assemblage as a result of its 
arrangement. 
 
3.1. Territorialisations: population and immigration 
 
The ‘elements’ in this context are the individual Jews who are living in 
Britain. Between 1961 and 1965 Prais and Schmool estimate the Jewish 
population in Britain numbered at 410,000 (1968). If the first articulation is 
defined as the territorializing processes that select the elements that will 
constitute an assemblage, then in the context of British Jewry in the 1960s the 
most significant of these was the process of immigration. Existing historical 
evidence suggest Jews first arrived in Britain during the rule of William the 
Conqueror in 1066 (Langham, 2005). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
chart Jewish immigration into Britain from the eleventh century, and for 
reasons that will become clear, it is the series of immigrations from the end of 
the nineteenth century that had the most significant territorializing effects in 
creating the British Jewish assemblage as it existed in the 1960s. These will 
be the focus of this subsection. 
 
Of these series of immigrations the most significant was of the Jewish 
communities who fled the anti-Semitic pogroms that took place in Russia’s 
Pale of the Settlement at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1880 the 
population of British Jewry numbered approximately 50,000 (Bentwich, 1960). 
At this point the Jewish community’s roots in Britain reached back to the pre-
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Emancipation period.46 In the 1880s British Jews were primarily middle class 
with the exception of a small and influential group of Jews who had become 
part of the British establishment. These included families ‘of reputation’ such 
as the Rothschilds and the Montiefores. Between 1880 and 1914, the 
emigration from Tsarist Russia meant the Jewish population in Britain grew by 
nearly five times to 240,000 (Alderman, 1992). This migration fundamentally 
changed the character of Britain’s Jewish community from one of post-
Emancipation English, middle class respectability to one in which the majority 
are poor Yiddish speaking working class immigrants. Of the interviewees 
Rose and Jeremy spoke explicitly about have roots in this immigrant 
community. This migration was in many ways the primary territorialisation 
from which many of the others that shaped the British Jewish assemblage in 
the 1960s flow. The next significant wave of immigration came after 1945 
when between 50,000 and 60,000 Jews fleeing post-Holocaust central Europe 
move to London. Rose’s father was from central Europe as were both Vivien’s 
parents. The final immigration to impact on the constitution of the assemblage 
were the Jews who emigrated from former British colonies in the 1950s 
totalling between 2,000 and 3,000 people. Stephen, with an Egyptian father, 
was the only interviewee who came to Britain as part of this migration. As a 
result of these various migrations and the high birth rate, particularly of the 
East European/Russian Jews, the Jewish population in Britain was at its 
highest in 1955 numbering 450,000 (Alderman, 1992). The birth rate steadily 
dipped until the present day (producing a population of 267,000 in 2001 
(ibid.)) pointing to various deterritorialisations, which will be discussed below. 
 
3.2 Territorialisations: areas of settlement 
 
The second territorialisation that shaped the British Jewish assemblage 
was the establishment of heavily populated Jewish neighbourhoods in Britain 
that occurred particularly after the post-pogrom migration. At the beginning of 
                                            
46 The Jewish Emancipation was the process whereby Europe’s Jewish communities were 
granted equal rights as citizens of the nation-states in which they lived. The process began in 
the late eighteenth century and ended in the early twentieth century. In Britain the Jewish 
Emancipation ended in 1890 when the restrictions based on religion for official positions 
within the British Empire (except that of monarch) were removed. 
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the twentieth century Jewish immigrants settled in the areas where 
immigrants had traditionally settled throughout modern British history, that is 
the impoverished and overcrowded centres of Britain’s large cities – notably 
the East End of London. During this period 80% of London’s Jews lived in the 
working class areas of Stepney, Bethnal Green and Poplar (Alderman, 1992). 
Both Zena and Harry lived in London’s East End. In Leeds Jews settled in the 
Leylands district and in Manchester, in Red Bank. Throughout the course of 
the twentieth century British Jews slowly moved away from what became 
known as ghettos and into slightly more affluent areas: Stamford Hill and 
Hackney in London (by the 1950s, Hackney had the densest population of 
Jews in the country), Camp Road, Chapel Town and Moortown in Leeds and 
Prestwich and Whitefield in Manchester. Stephen, Evelyn and Sarah resided 
in either Stamford Hill or Hackney during this period. This movement to more 
affluent areas is an indication of the social mobility of British Jews in this 
period that will be discussed in greater detail below. By the 1960s the social 
mobility of British Jews began to accelerate and the process of 
suburbanization deepened. For example, London’s Jewish population began 
to move out of Hackney to London’s suburbs, notably Edgware, Finchley and 
Redbridge. This process continued into the final decades of the twentieth 
century, by which point many primarily Jewish neighbourhoods (some of 
which were as far out as London’s ‘green belt’) were amongst the most 
affluent in Great Britain.47 All the interviewees, aside from anti-Zionists Brian 
and David, currently live in suburbs of London or Manchester. 
 
There are two important trends to take note of with regard to patterns 
of Jewish settlement in Great Britain between 1900 and 1967: i) regardless of 
where in the UK Jewish people have lived, the majority have always chosen 
to live with each other. In 1969 a survey undertaken on ‘Jewish Commitment 
in London’ found 76% of Jews “felt it important to live in an area where there 
were a significant proportion of Jews” (Gould, 1984). This spatial 
                                            
47 To give some indication of this, the 2001 census revealed that the area in Britain that has 
the highest concentration of Jewish people is Radlett in Hertfordshire: Jews make up 24.1% 
of Radlett’s population compared to an average of 0.5% in the rest of the country. In 2011, 
local newspaper The Borehamwood and Elstree Times reported that property in Radlett was 
the second most expensive place to buy property in the south east of England (Sharma, 
2011). 
 
 
93 
concentration achieves dense networking of the elements (i.e. British Jewish 
social networks) within the assemblage.  As this chapter will go on to 
demonstrate, this networking loosened over the course of the twentieth 
century but never in a way that a distinctive British Jewish culture and identity 
ceased to be maintained. ii) The pattern of settlement also reflected the 
upward social mobility of British Jews in the twentieth century, moving out 
from impoverished urban centres to the more affluent suburbs as the century 
progressed. In terms of this thesis, this upward social mobility is the most 
significant sociological trend in the development of the British Jewish 
assemblage in the twentieth century and will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
 
4. Relations of exteriority: the British Jewish assemblage’s shifting 
location in British society 
 
 The next stage in understanding the British Jewish community in terms 
of DeLanda’s assemblage theory is to understand how this community 
connects to other assemblages around 1967 – that is to map its relations of 
exteriority. Every assemblage is connected to a multitude of other 
assemblages and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to chart all the 
relations of exteriority of the British Jewish assemblage in the 1960s. This 
subsection will therefore concentrate on the relations of exteriority that most 
affect and were most affected by the Six Day War. These can be divided into 
three general areas: i) the relations that the British Jewish assemblage has to 
‘British society’ across the economic plane. ii) The relations that it has with 
other ethnic groups in Britain’s racial hierarchies (across the plane of 
ethnicity) and iii) its relation to Israel as it is mediated by Zionism, particularly 
across the affective plane. This relationship will be the subject of a much 
larger discussion at the end of this chapter. 
 
4.1. Upward social mobility: class and employment 
 
In terms of the social mobility of British Jews throughout the course of 
the twentieth century the 1960s was a key period of transition from being a 
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primarily working-class community to being a primarily middle-class one. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century British Jewry was largely comprised of 
poor Eastern European immigrants. However by the century’s end the 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of these immigrants had become 
largely assimilated (though with a strong sense of Jewish identity), anglicised, 
suburban and middle class. Geoffrey Alderman has suggested this social 
mobility was driven by the Jewish community’s “desperate insecurity” to 
socially integrate into a society that had marginalized them (Alderman, 1992). 
The reason these aspirations were able to begin materializing specifically in 
the 1960s was due to broader and more long-term territorialisations that were 
occurring both in and around the British Jewish assemblage in the period. The 
first are society-wide and had the potential to effect the population on the 
national level. These are the Education Act of 1944 – making all secondary 
education free, giving people who entered employment in the 1950s and 
1960s an increased chance to enter professions; the Welfare State initiatives 
of the 1945 Labour government increasing the life chances of Britain’s poor 
(of whom Jews were a part in the pre-1945 era); and Britain’s buoyant 
economy in the 1960s. There are two reasons why these factors had a more 
substantial effect on Britain’s Jews specifically. The first was the decline in 
anti-Semitism across British society in the post-Holocaust period opening 
access to areas of British society that Jews had previously been denied. This 
was compounded by the fact that the children and grandchildren of 
immigrants spoke English as a first language, and practiced Judaism as a 
religion far less ardently, making it easier to integrate into British society than 
it was for the first wave of Jewish immigrants at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The second reason is that because anti-Semitism was more 
pervasive in pre-1945 Britain the Jewish community was not properly 
absorbed into Britain’s rigidly defined class structure. This meant that given 
the right conditions (a decrease in anti-Semitism coupled with the sorts of 
redistributive policies bought about in the post-1945 period), the British Jewish 
working class could move around this structure with greater flexibility than the 
traditional British working class, increasing the opportunity for social mobility. 
All these larger historical forces coalesce in the 1960s, in a fashion that 
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results in the upward social mobility of the British Jewish assemblage in 
relation to the other assemblages whose connections are constitutive of it. 
 
 An indication of the social mobility of British Jews can be found in a 
seminal piece of British Jewish sociology carried out by Ernest Krausz called 
the Edgware Survey.48 In it Krausz measures the occupational distribution of 
the respondents of the survey comparing it with that of their fathers.  
 
Categories Respondents’ Fathers Respondents 
Professional 3.9% 15.5% 
Employers and 
Managers 
21.8% 42.2% 
Skilled Manual Workers 51.0% 32.5% 
Non-Manual Workers 4.7% 5.7% 
Semi-Skilled Workers 17.0% 1.8% 
Unskilled Workers - - 
(Adapted from (Krausz, 1969 (a), p. 84) 
 
The generational change in the first two categories and the last two are the 
most striking. In 1962-3 15.5% of the younger generation are professional 
compared to 3.9% of their fathers. 17% of the father’s generation were semi-
skilled workers compared to 1.8% of their sons. It is also revealing to point out 
that 53% of the Jews living in this middle class suburb were born in the East 
End. From these statistics Krausz concludes that “… the Edgware group has 
a very high upward mobility.” (1969 (a), p. 88). This is confirmed by research 
undertaken by Prais and Schmool (1975) who compare occupational 
distribution for the Jewish community as a whole and compare it to that of 
British society in general. Prais and Schmool find that 4% of the Jewish 
population are in a profession compared to 2% of the general population. 
                                            
48 The survey took place between 1962 and 1963 and questioned 1290 people spread over 
382 households and was designed to discover fundamental sociological information about the 
Jewish community living in Edgware, a recently populated Jewish suburb. The findings were 
published in a series of articles in the Jewish Journal of Sociology in 1969 (Krausz, 1969 (a), 
Krausz, 1969 (b)).   
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They also find that 13% of the general population are in unskilled employment 
compared to 0% of the Jewish population.  
 
The type of occupation in which Jewish people were employed in the 
1960s confirms their upward social mobility, suggesting reasons as to why 
this had taken place and also revealing something of the way Jewish people 
felt living in the assemblage of British Jewish society. In the immediate post-
Emancipation period, up until the mass immigration of 1880s British Jews 
tended to be employed in traditionally middle and lower middle class jobs 
such as merchants, traders and artisans (Bentwich, 1960). After the Tsarist 
migrations of the early twentieth century, the class character of the Jewish 
community changes because Jewish immigrants provided cheap labour, 
mainly for the UK’s clothing industry (what was popularly known as the ‘rag 
trade’ throughout the twentieth century, or in Yiddish the ‘schmatta trade’). 
Joseph worked for a textiles manafacturer in Manchester in the late 1960s. 
This was the largest area of employment up until 1945. In the 1960s Jews 
may have been over-represented in the professions such as law, medicine, 
dentistry, pharmacy, accountancy and higher education (Alderman, 1992) but 
these were not the largest areas of employment for Jews in Britain in this 
period. The most popular areas of employment were in fact market trading 
(Stephen became a market trader) and taxi driving (Harry was a taxi driver) – 
one third of taxi drivers in London were Jewish (ibid.). Many others ran their 
own companies, managed shops or ran modest manufacturing enterprises 
(ibid.)  (Jeremy ran a lighting manufacturer with his father). What is important 
to note here is that these are areas in which one is primarily self-employed. 
The most significant trend in British Jewish employment in the 1960s was self-
employment: 66.7% of Jews are self-employed in the 1960s compared to 
7.4% of the general population (Krausz, 1969 (a)). Krausz argues that, “many 
Jews strive to work on their account either because they think they have been 
discriminated against by employers, or because they fear that such 
discrimination might occur when applying for a job or when seeking a 
promotion” (Krausz, 1969 (a), p. 77). This means two things: i) the perception 
that there is anti-Semitism in Britain structures the employment decisions of 
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the British Jewish community.49 This runs counter to the fact that anti-
Semitism is actually on the decrease in the 1960s (as will be demonstrated 
below) and this decrease actually maximises the potential for Jewish 
economic prosperity in the 1960s.  
 
4.2. Relations of exteriority: the shifting location of Jews in Britain’s 
racial hierarchies 
  
 It is not only the British Jewish community’s economic and political 
relations of exteriority that shifted during the 1960s but also its relations of 
exteriority on the plane of ethnicity that moved in parallel ways. As British 
Jews became more suburban and more middle class – or as they fell more in 
line with dominant mid-century British socio-cultural aspirations – their 
difference as Jews became less marked than the generation before them. 
This is caused by a variety of territorialisations both internal to the 
assemblage and external to it in British society.50 
  
 In terms of an assemblage analysis of British Jewry across the plane of 
ethnicity a useful starting point is a framework developed by Freeman that 
Krausz then applies to British Jewry between 1962 and 1977 (Krausz, 1981). 
In this framework, Freeman develops a spectrum of assimilation that an ethnic 
minority can exist on in a society, depending on the cultural values of that 
minority and the societal setting they find themselves in. This spectrum is 
divided into three sections: ethnocentrism, assimilation and acculturation. 
Krausz describes ethnocentrism as, “the exaggeratedly favourable evaluation 
                                            
49 According to Stephen, it also influences the employment decisions of British Jews at this 
time:  
“Did your mum and dad ever tell you that they faced anti-Semitism, or maybe they did 
but they never said anything to you? Like maybe at work… 
Jando’s was a Jewish company, Jewish people running it. So no. That’s what you did. You 
got a job because someone knew someone… everyone in my area, my age group, went to 
the West End in the schmatta trade. ‘Can you get my son a job?’ It was jobs for the boys, and 
people you know rather than were you good at it.” (Stephen, p. 346) 
This is another way in which the assemblage maintained its dense networking. 
 
 
50 There is no internal and external as such in DeLanda’s assemblage theory as all the 
elements in across the social field are constitutive parts of multiple assemblages, meaning all 
assemblages are complexly interwoven. The terms external and internal are away of 
delineating these assemblages for analytical purposes. 
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of a group’s own system, culture and values and its likely to set barriers 
between different ethnically based groups.” Assimilation, “refers to those 
changes that bring about the disappearance of one ethnic group by its 
complete submergence into another” and acculturation is “a process whereby 
an ethnic group assumes in many respects the culture and values of the 
general society in which it exists but, at the same time, maintains it as a 
separate entity” (Krausz, 1981, p. 19). Where a minority community is located 
on this spectrum depends on their stage of development, their strength vis-à-
vis other ethnic groups, their societal context and their links to other societies 
(ibid). In the British Jewish context between 1962 and 1977, Krausz argues 
that the majority of British Jewry was acculturated.51 He argues that this 
occurs as a result of “the British structural and cultural scene… becoming 
more ethnically pluralistic in its orientation” (ibid.),52 ultimately concluding that 
British Jewry in British society between 1962 and 1977 is on, “an acculturation 
continuum inside a pluralistic setting.” (Krausz, 1981, p.  22). He explains this 
as a situation in which: 
 
“… an historically dominant culture persists in many areas of life and the 
notions of a minority and immigrant group still prevail, but where an incipient 
notion of plural cultural values is developing a somewhat changed social 
structure. Thus dominant-subordinate relationships are becoming less 
pronounced and there is a tendency towards greater acceptance of cultural 
exchange and adjustment on behalf of both the native British population and 
the more recently established ethnic groups.”53 
(Krausz, 1981, p.18) 
 
 What Krausz’s analysis gives us here is a sketch of the relations of 
exteriority that the British Jewish assemblage had with the assemblages of 
British society across the plane of race and ethnicity, and the arrangement the 
assemblage assumes as result. In the 1960s and 1970s, the dense networks 
                                            
51 Krausz mentions that the Chassidic Jews of London’s Stamford Hill are ethnocentric. 
52 Krausz qualifies this by arguing that because ethnic minorities in Britain in the 1960s and 
1970s do not experience full social equality that British society is ‘quasi pluralist’ (Krausz, 
1981, p. 19). 
53  Krausz’s assessment of British race relations in the 1960s and 70s is perhaps overly 
positive, in that it does not adequately account for racism at either the institutional or popular 
levels. It does, however, make more sense when applied to British Jewry as opposed to the 
Black-British, Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi communities, because, as will be described in 
greater detail further on, British Jewry was far more assimilated into British society in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
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that defined the Jewish assemblage in Britain in the first half of the century 
were loosening, allowing greater freedom for its elements to intermingle with 
the assemblages around it, eroding the barriers that define it. These networks 
do not however loosen completely, with the Jewish community still holding 
together as a distinct, ‘acculturated’ assemblage. These shifts can be 
evidenced in the following deterritorialisations: the decline in Jewish religious 
practice and the subsequent ‘anglicisation’ of British Jews. They occur for a 
variety of complex reasons: the territorialisations on the economic plane 
outlined above i.e. the embourgeoisement of British Jewry and the 
relationship with Israel (which will be detailed below). This subsection will 
detail the territorialisations of the plane of ethnicity, namely the decrease in 
British anti-Semitism post-1945 and the rise of postcolonial racism in Britain 
post-1950s. 
 
 By 1967, Jewish identity in Britain had lost much of its religious 
content. In Krausz’s Edgware survey he finds that 73.9% of Jews only attend 
synagogues on High Holy Days54 (Krausz, 1969 (b)). He had already 
commented on the loss of religiosity in British Jewish life in his earlier study of 
Leeds Jewry (1964) where he notes that although approximately 5,000 
families belong to the United Synagogue, “most of [their] members adhered 
only to some of the traditional rules in their private lives, completely ignoring 
others” (Krausz, 1964, p. 107). The religious laws Leeds Jewry adhere to 
strictly were circumcision, burial in a Jewish cemetery and attending 
synagogue on High Holy Days. The rules practiced with moderate 
commitment were eating kosher food, lighting the Sabbath candles and fixing 
a mezuzah55 to the doors of the house. The rituals that Leeds Jewry did not 
                                            
54 Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashana are the High Holy Days of Judaism; Yom Kippur lasts a 
day and Rosh Hashana lasts two, with the majority of Jews only attending synagogue on the 
first day. This means three-quarters go to Synagogue twice a year (or a maximum of three 
days if they attend the second day of Rosh Hashana). It must be noted here that synagogue 
attendance on these days can often be out of a sense of obligation rather than religious 
commitment and these services can have the atmosphere of a social occasion as opposed to 
a religious one. 
55 A mezuzah is piece of parchment inscribed with the words of the Jewish prayer, the shema. 
It is very often contained in a decorative case, Biblical law dictates that a mezuzah should be 
fixed to all the doorframes of a Jewish house. 
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follow are that of the mikvah56 and observing the Jewish Sabbath. It is 
revealing of the place of religion in the British Jewish assemblage that the 
rituals which are practiced the least are the ones that would most interrupt the 
everyday lives of the Jewish people should they practice them. Krausz 
concludes: “The net result is that the Jew has become more like his gentile 
neighbour, as he has become more acculturated. There is no doubt at all that 
religion as a force of control has become considerably weaker than during the 
early years of the community” (Krausz, 1964, p. 112). This is supported by a 
study carried out by Gould (1984) (in which the fieldwork was undertaken in 
1969 and 1970) which found a marked decrease in religious ‘commitment’ 
between the adults he interviewed and the adults of their parents’ generation 
with commitment being measured by the habitual practice of religious rituals. 
Of the interviewees, Jeremy, David, Joseph, Rose and Brian were all what 
might be called ‘High Holy Days’ Jews during the 1960s. Evelyn, Stephen and 
Sarah were more religious. 
 
Aside from the embourgeoisement of British Jews, one of the most 
significant causes of British Jewish acculturation in the 1960s was the 
reduction of anti-Semitism in British society. This affected the British Jewish 
assemblage in two ways. The first is that it increased their potential for 
integration into British society (as evidenced by their upward social mobility 
outlined above). The second is that although it objectively decreased, British 
Jews still felt it was as pervasive as it was during its height in the modern 
period between 1880 and 1945. In the Edgware Survey 78% of the 
respondents had said that they experienced no anti-Semitism at all compared 
to 0.8% who said they experienced a great deal. However Krausz theorises 
that 66.7% of the same respondents are self-employed because of their fear 
of anti-Semitism in the job market. This is corroborated in his study of Leeds 
Jewry where he concludes that Jews are sensitive to anti-Semitism and may 
see it where it does not exist (Krausz, 1964, p. 126). Krausz’s findings are 
confirmed by Anthony Julius’ extensive (though problematic)57 study of anti-
                                            
56 A mikvah is a ritually purifying bath. 
57 Its major problem being that the final part of this book elides anti-Zionism with anti-
Semitism. 
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Semitism in Britain Trials of The Diaspora (2010), in which he argues that 
between 1945 and 1967, anti-Semitism is at its lowest ebb (pp. 335–336). 
Paradoxically, the fear of anti-Semitism maintains the dense networking of the 
assemblage even as its decline allows greater freedom across the economic 
plane of British society.  
 
In terms of the interviewee’s experience of anti-Semitism a 
contradictory narrative emerges within their transcripts. Zena (p. 412), Evelyn 
(p. 484), and Joseph (p. 547) all claimed that they had strong experiences of 
anti-Semitism growing up in pre-1945 Britain. In terms of anti-Semitism in 
post-1945 Britain, Sarah remembers feeling different as a Jewish person but 
does not recall anti-Semitism as such. Brian only recalls anti-Semitism in 
reaction to the Irgun’s bombing of the King David hotel in 1946 (p. 572). Rose 
(p. 646) and David (p. 448, p. 462) do not recall experiencing anti-Semitism. 
This fits into Krausz’s findings outlined above. Contradicting these findings is 
Jeremy (p. 416), the only interviewee to attest to repeated instances of anti-
Semitism in the post-1945 period. Stephen claims that he experienced anti-
Semitism but in a way that is quite revealing of the position of Jewishness 
within Britain’s racial hierarchies in this period. Shortly after recounting a story 
that unexpectedly links being called a ‘Jew-boy’ near his school in Stamford 
Hill to the Holocaust, he then says the following: 
 
“Throughout my life, though I haven’t come across too many anti-Semitic 
incidents directed at me there’s always been that hidden fear that you’re 
always waiting for the next pogrom.”  
(pp. 358–359) 
 
Here Stephen notes that although his experiences of actual anti-Semitism are 
few, he is always fearful of it because of the history of pogroms. This is in 
keeping with Krausz’s findings that there despite there being a decline in anti-
Semitism, it still structures the British Jewish experience.  
 
One of the key reasons for the decline in actual anti-Semitism is the 
growth of racism towards postcolonial migrants and the ways in which British 
Jews were positioned and positioned themselves within Britain’s racial 
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hierarchies in the 1960s. In fact, in Krausz’s acculturation thesis, he argues 
that the post 1945 ‘coloured’ migration is one of the most significant events to 
have impacted British Jews on the plane of ethnicity in this period. Between 
1948 and 1956, a total number of 40,000 people from the Caribbean 
immigrated to the UK; between 1948 and 1961 over 100,000 Indian and 
Pakistani nationals immigrated. With Jewish immigration reduced to a trickle, 
these migrants replaced East European and Russian Jews as the focus of 
anti-immigration discourses. One of the structuring principles that organises 
Britain’s postcolonial racial hierarchies was skin pigmentation (Nava, 2007). 
Aside from the Jews who migrated from Britain’s ex-colonies (most notably 
Egypt and India), who totalled between 2,000 and 3,000 of the 410,000 Jews 
in Britain in the 1960s, the majority of Jews in Britain were of European 
extraction and therefore much closer in skin pigmentation to the general 
British population. As a result Jews suffered less racism. As Julius argues in 
this period, “anti-Semitism had become something of a minority taste among 
the members of far right groups, while racist attacks on New Commonwealth 
immigrants acquired greater salience” (Julius, 2010, p. 336)  
 
The impact of postcolonial immigration on Britain’s Jewish community 
is complicated. As Jeremy remarked in his interview: “Fortunately [the 
National Front] wasn’t against the Jews was it? It was against the Caribbeans 
[sic] and all the blacks coming in to work on the railways and stuff like that” (p. 
426). In the 1960s and 1970s there was more than just relief amongst British 
Jews that racism had shifted to newer ethnic minorities. Krausz reports that in 
his fieldwork, “discriminatory and derogatory remarks can be frequently heard” 
(Krausz, 1964, p. 131) against Jamaicans. Alderman corroborates the rise of 
racism in the British Jewish community in a discussion of the conservative 
political inclinations of Immanuel Jakobovitz, the chief Rabbi of British Jewry 
from 1967-1991: “in particular, he faithfully reflected a feeling of antipathy 
towards the aspirations of Britain’s black communities that is undoubtedly 
widespread within British Jewry” (Alderman, 1992, p. 349). The majority 
British Jewish relations of exteriority being formed on the postcolonial plane of 
ethnicity are not with the new ethnic minority assemblages, with whom they 
have a shared experience of racial discrimination, rather they begin to form 
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relations with ‘white’ British society with whom they are also integrating with 
on the socio-economic plane.  
 
4.2.1. Relations of Exteriority: Intermarriage 
 
A final way to consider the relations of exteriority on the plane of 
ethnicity in the 1960s is to look at the amount of intermarriage that took place 
within the Jewish community at the time. Prohibited in Jewish law, 
intermarriage had traditionally been seen as a problem for the community by 
its leading (and more conservative) bodies like the Board of Deputies and the 
United Synagogue (Lipman and Lipman, 1981). It is difficult to know how often 
it occurred in the 1960s because, according to Schmool (2009), statistics for 
intermarriage in the British Jewish community do not exist prior to 1994. She 
gives two reasons for this: i) statistical data on marriage collected by the 
Jewish community is based on synagogue weddings (where only Jews can 
marry Jews) and ii) British statuory data does not require that the religion of a 
person be noted at the time of marriage. However, at a conference held by 
the Board of Deputies on 2nd April 1962 Norman Cohen quoted a report from 
The Jewish Chronicle that estimated intermarriage constituted 15% of all 
marriages where one of the partners was Jewish (1964, p. 51, p. 65). This is 
relatively low, but he also claimed that, “public opinion is no longer outraged 
by intermarriage” (p. 51). This coupled with the fact that by 1995 50% of 
married/partnered men under thirty were in interfaith partnerships (Schmool, 
2009, p. 63) is evidence that further suggests that the dense networking of the 
British Jewish assemblage was slowly loosening on the plane of ethnicity in 
the 1960s. 
 
5. Flows of affectivity  
 
  A recurrent theme in the research undertaken by sociologists in the 
1960s is the suggestion that the British Jewish assemblage is somehow more 
‘affectively charged’ in comparison with the rest of the British population. For 
instance in Krausz’s study on Leeds’ Jewry he finds intermarriage between 
Jews and non-Jews is thought not to work by the Jewish community in Leeds 
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and interprets this dominant attitude arising as a result of “… the difference in 
personality make up. This is expressed, for example, by a belief in the 
‘Yiddishe Heart’ which the gentile is said to lack and that the belief that no 
close feeling can come about between a Jew and a Gentile because of an 
inner psychological gulf that exists between the two” (Krausz, 1964, p. 104).58 
In Julius Gould’s study on Jewish commitment he speculates as to “whether 
it’s true that such Jewish families build up tensions of a kind and intensity not 
found in other families.” [My emphasis] (Gould, 1984, p. 15). Gould also asked 
his 217 participants what they felt were the positive distinctive features of 
Jewish people. Twenty-seven answered ‘warmth’ and ‘sincerity’ (the most 
popular answer was ‘a concern with family life’, with thirty-nine responses) 
(ibid). The self-perception of the Jew as emotionally warmer than the non-Jew 
appeared in the interviews for this thesis. Jeremy said, “…Jewish people are 
much warmer. There’s more feelings. Non-Jewish people can be quite cold” 
(p. 442). This greater emotional intensity is understood in more negative 
terms by Sarah who said, “We’re more neurotic really aren’t we? Well aren’t 
we? So intense! So self-punishing, self-attacking; we’re complex, we’re 
neurotic, we’re aggressive...” (p. 541). 
 
 One interpretation of the Jewish self-perception that they are more 
emotionally intense than non-Jews is because they have internalised Jewish 
stereotypes that circulated at the time (Krausz, 1964). The construct of the 
over-emotional Jew has a long history (Gilman, 1991) but potentially becomes 
more vivid in twentieth century British culture which structures notions of 
Britishness around ideas of emotional restraint (the ‘stiff upper lip’, ‘British 
reserve’). In order for this construct to be maintained Jews, like other ethnic 
minorities, become British culture’s over-emotional ‘Other’. The argument that 
Jews see themselves in the same terms as a result of the internalization of 
this stereotype is a persuasive one but it is also possible to understand this 
phenomenon within the terms of assemblage analysis. For Grossberg, the 
intensity and type of affectivity that flows across an assemblage is dependent 
upon the arrangement of the elements that constitute the assemblage and its 
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relations of exteriority on the Plane of Organisation. The chief characteristic of 
the British Jewish assemblage, ‘acculturated’ in Krausz’s terms, is the 
arrangements of its elements into a dense network that maintains a relatively 
strong sense of difference between itself and other ethnic groups. According 
to the terms of assemblage analysis, affectivity flows across a relatively 
densely networked, self-contained (though loosening) assemblage in a more 
intense fashion. The reason for this is as follows: if the defining characteristic 
of the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology is its perpetual dynamism, then the 
affectivity which flows across it will always be mobile regardless of how 
stratified the section of the Plane of Organisation it is flowing across. In self-
contained, densely networked assemblages the mobility is the same but the 
space in which these flows of affectivity have to manoeuvre is smaller 
therefore increasing the intensity with which it moves. Rose touches upon the 
dense-networking of the Jewish community and the affectivity that flows 
across it in her interview: 
 
“The non-Jewish people who I meet think very highly of the Jewish family 
connections. When I go and talk about Friday night supper… really Friday 
night supper, in terms of a family, it stays together until the children move 
out. Most of the people I know, the children are at home for Friday night 
supper. The non-Jews say to me, ‘we used to do that Sunday lunch time but 
the children are all doing different things and we go shopping now’. And 
they’re very jealous of it, very jealous of it. The family connection. I have to 
say to them that the ideal is wonderful but it doesn’t always happen. I try and 
explain ‘broyges’59 to them […] I say that you can have lots of broyges too.”  
 
(Rose, p. 673) 
 
 
Here Rose thinks Jewish families have a greater propensity for ‘broyges’ 
because of the rituals that maintain the dense networking of the community as 
a whole. This analysis makes ‘Jewish emotional intensity’ a material fact 
(though not an ‘essential’ one – different material conditions will produce 
different flows of affectivity) rather than merely a self-perception based on the 
internalization of a stereotype. The two approaches, however, are not 
incommensurable: self-perceptions have material effects i.e. the living out of 
the edicts of the stereotype because it has been successfully internalized. 
                                            
59 Yiddish word meaning quarrel or argument 
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Giving ‘Jewish emotional intensity’ a non-essentialist material basis is 
important for this thesis because it could explain why Zionism and the British 
Jewish relationship with Israel might function more on the affective plane of 
the assemblage than anywhere else within this assemblage in the post-1967 
conjuncture. 
 
According to Grossberg, flows of affectivity have both a quantitative 
and qualitative dimension – an intensity and a type. If the British Jewish 
assemblage was organised in such a way during the 1960s that it was pre-
disposed to more intense flows of affectivity then what are the dominant types 
of affect flowing at the time? The most significant types of affect have already 
been touched upon in the above sections on the transforming position of 
British Jews both socio-economically and racially. Both these factors 
increased the confidence and the sense of power and status that Jews felt 
living in Britain. This is intersected, however, by the fear that British Jews are 
still the victims of anti-Semitism. This fear could take on monstrous 
dimensions in the idea that was popular at the time that anti-Semitism’s 
logical conclusion was the Holocaust, which had only occurred around twenty 
years prior to the 1960s, meaning it was still in living memory. Therefore, the 
British Jewish affective plane is animated by a mix of not only confidence and 
power but also fear that in times of emergency can take on monstrous 
dimensions in the form of fear that a Holocaust could happen again. This pre-
1967 ‘structure of feeling’ enables an understanding of why British Jews 
began to invest so intensely in Israel and Zionism as a result of the Six Day 
War. The dominant British Jewish interpretation of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
was that a strong Jewish people rose up to miraculously fended off a 
genocide of Israeli Jews at the hands of anti-Semitic Arabs. This interpretation 
of events alters the organisation of the British Jewish affective plane. It 
enables the belief that a militarily strong Israel will protect British Jews from 
anti-Semitism, which they perceived as always lingering in the background of 
British society. The way they understood the war assuaged this fear. The 
changes occur therefore, not only in the relationship British Jews have with 
Israel but also the way they feel as Jews in Britain. A more detailed discussion 
of the Zionist construction of the Six Day War, the affectivity it generates and 
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the impact this construction has on British Jewry is the subject of Chapters 6, 
7 and 8. What is important to note here is that the Six Day War functions 
largely on the affective plane of the British Jewish assemblage: producing its 
own flows of affectivity whose impact is so large because they resolve the 
contradictions of this plane as it was organised in the 1960s.  
 
6. Coding: coding Jewishness in 1960s popular culture 
 
 In the same way that the 1960s was a moment of transition, in terms of 
the territorialisations that occurred across the social, economic, political and 
‘racial’ planes of the British Jewish assemblage, so it was for the codings that 
contributed to the organization of the assemblage in this period. This section 
argues that the majority of representations of Jewishness being consumed by 
British Jews60 in the 1960s nostalgically looked back at the impoverished and 
disempowered lives they, their parents and grandparents were moving away 
from in the post-1945 period. However, at the same time a new representation 
of Jewishness was tentatively emerging, one that began to reflect, in a more 
explicit way, the increased power they were experiencing in these new lives. It 
goes onto argue that it was only after the spectacular display of Jewish power 
that emerged in the Zionist construction of the 1967 war that representations 
of Jewish power became incorporated into British Jewish cultural identity in 
any meaningful way. It is beyond the scope of this section to look at all the 
representations of Jewishness consumed by British Jews in this period, so 
instead it will concentrate only on the most popular: the West End production 
of Fiddler on the Roof (1967), the West End production of Funny Girl (1966), 
starring Barbra Streisand, and Exodus (1960).  
 
                                            
60 Although British Jews were cultural producers in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. authors such 
as Wolf Mankowitz and Emmanuel Litvinoff) and much of their cultural production had 
representations of Jewishness at their heart (Litvinoff’s The Lost Europeans (1962) and The 
Man Next Door (1968); Mankowitz’s book and film A Kid for Two Farthings (1953; 1955)), the 
most widely consumed representations of Jewishness by Jews in this period had been 
produced in the United States. Richard Hoggart had expressed concern about the 
Americanisation of working class cultural consumption in the 1950s (1957). The cultural 
consumption of British Jews in this period unfolded in-line with this trend. Zena’s ‘Popular 
Zionist’ cultural consumption is evidence of this. 
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Fiddler on the Roof, in both its theatre (1967) and film (1971) versions, 
was the most popular representation of pre-1945 Jewish life that the just 
becoming affluent British Jews were consuming in this period. Set in 1905 
Tsarist Russia, Fiddler… tells the story of Tevye a poor milkman trying to 
uphold the traditions of shtetl61 life that the onset of modernity had begun to 
erode. The narrative culminates in a pogrom that forces the shtetl’s 
inhabitants to leave Russia and embark in the sort of migrations detailed 
above. Cultural critic Michael Staub reflects on the pleasures of American 
Jews watching Fiddler… in a way that is relevant to British Jews in the same 
period: “These comforts of hearth and home provided Jews many things, 
among them the improbable chance to wax nostalgic over the travails of shtetl 
life in late nineteenth century Czarist Russia” (2004, p. xvii). 
 
Tevye exhibits many attributes of the classic Jewish archetype of ‘the 
ghetto Jew’. The ghetto Jew has existed in European culture, at least since 
the Middle Ages (Aschheim, 1982). The characteristic features all stemmed 
from him (invariably he was male (Boyarin, 1997)) living in, if not the ghettos 
of Europe, then certainly its impoverished, Jewish majority areas. Living in a 
ghetto invariably meant this archetype was poor and lived at the whims of the 
host culture, a fate he was very often resigned to. Though not true of Tevye, 
the ghetto Jew could be excessively bookish – a creature of the mind and not 
the body. Ghetto Jews had developed a sophisticated ‘Jewish sense of 
humour’ as a means to negotiate the pitiful hand that life had dealt him. There 
are various examples of this type of Jewishness circulating across the British 
Jewish assemblage at this time: in the tales of early 20th Century East End 
Jewish life in Mankowitz’s A Kid for Two Farthings  (1953, 1955) and in 
Emmanuel Litvinoff’s Journey Through a Small Planet (1972); in the sexually 
neurotic ‘overly-intellectual’ representations of Woody Allen’s comedy persona 
and the literature of Philip Roth (1959; 1969). In fact, the 1960s saw a rise in 
the prominence of Jewish culture in the West (Stratton, 2000; Staub, 2004) 
and arguably, the archetype of the ghetto Jew was the most prominent of the 
representations that constituted this output. 
                                            
61 Shtetls were the Jewish only villages and towns that existed in the Pale of the Settlement 
prior to the Holocaust. 
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 That there had been such a proliferation of Jewish representation in 
1960s popular culture on its own points to the transition in the British Jewish 
community that is underway in the 1960s. This proliferation of Jewish 
representation demonstrated the upward mobility of Jews in western 
societies, specifically the culture industries. During this period certain 
representations of Jewishness emerged that represent an evolution of the 
ghetto Jew archetype that still tended to dominate in this period. The satirical 
and anti-establishment comedy of Lenny Bruce is one example, as is the 
music of Bob Dylan and poetry of Allen Ginsberg. Dylan’s cultural output 
rarely traded on his Jewishness, Ginsberg’s more so,62 but these three artists 
represented more empowered ways of being Jewish that differed from the 
archetype of the ghetto Jew. The most mainstream version of this more 
empowered representation of Jewishness was Barbra Streisand, specifically 
in her role as Funny Girl’s (1966) Fanny Brice, a feisty Jewish vaudeville 
entertainer who, through talent and determination, escapes her poor Lower 
East Side origins to become a wealthy Broadway star; therefore paralleling 
the sociological shifts occurring in British Jewry at the time. Herman (1998) 
argues Streisand’s success (“a watershed in Jewish film history” (p. 172)) also 
reflected shifts across, what this thesis calls, the plane of ethnicity. 
 
“Streisand’s ability to be unapologetically Jewish and wildly famous at the 
same time is due, in large part, to the effects of the countercultural 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which sanctioned overt ethnicity as a 
form of revolt against the white male Anglo-Saxon protestant ruling elite. 
Aggressively ethnic figures such as Streisand were accepted as part of the 
rebellion against homogenized WASP norm of the… early 1960s, which had 
been hegemonic in film as it had been in society.”  
(Herman, 1998, p. 172) 
  
Herman’s quote points to the ways in which both Streisand’s star 
persona and the characters she plays both explicitly and often defiantly 
celebrate Jewishness. The type of Jewishness she refers to has its roots in 
the wisecracking and impoverished ghetto Jew archetype just discussed – 
much of Funny Girl’s humour comes from Brice being a poor, Lower East Side 
                                            
62 ‘Kaddish’ (1961) is one of Ginsberg’s most famous poems and is named after and inspired 
by the Jewish mourning prayer. 
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Jew out of her depth in the rich world she is ascending into.63 A more radical 
departure from this archetype and one which represents a more powerful form 
of Jewishness is the Zionist representation of Jewishness that is the character 
Ari Ben Canaan in Leon Uris’ novel Exodus (1958), played by Paul Newman 
in Otto Preminger’s film version (1960). Ben Canaan is arguably the most 
popular representation of the Zionist ‘New Jew’ that had been formulated 
since the beginning of Zionism specifically to counter the ghetto Jew 
representation (Presner, 2007). If Zionism saw the ghetto Jew passively 
accepting his place in the world, its New Jew construction actively railed 
against it. If the ghetto Jew was overly intellectual, the Zionist New Jew was a 
creature of the body – a warrior and a farmer. According to Zionism, the Jew 
physically withered in the ghettos of Europe, and the only place he could 
flourish was in his homeland, Eretz Israel. Ari Ben Canaan was the most 
popular representation based on this archetype by the 1960s (Loshitzky, 
2001, p. 1). Evidence of the impact of Exodus on British Jewry appears in the 
interviews undertaken for this thesis. Zena bought her VHS copy of the film 
with her to the interview. Evelyn (p. 488) and Harvey (p. 593) both talked 
about it having an instrumental effect on either their or someone they knew 
becoming more Zionist. If Exodus popularized the notion of the New Jew, 
Friedman argues that it was only after the 1967 war that Diaspora Jews 
actively began to identify with this representation: “After the Six-Day-War… 
you didn’t have to associate yourself with Woody Allen; you could identify with 
Paul Newman” (cited in Loshitzky, 2001, p. 1), thus pointing to the catalytic 
effect that the Six Day War has in re-organising the codings that contribute to 
the production of the British Jewish assemblage in the post-1967 conjuncture. 
New representations of Jewishness may have been emerging in the 1960s 
(Barbra Streisand, Ari Ben Canaan) amongst the more familiar 
representations (Fiddler on the Roof, Woody Allen) but it was only after the 
intensive processes triggered by the Six Day War in the British Jewish 
community (see Chapter 6) that these representations are incorporated into 
British Jewish cultural identity (see Chapter 7). 
                                            
63 In one scene, Brice is offered some pate to which she responds, “I drink it all day”. After 
eating it she jokes, “Just some dried-out toast in a sliver/ On the top a... a little chopped liver!” 
in her most comedy ‘Jewish’ sounding voice. 
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7. The History of Zionism in Britain and the British Jewish relationship 
to Israel 1890–1967 
 
 The territorialisation to have the most direct effect on the rise of 
Popular Zionism amongst British Jewry post-1967 is the waxing and waning of 
the influence that Zionism (as an ideology and as a movement) has as an 
organising principle of the British Jewish assemblage and their relations of 
exteriority not only to Israel but also to British society. Since the emergence of 
modern Zionism in the 1890s until 1967, the popularity of Zionism went 
through a number of peaks and troughs. As this section will demonstrate, the 
‘popularity’ that Zionism achieved amongst British Jews in the post-1967 
conjuncture was not inevitable. In fact, up until the establishment of the State 
of Israel in 1948, Zionism and the idea that there should be a State of Israel in 
Eretz Israel was “deeply divisive” in British Jewry (Kosmin et al. 1997, p. 3). In 
the decade leading up to the 1967 war, Zionism’s popularity was in decline. 
“The transition from Zionism as a minority interest to Israel as a point of 
consensus for the British Jewish Community was not easy” (ibid.). 
 
 Over the course of the twentieth century Zionism unfolded primarily 
across two planes of the British assemblage: the institutional plane and the 
popular plane. The institutional plane refers to the organized groups of British 
Jewry that perform a civic function. The plane can include an institution as 
prominent as the Board of Deputies, who operate as the main representatives 
of British Jewry, or as small as a local literary group. It can also include Zionist 
organisations such as the Zionist Federation, or organisations that do not 
have Zionism as their main focus; a key indicator of Zionism’s popularity is to 
what extent it influences the decisions made by this sort of Jewish institution. 
The plane can also be groups who are not Jewish but have a large amount of 
Jewish members i.e. trade unions.  
 
It is important to note here that traditional histories of Zionism in Britain 
have concentrated on Zionism on the institutional plane i.e. detailing the 
establishment of Zionist organisations, the influence of Zionism on Jewish 
organisations and the interaction of Zionist leaders and ideology with the 
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British establishment (Shimoni, 1986 (a), 1986 (b); Alderman, 1992; 
Endelman; 2005). This concentration on ‘the great men’ of Zionism in Britain, 
as opposed to the history of the popularity of Zionist ideology amongst the 
bulk of Britain’s Jewish population, is reflective of two things: i) the 
conservative nature of much research in the area and ii) the ready availability 
of archival material relating to the institutional plane compared with the scant 
amount relating to the popular plane. The result is that any attempt at 
constructing a narrative of the history of modern Zionism at the popular level, 
based on the existing literature, becomes difficult (though not impossible). 
What follows is an attempt to do so by using what limited material already 
exists, and establishing connections between the institutional and popular 
planes.  
  
7.1. Zionism in Britain: 1880–1914 
 
“At first sight, British Jewry at the end of the nineteenth century might not 
have appeared a very fertile soil in which Jewish nationalism might grow.”  
 
(Alderman, 1992, p. 211)  
 
Zionism first appeared in Britain in the 1890s, brought over by the 
mass migration of Jews fleeing the Tsarist pogroms in Russia’s Pale of the 
Settlement. Of all the political ideologies that these immigrants brought to 
Britain, Zionism was a minority interest; the most widespread was 
communism. The reason for communism’s popularity in this period was that it 
directly addressed the most pressing concerns of immigrant Jews in Britain in 
this period, namely their poverty. Zionism appealed to a minority of idealists; it 
was not popular amongst British Jewry in this period. Alderman estimates that 
during the period before 1914 only 6% of Jews in Britain supported Zionism 
(1992). At the institutional level the first Zionist organization to be established 
in Britain was a branch of the East European group Hovevei Zion (translated 
as Lovers of Zion) and attracted exactly the sort of person just described. 
Other such organisations began to appear in Britain later in the decade 
serving a similar constituency, for example Leeds’ first Zionist Society Agudas 
Hazionim was established in 1898, with a lady’s and youth sections opening 
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in 1900 (Krausz, 1964). The English Zionist Federation, which eventually 
became the key Zionist organization in the communal life of British Jewry, was 
also established in 1898.64  
 
 Some of the earliest evidence that Zionism was unpopular within British 
Jewry includes statements made by Chief Rabbi Herman Adler in 1897 in 
which he calls the First Zionist Congress (which had convened in Basel, 
Switzerland in August of that year) “an egregious blunder” and denounced the 
idea of a Jewish state as “contrary to Jewish principles” (Alderman, 1992, p. 
212). The hostility of these comments would become a refrain in the approach 
that the British Jewish establishment65 took towards Zionism up until 1948, 
although the grounds for the hostility would be different. The Chief Rabbi’s 
claim that a Jewish state was contrary to Jewish principles continues to be the 
central idea of Jewish religious anti-Zionist discourse in the present day. The 
central tenet of this discourse is that only when the messiah comes can there 
be a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. Any attempt to establish one before this time 
was contrary to Jewish law. This position was a marginal one within early 
British Jewish anti-Zionism and remains marginal today. The dominant 
critique of Zionism most popular amongst the British Jewish establishment 
was that it broke what they understood to be “the Emancipation Contract” 
(Shimoni, 1986 (a), p. 22) implicitly agreed upon when Jews acquired full 
emancipation into British society over the course of the nineteenth century. As 
the British Jewish establishment understood it, by acquiring emancipation 
Jews in Britain had a “moral undertaking” (ibid.) to divest themselves of any 
Jewish national attributes and assimilate into the cultures of the host nations 
where they lived. This assimilationist approach rested on the idea that 
Jewishness was a religious, not a national identity and it was therefore 
possible for Jews to be loyal citizens of the countries in which they lived. 
                                            
64 Theodor Herzl first visits Britain in this period, arriving in London on 21st November, and is 
introduced to a number of Jewish notables by the writer and activist Israel Zangwill. In April 
1896 Herzl’s book Der Judenstaat is translated into English and published in Britain. 
 
65 The term ‘British Jewish Establishment’ refers to the leaders of British Jewish 
organisations, such as the Board of Deputies and the United Synagogue, Jewish charities, 
Jewish businesses like Marks and Spencer. In some cases the British Jewish Establishment 
is intertwined with the British establishment, like the Rothschild family who in 1885 had a 
member sitting in the House of Lords.  
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Zionists, on the other hand, believed that Jewishness was both a religious and 
a national identity and that Jewish national identity could only achieve its 
fullest expression in the realization of either Jewish sovereignty or autonomy 
in Eretz Israel. As the assimilationist establishment saw it, in advocating 
Zionism you undermined your loyalty as a British subject, threatening the 
tenuous security Jews had achieved in Britain as a result of emancipation. It 
also, they believed, fed the anti-Semitic accusation that Jews had no right to 
live in Britain because they could never be fully British.66 The conflict between 
the British Jewish establishment and the Zionists would proceed along these 
lines until 1948, when the establishment of the State of Israel more or less 
ended anti-Zionism within the Jewish community.67 
 
 7.2. Zionism in Britain: 1917–1929  
 
The next significant moment in the rise of Zionism in British Jewry was 
the Balfour Declaration on 2nd November 1917. This was a formal 
commitment on behalf of the British government to the main Zionist 
organisations that it supported the establishment of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine. The main section of the text was as follows: 
 
“His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” 
(cited in Yapp, 1987, p. 270) 
 
                                            
66 Chaim Weizmann supported Britain’s leading anti-Alienist and MP for Stepney. He once 
said, “the fact is inescapable that many Zionists and Anti-Semites share in common the 
conviction that integration into non-Jewish society was impossible and that basically the 
Emancipation was a mistake” (Alderman, 1992, p. 229). Conversely British anti-Semites 
supported Zionism as evidenced by an editorial written in the anti-Semitic paper The New 
Witness on 11th October 1917: “We have repeatedly affirmed… our sympathy with the cause 
of Zionism” (Shimoni, 1986 (a), p. 23). Conceptually anti-Semitism and Zionism are co-
terminous. Both share a similar social ontology, structured by ethno-nationalism, in which 
people are segregated into distinct ethnic entities wedded to distinct territorial spaces. It is 
therefore logical that they should manoeuvre across the political plane in a parallel fashion. 
67 Assimilationism was not the only perspective anti-Zionism was fought from. The communist 
Jews in Britain often denounced Zionism through the Yiddish language paper Arbiter Frand 
arguing that poor Jews in Palestine should be helped through charity but that Zionism was a 
bourgeois plot designed to undermine the proletariat. 
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The declaration came about as a result of much politicking on the institutional 
plane between Zionists like Chaim Weizmann (president of the Zionist 
Federation) and Nahum Sokolow (secretary of the World Zionist Congress), 
members of the British Jewish elite like Baron Walter Rothschild, members of 
the British establishment like editor of The Manchester Guardian C P Scott 
and the British Government, namely Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary and 
author of the document. Despite its tremendous significance for political 
Zionism, particularly in Palestine, it had little impact on the popular plane, as 
Kosmin et al. argue “[The Balfour Declaration] did not signal a sudden and 
rapid rise in the fortunes of British Zionism. If anything it entered a period of 
decline and failed, at the time, to become a mass movement” (1997, p. 3). 
This was reflected in the declining membership of the Zionist Federation in the 
1920s (Shimoni, 1986 (a)). The impact on the institutional plane of British 
Jewry, however, was significant. With the British government apparently 
favourable to Zionism, Zionist organisations such as the Zionist Federation 
became less dogmatic and more realistic about what they are able to achieve 
(Shimoni, 1986 (a)). This conciliatory stance deepened after Britain was given 
mandatory powers in Palestine by the Treaty of Sèvres in 1919.68  
 
Anti-Zionism on the institutional plane also modulated and a newly 
developed ‘non-Zionism’ (ibid.) emerged in this period. Non-Zionism differs 
from anti-Zionism, for while they both agree that Jews are not a distinct 
national entity and therefore there should not be a Jewish national homeland 
in Palestine, non-Zionism does not actively oppose Zionism and in some 
instances co-operates with British Zionist organisations in aiding Jewish 
development in mandatory Palestine. The most high profile manifestation of 
non-Zionism was an organization called the League of British Jews, a group 
established twelve days after and in response to the Balfour Declaration.. 
Non-Zionist organisations such as the League of British Jews wanted to aid 
Jewish immigration as long as it did not oppose their view that people of 
different religions and ethnic origins could live together in the same state. 
                                            
68 The Treaty of Sèvres was the peace treaty agreed between the Allies and the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of the First World War, which partitioned the Ottoman Middle East into 
British and French spheres of influence. As part of the treaty, it was agreed that Palestine 
would fall under the mandate of the British Empire. 
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Although the League of British Jews could never have claimed to be popular – 
the maximum number of members at any one time was 1,300, drawn mostly 
from the British Jewish establishment (the inaugural chairman was Lionel de 
Rothschild) – it did reflect a shift in thinking about Zionism in the British 
Jewish assemblage from the indifference and hostility of the pre-1914 period.  
 
7.3. Zionism in Britain: 1929–1939 
 
A series of events occured, globally and on the British scene, in the 
late 1920s and 1930s that changed the fortunes of Zionism amongst British 
Jewry. The first was the rise of anti-Semitic fascism not only in Britain, but 
across the West, particularly in Nazi Germany. The second were the Arab 
revolts against Zionist immigration to Palestine and the British government’s 
response to them. On the institutional plane, Zionism became stronger in 
these new historical arrangements and at the popular level, British Jews 
became more receptive to Zionism as an ideology because it claimed to 
protect them against their growing vulnerability in the new world order (Plane 
of Organisation) of the 1930s.  
 
 Anti-Semitism substantially increased in Britain the 1930s. The most 
visible representation of this increased anti-Semitism was the rise of Oswald 
Moseley’s British Union of Fascists (1932–1940). The BUF was explicitly anti-
Semitic and particularly popular in London’s East End, where it appealed 
mainly to white working class people unsettled by the changes Jewish 
immigration was bringing to the areas in which they lived (Kushner and 
Valman, 1999). Anti-fascist resistance was at least as strong as the British 
Union of Fascists, joining together various groups on the political left and 
certain parts of the Jewish community (the two were closely interwoven in the 
pre-1945 period). The most prominent anti-fascist group, partly because it 
was the best organized, was the Communist party who lead the largest anti-
fascist demonstration in Britain in the 1930s, in what came to be known as the 
Battle of Cable Street. Though the Communists lead the anti-fascist 
resistance in Britain, the Zionists did play a part, aligning themselves to other 
anti-Fascist Jewish groups like the Jewish People’s Council Against Fascism 
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in 1936. This explicitly anti-fascist stance contrasted with the non-Zionist 
British elite like the Board of Deputies who did very little to resist fascism,69 
arguing that fascism should be addressed by the British authorities. The 
Zionists exploited the British Jewish elite’s approach to anti-Semitism to suit 
their own agenda. For instance, the leader of the Zionist Federation’s youth 
organization the Federation of Zionist Youth (FZY) Aubrey Ebban70 wrote in 
1937, “the greatest obstacle in the face of Zionism and all progressive 
movements in the community is the antiquated tradition of Anglo-Jewish 
aristocracy” whose neutrality in the face of fascism he claimed was ‘suicidal’ 
(cited in Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 93). The result of the Zionist organization 
representing the approach of the British Jewish elite to rising anti-Semitism as 
passive and ‘suicidal’ was that, “Zionism became a force on the ascendant in 
Anglo-Jewry during the 1930s… by associating themselves with [anti-fascist] 
activism and expressing dissatisfaction with the timid conventionality of the 
patrician communal leadership, Zionists were able to enlarge their base of 
support in Anglo-Jewry” (Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 91).  
 
 The late 1920s and 1930s also saw a series of events occur in 
Palestine that contributed to the rise of Zionism on both the popular and 
institutional planes. In August 1929 the tensions between the Yishuv and the 
Palestinians in Palestine peaked in a series of events that Zionists call the 
‘Arab Riots’ and Palestinians (and Palestinian supporters) call the ‘Arab 
Resistance’. In these events 116 Arabs and 133 Jews were killed. The most 
notorious of these events, from the British Jewish perspective, was ‘the 
Hebron Massacre’ in which approximately sixty-five Jews were killed. The 
British government responded by issuing the Passfield Paper in August 1930, 
which attempted to limit Zionist aspirations in Palestine (in terms of 
immigration and land purchasing) in order to protect the interests of the Arab 
population. The Arab resistance and the white paper caused distress across 
the institutional plane of the British Jewish assemblage, uniting non-, anti- and 
pro-Zionist organisations (non-Zionist groups like the Union of Jewish Women 
                                            
69 The Board of Deputies was also against the boycott of German goods in the 1930s. 
70 Who would change his name to Abba Eban, and would become the State of Israel’s 
Foreign Minister between 1966 and 1974 (i.e. during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war).  
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and Liberal Jewish Synagogue expressed identification with the Jews of 
Palestine). Equally as distressing to Briitsh Jewish organisations were the 
recommendations of the MacDonald White Paper of 1939, which reneged on 
the British commitment to partition Mandatory Palestine into two states, one 
Jewish and one Arab, as set out by the terms of the Peel Commission of 
1937. What the white paper instead suggested was that once Britain lost its 
mandate to govern Palestine, the country would become an Arab state with a 
Jewish minority. What angered British Jews the most, Zionists and non-
Zionists alike, was the limitation on Jewish immigration the white paper set in 
place – a cap of 75,000 between 1940 and 1944 – designed to ensure the 
Jews remained a minority. By 1939 the future for Jews under Nazi rule on the 
eve of war looked grim and limiting Jewish emigration to Palestine was 
perceived as cruel by Jews in Britain. In fact, by the end of the 1930s the 
gathering clouds of war and what it might mean for the Jews in Europe made 
Jewish people in Britain feel insecure in a more general sense. For reasons 
about to be discussed, the affective atmosphere generated by the geo-
political arrangements between Britain, Palestine and Europe made British 
Jews more receptive to Zionism as a way to feel protected during a time of 
increased anti-Semitism. 
 
The territorialisations that occurred across the British Jewish 
assemblage in the 1930s had significant effects on the fortunes of Zionism. 
The institutional plane of the assemblage underwent an almost total 
territorialisation by Zionism: “the Zionist Federation in effect became the most 
dynamic and powerful force in the organized life of British Jews.”(Kosmin et 
al., 1997, p. 4). By 1939, the traditionally non-Zionist Board of Deputies 
elected an avowed Zionist, Selig Brodetsky, as its head. By this time, “in many 
organisations not directly concerned with Israel, the dominant lay and 
professional personnel were very often motivated by their Zionism. Practically 
speaking Zionism and support for Israel became all pervasive” (ibid.). On the 
institutional level both anti- and non-Zionism diminished into insignificance by 
1939, decreasing further by 1948 (disappearing completely after the 1967 
war). In the 1930s the popular level of the British Jewish assemblage is 
immune to the degree of Zionist territorialisation that occurs on the 
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institutional plane. There was a rise in membership of Zionist organisations: in 
1928/9 the World Zionist Organization has 9,721 members, in 1932/3 this 
rose substantially to 17,719 members and in 1938/9 23,513 (Shimoni, 1986 
(b), 91). However, as Joe Jacobs the secretary of the Stepney Communist 
Party wrote, “the Jews in East London are not yet in favour of Zionism. That is 
not to say that many Jews are not Zionists. The majority did not see this as a 
solution to their problems. They saw themselves as British Jews” (Alderman, 
1992, p. 271). This was corroborated in the newspaper The Young Zionists, 
which wrote, “among Jewish working class young people Zionism has made 
no headway. The tendency in the best part of our Jewish working class… is to 
join the Communist party” (ibid.). The relations of exteriority around the British 
Jewish assemblage in 1930s did open up greater areas of receptivity to 
Zionism within the assemblage. One of Zionism’s organizing principles is the 
idea that anti-Semitism is ahistorical, that it will always threaten Jews living in 
the Diaspora and the only place they can feel safe is in a State of Israel. It is 
logical then that when the historical arrangements coalesce in such a way as 
to parallel Zionism’s ahistorical claims i.e. anti-Semitism, both real and 
perceived, are on the increase, that Zionism becomes more persuasive as an 
ideology and therefore more popular.  
 
7.4. Zionism in Britain: 1939–1967 
  
The events in the decade leading up to the establishment of the State 
of Israel, including the establishment itself, had a dual effect on the place of 
Zionism in the British Jewish assemblage. On the institutional plane, the 
1940s paradoxically represents both the height of Zionist territorialisation but 
also the beginning of its decline, specifically after the establishment of the 
State of Israel in 1948. On the popular plane, Zionism as an ideology became 
accepted, in part because the state now exists but mainly because of the way 
Zionism came to be articulated to the Holocaust in the minds of Diaspora 
Jewry i.e. the State of Israel as ‘insurance’ (Gould, 1984), a safe haven in the 
event should another another anti-Semitic genocide be attempted. 
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In the pre-1948 period, Zionism was a political force that militated for 
either Jewish sovereignty or autonomy in some part of ‘Eretz Israel’. On 15th 
May 1948 Zionism achieved its goal with the establishment of the State of 
Israel, as recognized by the United Nations. “By the time the state was 
established in 1948, Zionism had indeed become a mass movement among 
British Jews and arguably the single most powerful force within Anglo-Jewry” 
(Kosmin et al. 1997, p. 4). This statement perhaps over-evaluates the place of 
Zionism in Britain in the 1940s; the expression “mass-movement” is not 
qualified and suggests that the majority of British Jews were political Zionists 
in the 1940s when evidence from the period suggests that they were not. 
However, when applied to the institutional plane this statement is accurate. In 
1942 Zionist and non-Zionist groups from across the globe attended the 
Biltmore conference in the USA in response to the growing awareness of the 
Nazi genocide of European Jewry. The outcome of this conference was the 
demand that ‘Palestine become a Jewish Commonwealth’, which, Shimoni 
argues, radicalised Zionism at an international level mainly because 
previously non-Zionist groups became fully committed to Zionist goals. In 
November 1944 the Board of Deputies in Britain issued a ‘Statement on Post 
War Policy’ reproducing the demands of the ‘Biltmore Declaration’, putting 
them at odds with the British Government’s post-1939 White Paper position. 
The ex-Leader of the Board of Deputies and non-Zionist Neville Laski notes in 
1943, how, “in geometrical progression the Zionists have assailed and 
captured the synagogues, literary societies, youth institutions and quasi 
political institutions of the community” (Shimoni, 1986 (b), p. 98). Zionism 
became more radical pre-1948 and more Jewish institutions became Zionist, 
achieving the maximum territorialisation of that plane to date. Non- and anti-
Zionist groups still existed even after the establishment of the State of Israel, 
namely the Anglo Jewish Association, the Liberal Synagogue and The Jewish 
Fellowship. 
 
After the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 Zionism’s fortunes 
changed once again: “In the ultimate success of organized British Zionism 
were sown the seeds of decline”. As Ernest Krausz remarks in his study of 
Leeds Jewry in 1958/9: “With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, 
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Leeds Zionists shared in the enthusiasm of Zionists elsewhere, although they 
soon had to face a waning of that enthusiasm on the part of their supporters 
once the sense of achievement had been felt. Whilst fundraising activities 
have been successfully maintained, the accent during the last few years has 
been on a greater cultural link with Israel to be achieved by increased 
educational activities” (Krausz, 1964, p. 20). Post-1948 Zionist activity shifted 
away from the political plane (demonstrations, letter-writing, forming bonds 
with other political groups, meeting with MPs) typical of the 1930s and moved 
onto the cultural and economic planes (charity) where it was exercised with 
less intensity in comparison to the Zionist activity of the 1930s and early 
1940s. In terms of the popular plane: pre-1948 the idea that a Jewish nation–
state might even exist could be and was contested. However, once the State 
was established –an act that was widely understood in the West as the UN’s 
response to the Holocaust – the contestability of the state decreased within 
the mainstream of British Jews. Up until 1967, that the State existed at all is 
accepted as a fact of life by the majority of British Jews. It is only Jewish 
political radicals like interviewee Brian who question the existence of a Zionist 
state in this period. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate in some depth the position of Israel and 
Zionism in the British Jewish assemblage between 1960 and 1967. Just to 
surmise here: by the 1960s a picture emerges from the existing literature and 
the interview data collected for this thesis of support for Zionism fading. The 
existence of the State of Israel remained accepted as a given fact and this 
was a monumental achievement for the Zionist project, however Zionist 
activity in Britain remained mostly depoliticized (Krausz, 1964) and the 
affectivity that Britain’s Jews invested in Israel became muted: “even the 
enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal as a form of nationalism, which not so long 
ago reached great heights, appears to be on the wane” (Krausz, 1964, p. 
115). The interview data reinforces Krausz’s findings: 
 
“[Israel] was a Jewish country that’s all.”  
(Jeremy, p. 418) 
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“I had no sense of anyone not thinking that Israel was as much of a social 
fact as France.”  
(David, p. 452) 
 
“Israel was just something in the back of my mind… Israel was just a kind of 
thing in the background. There was a country there that I was born in and 
that we had lots of family there and I would go to.”  
(Stephen, p. 362) 
 
If, as these quotes suggest, prior to 1967 the affectivity that British Jews 
invested in Israel was of low intensity, this radically changed after the Six Day 
War. As Chapter 7 attempts to demonstrate an affective investment in Israel 
became a crucial component of British Jewish cultural identity. Similarly, after 
the war, (a variation of) Zionism territorialised the British Jewish assemblage 
in almost its entirety. Aside from some strands of the British ultra-Orthodox, 
there was not a single assemblage on the institutional plane that was not 
‘captured’ by Zionism. Moreover, the way that Zionism operated on the plane 
of the popular is less like a political ideology and much more like an affective 
disposition (see Chapter 8 for detailed evidence of this).  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter places Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory alongside 
Lawrence Grossberg’s Deleuzo-Guattarian cultural Marxism in order to outline 
the historical context of the rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish 
community after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. In doing so, this chapter has 
argued that the 1960s was a key decade of transition for British Jewry, both 
socio-economically (the process of their embourgeoisement is well 
underway), and racially (they begin their incorporation into the dominant racial 
structures of British society). These new socio-historical arrangements 
produced new flows of affectivity across the British Jewish assemblage; 
different ways of feeling Jewish in Britain, namely an increased sense of 
power in British society that is undercut by a fear of anti-Semitism and the fear 
of a potential second Holocaust. This contradiction was reinforced in the 
codings that organised the British Jewish assemblage, i.e. the representations 
of Jewishness they are consuming. In the main these represent Jews as 
powerless to anti-Semitism; though images of Jews defying anti-Semitism do 
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begin to emerge in this period. Arguably this pre-1967 arrangement pre-
disposed the assemblage to the changes that occur as a result of the war. 
The Zionist representation of the 1967 war simultaneously convinced British 
Jews that Jews (mainly Israeli Jews) could be powerful in ways they 
themselves were just beginning to feel and that these powerful Jews would 
protect them against a potential second Holocaust, should one be attempted. 
This process and its ethical implications are detailed at length in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967: An Historical Account  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The following section is an historical account of the June 1967 war, the 
events that led up to it and the wider historical context in which these events 
took place. There are two reasons for including this section. The first is  
to provide a detailed historical account of the war that can be referred back to 
in subsequent chapters. The second is more integral to the argument being 
made in the thesis. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, 
one of the reasons that the British Jewish community had such an intense 
affective response to the June 1967 war was because they were persuaded 
by the highly “manipulative” (Segev, 2005, p. 283) Zionist representation of its 
events. As will be demonstrated below this representation was constructed 
specifically for propaganda purposes in order to garner international sympathy 
(at both the diplomatic and popular levels) for the Israeli position before, 
during and after the war. Like all propaganda, this representation is a radical 
simplification of the complex historical forces that lead up to the outbreak of 
war (Jackall, 1994). My argument is that the Zionist version of the war is 
historically decontextualized, it omits some events entirely, it wilfully 
misinterprets others and it polarizes the war’s main protagonists into ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ (as opposed to a group of nation-states trying to secure their geo-
political interests in the region). The account that follows is an attempt to more 
accurately represent the 1967 war so that in subsequent chapters the role 
played by the disparity between what ‘actually’ happened and what British 
Jews believed happened played in the Zionist territorialisation of the British 
Jewish community can be properly determined. As is demonstrated in this 
chapter, it was precisely this disparity that triggered the intense affective 
response in the British Jewish community that generated the Zionist 
territorialisation of the community after the war. 
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The word ‘actually’ is placed in inverted commas because this section 
begins from the premise that no historical narrative can ever transparently 
represent events as they ‘actually’ happened. At best, an historical narrative is 
a representation of events or an historian’s interpretation of that 
representation. The historical narrative below is constructed from a range of 
secondary sources written from different political perspectives – from pro-
Palestinian/Arab (Sharabi, 1970), to critical Israeli (Segev, 2005) to Zionist 
(Morris, 2001). Considering not only the political breadth of these sources but 
also the crucial significance that the June 1967 war continues to have in 
contemporary politics, the narratives they each construct contain significant 
differences. The narrative below negotiates these differences in the following 
way: where possible it presents facts as they happened (for instance all the 
accounts agree hostilities between the different armies began between 07.00 
and 08.00 on 5th June 1967) and where there is a historiographical debate 
over an event, or an interpretation of an event, the chapter briefly outlines the 
spectrum of positions on that event and then, if necessary, makes the case for 
the most persuasive perspective.  
 
The narrative is organised chronologically and split into the following 
sections: 1) ‘The Wider Context 1948–1966’, which explains the wider geo-
political dynamics that contributed to the outbreak of the June 1967 war. This 
section explicitly focuses on the relationship between Syria, Egypt, Jordan, 
the Palestinians and Israel in this period, setting this in the wider context of 
the rise of Arab Nationalism in the Arab world and its relationship to Zionism 
and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It also touches on the 
geo-political dynamics of the Cold War. Section 2 looks at what Oren has 
called “the Catalysts” (2002, p. 33) i.e. the handful of events that signalled a 
notable intensification of hostile relations between the above mentioned 
parties in between November 1966 and May 1967. Section 3 looks at what 
was known at the time as, the ‘Middle East Crisis’ that occurred between 
May/June 1967 and directly precipitated the war. Section 4 looks at the war 
itself and section 5 looks at the military and territorial gains and losses for all 
the parties involved in the war. 
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2. The wider context: 1948–1966 
 
 “Mutual miscalculation” (Morris, 2001, p. 302) is the dominant 
explanation of what bought about the 1967 war (Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002; 
Segev, 2005). Israeli historian Avi Shlaim has written “of all the Arab-Israeli 
wars, the June 1967 war was the only one that neither side wanted. The war 
resulted from a crisis slide that neither Israel nor her enemies were able to 
control.” (cited in Brenchley, 2005, p. 122). Michael Oren uses the following 
metaphor to describe the complex confluence of factors that came together to 
precipitate the war: “Much like the hypothetical butterfly that, flapping its 
wings, gives rise to currents that eventually generates a storm, so, too, might 
small, seemingly insignificant events spark processes leading ultimately to 
cataclysm. And just as that butterfly needs a certain context – the earth’s 
atmosphere, gravity… to produce that tempest, so, too did events prior to 
June 1967 require specific circumstances in order to precipitate war” (2002, p. 
2). These circumstances were, i) the highly complex relationships between 
Syria, Jordan and Egypt in the postcolonial period, dominated as it was by the 
political ideology of Arab nationalism. ii) The hostile relationship between the 
Arab world and the newly founded State of Israel particularly after the first 
Arab-Israeli war in 1948.71 This relationship pivots on two factors: the 
ideological affront to Arab nationalism caused by the Zionist colonization of 
Palestine and the injustice of the displacement of Palestinian Arabs from their 
land and homes. iii) The wider geo-political context, primarily of the Cold War 
dominated by USA and USSR, but also the ex-colonial powers (Britain and 
France). 
 
2.1. Inter-Arab relations 
 
One of the myths sustained in Popular Zionism about this period was that 
‘the Arabs’ were a homogenous group, driven by anti-Semitism, working in 
concert to bring about the destruction of the State of Israel and the murder of 
its Jewish population. Most historical accounts of the diplomatic relations 
                                            
71The Palestinian Nakbah (Catastrophe), the Zionist ‘War of Independence’. 
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within the Arab world, particularly between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in the 
period 1948–1966 dispute this, agreeing that their relationship was 
characterized as much by tension and hostility as it was by more than 
occasional cooperation (Sharabi, 1970; Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002). For 
example, as late as May 1967, radical Ba’athist Syria was agitating for 
revolution in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by detonating a truck full of 
explosives in the Jordanian border town of Ramtha killing twenty-one 
Jordanians. As a result, Jordan broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, only 
to be resumed on 4th June, the day before the June 1967 war began (Mutawi, 
1987). 
 
2.1.1. Divisions within the ‘Arab nation’ 
 
The major ideological division in the postcolonial Arab world was 
between the conservative monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan and 
socialist Arab regimes such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq (between 1958–1961 
Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) partially based on 
their shared political orientations).72 The socialist Arab states regularly 
agitated against Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s feudal social structures (Egypt 
was involved in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia in Yemen throughout the 
1960s). In terms of their location within Cold War geo-politics, Jordan was 
pro-Western and Syria had strong relationships with the USSR. Egypt’s 
position is more complex: it received wheat and aid from the United States (in 
1962 40% of Egypt’s population was fed by US aid (Oren, 2002, p. 15)). 
However its military was supplied by the Soviets and during this period it was 
considered a Soviet diplomatic ally. 
 
 Syria’s tensions 
Syria was the most radical and unstable of the Arab regimes. Attaining 
independence from colonial France in 1946, it underwent a number of coups 
between 1949 and 1970. The doctrinaire socialist Ba’ath party was in power in 
1967 (having engineered a coup in 1963). Syria had tense relations with both 
                                            
72 See (Thompson, 2009, pp. 304–306) for a detailed account of both the formation and 
dissolution of the UAR. 
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Egypt and Jordan throughout the 1960s, regularly goading both through its 
propaganda machinery that neither were sufficiently committed to Arab 
nationalism or the Palestinian cause. Of the two, Syria’s relationship with 
Jordan was arguably poorer, with Syria openly agitating for the overthrow of 
the Jordanian monarchy (e.g. the Ramtha bombing) by funding and arming 
Palestinian guerrilla organisations (e.g. Yasser Arafat’s el-Fatah) based in 
Jordan. Syria was strongly supported by the USSR, which increased the 
diplomatic weight it carried with both its Arab and Israeli neighbours. 
 
 Jordan’s tensions 
 Jordan gained independence from the British Empire in 1946. It has 
since been ruled by the Hashemite dynasty. King Hussein, the King during the 
1967 war, acceded to the throne in 1953. As a monarchy Jordan was 
criticized by Egypt and Syria, not only on ideological grounds but also for its 
pro-Western orientation in trade and diplomatic affairs (for which it was 
accused of being in collusion with Imperialism). Another source of tension for 
Jordan was with its Palestinian refugee population. Between April 1950, when 
the Hashemite Kingdom annexed the West Bank, and May 1967, 50% of 
Palestinian refugees lived in Jordan. The Palestinians expected the King to 
provide a radical solution to their statelessness and dispossession. Hussein 
was reluctant to pursue a radical strategy and mire his kingdom in a war with 
Israel that he was not sure was winnable. This lead to occasional Palestinian 
uprisings within Jordan, which the King often attempted to quash. Hashemite 
repression of the Palestinians led to Egyptian propaganda claiming that 
Hussein was not sufficiently committed to the Palestinian cause. In a 
particularly notable fit of rhetoric in February 1967 Nasser called Hussein, “the 
whore of Jordan” (Oren, 2002, p. 37). 
 
 Egypt 
 By 1956, Egypt had not long seceded from the British Empire and 
undergone a military coup that had made General Gamal Abdel Nasser 
president. Nasser was a popular and charismatic leader who, until 1967, 
could claim to be the leading figurehead of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism 
has been defined in the following way: “Arab nationalism represents the 
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Arabs’ consciousness of their specific characteristics as well as their 
endeavour to build a modern state capable of representing the common will of 
the [Arab] nation and its constituent parts” (Choueiri, 2000, p. 23). It sought to 
unite the Arab nations of the Middle East and North Africa and to resist all 
types of imperialism that attempted to dominate the collective Arab nation. 
This anti-imperialism mainly focused on Zionism but also on the United 
States, France, Britain and the USSR. Egyptian tensions with Jordan and 
Syria are described above.  
 
 The Palestinians 
 The Palestinians are the only Arab people in the postcolonial period not 
to have achieved statehood. Some 80% of Palestinians were made into 
refugees by Israel in 1948, and not allowed back into their homes. In May 
1967 UNWRA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency – the organisation 
responsible for administering relief to Palestinian refugees) estimated that 
there were 1,344, 576 Palestinians refugees registered with them (this does 
not include Palestinians living in Israel) (Buehring, 1971, p. 38). By this point, 
the Palestinians were being represented in the Arab world by the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), founded in 1964 and led by Ahmed Shuqayri. 
The PLO’s armed wing, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), primarily a 
guerrilla force, was 10–15,000 strong. Other Palestinian guerrilla groups 
emerged in this period most notably el-Fatah, lead by Yasser Arafat. During 
this period Palestinian politics was funded primarily by the Syrians. The 
Palestinians most antagonistic relationship within the Arab world was with the 
Jordanians, who they attributed much of the blame for the loss of Palestine in 
1948 (Mutawi, 1987). 
  
2.1.2. Arab cooperation in the 1960s 
 
Despite these divisions, Arab nationalism provided an impetus for 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians to cooperate throughout the 1960s, 
and this was realised with a degree of success. The 1958 unification of Syria 
and Egypt into the United Arab Republic is the high point of this cooperation. 
Another expression of Arab unity was the four Arab Summits that convened 
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between 1964 and 1967, drawing together the Arab nations in an attempt to 
instantiate an organisational framework through which Arab cooperation could 
materialise. One of the largest issues that provided the focus for these 
summits was the desire to coordinate resistance against Israel. At the first 
summit in Cairo on 14th January 1964, its delegates agreed to spend $17.5 
million to divert water from the River Jordan away from Israel (this was a 
major source of tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours) and $345 
million to wage war with Israel. The United Arab Command would also be 
established, uniting the various Arab armies under Egyptian control.73 It was 
during this summit that the PLO and PLA were formally established and 
recognised. The final important example of Arab cooperation, before the 
immediate build up to the June 1967 war, was the Syrian-Egyptian mutual 
defence pact in 1966. Oren has argued that, although there was clearly the 
will within the Arab world to coordinate policy, very little cooperation actually 
materialised (2002). Despite the divisions within the Arab world, and the 
failure to produce any substantial policy, these gestures of cooperation 
concerned the Israelis and contributed to the general atmosphere in the 
Middle East that produced the crisis that precipitated the June war. 
 
2.2. Arab-Israeli tensions in the 1960s 
  
From 1964 onwards the tense relationship that the creation of the State 
of Israel had provoked with its Arab neighbours since 1948 steadily 
escalated.74 Oren notes that “an atmosphere of extreme flammability” (2002, 
p. 32) had developed in the region by 1966. The most flammable relationship 
was between Israel and Syria. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel were all 
engaged in bellicose rhetoric throughout this period but Syria and Israel were 
the only nations to combine rhetoric with armed force. Arguably, it is their 
relationship that had the most decisive effect on the outbreak of war. 
 
 
                                            
73The UAC failed to actually materialize accept in limited form during the 1967 war. 
74 The high point of this tense relationship was the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which Israel invaded 
the Sinai Peninsula with the support of UK and France.  
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Syria and Israel 
Between 1957 and 1962 Israel filed 422 complaints with the UN 
concerning Syrian attacks on Israel’s northern border. These tensions focused 
on two issues. The first was the Arab-Israeli conflict over access to the River 
Jordan’s freshwater supply. The second were the skirmishes that broke out 
between Israel and Syria over the areas of land that had been de-militarized 
by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement following the first Arab-Israeli war 
in 1948. In direct contravention of the terms of this agreement, Israel claimed 
sovereignty over these demilitarized zones (DMZs) and attempted to cultivate 
the land contained within it. The Syrians claimed that the tractors that the 
Israelis were sending in were armoured, so responded with gun and artillery 
fire, not only on the tractors, but also on Israeli settlements close by. Israel 
would then return fire. These skirmishes intensified between 1962 and 1967. 
Oren (2002) notes a particularly heavy eruption during November 1964 and 
Kosut (1968) points to intensifications after a Syrian coup in February 1966, 
again in October 1966, and once again in early 1967. The other manifestation 
of Syrian/Israeli animosity was the Syrian funded Palestinian guerrilla 
(Fedayeen) operations that largely took place on the Jordan/Israel border 
where the Fedayeens were based. This caused significant tension between 
Syria and Jordan because Israel would always retaliate with punitive counter-
attacks on Jordanian territory. 
 
Fedayeen attacks on Israel 
 Responsibility for the Fedayeen attacks has been mostly attributed to 
El Fatah (Kosut, 1968). Between June 1965 and January 1967 Morris 
estimates there were 122 Fedayeen raids within Israel. Oren notes a severe 
escalation in the first half of 1967 with 270 raids (2002). 
 
 Egypt, Jordan and Israel 
During the 1960s neither Jordan nor Egypt was involved in 
conflagrations with Israel in the way that Syria was. Both Hussein and Nasser 
were pragmatic and were aware of the cost of drawing Israel into a large 
military confrontation. Hussein was more conciliatory towards the Israelis than 
Nasser and throughout the 1960s Jordan held highly secret meetings with 
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Israel in a tentative attempt to reach a peaceful modus vivendi between the 
two countries (Mutawi, 1987). Hussein also clamped down on the Fedayeens 
in a bid to appease the Israelis and stop retaliatory raids on Jordanian 
territory. Nasser and Hussein (particularly Nasser) were keenly aware of the 
central place that the Palestinian cause had within Arab public opinion. One of 
Nasser’s major concerns was maintaining the prestige of his position as the 
figurehead of the Arab world, so he constantly promoted anti-Zionist 
sentiment in Egyptian propaganda (largely disseminated through his regime’s 
radio station Voice of the Arabs, listened to across the Middle East) as well as 
his and Egypt’s commitment to restoring Palestine to Arab hands. So although 
Nasser felt that a war with Israel in the 1960s was not in Egypt’s interests, his 
propaganda was designed to suggest otherwise. During the May/June crisis, 
this propaganda played a significant role in bringing about the war.  
 
Like Egypt, Israel was also keenly aware of the role that propaganda, 
rhetoric and image-making played in the dynamics of the region. Since 1948, 
the Zionist state has attempted to create and maintain the image of a regional 
strong man so that its enemies were deterred from attack (Segev, 2005). 
Throughout the 1960s, and particularly in the few months leading up to the 
May/June Crisis, Israel pursued this policy not only with threatening anti-Arab 
rhetoric, but also with punitive retaliations against Fedayeen attacks, often 
designed to be disproportionately stronger than the original attack. This 
disproportionality was, arguably, a key factor in the escalation of hostilities 
between Israel and its enemies since the mid 1960s. As will become clear in 
the following section it is this escalation that in turn produced the May/June 
crisis that precipitated the June War. 
 
3. “The Catalysts”  
 
 Es-Samu’a 
 On 13th November 1966 Israel launched its biggest ‘retaliatory’ raid 
against a Fedayeen attack to date on the West Bank refugee camp of Es-
Samu’a (which the Israelis believed to be an El Fatah base). The IDF had 
designed it to be a ‘clean’ attack but the Jordanian army (the Arab Legion) 
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arrived at Es-Samu’a and it turned into a pitch battle that included the Israeli 
Air Force (IAF). By the end of the operation, thirteen Jordanian soldiers were 
killed and fifty-four were wounded, three civillians were killed and ninety-six 
wounded and approximately 120 homes had been destroyed. This was the 
largest and most deadly fight between Jordan and Israel since 1948 and 
signalled a change in the comparatively acquiescent relationship the two had 
enjoyed in the preceding decade. As a result there were Palestinian riots 
against the Hashemite regime across the West Bank that lasted for eleven 
days because the Palestinians felt that Hussein was not working sufficiently in 
their interests. Hussein was incensed that Jordan was persistently being 
punished for Syrian funded Fedayeen attacks and that Nasser, who claimed 
to be the leader of the Arab struggle against Israel in his propaganda, had 
done nothing to support the struggle since 1956. Hussein then accused 
Nasser of “hiding behind UNEF’s skirts” (Morris, 2001, p. 303). 75 The 
accusation, the beginning of the intensification of the goading between the 
Arab nations, stung Nasser and was one of the many factors that contributed 
to the road to war. 
 
 Flight over Damascus 
Another crucial turning point in Arab-Israeli relations that was a 
“forerunner of the serious crisis that developed in May” (Kosut, 1968, p. 39) 
was an aerial dogfight that occurred between the Israeli and Syrian air forces 
on the northern border on 7th April 1967. Once again Israeli tractors entered 
the DMZs and the Syrians opened fire. The IDF retaliated and what in the 
past would have been a limited skirmish developed into a ‘mini-war’ (Oren, 
2002, p. 46) that included a total of 130 planes from both sides. Israel won the 
battle and one of its planes flew a victory loop over Damascus, an action that 
particularly humiliated the Ba’athist military regime. 
 
 
 
                                            
75UNEF were the United Nations Emergency Force that was stationed on the Egyptian side of the 
Israel/Egypt border as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1956. They acted as a buffer between the two 
states.  
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Israel’s threatening rhetoric 
During this period of increased hostility, Israel intensified its threatening 
rhetoric, particularly against Syria. In an interview on Israel Radio, the Israeli 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said of the Syrians, “if they try to sow unrest on our 
borders, unrest will come to theirs”, (cited in Mutawi, 1987, p. 92) and in a 
speech given at a Mapai party forum on 12th May 1967 he says, “In view of 
the fourteen incidents in the past month alone it is possible that we will adopt 
measures no less drastic than those of April 7th” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 52). 
In the IDF magazine Bamahane, the Israeli chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin is 
quoted as saying, “The type of reaction adopted against Jordan and Lebanon 
is applicable only against states that do not favor acts of sabotage mounted 
from their territory… In Syria the problem is different because the government 
activates the saboteurs – therefore the objective of the action in Syria is 
different” (cited in Morris, 2001, p. 304). In the same period, the United Press 
International reported that a “high Israeli source said Israel would take limited 
military action designed to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian 
terrorists continued sabotage raids inside Israel” (ibid). Morris claims the 
source was Aharon Yariv, the head of the IDF’s military intelligence. Of this 
threatening rhetoric, Oren argued that it was designed to deter the Syrian 
regime from continuing to agitate against Israel, “but only succeeded in 
multiplying the chances for [a confrontation]” (2002, p. 53). This is supported 
by Mutawi who claims that this rhetoric lead the Arab regimes to believe that, 
“it would not be long before Israel attacked Syria with the aim of overthrowing 
the Syrian government” (1987, p. 92).  
 
Soviet misinformation 
 The suspicion that Israel wanted to invade Syria was confirmed at the 
end of April 1967 when the USSR told Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt’s 
National Assembly, that Israeli troops were amassing on the border with Syria 
and were poised to attack. The Soviets had first claimed this in October 1966, 
and then again in November and in January 1967, but the aerial dogfight 
between Israel and Syria on 7th April and the escalation in Israel’s anti-Syria 
rhetoric finally gave the claim some credence. The claim was, however, false. 
During this period there had never been an IDF mobilization on the border, 
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something the Israelis had tried to prove in earnest to the UN and the Soviet 
ambassador in Israel (the Soviet ambassador declined to inspect the border). 
Historians have speculated as to why the Soviets passed on this 
misinformation to the Egyptians, but until the relevant Russian archives are 
de-classified only speculation is possible (Morris, 2001, p. 305). Whether the 
Egyptians believed the Soviet claim or not,76 they acted on it and used it as 
justification in their propaganda. It is their actions as a result of the Soviet 
misinformation that precipitated the May/June Crisis that started the war. 
 
4. The May/June Crisis: Brinkmanship and Miscalculations 
  
 Most historians have claimed that the May/June Crisis was bought 
about by a series of ‘miscalculations’ and was unintended by either side 
(Brenchley, 2005; Morris, 2001; Mutawi, 1987; Segev, 2005). These 
miscalculations occurred as a result of over-zealous brinkmanship designed 
to, on the Egyptian side, shift the regional status quo in their favour and by the 
Israelis to maintain a status quo. By May 1967, Nasser’s reputation was 
flagging at home, where the economy was suffering, and in the Arab world, 
which throughout the late 1966–mid-1967 period repeatedly berated Nasser 
for claiming to be the head of the Arab Nation while standing passively aside 
during Israel’s attacks on Syria and Jordan (Mutawi, 1987). Nasser needed a 
propaganda victory against Israel to restore his image. More than this, Nasser 
also wished to shift the strategic balance of power in the region, which, the 
Arabs felt, had favoured the Israelis as a result of the post-Suez Crisis status 
quo. It was these two factors that drove Nasser to take the actions he did in 
the May/June crisis as opposed to a genuine desire for war (Sharabi, 1970; 
Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002; Brenchley, 2005). There is strong evidence to 
suggest that Nasser did not think the Egyptian army was in sufficient shape to 
initiate an offensive (a substantial proportion of the army was fighting in 
Yemen’s civil war) (Mutawi, 1987). The factors that drove the Israeli actions 
                                            
76Both Oren and Morris recount the same story in their narratives disputing whether the 
Egyptians believed this misinformation: Egyptian General Fawzi flys over the Israel/Syria 
border on a trip to Syria and sees that there are no IDF concentrations. He tells Nasser this 
information, who has had similar reports from the US Embassy and the CIA, but Nasser 
choses to ignore it. 
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during the crisis were their desire to maintain the strategic balance of power in 
their favour and also to maintain their ‘deterrent capability’. The historical 
evidence suggests that the Israeli cabinet was divided about going to war until 
the very last day of the crisis (Oren, 2002; Segev, 2005).  
 
 Egypt’s remilitarization of the Sinai  
The first “serious miscalculation” (Brenchley, 2005, p. 17) was on 15th 
May 1967 when Egypt re-militarized the Sinai desert and thus the Egypt/Israel 
border, which had been de-militarized as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1956. 
Egypt argued that it did this in response to the alleged IDF build up on the 
Syrian border. Oren argues that the remilitarization of the Sinai was “pure 
propaganda”, supporting this claim by a number of statements Nasser made 
in the press at the time e.g. “Egypt has no aggressive designs, but neither 
would it suffer any Israeli aggression against Syria” (Oren, 2002, p. 59). Israel 
mobilised 70,000 troops in response (Segev, 2005). 
 
 The removal of UNEF 
 On 19th May Nasser made another ‘miscalculation’ (Brenchley, 2005). 
He asked U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to remove 
UNEF from the Israel/Egypt border. UNEF had been stationed there as a 
peacekeeping force since 1956. Both Syria and Jordan had goaded Nasser 
for allowing UNEF to be stationed on Egyptian territory. Brenchley (2005) 
argues that despite asking U Thant to remove UNEF, Nasser did not actually 
expect him to remove it. What Nasser hoped was that the request be debated 
in the UN and as a result the Security Council would pressure Israel to 
remove its troops from the Syrian border. Nasser would keep UNEF where it 
was thereby scoring a diplomatic victory against Israel. Instead, U Thant tried 
to call Nasser’s bluff promising to remove UNEF. Rather than lose face, 
Nasser agreed and on 20th May UNEF left their post.77 At this point, Brenchley 
argues, “it seems clear that [Nasser] was not really seeking a war with Israel” 
                                            
77The diplomatic community at the time saw this decision as a mistake on U Thant’s part. He 
later defended himself with the argument that UNEF could only ever be deployed with Egypt’s 
consent and once that was withdrawn, the force had no legal basis for being there. Israel had, 
in fact, refused to allow a UNEF force to be deployed on its side of the border in 1956 so the 
UN never deployed one. 
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but he had once again, “miscalculated” (Brenchley, 2005, p. 19). The move 
gave Israel cause for concern and was reported in the international press, 
including the British newspapers. 
 
 Closing the Straits of Tiran 
The next miscalculation, this time “fatal” (ibid.), was Nasser’s decision 
on 21st May to blockade the Straits of Tiran to any shipping carrying ‘strategic’ 
materials to Israel (Nasser claimed Egypt had mined the entrance).78 The 
Israelis claimed that open Straits were vital to trade interests. This claim is 
undermined by Minister of the Interior Shapira’s proclamation in a cabinet 
meeting that if the blockade took two years to undo, “that’s not a bad thing” 
(cited in Segev, 2005, p. 239). In the same meeting Rabin also announced 
that if trade-ships travelling through the straits were accompanied by an 
American escort, the Egyptians would not stop them (Segev, 2005, p. 240). 
Nevertheless, Israeli propaganda at the time represented the decision as a 
“noose tightening around their neck” (Morris, 2001, p. 309). Since 1956, Israel 
had persistently claimed that the blockading of the Straits of Tiran would 
constitute a casus belli. As late as 19th May, Israel was re-iterating this claim 
(Sharabi, 1970). By blockading the straits Nasser not only scored a 
propaganda victory, restoring some of his lost prestige (according to Oren, the 
Arab world was “elated” (2002, p. 84)) but had also begun to shift the regional 
balance of power into Egypt’s favour. Segev writes that in Israel this action 
made the Israeli public think a Middle Eastern war would happen “almost 
certainly” (2005, p. 238).   
 
  
 Anti-Israeli Arab Propaganda and its effect on Israel  
Throughout this period in-fighting between the Arab States all but 
stopped and the anti-Israel propaganda from all sides escalates. The following 
are a selection of Arab propaganda statements from the period of the crisis: 
 
                                            
78 The Straits of Tiran is the eight-mile wide opening into the Gulf of Aqaba from the Red Sea, 
lying in between the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas. 
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“The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy 
Israel” 
Nasser (cited in Mutawi, 1987, p. 95) 
 
 “Arab masses, this is your day. Rush to the battlefield… Let them know that 
we shall hang the last imperialist soldier with the entrails of the last Zionist.”  
 
Damascus Radio broadcast (cited in Morris, 2001, p. 310) 
 
“The Zionist barracks in Palestine is about to collapse and be destroyed… 
every…. Arab has been living for the past 19 years on hope – to see the day 
Israel is liquidated.” 
 
Voice of the Arabs broadcast (ibid.) 
 
 
It is difficult to discern whether such propaganda was intended as written or 
whether, like the Israeli anti-Syrian propaganda, it was to boost their own 
country’s morale and deter the enemy from starting a war. The weight of 
historical evidence demonstrating that Nasser did not want a war would 
suggest the latter. Nevertheless, this propaganda could be heard in Israel. 
Coupled with Egypt’s recent manoeuverings, this propaganda had a decisive 
effect on the Israeli public’s affective disposition at the end of May, who were 
now convinced that the Arabic armies were about to invade with the explicit 
purpose of murdering the Jewish population. Edited excerpts of Arab 
propaganda were also disseminated internationally by Zionist organisations 
as part of the Israeli propaganda effort to portray Israel in a sympathetic 
light.79 On 25th May, Richard Helms, the Director of the CIA, noted “an 
explosive growth of Israeli anxiety” (Segev, 2005, p. 257). On 23rd May 
Yitzhak Rabin suffered a nervous breakdown from a sense of responsibility for 
putting Israel into this situation. The Israeli population began to hoard food, 
dig trenches in the street and Rabbis began to consecrate public parks in 
case they need to be used for mass graves (Segev, 2005, p. 286). Segev 
argues that, “this was fear of destruction and its source was rooted in the 
Holocaust” (2005, p. 282). Segev also notes how the idea that Israel’s Jewish 
population faced destruction a at the hands of the Arab armies began to 
appear in Israeli cabinet discussions about the crisis. For instance, in a 
                                            
79The Zionist propaganda effort and the affectivity it triggered is outlined in more detail in 
Chapter 6 but it will be useful to touch upon it here in order to demonstrate the decisive effect 
such an atmosphere had on the unfolding of the May/June crisis. 
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Security Cabinet meeting held on 23rd May 1967, Finance Minister Pinchas 
Sapir says, “we are talking about our very existence here” (Segev, 2005, p. 
240).  
 
The idea that Israel faced an existential crisis and that this idea was 
rooted in the memory of the Holocaust, played a decisive role in the Zionist 
territorialisation of the British Jewish community. This will be discussed at 
greater length in the following chapter. What is important to note here is that 
the spectre of the Holocaust was also a central dynamic in the decision 
making process of the Israeli elite during this period. In Segev’s account this 
issue split Israeli decision-makers three ways. Some (eg. Zerah Warahftig, 
Minister of Religious Affairs and Pincas Sapir, Minster of Finance) sincerely 
believed that the Jewish people faced destruction in Israel and argued as 
much in cabinet meetings. Some army generals including General Avraham 
Yaffe and Quartermaster General Matityahu Peled did not believe that this 
destruction was possible but used the idea as a rhetorical strategy to 
persuade Eshkol and Rabin to go to war to further Israel’s strategic interests. 
The third group (including Eshkol and Yigal Allon) did not believe Israel faced 
an existential threat, nor did they use the Holocaust as a rhetorical strategy 
(Segev, 2005). They did, however, realise its value for propaganda and 
diplomatic purposes, and the idea that Israel faced an existential threat was 
put into the service of both. For example, Moshe Biton, the director of the 
North American department in the Israeli foreign office instructed the Israeli 
Embassy in Washington to coordinate a pro-Israeli publicity campaign that 
evoked the Holocaust targeting the American Jewish public. No such directive 
was issued to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain or to the Israeli Embassy 
in the UK but a wealth of propaganda material exists in the archives of these 
institutions that strongly suggests both operated according to the same 
principle (see Chapter 6 for more details). Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban 
also raised such fears during his intensive shuttle diplomacy in the last days 
of the crisis. For example, in Washington Eban was instructed by the Israeli 
cabinet to describe the atmosphere in Israel as apocalyptic and that the 
country was facing a “life or death” situation (Segev, 2005, p. 254). Neither 
Eban nor Lyndon B. Johnson believed this claim. In fact, not long before Eban 
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flew to Washington US intelligence had filed a report on the potential 
prospects if Israel went to war with its Arab neighbours. The report was 
prophetic, predicting that terrorist activity would lead to a war; that Israel 
would win in six to ten days; that Israel was militarily superior to the combined 
Arab armies and that Israel would destroy the Egyptian air-force, occupy 
Sinai, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Segev, 2005, 
pp. 252–3). Eshkol, Rabin and Dayan (who had been bought into the Israeli 
cabinet as Defence Minister to great fanfare on 1st June 1967, to assuage the 
hysteria emerging in Israeli society) more or less concurred with these 
findings, though the idea of occupying territory only became concrete after the 
war started. In cabinet meetings, Dayan and Rabin advocated starting a war, 
quickly and as a surprise, in order to strengthen/maintain Israel’s deterrent 
capacity and keep a favourable Israeli status quo not because they believed 
Israel was facing a genuine existential threat (Segev, 2005).  
 
The fact that the Israelis who made the decision to go to war had 
surmised there was no existential threat and the fact that they actively sought 
to promote the idea both diplomatically and through their propaganda 
machinery around the globe has important consequences for this thesis. For 
instance, all the British Jews interviewed for this study believed Israel and its 
population was facing annihilation, even those who were anti-Zionist. 
Moreover, in their interviews they demonstrate that they had no sense that 
this may have been propaganda either in 1967 or at the time of being 
interviewed (anti-Zionists David and Brian differ in this respect). That they 
believed Israeli Jews faced genocide was the key factor determining the 
quality and intensity of the British Jewish affective responses to the war as 
well as the politics and shifts in identity that this response mobilised. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
 By the 4th June Eshkol is finally persuaded that Israel should start the 
war in order to maintain Israel’s deterrent capabilities and to shift the status 
quo into Israel’s favour. The strategic objectives Israel set itself was the re-
opening of the Straits of Tiran and the destruction of the Egyptian army. The 
idea of occupying Eastern Jerusalem, (including the Old City), the West Bank, 
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the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights was not an immediate military objective 
at this point.80 Rabin and Dayan set ‘H-hour’ for between 07.00 and 07.30 the 
following morning. By this point the IDF had been fully mobilized for ten days 
with 275,000 men, 1,100 tanks and 200 planes poised to attack.  
 
 By the end of May and the beginning of June, hostile relations between 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians had begun to cool. On 30th May 
1967 Nasser and Hussein signed the Egypt-Jordanian Defence Pact that 
agreed that if either were attacked both parties would defend each other. The 
pact endorsed an idea mooted in previous Arab summits – that Jordan’s army 
come under Egyptian control. On 1st June 1967 Egyptian General Riad 
arrived in Jordan to lead its army. The pact also signalled a rapprochement in 
the relationship between Hussein and the Palestinians. On 4th June Jordan 
and Syria re-established diplomatic relations. Of this moment of rare Arab 
unity Oren argues, “in spite of the bitter of differences between them, the 
divisions of opinion in each, Arab nations were united as at no time in their 
postcolonial history. There could now be no doubt: an Arab world existed and 
could act” (2002, p. 163). 
 
According to the empirical evidence gathered for Chapter 6, the British 
Jewish perception of the various parties’ strategic intentions during the Middle 
East Crisis was that ‘the Arabs’ (little distinction is made between the different 
parties) wanted to go to war in order to destroy the State of Israel and its 
Jewish population, whilst the Israelis had no choice but to defend themselves 
from the oncoming genocide. As the historical account given in this chapter 
demonstrates this perception does not accurately reflect the events as they 
                                            
80This account of Israeli intentions at the start of the war is provided by a close reading of the 
minutes of Israeli cabinet meeting minutes during this period by both Segev and Oren. It 
slightly nuances Sharabi’s (and other Palestinian) claims that the war was an expression of 
Zionist colonialist and expansionist tendencies. That is not to say that Zionism did not have 
these tendencies. The desire to occupy ‘Judea’ and ‘Samaria’ (the biblical names for the 
areas around the Jordan river including the West Bank) had been present in Revisionist 
Zionism long before the war started, and this tendency is explicitly introduced into Israeli 
decision making with the inclusion of Menachem Begin (leading light of Revisionist Zionism in 
the 1960s) into the emergency cabinet formed a few days before the outbreak of war. 
Moreover the IDF had long drawn up contingency plans to annex Jerusalem and parts of the 
West Bank, it is just at this point there were no plans to enact them. 
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happened. The weight of evidence presented in the historical literature 
suggests that despite the claims in their propaganda neither Egypt, Syria nor 
Jordan wanted a war (and if the Palestinians did they were in no position to 
initiate one), let alone a genocidal war that would bring about the destruction 
of the Israeli state. What Nasser wanted, through a series of carefully 
orchestrated diplomatic initiatives, was to boost his flagging status in the Arab 
world and to shift the geo-political status quo back into Egypt’s favour. 
Nasser’s lack of finesse in executing this plan was one of the reasons Egypt 
found itself dragged into a war it had no intention of starting. Hussein was 
even less favourably disposed to starting a war with Israel (let alone 
exterminating its Jewish population) because Hussein believed such a war 
was unwinnable. The reason Hussein signed the defence pact with Egypt was 
that, by the beginning of June, he knew a war was inevitable and if he did not 
fight on the Arab side, the Palestinians refugees residing in Jordan would 
revolt and possibly drag Jordan into a civil war. Hussein would also be further 
alienated from the Arab world (Mutawi, 1987). There is less evidence about 
Syria’s intentions before the war but the fact Syria does not aid Jordan during 
the war nor begin a offensive of its own (as demonstrated below) would 
suggest that bellicose rhetoric was little more than empty propaganda. 
Throughout the May/June crisis, the key decision-makers in the Israeli cabinet 
knew that at no point was Israel being threatened with extinction, but adopted 
this line of argument to garner international sympathy both at the popular and 
diplomatic levels. Israel (and not the Arabs) went on to start the war in order 
to maintain not only a Middle Eastern status quo that favoured their strategic 
interests but also a strong man image that would deter their neighbours from 
attempting future attacks. Despite the anti-Zionist/Palestinian claim that 
Israelis started the war to occupy the territory it had by the war’s end, there is 
no historical evidence to suggest occupation was the aim by the end of the 
Middle East Crisis. (However, that the strategic goals change throughout the 
war is unsurprising: Revisionist Zionist expansionism was always a 
potentiality within the ideological assemblage that is Zionism, that, as will be 
demonstrated below, is only operationalized during the unfolding of the war). 
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5. The War 
  
Day 1 
The war started on 5th June between 07.00 and 08.00 with a surprise 
Israeli air strike on the Egyptian air force in its airfields. Both at the time, and 
in the subsequent historical literature, Zionists have argued that this strike 
was ‘pre-emptive’. This claim was one of the biggest controversies of the war: 
in terms of its diplomatic consequences at the time, in terms of the 
propaganda war both sides were waging during the war and in terms of the 
ensuing historiographical debates. The reason that the ‘pre-emptive’ claim is 
controversial is simple – ultimately it ascribes responsibility to who started the 
war. Did Nasser’s role in the May/June crisis precipitate the war or did Israel 
purposefully misinterpret Nasser’s “sabre-rattling” (Jeffrey, 1967, p. 11) as a 
pretext to start a war that would serve its own expansionist interests? There 
are different positions in histories of this dispute. As demonstrated above 
both, Oren and Shlaim argue that the war began as a result of a diplomatic 
crisis escalating out of the control of the parties involved – that the crisis took 
on a life of its own. Brenchley argues that Nasser had put Israel into a position 
that justified a ‘pre-emptive’ attack: “Israel had for a decade warned that an 
Egyptian blockade of Elath [sic] would bring war. Their decision that it should 
be they who made the pre-emptive strike must be adjudged to have been 
consistent with these warnings” (2005, p. 40). Sharabi (1970) argues that the 
war was the expression of Zionism’s colonial, expansionist, aggressive 
tendencies, explicitly claiming that Israel was the aggressor. Zionist 
propaganda at the time argued that Israel, being threatened with destruction, 
had no choice but to start the war as an act of self-defence. The Zionist 
version is also the dominant view of British Jewry (see Chapter 6). The 
affective impact of this interpretation will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters. What is important to note at this point is that the Israeli 
decision to strike, their representation of that strike as ‘pre-emptive’ and its 
significant military success played an instrumental role in persuading British 
Jewry that the ‘Zionist Jew’ really was as daring and heroic as Zionists had 
always claimed. The myth of the ‘heroic Jew’ is one of the central pivots 
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around which the post-67 Zionist territorialisation of British Jewry turns (see 
Chapter 7). 
 
 In strategic terms, the Israeli air-strike was an enormous success. 
Within 100 minutes 286 Egyptian airplanes (of 420) had been destroyed. At 
10.35 IAF commander Motti Hod reports to Rabin that “the Egyptian air force 
has ceased to exist” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 176). Already Israel had nearly 
total air supremacy, and an Israeli victory was now almost a certainty. As a 
result, Ezer Weizman, the IDF deputy Chief of Staff, told his wife that Israel 
have all but won the war (Segev, 2005). At 08.15 the ground war began and 
the IDF entered the Sinai Peninsula. At 10.00 Jordan started limited shelling 
along the Israeli border. Dayan, who throughout the war acted as Israel’s chief 
decision maker (often going over Eshkol’s head), did not want to open a 
second front with Jordan, but by 12.30 felt Israel had no choice and ordered 
the IAF to attack Jordan’s airbases. The small Jordanian air force was quickly 
destroyed. Dayan then ordered two IDF brigades to assault Jenin, in the West 
Bank and the areas around Jerusalem. By 16.30 the IDF had captured 
Jerusalem’s Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives, Al-Tur, Government House 
(which had been used as UN office since 1948) and Sur Baher and Rafah in 
the Gaza strip. At 14.30 Syria began to shell Israel’s settlements on its 
northern border. Dayan did not want to open a third front, but again ordered 
the IAF to attack Syrian air force positions eventually destroying two-thirds of 
Syria’s air power. By the evening Israel had captured Southern Jerusalem and 
the whole Gaza strip excluding Gaza City where the IDF encountered 
formidable resistance from the PLA. Kosut called the Israeli ground offensive 
‘crushing’ (1970, p. 74). This can be evidenced by Israel’s impressive military 
gains. However, it is important to note that the majority of the accounts of the 
war, notably Oren’s and Mutawi’s, use evidence, including IDF reports, that 
record the spirited resistance of the Arab soldiers on all fronts. This is 
important for this thesis because a significant element of the Popular Zionist 
discourse of the war is that the Arab soldiers were weak and cowardly and 
were easily overrun by the heroic and mighty IDF. The reasons for the Arab 
loss will be discussed below, but it is important to note here that the historical 
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evidence strongly suggests that this image of the Arab soldier during the war 
is an orientalist misrepresentation within Popular Zionism (Said, 1970). 
 
 Throughout this first day propaganda raged on both sides. In the 
morning Dayan felt it important that Israel maintain a fog of war that portrayed 
Israel as the victims according to the following logic: “As long as the world 
thought Israel was defending itself and fighting for its life, there would be no 
pressure from the outside to stop the attack” (Segev, 2005, p. 338). The 
anxiety felt by the Israeli public was tremendous as a result. However, given 
how inextricably bound the IDF was (and continues to be) to the other parts of 
Israeli society (it is a civilian army and Israeli society was relatively small), the 
early Israeli gains could not be kept from the public for long. At 12.00 Israeli 
Radio announced that 120 Egyptian planes had been destroyed, with Israeli 
newspaper Ma’Ariv printing this statistic in their third edition. At 15.00 Dayan 
informs the editors of three major Israeli newspapers that Israel had destroyed 
400 Arab aircraft and Rabin and Hod announced as much on Israeli radio at 
02.00 the following morning (Segev, 2005). As will be discussed in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters this information was quickly taken up by the 
international press, so that British Jewry became aware of the enormous 
Israeli gains by the end of the first day. Interestingly the Arab side adopted an 
alternative propaganda strategy to Dayan, reporting Arab victories as late as 
22.00 on the first day. This had no effect on British Jewry but frightened the 
Israeli public and confused the Arab armies who could not tally what they are 
hearing on Arab radio stations with what they were experiencing on the battle 
field. Arab propaganda became a real strategic hindrance to the Arab armies 
throughout the rest of the war. 
 
 Day 2 
 At 02.20 on 6th June, Israel launched an offensive on Jerusalem, with 
the express intention of capturing the Old City. According to Oren and Segev, 
this decision had been made by the Israeli security cabinet the night before in 
the excitement of the first day’s military victories. The goal Israel had set itself 
when it started the war was the destruction of the Egyptian army in order to 
strengthen its position within the Middle East and deter Arab armies from 
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continuing hostilities on Israel’s border whether that be border skirmishes, 
guerilla attacks or war. By the end of the first night, the security cabinet felt 
that Israel’s performance in the war thus far had created an historic 
opportunity to capture East Jerusalem. In doing this they could reunite 
Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel, which, by 1967, was a dream 
at the centre of Zionist ideology.81 As will become clear below Israeli territorial 
gains in the June war proceeded in a similar fashion. On the eve of the war, 
Israel had not set out to capture Jerusalem or occupy the West Bank, and the 
Golan Heights (a limited occupation of the Sinai including Gaza fits in with 
their strategic goals), but the way events of the war unfolded in the Israelis 
favour meant that the IDF’s strategic goals changed on a daily basis. 
 
 By 05.25, King Hussein knew of Jordan’s losses and the severe effect 
this had on the chances of successfully defending Jerusalem from the Israeli 
army. As a result he sent four messages to Israel requesting a ceasefire, 
which arrived in Israel at 08.00. The Israelis ignored these requests. At 07.00, 
Syria began an offensive on the northern border with a feint that was repelled 
by the kibbutzniks living in the northern settlements. At this point, Dayan was 
still resistant to opening up a third front. By 10.30 Jenin and Latrun on the 
West Bank had been captured and later that afternoon Ramallah was also 
under Israeli control. In the Sinai, Israel continues its successful advance and 
the Egyptian Army began to retreat, under orders from the Egyptian high 
command. This was an agonizing process: for instance soldiers stationed at 
Sharm El Sheik, located at the most southern point of the Sinai peninsula had 
to flee to Suez 180 miles away. Most of this journey was undertaken on foot 
because their vehicles had run out of fuel. The water also would not have 
lasted. The retreat became chaotic and desperate – heavily contributing to 
one of Popular Zionism’s most enduring images of the conflict, the 
‘backwards’ Arab armies.  
                                            
81 It is important to note that Jerusalem had not always occupied such a central and 
affectively charged position within Zionist discourse. Pre-1948 neither Herzl, Weizmann or 
Ben Gurion felt Jerusalem was the most suitable option for the capital city for a Zionist state, 
as it represented superstition against the Jewish modernity that Zionism was trying to carve 
out in the Middle East. According to Laqueur, “their emotional attachment was not 
overwhelming” (1972, p. xxii). 
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 There was a significant development in Arab propaganda on the 
second day of the war. Arab radio began to explain its defeats by accusing 
the Israeli army of receiving support from the US and British armies. This was 
untrue. Lyndon B Johnson calls this ‘The Big Lie’ and American and British 
diplomats at the UN vehemently denied the claim. The immediate effect is that 
seven of the Arabic oil producing nations stopped supplying USA and Britain 
with oil until August 1967, when ‘the Big Lie’ was disproved. By the afternoon 
of the second day the Israeli media are reporting Israeli military achievements 
“joyful[ly]” (Segev, 2005, p. 358). As early as 4am the BBC announced the 
war would be over soon. 
 
 Day 3 
The 7th June was arguably the most significant day for Zionism with the 
capture of Eastern Jerusalem and the Old City. By 1967, Jerusalem occupied 
a central position within Zionist discourse, signifying the ancient Jewish claim 
to ‘Eretz Israel’, the perceived spiritual centre of the Jewish religion, and 
political Zionism’s desired capital city for the State of Israel. This polyvalency 
exerted tremendous affective force across, not only the Zionist assemblage, 
but also the diasporic Jewish assemblage. The Israeli capture of East 
Jerusalem was arguably the most important element in Popular Zionist 
representations of the June 1967 war. The affective force that Jerusalem and 
the capture of its Eastern section by the Israeli state had on British Jewry will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. However, in briefly sketching the 
details of the capture of the Old City as part of the narrative of the war the 
following sub-section will touch upon the affective reaction of the IDF and the 
Israeli public in order to communicate how significant the event was for Jews 
and why it had such a tremendous effect on the British Jewish community. 
 
 In the early morning of 7th June, King Hussein requested another 
ceasefire, which Israel again rejected. The Israeli leadership knew that the 
IDF had to act quickly if it was to be successful in capturing East Jerusalem 
before it accepted the terms of the ceasefire that the UN was trying to impose 
throughout the war. At 06.00 the IDF opened fire on the Old City’s Muslim 
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Quarter. At 09.45 the army bombarded Lion’s Gate and entered the Old City. 
By 10.00 the IDF had entered al-Haram al-Sharif (Arabic for ‘The Noble 
Sanctuary’)/Har Ha-Bayit (Hebrew for ‘The Temple Mount’), the site that 
contains the Western Wall and the Dome of the Rock; both have tremendous 
religious significance for Judaism and Islam respectively, and therefore this 
area continues to be the most contentious of the Palestine/Israel conflict. By 
this point the Jordanian army had retreated, with the exception of a handful of 
snipers. This put the Old City in Israeli control. 
 
 IDF intelligence officer, Arik Akhmon described the following scene 
when he arrived at the Western Wall: “There you are on a half-track after two 
days of fighting, with shots still firing in the air and suddenly you enter this 
wide open space82 that everyone had seen before in pictures, and though I’m 
not religious, I don’t think there was a man who wasn’t overwhelmed with 
emotion. Something special had happened” [My emphasis] (quoted in Oren, 
2002, p. 245). Ezer Weizmann recollects an affective response across his 
body: “We approach the Kotel and I feel my heart and my blood and my 
breath are pounding and coming faster and faster. I have no control. This is 
the history of my people, breathing here its breath of thousands of years.” 
(Segev, 2005, p. 379) Mordechai Gur, the leader of an IDF paratrooper 
squadron, writes about how this affective response was a collective one when 
he describes the Israeli soldiers’ response to capturing the Temple Mount: 
“Hugging, yelling, overwhelmed, slapping each other on the back. Laughing, 
shouting, hugging again. I feel at home here. The object of our laughing – the 
Temple Mount! Mount Moriah. Abraham and Isaac. The temple. The Zealots, 
the Macabees, Bar Kokhba, the Romans and the Greeks. They all tumbled 
together in my mind. But the feeling steady and deeper than anything. We are 
on the Temple Mount! The Temple Mount is ours!” (Segev, 2005, p. 367).  
                                            
82Akhmon is not historically accurate here. The space in front of the Western Wall only 
became ‘wide open’ on 11th June 1967, after the IDF destroyed the 135 homes standing in 
front of it and displaced between 650–1,000 Arabs who lived in them (an elderly woman died 
during this process). (Masalha, 2003, pp. 189–195; Segev, 2005, p. 400) 
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All three of these accounts point to the affectivity flowing across the 
Zionist soldiers surging past a ‘critical threshold of intensity’:83 for instance, in 
Akhmon – “I don’t think there was a man who wasn’t overwhelmed with 
emotion. Something special had happened”. Gur also described the troops as 
being overwhelmed and the feeling being “steady and deeper than anything”. 
Both Weizmann and Gur ascribe meaning to this surge of affect by situating 
the IDF’s capture of Jerusalem within Zionism’s highly specific reading of 
Jewish biblical history that emphasizes ‘heroic’ and warrior-like individuals 
and stories (the Zealots, the Macabees and Bar Kohba). 
 
Segev writes about a change in social relations between soldiers 
deriving from this surge in intensity. He describes how the soldiers who 
arrived at the wall put on tefillin and began “praying with great intensity and 
extraordinary devotion… each Jew bound to every other Jew. Whole groups, 
swaying clusters of hands and feet and heads and bodies… some were nailed 
to the spot, perhaps not even feeling the tears rolling down their cheeks” 
(Segev, 2005, p. 379). What Segev is describing here is a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
Body-without-Organs, when a surge in intensity across an assemblage re-
organises its constituent elements in a de-hierachized fashion so that affect 
flows across the assemblage undisturbed.84 The phenomenological 
experience for a singular element within the assemblage when it becomes-
Body-without-Organs is, in the words used by one of the British Jews 
interviewed for this thesis when describing what the effects of the Israeli 
victory on the British Jewish community, that of being “all joined up” (Jeremy, 
p. 414). The Body-without-Organs cannot be sustained for a long period of 
time. However, once it re-forms the configuration has changed from what it 
was before undergoing this intensive affective process. The political and 
                                            
83 As is explained in Chapter 6, the idea of affectivity surging passed a ‘critical threshold of 
intensity’ is taken from DeLanda’s reading of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (1968 (a)) 
in his book Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002). In this reading, DeLanda argues 
that what causes a change in the formal constitution of an assemblage is the intensity of 
affect that flows across it surging past a critical threshold.  
84According to Deleuze and Guattari, the normative organisation of the assemblages that 
exist within the cultures of industrial capitalism (in both its liberal and social democratic 
variants) is that of being ‘oedipalised’, i.e. a hierarchical organisation of the assemblage’s 
elements that disperses the flows of affect in the interests of the elements at the top of the 
hierarchy – the State, or the Capitalist depending on the historical formation of the society in a 
given moment.  
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ethical consequences of such a re-configuration will be discussed in Chapter 
6. Suffice to say here that the capturing of Jerusalem had an extraordinary 
effect on the Israeli public (the Israeli poet Natan Alterman describes the 
Israeli people as being “drunk with joy” (ibid.)). 
 
 By 12.15 on 7th June the IDF had taken Sharm El Sheik, the coastal 
town overlooking the Straits of Tiran and shortly after Dayan declared the Gulf 
of Aqaba an international waterway (thus overturning Nasser’s decision to 
close it to Israel shipping). On 7th June, the Egyptian army was still retreating 
chaotically across the Sinai. By the evening of 7th June the whole of the West 
Bank was in Israeli control: Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah and 
Jericho had fallen as had all the four crossings of the Jordan River. The fear 
of an Israeli occupation of the West Bank had prompted tens of thousands of 
Palestinian villagers to flee. Major hostilities between the Jordanian and Israeli 
armies had ceased by this point. Contrary to the Popular Zionist version of 
events an IDF report claims the Jordanians fought with “courage” and 
“determination” (Oren, 2002, p. 257). 
 
 Day 4 
 On 8th June 1967, fighting was still taking place in Sinai despite the 
retreat of the Egyptian army. By this point the IDF had estimated that 70% of 
the Egyptian army’s ‘hardware’ had been destroyed and that 11,000 Egyptian 
soldiers had crossed the Suez canal and 20,000 were stranded without water. 
Muhammad Ahmad Khamis, the communications officer of the Sixth Division 
of the Egyptian army, describes what the Sinai looked like on the fourth day of 
the war: “It was a horrible sight. The broken pieces of the army strewn over 
the sand… Burnt out tanks… Destroyed vehicles… charred bodies that 
looked like statues” (cited in Oren, 2002, p. 273). On the Syrian front, the 
Syrian army continued to shell Israel’s northern settlements, but as long as 
the IDF was still fighting in Sinai, Dayan did not want to open a third front. The 
Israeli cabinet discussed invading Syria and occupying the Golan Heights for 
the first time on this day. The reason for Israel occupying the Golan was 
strategic, as opposed to the ideological reasons for occupying East 
Jerusalem: in the Syria/Israel conflagrations of the previous decade the 
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Syrians were able to use the high ground of the Golan to their strategic 
advantage. An Israeli occupation would also safeguard their interest in the 
source of the Jordan River. During discussions about the Golan Heights on 8th 
June, the cabinet was split: both Rabin and Yigal Allon wanted to invade Syria 
(although Rabin was more reluctant), as did Eshkol who, during his career, 
had been personally involved with the water issue in Northern Israel. Dayan, 
however, continued to resist the idea and so no final decision was taken. By 
the end of 8thJune, Israel, Jordan and Egypt had accepted the terms of a UN 
ceasefire, and fighting ceased on these fronts. 
 
 Day 5 
 At 06.00 on 9th June, Dayan ordered the IDF to initiate hostilities with 
Syria with the strategic goal of occupying the Golan Heights. This decision 
contradicted the position he had taken about attacking Syria up until that point 
and was made without Eshkol’s approval, infuriating the Israeli Prime Minister. 
The attack began at 09.40. Despite the fact that fighting was fierce and 
bloody, Israel managed to take Syrian positions eight miles from the border by 
the end of the day. On the Egyptian front, the whole of Sinai was under Israeli 
control (apart from Port Fu’ad) by the same time. The Egyptian propaganda 
machinery could no longer disguise the scale of the Arab loss from the 
Egyptian public and as a result the public began to turn on Nasser. At 18.30 
Nasser was forced to resign, blaming American and British military aid to 
Israel for Egypt’s losses. His resignation devastated the Egyptian people, 
who, on hearing his resignation speech, poured out onto the street in their 
thousands demanding he stay in power.85 Nasser then withdrew his 
resignation. 
 
Day 6 
By 10th June, the only fighting still occurring was on the Golan Heights. 
By the end of the morning the Syrian command thought that the IDF had 
taken Quneitra (the largest population centre in the Golan) and so ordered the 
                                            
85It would be instructive, but beyond the scope of this thesis, to analyse the collective 
affective response of the Egyptian people to the Arab loss manifested in moments such as 
this, and the effect it had on Arab Nationalism on the plane of the popular as a result. 
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Syrian army to retreat and protect Damascus from an Israeli invasion. During 
the retreat 4,000 Syrian soldiers fled to Lebanon, 3,000 fled to Jordan, and 
95,000 civilians fled the Golan. By this point the global perception was that 
Israel wanted to invade Damascus (Oren, 2002, p. 294). As a result the USSR 
threatened to intervene militarily and severed all diplomatic ties with Israel. 
There was intense international pressure for Israel to observe a UN ceasefire, 
which Dayan ignored instead allowing David Elazar (head of the Northern 
Command) more time to secure the Israeli occupation of the Golan. By 12.30 
Israeli forces had arrived in Quneitra to find it empty of soldiers and civilians. 
The Israelis were now in full control of the Golan Heights. Israeli objectives 
had been achieved so Dayan accepted the UN ceasefire, which became 
operational at 18.00. The hostilities were officially over.  
 
5.1. Israel’s victory/the Arab’s loss 
 
 One of the aspects of the war accurately represented within Popular 
Zionist discourse is the scale of the Israeli victory. Occupying the Sinai, the 
Golan Heights and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) added 42,000 
square miles to Israel’s territory. This meant that Israel had grown roughly 
three and a half times in size since 5th June 1967 (Oren, 2002, p. 307). The 
comparative number of fatalities for both sides was similarly disproportionate: 
the maximum estimate for Arab fatalities is 22,450 compared to 800 for the 
Israelis, hence the Arabs suffered nearly thirty times more than the Israelis 
(Segev, 2005). Egypt had also lost 85% of its Soviet supplied military 
hardware, which cost approximately $2 billion. Taking into account that the 
war lasted six days, the Popular Zionist representation of a stunning Israeli 
victory compared to a devastating Arab loss is supported by the statistics. 
 
 What Popular Zionism misrepresents, however, are the reasons for the  
Arab loss, which is explained as a result of an essential Arab backwardness 
(see Chapter 7). A similar orientalism is reproduced in some of the historical 
literature, for example: “the Six Day War was in all essentials a clockwork war 
carried out by the IDF against three relatively passive, ineffective Arab 
armies” [my emphasis] (Morris, 2001, p. 313). There is substantial historical 
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evidence (including IDF reports) to demonstrate that Arab armies were not 
passive (Mutawi, 1987; Oren, 2002). The Arab armies, were however, 
rendered ineffective by a number of factors, both internal and external. The 
most important of these was Israeli air supremacy, achieved as a result of the 
Israeli strike that began the war and which severely disabled the Arab armies 
by robbing them of the necessary air cover to carry out defensive operations. 
Another major factor was that the Arabs were not a unified side in the way 
that Arab nationalism presented itself or that British Jews still imagine. 
Despite the attempts described above to co-ordinate the different Arab 
countries into a unified entity, diplomatically and militarily, Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan were riven by division up until the last days of the May/June crisis. 
Sharabi argued in 1970 that,  
 
“what we call the Arab side does not in reality constitute a single entity; it has 
no co-ordinated, organizational arrangements, no unified political or military 
structure, no adequate communications and information systems. Inherent in 
Arab agreements is a multiplicity of conflicting decisions, desires, intentions: 
formal collective agreements lack substantive content and as a result have 
little practical import”  
(Sharabi, 1970, p. 64).  
 
What this meant for Arab operational strategy during the war was that, “the 
Arabs, incapable of devising a unified strategy, were incapable of carrying out 
a rational military plan”, resulting in “… miscalculation, faulty intelligence, 
inability to convey messages and inadequate communication” (Sharabi, 1970, 
p. 63). The most extreme example was that at various points throughout the 
war, different Arab governments dissembled to each other about the 
movements of their armed forces. For example, at the beginning of the war 
Nasser informed Hussein that Israel had suffered ‘staggering’ losses and that 
Israel airfields had been destroyed. This lie had a decisive impact on 
encouraging Jordan to fight (Mutawi, 1987). This lack of unity was 
compounded by the IDF’s better training and motivation, something 
represented accurately in Popular Zionism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 
6. After the ceasefire 
 
 Israel’s immediate response to the situation created by the ceasefire 
lines was formulated in a cabinet meeting on 19th June 1967. In this meeting 
the cabinet agreed that the Sinai peninsula and the Golan Heights would be 
returned to Egypt and Syria if those states would negotiate a peace treaty with 
Israel – ‘land for peace’. Gaza would remain part of Israel and its citizens 
would be resettled. Jerusalem would remain the sovereign and undivided 
capital of Israel. The cabinet could not agree on the future of the West Bank 
(Oren, 2002, pp. 313–4). The US communicated this offer to Egypt and Syria. 
Neither country responded because Israel’s proposals did not include any of 
the Jordanian territory that the Israelis had captured (Mutawi, 1987, p. 180). 
 
 The Arab response was complex, attempting, as it did, to signal 
different things to the Palestinians and the Israelis. In trying to show to the 
Palestinians that their cause had not been forgotten the Arabs formulated the 
hardline ‘three no’s’ at the Arab Summit that took place in Khartoum on 29th 
August 1967 – ‘no negotiations, no recognition and no peace treaty’ – 
implying the only Arab response to Israeli aggression would be another 
military conflict. The Arab armies, however, were in no position to fight 
another war so Hussein and Nasser also agreed to covertly pursue the 
diplomatic and political means that had been so explicitly ruled out by the 
‘three no’s’. This consisted in attempting to indirectly negotiate with the 
Israelis through third parties. The ‘three no’s’ played into Israel’s hands in the 
sense that it enabled the Israelis to paint the Arabs as intransigent. In August 
the Israelis withdraw the 19th June offer, stressing they would only have direct 
negotiations with the Arab states, something to which the Israelis knew no 
Arab leader could agree. On 17th October the Israeli cabinet announced that it 
would, “fully continue to maintain the situation established by the ceasefire 
agreements and to safeguard her position” (Mutawi, 1987, p. 180). 
 
 The UN responded by issuing Resolution 242 ‘Concerning Principles 
for a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East’ on 22nd November 1967. To 
summarise, its main terms were: i) that the acquisition of territory by war was 
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“inadmissible”; ii) “the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every 
state in the area can live in security”; iii) the withdrawal of Israel from 
“territories occupied in the recent conflict”; iv) terminations of all “states of 
belligerency”, and the acknowledgment of the “sovereignty” of all states in the 
area”; v) the guarantee of open international waterways; vi) “achieving a just 
settlement of the refugee problem” (cited in Mutwai, 1987, p. 179). The terms 
were problematic in the following ways. In the French and Arabic language 
version of the text it says the withdrawal of Israel from “the territories 
occupied…”. In the English language version it only says “territories 
occupied”. The Arabs therefore interpreted it as all the territories occupied by 
Israel after the 1967 war and the Israelis have argued that the wording leaves 
the question of exactly which territories need to be returned open to 
interpretation. The PLO (by this point with Yasser Arafat at the helm) was 
furious that no explicit mention of the Palestinians had been made. All the 
Arab nations apart from Syria accepted the terms of the resolution. Israel 
accepted them “begrudgingly” (Oren, 2002, p. 326) though Mutawi claims that 
the Israelis make demands that are not included in the resolution (1987, p. 
180) (though does not specify what these demands are). The PLO accepted 
Resolution 242 twenty years after it is passed.  
 
6.1. The Palestinian refugees 
 
 Aside from the fatalities, casualties and the occupation, the other 
devastating consequence of the war was the creation of more Palestinian 
refugees, primarily through their forced migration from the newly occupied 
territories at the hands of the Israeli state (Masalha, 1997, 1999, 2003; Segev, 
2005). With approximately 1.3 million Palestinians within Israel’s de facto 
borders created by the new ceasefire lines (including Palestinian citizens of 
Israel), Israel contained a new demographic profile that challenged the 
ideological imperative for the Zionist state to retain a Jewish majority. The pre-
1948 Zionist concept of ‘transfer’ was revived across Israeli society as a 
means to solve this ‘problem’ (Masalha, 2003, pp. 178–189). As a result a 
series of measures were enacted by the State of Israel that resulted in the 
forced migration of approximately 430,000 Palestinians between June and 
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December 1967, depleting some areas of as much as 88% of their Palestinian 
population (many of whom were 1948/9 refugees) (Masalha, 2003, pp. 189–
205). On 6th June, villages in the Latrun salient were destroyed and 2,000 
families were expelled (approximately 6,000 people). On 11th June, a similar 
fate befell Jerusalem’s Al-Magharbeh quarter (detailed above). At the very 
beginning of the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank, the 
army’s first Military Governer of the West Bank Haim Hertzog (later President 
of Israel) started the process of deporting approximately 200,000 Palestinians 
from these areas. This was primarily achieved by supplying Israeli buses that 
took Palestinians from these areas to the Allenby Bridge that connected the 
West and East Banks of the River Jordan. There were various methods used 
to stimulate this forced migration – outright violence being one. Masalha 
quotes at length one of the Israeli soldiers who oversaw this process and 
details the violence used to force some Palestinians onto these buses (2003, 
pp. 202–203). Kossaifi (1996) contends that between 1967 and 1987 there 
was a steady flow of Palestinians out of Israel and the occupied territories 
averaging approximately 33,000 per annum. This includes those forced out by 
the Israeli policy of deportation detailed in (Masalha, 1997, pp. 110–134). 
Between 1967 and 1977, just over 1,100 Palestinians had been deported as a 
result of this policy (ibid.). 
 
7. Postscript: the effect of the war on Great Britain 
 
 The 1967 war had ramifications outside the region, mainly in terms of 
trade. Though these ramifications never emerged in the interviews, they 
would have affected the interviewees, if only indirectly, so they warrant brief 
mention here. The main way Britain was affected was through the ‘Big Lie’, 
the immediate result of which was that seven Arab oil-producing countries 
stopped supplying oil to Britain until August 1967 (when the lie is disproved). 
The Suez Canal was also closed from the beginning of the war until 1975, a 
decision that “seriously damaged Britain’s trade”, costing Britain 
approximately £20 million per month (Brenchley, 2005, p. 50). The result of 
this trade loss was the devaluation of sterling, which, British Prime Minister 
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Harold Wilson claimed, contributed to Labour’s loss in the 1970 general 
election (ibid.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
Chapter 6 
 
May–June 1967: A History of Intensities 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“In [Deleuze and Guattari’s] historical account of human social machines 
through time they regard individuals in the polity to be composed of racial and 
historical intensities. This then produces a history that is neither social history 
in its usual sense nor a history of macro structures and great individuals. 
Instead one needs to read macro or ‘molar’ social formations as composed of 
molecular intensities… Such a history would attend at once to art and to the 
relations among bodies, and to the production of intensities and their 
circulation.” 
(Colebrook, 2009, pp. 30–31) 
 
“Good or bad, politics and its judgements are always molar, but it is the 
molecular and its assessment that makes or breaks it” 
 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 244) 
 
The last chapter provided an historical account of the events that both 
precipitated and constituted the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. This chapter will 
look at the immediate effect of the war on the British Jewish community during 
the period of May–June 1967. It analyses three aspects of the effect of the 
war: i) the way in which the war was perceived by the British Jewish 
community; ii) the affectivity this generated; and iii) the activity that took place 
as a result. In doing this, the chapter takes its cue from Claire Colebrook’s 
imagining of a Deleuzo-Guattarian practice of molecular history – one that 
attends to art (interpreted broadly here as the representation of the 1967 war), 
the relations among bodies and to the production of intensities and their 
circulation. From surveying the interview and archival material it is clear that 
what occurred within the British Jewish community during May and June 1967 
was the production and circulation of molecular intensities across the bodies 
of the British Jewish community. Although the intense reaction of British Jewry 
to the war has been touched upon in the existing historical literature 
(Endelman, 2002) the history of May and June 1967 has yet to be conceived 
of as, primarily, a history of intensities. This is an important theoretical move if 
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we want to understand the intensely affective relationship British Jews have 
had with Israel in the post-1967 conjuncture.  
 
In positing a history of molecular intensities, Colebrook does not 
provide a methodology for how one might be practiced. Therefore, this 
chapter turns to the reading of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (1968 (a)) 
offered in DeLanda’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002). The 
reason for using DeLanda’s approach is because he so lucidly draws out the 
material processes that Deleuze argues bring about ontological change into a 
single cohesive theory. He does this by using examples from maths and 
physics, specifically thermodynamics, to illustrate his particular reading of 
Deleuzian metaphysics. According to the dominant logic of the academy (one 
that separates knowledge into discrete disciplines) it does not follow that 
thermodynamic processes can be used to explain changes in human culture. 
It does, however, make sense from a Deleuzian perspective because the 
‘flattening’ of his ontology (see Chapter 2) enables ‘transversal’ movement 
across the disciplinary boundaries constructed by this logic.  
 
In short, this chapter offers a DeLandian-Deleuzian reading of the 
immediate effect of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 on the British Jewish 
community as a history of molecular intensities. It does this by sifting through 
the interview data and archival material gathered for this PhD from a 
Deleuzian perspective in order to reconstruct the intensive processes that 
bought about the molar changes in the organisation of British Jewish 
subjectivity and the organisation of British Jewish popular politics which are 
the focus of the subsequent two chapters. Focusing on the intensities that 
were produced and circulated in this historical moment enables a clearer 
understanding of the relationship British Jews have had with Israel post-1967 
as a result of the war – a relationship that is still defined by its intensely 
affective nature. 
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2. DeLanda, Deleuze and intensive processes of ontological change 
 
“The human sciences with their materialist, evolutionary and even dialectical 
schemas, lag behind the richness and complexity of causal relations in 
physics or even biology” 
 
 (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 476) 
 
 
In Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Manuel DeLanda sets out a 
reading of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition relating it to the fields of 
mathematics and physics. In the first chapter he uses examples from pure 
mathematics and thermodynamics to illustrate how Deleuze conceives of 
processes of change. The key term in this chapter (and the rest of the book) is 
“intensive” and DeLanda relates it to processes of change by showing how in 
Deleuze’s work, change according to the terms of the Deleuzian ontology 
emerges as a result of the accumulation of intensive forces passing a critical 
threshold. This process is outlined in the following section and is illustrated 
using DeLanda’s example of how change comes about in thermodynamics. 
This section will then explain how this Deleuzian theory of processes of 
change can be applied to the field of human culture. The remainder of the 
chapter will demonstrate its applicability to the intensities generated within the 
British Jewish community as a result of witnessing the Six Day War through 
the British media, and will conclude by pointing to the changes within British 
Jewish culture that this accumulation of intensities bought about. 
 
 DeLanda begins Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy explaining 
the fundamentals of the Deleuzian ontology. His first move is to demonstrate 
how Deleuze is an anti-essentialist philosopher, but atypically for an anti-
essentialist writing between the 1950s and 1990s, his focus is on the 
ontological as opposed to the epistemological. He does this by demonstrating 
how the basic unit of post-Platonic essentialist ontologies is the 
transcendental ‘essence’ that gives each entity that constitutes those 
ontologies their particular identities. The intention of defining identity in terms 
of transcendental essences is to communicate the idea that the identity of 
these ontological entities is fixed and immutable – they have an essence that 
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remains eternal and unchanged. As an anti-essentialist, Deleuze does not 
believe that objects have immutable identities fixed by transcendental 
essences. He instead argues that the identity of entities changes in 
accordance with the historical conditions in which these entities emerge – 
specifically the changing relationships they have with the other entities to 
which they are connected. To communicate the multiple identities that the 
same entity can have dependent on the historical conditions in which it is 
located, Deleuze replaces the term essence with ‘multiplicity’.86 DeLanda 
defines the term multiplicity in the following way: “Multiplicities specify the 
structure of spaces of possibilities, spaces which in turn, explain the 
regularities exhibited by morphogenetic processes.” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 10) . 
A multiplicity is an abstract model of all the identities an entity can assume in 
shifting historical circumstances. (The spatial metaphor – ‘the structure of 
spaces of possibilities’ – is simply a way of concretising a highly abstract 
notion for expositional clarity). ‘Morphogenetic processes’87  refer to the 
material processes that bring these different identities into existence. 
 
 One of the concrete examples that DeLanda uses to illustrate this idea 
is the molecular compound H20. The multiplicity in the context of H20 would 
be an abstract model that represents all the possible forms that H20 can take 
without radically changing its nature88  – steam, water or ice. Whether H20 is 
steam, water or ice depends on how, as a multiplicity, the ‘space of 
possibilities’ is structured at a given time. What determines this structure are 
‘singularities’, a term that DeLanda defines as representing “the intrinsic long-
                                            
86  This definition of multiplicity is specific to the way it is used in Difference and Repetition. 
Deleuze often uses the same term to mean slightly different things in different books. 
DeLanda explains this in the following way: “Gilles Deleuze changes his terminology in every 
one of his books. Very few of his concepts retain their names or linguistic identity. The point 
of this terminological exuberance is not merely to give the impression of difference through 
the use of synonyms, but rather to develop a set of different theories on the same subject, 
theories which are slightly displaced relative to one another but retain enough overlaps that 
can be meshed together as a heterogenous assemblage. Thus, the different names which a 
given concept gets are not exact synonyms but near synonyms, or sometimes non-
synonymous terms defining closely related concepts.” (DeLanda, 2002, p. 157) 
 
87  The definition of ‘morphogenesis’ is the birth of form. 
 
88  i.e. the decomposition of the compound into hydrogen or oxygen atoms or the addition of 
other atoms to create a new molecular compound. 
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term tendencies of a system, the states which the system will spontaneously 
adopt in the long run as it is not constrained by other forces” (DeLanda, 2002, 
p. 15). What this means is that theoretically, H20 can take on a variety of 
forms (more than just steam, water or ice). However the fact that in the 
physical arrangements of our universe at this historical moment, H20 tends to 
manifest as either steam, water or ice is as a result of the arrangement of 
singularities that govern its potential unfoldings. Therefore, in order to change 
the form an entity adopts at a given moment it is the singularities that need to 
change. 
 
In order to outline the morphogenetic processes that rearrange the 
singularities that determine the form of an entity at a given time it will be 
useful to introduce two more terms: ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’. In 
thermodynamics every entity has extensive and intensive properties. 
Examples of extensive properties are length, area and volume. DeLanda 
explains extensive properties as intrinsically divisible i.e. a volume of matter 
can be divided in two, resulting in two equal halves of the original volume, 
each half the extent of the original (2002, p. 26). Temperature and pressure 
are examples of intensive properties. Intensive properties cannot be divided in 
the way just described. If a quantity of water heated to 90° is divided in two 
the result is not two quantities of water at 45°. To half the temperature of that 
quantity of water would involve a reduction of temperature through a series of 
states until the halfway point between 90° and 0° is reached. Extensive 
properties, therefore, pertain to the form an entity assumes in given 
conditions. Intensive properties pertain to the morphogenetic processes that 
cause that form to change. 
 
 To illustrate this, DeLanda returns to H20. In order to change the 
extensive properties of H20 – the formal arrangement of its molecules into 
steam, water or ice – an intensive process needs to be ‘triggered’ i.e. the H20 
needs to be heated passed temperatures of either 0° (ice to water) or 100° 
(water to steam). 0° and 100° are what as known as ‘critical thresholds’ in 
thermodynamics because these are the points at which an intensive process 
will cause a change in the extensive properties of a specific entity. The 
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change bought about in the extensive properties of an entity as a result of an 
intensive process reaching a critical threshold is called a “phase transition”. 
What specifically changes during a phase transition is the arrangement of the 
singularities that are structuring what the entity can be at that given moment. 
The intensive process (heating in this instance) dislodges the specific 
arrangement of those singularities causing them to arrange anew once the 
critical threshold has been passed. 
 
 The more fundamental idea being addressed in DeLanda’s reading of 
Deleuze’s work is the construction of Deleuze’s ontological construction of the 
universe into three distinct fields: the actual, the virtual and the intensive. The 
actual is how Deleuze understands the universe as it is, and all the 
multiplicities that comprise it, as they have been ‘actualised’ during a specific 
historical moment. The virtual is all the ways the universe could be realised 
depending on the morphogenetic processes to which the multiplicities that 
comprise it are exposed.89 The virtual is no less ‘real’ than the actual – they 
are both comprised of exactly the same elements. The virtual is just the 
different, as yet unrealised, ways that these elements could be potentially re-
arranged. The intensive refers to the morphogenetic processes that rearrange 
these elements i.e. that actualise the virtual (give birth to its form); specifically 
the accumulation and dissipation of intensities and the phase transitions they 
bring about.  
 
DeLanda argues that it is within a phase transition that both the virtual 
and the intensive – all the things the world could be and the processes that 
bring them about – becomes most visible in the actual. When a phase 
transition ends and the new extensive properties take shape, the newly 
actualised actual occludes the virtual and the intensive processes which 
bought them into being. There are instructive parallels here with Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony and the processes through which it is secured. At 
moments of ‘organic crisis’ the processes that bring about potentially new 
relations of force (namely political struggle) become visible. Once the crisis is 
                                            
89 The actual refers to the Plane of Organisation and the virtual to the Plane of Immanence, 
as outlined in Chapter 2. 
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resolved i.e. the relations of force become settled through a specific class or 
class fraction achieving hegemony – all the other possible ways of organising 
the polity become obscured and common sense holds that the current form of 
political organisation is the only one possible.90 It is in parallels with more 
politically orientated philosophy (not only Gramsci but also Foucault and his 
concept of ‘normalisation’ (1975)) that it becomes apparent how Deleuzian 
metaphysics as illustrated through thermodynamics becomes applicable to 
the fields of politics and culture. The broadest application of the Deleuzian 
approach to ontological change outlined above to the field of politics and 
culture is the notion that if we are unsatisfied with the cultural and political 
arrangements that currently exist in the actual and we want to bring about 
new cultural and political arrangements (as they exist in the virtual) it is the 
intensive that should be the focus of our energies. Similarly, if an historian is 
interested in making sense of how new cultural and political arrangements 
were bought into existence at a particular point in time, according to Deleuze’s 
logic, it is the intensive to which that historian should direct their focus. 
 
Before this section explains precisely how the thermodynamic terms 
outlined above (singularity, multiplicity, phase transition, critical threshold etc.) 
can be applied to the fields of politics and culture, it will introduce a final term 
from A Thousand Plateaus that will enable a much fuller understanding of the 
immediate impact of the war of the British Jewish community – the Body-
without-Organs (B-w-O). In the terms outlined above, the B-w-O corresponds 
to the form an entity assumes whilst it is undergoing a phase transition. In A 
Thousand Plateaus ontological entities are referred to as either ‘machinic 
assemblages’ or ‘bodies’ and like the entities described above they are 
assembled out of much smaller elements connected to each other by relations 
of exteriority. These relations of exteriority do not simply fix the specific 
arrangements of the elements within the assemblage they constitute; they 
also fix the power relations that circulate across these assemblages and the 
other assemblages that they are connected to. One of the ways Deleuze and 
Guattari, illustrate these ideas is through the metaphor of the human body, the 
                                            
90 For in depth explanations of these terms see Chapter 2. 
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organs that compose it, and the way these organs are organised within the 
Oedipalised pyscho-sexual arrangements of late capitalism. These 
arrangements work to organise the polymorphously perverse flows of sexual 
desire that Freud argued characterises infant sexuality (Freud, 1905, p. 280) 
into the more organised arrangement of adult sexuality in which the 
reproductive organs are privileged as locuses of sexual desire. Deleuze and 
Guattari are deeply critical of these arrangements and throughout A Thousand 
Plateaus argue for ontological arrangements in which desire (in Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms i.e. ‘force of existing’ as opposed to sexual desire) can flow 
more freely across the Plane of Organisation. One of the ways this can be 
achieved is through the creation of the B-w-O – or the creation of a body that 
is organized in an absolutely de-hierarchised fashion, i.e. one where no organ 
is privileged, and across which desire flows un-interrupted.  
 
One of the ways a body becomes dis-organised is through a surge of 
intensity, the force of which undoes the relations of exteriority holding its 
constituent parts in place. Whereas in thermodynamics, intensity is heat or 
pressure, in the context of cultural and political change, intensity translates as 
affectivity.91 Once the affectivity surging through a human population reaches 
a critical threshold of intensity, that human population undergoes a phase 
transition in which its formal arrangements will in some way (be it social, 
economic, political or cultural) change. In between the critical threshold being 
passed and the phase transition occurring there is a moment in which the old 
arrangements have come undone and the new arrangements have not quite 
taken hold; this is the moment of the Body-without-Organs. Deleuze and 
Guattari describe the organisation of the B-w-O in the following way: 
 
“A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body 
upon which that which serves as organs is distributed according to crowd 
phenomena, in Brownian motion, in the form of molecular multiplicities.”  
 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 34) 
 
                                            
91 This is not the case for DeLanda in which he defines affect in terms of capacity as opposed 
to intensity (see Chapter 4). 
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They then describe the experience of ‘organs’ distributed according to crowd 
phenomena… in the form of molecular multiplicities as: 
 
“There is no longer a self that feels, acts and recalls; there is ‘a glowing fog, a 
dark yellow mist’ that has affects and experiences, movements and speeds”  
 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 180) 
 
The moment of the B-w-O is when all the elements become charged by the 
same intense affectivity that undid the relations that had kept them together in 
their previous formation; and because they are charged by the same intense 
affectivity they are mobilised in the same way – all the elements begin to act 
in concert with each other. At the level of human populations this is a de-
subjectificatory and de-signifcatory moment, “there is no longer a self that 
feels, acts and recalls…” Meaning and subjectification are replaced by a ‘mist’ 
of intensities that breaks the human subjects, who constitute the machinic 
assemblage, down into molecular multiplicities of “affects and experiences, 
movements and speeds”. 
 
A B-w-O is only ever a transitory moment, a moment of passage 
between two states, a phase transition. (Deleuze and Guattari warn that 
sustaining the B-w-O over long periods of time could result in psychosis). 
What new form the body takes after it has become a B-w-O depends on what 
type of B-w-O transpired during the phase transition. In A Thousand Plateaus 
Deleuze and Guattari describe three different possible B-w-O’s: the joyous B-
w-O, which results in a more joyously arranged body; a B-w-O that violently 
destratifies resulting in a new psychotic body; and the cancerous B-w-O of the 
fascist. It is the final B-w-O that, this chapter argues, occurs during the phase 
transition bought about by witnessing the Six Day War in the analysis below. 
A cancerous B-w-O of the fascist is so-called because of the specific way it 
gives form to matter on the Plane of Organisation: “each instant, each second, 
a cell becomes cancerous, mad, proliferates and loses its configuration, takes 
over everything” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 180) Like a cancer cell, the 
cancerous B-w-O insinuates itself within another body producing identical 
cells which eventually work to destroy the other cells comprising that body. 
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Deleuze and Guattari argue that the cancerous B-w-O affects two stratums of 
the Plane of Organisation specifically: the stratum of significance and the 
stratum of subjectification. Its ‘cancerous’ function on the stratum of 
significance is the ‘mad proliferation’ of a single meaning and the destruction 
of this stratum’s ability to produce and circulate a variety of different meanings 
across the Plane of Organisation. Similarly, its cancerous function on the 
stratum of subjectification is the ‘mad proliferation’ of identical subjectivities 
(the ‘serialisation’ of subjectivities) typical of fascist political and cultural 
arrangements. The examples of a cancerous B-w-O used in A Thousand 
Plateaus are the state and the army. As will become clearer below, this 
chapter does not argue that the Six Day War produces fascism in its 
conventional sense but rather that the effect of witnessing the war limited the 
circulation of the various possible interpretations of what the war, Israel and 
Zionism means, and the various subjective positions that had existed and 
might still exist towards Israel as a result.92  
 
                                            
92 The terms ‘cancerous’ and ‘fascist’ are highly problematic in any discussion of Jewish 
culture because a key trope of the modern anti-Semitism deployed by the Nazis to justify the 
Holocaust was the representation of Jews as a disease that polluted the racially pure body of 
‘indigenous’/Aryan German culture (Gilman, 1991). There is a very significant danger of 
reproducing this association in the assessment of what occurred in British Jewry during the 
crisis and the war as the becoming cancerous B-w-O of the fascist. To avoid this danger it is 
important to carefully demonstrate the different use of the terms ‘cancerous’ and ‘fascist’ in 
Deleuzo-Guattarian discourse compared to their use in modern anti-Semitism.  
The fascism to which Capitalism and Schizophrenia refers is only tangentially Fascism in its 
conventional sense, i.e. the early twentieth century political movement founded by Benito 
Mussolini and adopted around the world in various forms and with different relationships to 
race science and anti-Semitism. Conversely, fascism, in its Deleuzo-Guattarian usage, refers 
to any assemblage whose power relations are organised in a highly arborescent (hierarchical) 
manner. The main culprits of fascism in Anti-Oedipus are not Mussolini et al. but the French 
Communist Party and L’Ecole Freudienne under Jacques Lacan, organisations that, 
ideologically, have nothing in common with political Fascism. In fact, the French communist 
party was explicitly anti-Fascist and anti-racist. 
Similarly, the use of the metaphorical term ‘cancerous’ in A Thousand Plateaus refers not to 
notions of racial purity and the diseased body politic but specifically to the morphogenetic 
function of cancer cells in human and non-human organisms i.e. the ‘mad proliferation’ of 
identical ‘cells’ on the ‘stratum’ of signification and subjectification, whose very sameness 
serves a destructive function (as just described).  
There is a debate as to whether Zionism is a form of fascism, and most serious Zionist or pro-
Israeli scholars point out, not only the similarities between the two, but how often the two 
movements worked together in the early twentieth century (Alderman, 1992; Shimoni, 1995) 
The position this thesis takes within this debate is Edward Said’s in A Question of Palestine 
(1979) that “Zionism is Zionism” i.e. that as an ideology and a practice, Zionism has a 
specificity that direct comparisons to other political ideologies occlude. This specificity needs 
to be fully accounted for, if Zionism is to be successfully opposed. 
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3. Thesis 
 
 The remainder of the chapter attempts to outline the morphogenetic 
processes triggered in the British Jewish community by witnessing the Six 
Day War. It argues that the multiplicity in this context is the British Jewish 
assemblage – not only the form it takes in the actual on the eve of the crisis 
that precipitated the war, but also all the other potential forms it could take in 
the virtual. The ‘form’ of any assemblage is measured by its extensive 
properties. The extensive properties of a community of people are its 
economic, political, social, kinship and institutional arrangements, the different 
forms of cultural and aesthetic expression and the affectivity that flow across 
it.93 These extensive properties are outlined in detail in Chapter 4. Different 
singularities structure this arrangement, however, the singularity that became 
the focus of the intensive process that is the subject of this chapter is the 
traumatic memory of the Holocaust. The reason this can be understood as a 
Deleuzian singularity is because it gave shape to a number of the extensive 
properties of the British Jewish assemblage during the conjuncture prior to the 
1967 war (1945–1967) – for example the decision of the majority of Jewish 
men in this period to self-employ. As will become apparent, the extensive 
property most changed by the intensive process triggered by witnessing the 
war was the affectivity that flowed across the British Jewish assemblage, i.e. 
the way that British Jews felt as Jews in Britain and the world more generally. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the trauma of the Holocaust meant that British 
Jews had an inflated sense of anti-Semitism in Britain, making them feel less 
safe as Jews.  
 
The focus of this chapter is the intensive process that occurred in the 
British Jewish community during May/June 1967 and what happens to the 
community as a result. The trigger that sets off the intensive process is 
witnessing the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 through the prism of Zionist 
propaganda, i.e. as the Six Day War – a quasi-religious event in which the 
                                            
93 This definition is taken from Grossberg’s reading of Marx’s social totality (Grossberg, 1992). 
Grossberg adds an affective plane to classical Marxism’s breaking down of the social totality 
into the economic base and superstructure. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed explanation). 
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super-heroic IDF saved Israel’s Jews from a genocide at the hands of anti-
Semitic Arab armies. The representation of the war in this way triggered an 
intense affective response within the British Jewish community: first an 
intense terror during the crisis that preceded the war and then a similarly 
intense elation triggered by the Israeli victory. The affectivity generated during 
this period was so intense the British Jewish community passed a critical 
threshold and became a Body-without-Organs. This can be seen mainly in the 
frenetic political activity that occured within the British Jewish community in 
May/June 1967. During the moment of the becoming Body-without-Organs of 
the British Jewish community, the singularities that structured its organisation 
began to re-arrange – i.e. it underwent a phase transition. What happened 
specifically is the traumatic memory of the Holocaust became articulated to 
the idea that a second Jewish genocide (which they saw as almost inevitable 
at all times) would only be stopped by a militarily strong State of Israel. This in 
turn causes a re-arrangement of the extensive properties of the British Jewish 
assemblage at both the molecular level (the affectivity flowing across the 
assemblage) and at the level of the molar (British Jewish cultural identity 
changes and Zionism becomes ‘Popular’). All these changes are discussed in 
depth in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1. The Trigger: The Six Day War 
 
 The first step in analysing the effect of the1967 war on the British 
Jewish community in the terms set out above is to discern what precisely 
triggered the morphogenetic process. From the interview data and archival 
material it is clear this was the way that British Jews perceived the war –
specifically what they felt was at stake during its build up – (commonly 
referred to as the ‘Middle East Crisis’ at the time), and what the Israeli victory 
meant for Israel as a result. For British Jews the Middle East Crisis of 
May/June 1967 threatened the annihilation of the State of Israel and the 
genocide of its Jewish population at the hands of the armies of anti-Semitic 
Arab nations. This perception is partially rooted in the idea that British Jews 
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had of Israel at this time i.e. that it was a small, weak nation associated with 
Holocaust victims and refugees. Therefore when Israel achieved its 
resounding military victory it was so unexpected the dominant tendency within 
British Jewry was to understand it as a miracle. As a result, the perception of 
Israel changed to a superheroic nation. This is a dramatic misrepresentation 
of what was at stake during the crisis and the war it precipitated. This section 
argues that this misrepresentation came about as a result of the Zionist 
propaganda effort, which is discussed in more detail at the end of the section.  
 
4.1.1. The British Jewish perception of the Middle East Crisis 
 
The perception of the Middle East Crisis as threatening the annihilation 
of the State of Israel and the genocide of its Jewish population appears 
throughout the interviews in a number of ways. This perception was largely 
expressed through the language of Zionist propaganda. The broader 
discursive framework through which these ideas are formulated is the memory 
of the Holocaust itself, images of which appear explicitly in the interviews. The 
Holocaust also appears through the perception that the Arabs were motivated 
by anti-Semitism and through the elision of Nasser with Hitler. 
 
‘Annihilation’ 
 
When the interviewees were asked what they remembered thinking 
was at stake during the build up to the war they all responded in the same 
way – it was “the very existence of the State of Israel” (Stephen, p. 353). For 
most of the interviewees, the annihilation of the State did not simply mean the 
end of the state apparatus but annihilation of Israel’s population. 
 
“… we could see it happening: the whole population being wiped out by 
potentially hostile forces on the one hand and the complete elimination of the 
State of Israel.” 
 
(Brian, p. 577) 
 
 
“All I can see is a picture of a little strip of land […] And there’s the med and 
they’re surrounded by all these countries […] I can almost see […] the 
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graphics of how they would descend on Israel, from all sides and drive them 
into the sea.  
 
So that would be killing Israelis or expelling Israelis… 
I think killing them, killing Israeli’s, that’s how we saw it.” 
 
(Sarah, p. 525) 
 
 
“… ‘they would have been wiped off the map’? Did that mean… 
A lot of Jews would have been killed again.” 
 
(Rose, p. 648) 
 
Both David and Rose felt that this was the only possible outcome for Israel, 
considering its size and the fact it faced a united Arab front: 
 
“Very unlikely. The only sensible end to the war seemed like an Arab victory 
because there were five times as many of them.” 
 
(David, p. 457) 
 
“A lot of Jews would have been killed again […] And it had to happen. How 
could it possibly not happen? You know all the newspapers were filled with all 
these maps with so many thousands airplanes, so many thousand tanks and 
there’s Israel.” 
 
[My emphasis] (Rose, p. 648) 
 
 
The fact that the interviewees all responded in this way is interesting for two 
reasons. The first is that it is evidence of Deleuze and Guattari’s cancerous 
Body-without-Organs of the fascist, particularly the effect it has on the stratum 
of signification. Of all the possible significations (ways of decoding what the 
crisis signified) that could have circulated across the British Jewish 
assemblage in May and June 1967, the signification of the Middle East crisis 
as the annihilation of the state almost completely dominates. For David and 
particularly Rose – there was no other possible outcome. This closing down of 
polysemy is a persistent feature of the British Jewish perception of both the 
crisis and the war.  
 
The second way that the perception of the crisis as the potential 
annihilation of Israel is interesting is because the idea that Jewry is 
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perpetually facing an existential threat is a foundational idea of Zionism. One 
of the ways classical Zionist ideology argued the case for establishing a State 
of Israel was that as long as Jews existed in the Diaspora, they would never 
be safe from anti-Semitism and the only way to protect themselves from this 
was through the up-building of a strong Jewish nation-state in ‘Eretz Israel’ 
(Shimoni, 1995).94 The fact that the Middle East crisis began to be 
represented in this fashion demonstrates the beginnings of the Zionist 
territorialisation of British Jewry in 1967. 
 
The Language of Zionist Propaganda 
 
Further evidence of the start of the Zionist territorialisation of British 
Jewry can be seen in the way that the interviewees use the language of 
Zionist propaganda to make sense of the Middle East Crisis. 
 
‘Poor little Israel’ 
 
The first example of this was voiced by the women interviewees – the 
Zionist representation of Israel as a ‘tiny’ land surrounded by hostile Arab 
forces: 
 
“I remember that my parents and I were […] very concerned that poor little 
Israel compared to all the Arabs around would be able to cope.” 
 
(Vivien, p. 625) 
 
“[The Arabs] don’t want the land. They don’t want Israel to be there. Full stop. 
[…] It’s a tiny little land. It’s tiny. [Light laugh]” 
 
(Evelyn, p. 492) 
 
“All I can see is a picture of a little strip of land. It was a very narrow strip of 
land.” 
 
(Sarah, p. 525) 
 
                                            
94 The notion that Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel persistently face an ‘existential threat’ 
has continued to exist since the State was established, from 1948–1967 the threat was 
symbolised by Nasser and ‘the Arabs’. Between 1967–2004 it was mainly represented by 
Arafat and the PLO. In the present day Iran represents this threat in the Zionist imagination. 
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The representation of Israel as a geographically small proportion of the Middle 
East is technically accurate. However, this representation performs two 
important ideological functions. The first was to misrepresent the State of 
Israel as weak and vulnerable. The second is to justify the colonisation of 
Palestine and the displacement of the Palestinian people. It does this by 
implying that the Palestinians who wish to remain in their ancestral homeland 
are unreasonable when they could just move somewhere in the much larger 
Arabic Middle East. The first is a misrepresentation because, as the Israeli 
cabinet knew at the time and as was proved by the victory, Israel was not 
vulnerable in 1967.95 As the Israeli victory goes to prove it was militarily 
stronger than the Arab armies combined. The second aspect of this 
ideological misrepresentation misunderstands the relationship between a 
people, their culture and the territory they have inhabited for centuries. 
Regardless of the veracity of the representation of Israel as ‘tiny’, it is one of 
the key ways Israel was understood during the crisis and it plays a key part in 
the affective response triggered as a result. 
 
‘Push them into the sea’/‘Wipe them off the map’ 
 
Two other refrains that emerged in the interviews was the idea that an 
Arab victory would result in i) Israeli Jews being ‘pushed into the sea’ and ii) 
Israel itself being ‘wiped off the map’. Both are different expressions of the 
same annihilation anxiety. 
 
“That’s what I thought was at stake: that these bullies, which is what they 
were at the time, that they could just squash them into the sea. But that’s not 
the case.” 
  
(Jeremy, p. 422) 
 
“My fear was that Jews were going to be driven into the sea.” 
 
(David, p. 454) 
 
 
 
                                            
95 Remarkably, the interview data suggested that British Jews still feel Israel is weak and 
vulnerable at the time of being interviewed. 
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“They would have forced them into the sea. That’s what they had 
proclaimed.” 
 
(Joseph, p. 556) 
 
“… but back then people were saying, ‘it’s going to be wiped off the map’, ‘it’s 
going to be pushed into the sea’, ‘it’s going to be decimated’. Everybody you 
spoke to said that.” 
 
[Emphasis in original] (Rose, p. 648) 
 
 
(The origins of the notion that the Jews would have been pushed into the sea 
are addressed below.) 
 
The Holocaust 
 
The broader discursive framework that produced the above 
representations of the build-up to the war as the potential genocide of Israeli 
Jews was the traumatic memory of the Holocaust. The Holocaust emerges in 
the interview data and archival material in a number of ways. First it is 
mentioned implicitly and explicitly by the interviewees, in the British media at 
the time and can also be seen in the archival material. Explicit refers to 
instances when the word Holocaust is used by both Jews and non-Jews in 
Britain to describe what they thought would happen to Israeli Jews if the 
Middle East Crisis turned into a war. Implicit refers to instances when words 
taken from popular discourses on the Holocaust are used in the same way – 
for example extermination, annihilation and liquidation – and would have 
invoked the memory of the Holocaust, intentionally or otherwise. The 
Holocaust also appears in the British Jewish perception that the Arab nations 
were driven by anti-Semitism and in the representation of Nasser as Hitler. 
 
Perhaps the strongest articulation of the Middle East crisis as a 
potential genocide of Israel’s Jews with the notion of the Holocaust can be 
seen in the following statement by British Jewish writer Wolf Mankowitz, 
written in the edition of literary journal Jewish Quarterly published immediately 
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after the war. In it he claimed that what the war in fact threatened was the 
accomplishement of Hitler’s final solution:  
 
“It’s very simple. 150 million Arabs, backed by the greatest military power in 
the world, were committed to the elimination of a people of 2 ½ million […] 
Any minute they were going to be liquidated. The ‘final solution’, 
unsuccessfully attempted by Hitler’s technocrats, was about to be 
accomplished.”  
  
(Mankowitz, 1967/8, p. 15) 
 
The most detailed articulation between the Holocaust and the build up to the 
war in the interviews is made by Rose, whose father had fled Czechoslovakia 
on the eve of the Second World War.  
 
“I was terrified, yes. Because then people were very much aware of what had 
happened in 1936 […] in Germany. People had nowhere to go […] people 
wanted to go out of Europe and there was nowhere for them to go. Nobody 
wanted them you see […] It suddenly came back. Especially those of us with 
European backgrounds who realized that if they had wanted to, if our 
grandparents had wanted to run a way from the Nazi threat, there was 
nowhere for them to go. It suddenly came home to us that Israel was our 
insurance really, if this sort of thing, if the Nazi threat had happened again 
[…] Our views at that point was if Israel was destroyed we all were going to 
be in exactly the same position as the Jews in the thirties.” 
 
 (Rose, p. 653) 
 
In this quote Rose does not think that the war would have meant a second 
Holocaust (i.e. the attempted industrualised genocide of global Jewry). 
Instead she thinks that had Israel lost the war, British Jews would lose their 
insurance from a potential second Holocaust – a claim made by Zionists since 
the 1967 war and one that appeared across the interview data (discussed at 
length in the next chapter). Anti-Zionist David, says he made the same 
connection in 1967: 
 
“I… saw a continuity between that and the Holocaust.” 
 
 (David, p. 458) 
 
Vivien, who also had family perish during the Holocaust, implies the 
connection: 
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Do you remember what that might have meant to you: that the State of 
Israel would cease to exist or that people would have been killed or that 
people would be deported… or maybe you didn’t have a sense of it, I 
don’t know. 
[Long pause] I don’t know. I think it was a frightening thought. I don’t think I 
had gone that far as to think what might have happened. You know, 
especially my parents were very worried about it because they felt it was very 
important to have Israel.” 
 
(Vivien, p. 626) 
 
This articulation between the war threatening a genocide of Israel’s Jews and 
the Holocaust is not one being made retrospectively by the interviewees in 
line with the Zionist memorialisation of the war over forty years preceding the 
interviews. It was an idea that circulated widely across British society at the 
time. For example, it appeared across many British media outlets both 
impicltly and explicitly. It appears explicitly in a reference to the final solution 
in a letter written by the leftist Jewish playwright Arnold Wesker to The 
Guardian published on 1st June 1967: 
 
“I urge [Prime Minister] Wilson and the leaders of the world to recognize that 
what is happening in the Middle East is… a re-emergence … of the same 
spirit that stirred Nazi Germany to implement a “final solution” for the Jews. 
Egypt, Syria and the Arab world have stated … that their aim is the 
annihilation of Israel.”  
 
 
The Holocaust also appeared implicitly in a number of statements made 
across the British media during the build up to the war and the war itself. On 
31st May, BBC journalist Ian Trethowan appeared on TV news programme 24 
Hours and said “… the most potent danger, which seemed to build up 
palpably before our eyes… is the threat to the very life of Israel” (Churchill, 
1967, p. 224). On 7th June 1967 a full-page advert appeared in the Daily 
Express with the headline ‘Israel is fighting for survival’ and including the text, 
“the openly avowed intention of the Arab nations is Israel’s complete 
annihilation of two and half million men, women and children.” The advert was 
signed by a number of celebrities including Elizabeth Taylor, Vanessa 
Redgrave, Dudley Moore and Oliver Reed. On BBC Radio’s World at One 
Winston Churchill (grandson of the war Prime Minister) recounted a 
conversation he had with David Ben Gurion during the Middle East crisis in 
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which Ben Gurion said, “one thing you’ve got to understand is that for the 
Arabs, what is a military defeat? It’s the loss of an army… For us military 
defeat means probably death for every single one of us” (Churchill, 1967, p. 
226). On the same day Liberal MP Jeremy Thorpe appeared on BBC 
television programme Panorama arguing that Britain ought not “wash our 
hands and allow a small nation to be exterminated” and then re-iterated the 
sentiment in a question to pro-Nasserite MP Cristopher Mayhew asking, 
“would he then stand aside and watch this nation exterminated?” (ibid.). Using 
terms like “threat to the very life”, “Israel’s complete annihilation” and 
“extermination”, whilst not explicitly stating that the war threatened a 
Holocaust would have invoked its memory in this context. 
 
The notion, rooted in the memory of the Holocaust, that an Arab-Israeli 
war would mostly like result in the genocide of Israeli Jews was also repeated 
in speeches made at public meetings held in solidarity with Israel. One of the 
largest of these was a demonstration of solidarity at the Royal Albert Hall on 
5th June 1967. A speech was delivered at this demonstration that included 
the line: 
 
“Ladies and Gentleman, six million Jews were destroyed in the Second World 
War. Are we to say that two million of the survivors are not to be entities on 
any of the worlds surface, to live in peace and harmony.”96  
 
‘Two million’ refers to the population of Israel in 1967, not all of whom were 
Holocaust survivors as the speech suggests. The connection between the 
Holocaust and the impending war is made once again by Wolf Mankowitz in a 
speech delivered at a ‘Solidarity with Israel’ conference on 11th June 1967 at 
Woburn House in London. 
 
“But for us Jews there can be no doubt or discussion about our commitment, 
because the destruction of Israel would be the destruction of Jewry… Many 
liberal-minded people said that, of course, when it comes to the point, the 
west would not allow the Arabs to make good their Hitlerite threats of 
extermination. But Hitler made good his threat to the extent of six million 
                                            
96   (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall) 
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human beings. Why shouldn’t a Holy War of Arab states supported by the 
Soviet Union be able to manage a relatively small genocide?”97  
 
 The articulation of the Middle East crisis to the idea of an Israeli Jewish 
genocide and the memory of the Holocaust did not only appear in Zionist 
propaganda or in certain parts of the British media but also circulated 
amongst the British Jewish population. Evidence for this is provided by the 
interviews undertaken for this thesis. It could be argued that because these 
interviews were conducted approximately forty years after the war took place 
that this articulation might be a Halbwachsian collective memory, i.e. a 
memory constructed by British Jews to serve present Zionist ideological 
needs. A striking piece of evidence that shows that this is not the case and 
that this idea circulated during the crisis can be seen in the private 
corrospendence of notable Jewish leftists Ralph Miliband (living in Britain at 
the time of the war) and Marcel Liebman (living in France).98 Throughout this 
correspondence the articulation of the crisis to a potential genocide of Israel’s 
Jews rooted in the memory of the Holocaust is repeatedly made by Ralph 
Miliband. For example, in a letter written on 28th May 1967, Miliband claimed 
that the goal of blockading the Gulf of Aqaba was to “destroy… the State of 
Israel… in a war of annihilation” (Achar, 2006, p. 14). According to Miliband 
the elimination of the state means the elimination of its citizens (Achar, 2006, 
p.15). In the same letter he echoed the sentiment made at the Royal Albert 
Hall in the above quote by writing, “I would consider the extermination of two 
million Jews, including hundreds of thousands of survivors of the camps, as 
an appalling catastrophe” (Achar, 2006, p.16). Liebman critiqued these claims 
in his letters to Miliband but Miliband insists, in a letter dated 2nd June 1967, 
that “the Arab world directly threatens Israel’s existence – and the idea that 
this is not the case is absurd” (Achar, 2006, p. 43) going on to say that the 
war would be “an event that would have the dimensions, if not the numbers, of 
Hitler’s massacres” (Achar, 2006, p.47). The last statement is particularly 
powerful and, along with the others, provides evidence that the connection 
between the Holocaust and the crisis is not one being retrospectively applied 
by the interviewees. What makes this evidence striking is that Miliband was a 
                                            
97 ibid. 
98 This corrospendence has been published as a small book (Achar, 2006).  
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Marxist academic with anti-imperialist political sympathies, and a self-
professed ambivalent relationship to Zionism (Achar, 2006) – so not a typical 
British Jew as described in Chapter 4 and someone who would have been 
more resistant to Zionist propaganda. In a moment of self-reflexivity Miliband 
speculated that it was as a Jew that he made the connection between the 
Holocaust and what was unfolding in the Middle East and that “no doubt an 
emotional element enters into play” (Achar, 2006, p. 47) – gesturing towards 
the affectivity triggered by the connection and that is discussed below. 
 
Arab Anti-Semitism 
 
 The use of the Holocaust as the dominant interpretive framework, 
through which the interviewees made sense of the build-up to the war, 
appears in the interview data in another ways. The first is in interpreting the 
Arab states’ motivation as anti-Semitism. 
 
“For you what did you think the Arabs wanted? 
To wipe Israel off the map. 
 
Completely to destroy… 
Absolutely. It wasn’t about land. It was about destroying this fly in the 
ointment. 
 
If it wasn’t about land can you explain what you think it was about? 
[Pause] Well at that time it just felt anti-Semitic. It felt, ‘we just want to kill the 
Jews’.” 
(Sarah, p. 526) 
 
Stephen interprets UN chief U Thant’s decision to remove the UN 
peacekeeping force from the Israel/Egypt border as motivated by anti-
Semitism. 
 
“… to me that’s anti-Semitism […] And why would you take a peacekeeping 
force that needs it desperately now […] how does the guy at the top of the 
United Nations pull out a peacekeeping force, just as things are getting 
worse. ‘Widely perceived as fault of Thant’. [raises voice] Who else’s fault 
could it have been? No good piece of shit.” 
 
(p. 373) 
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‘Arab Anti-Semitism’ was also a central plank in the Zionist propaganda being 
disseminated at the time99 and is discussed in detail below. 
 
Nasser as Hitler 
 
  The final way that the Holocaust appears in relation to the build up to 
war was in the elision of Nasser with Hitler. This elision first happened during 
the Suez Crisis in 1956 in when the British government and the British press 
described Nasser as ‘Hitler on the Nile’. The intention of representing Nasser 
as Hitler during the Suez Crisis was an attempt to garner support from the 
British public for the joint British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. 
Hitler represents absolute evil in post-1945 British culture so it was a common 
tactic of British propaganda during wartime to try and align enemies of Britain 
with Hitler in the minds of the British public. This tactic was revived in 1967 by 
pro-Israeli members of Britain’s establishment. In the context of the 1967 war 
it had the double effect of not only suggesting that Nasser was totalitarian, 
dictatorial, bloodthirsty, and evil but also that he had anti-Semitic and 
genocidal intentions in going to war with Israel.100 
 
Liberal MP John Pardoe made the connection between Hitler and 
Nasser in a speech he gave at the Royal Albert Hall rally: 
 
“[Israel’s] annihilation has been more specifically threatened by Nasser than 
has the annihilation of any other small country since the publication of Mein 
Kampf.”101  
 
The connection also appears in Zionist propaganda. The Labour Friends of 
Israel (one of the main disseminators of Zionist propaganda at the time) 
published a pamphlet called ‘Nasser’s Nazis: Egypt a Home for Wanted 
Hitlerites’.102  
                                            
99 (CZA: F13/560 General) 
 
100  Zionist propaganda represented Yasser Arafat as ‘Hitler in the Bunker’ during the 1982 
Lebanon-Israel war. 
 
101  (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Albert Hall) 
102  (CZA: S5/12478 ‘England’) 
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It is impossible to speculate what would have happened had the war 
ended in an Arab victory. It is, however, highly unlikely that it would have 
ended in the industrialised genocide of Israel’s Jewish population. In the 
unlikely event that this had been the secret intention of the Arab states during 
the build up to the war – and there is no historical evidence to support this – 
the Arab states did not have the means to undertake genocide on an 
industrial scale. Why then, does this become ‘the only possible outcome of 
the war’ (to paraphrase Rose) in the minds of the British Jewish community in 
the weeks preceding its out-break? There are two reasons for this. The first is 
that in 1967, the immense trauma of the Holocaust had yet to be negotiated in 
British (or world) Jewish culture. It structured the British Jewish cultural 
unconscious, profoundly shaping the perception British Jews had of their 
place in the world, namely that ultimately they would never be safe from anti-
Semitism. It is because of the crucial role that the traumatic memory of the 
Holocaust plays in giving shape to post-1945 British Jewish culture that it can 
be seen as a Deleuzian singularity (as defined by DeLanda) i.e. as a 
structuring principle that governs the unfolding of a culture determining many 
of its formal attributes. This is one of the reasons that post-1945 any threat to 
a Jewish community, the spectre of the Holocaust is resurrected as a possible 
outcome. 
 
The second reason is that there was a concerted effort on the part of 
the Israeli state and Zionist organisations in Britain to present the build up to 
the war in these terms in their propaganda. For instance, in a last minute 
attempt to gain support from the USSR before the beginning of the war Israeli 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol wrote the following to his Russian counterpart 
Alexei Kosygin: “Surrounded on all sides by hostile armies, we are engaged in 
a life or death struggle to defend our existence and to prevent Nasser from 
fulfilling his goal of repeating the crimes perpetrated by Hitler against the 
Jewish people” (Oren, 2002, p. 169). In Britain this and similar messages 
were disseminated by the Israeli Embassy and the Zionist Federation (ZF) – a 
‘nerve centre of … public relations work’ according to a ZF press report. This 
work included issuing a series of pamphlets, reprinting speeches and writing 
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letters to newspapers editors. One of the pamphlets that warranted special 
mention in the report is ‘From Egypt With Dove’ “in which we reproduced a 
series of cartoons that had appeared in the Arab press”.103 Many, though not 
all, the cartoons within this booklet represent Israel in the form of an anti-
Semitic depiction of a Jewish man (large nose, stout hunched over figure, 
forelocks) that was used most famously by Nazi newspaper Der Stuermer. 
The booklet also includes a December 1934 Der Stürmer cartoon in its pages. 
Quotes from Arab leaders and the media are also printed, including: “’with the 
closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel is faced with two alternatives, either of 
which will destroy it: it will either be strangled to death by the Arab… 
blockade… or it will perish by the fire of the Arab forces…’ (Radio Cairo, 20th 
May)”.104 
 
This booklet (and others like it) raise complex issues for the historical 
interpretation of the intentions of the Arabs in the month long tensions before 
the outbreak of war. These images and quotes did appear in the Arab press 
during the build up to the war and using a Der Stürmer style image of a Jew to 
represent Israel is plainly anti-Semitic. However, the link between these 
representations and the idea that the Arabs were driven by anti-Semitic 
intention or that they had planned a Holocaust is not as straightforward as the 
Zionist Federation suggests, having gathered these representations together 
into a single booklet. Firstly, as argued in Chapter 5, there was no unified 
Arab intention during the build up to the war. The events of May/June 1967 
transpired as a result of the power struggle taking place within the complex 
geo-political arrangements of a Middle East fraught with competing political 
ideologies – not as a result of an ahistorical and genocidal anti-Semitism. 
Secondly, the picture of Arab propaganda that emerges in the existing 
historical literature is more complex than its Zionist representation. For 
example, in an article examining the historical origins of the alleged Arab 
threat to ‘throw the Jews into the sea’ Israeli historian Moshe Shemesh 
demonstrates how this specific formulation was created by the Israeli 
                                            
103   (ISA: 4006/13 Press Report on Six Day War) 
 
104   (CZA: S5/1247 England: Material Relating to War) 
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information bureau by distorting a statement made by PLO leader Ahmed 
Shuqayri at a press conference. When asked what would happen to the 
citizens of Israel if the Arabs won the war, Shuqayri answered: “We will 
endeavor to assist [the Jews] and facilitate their departure by sea to their 
countries of origin.” Regarding the fate of Jews born in pre-1948 Palestine, he 
replied: “Whoever survives will stay in Filastin, but in my opinion no one will 
remain alive” (Shemesh, 2003, p. 72). The prospect that ‘no one will remain 
alive’ would no doubt have disturbed an Israeli and Jewish audience. 
However the statements couching this claim – ‘whoever survives will stay in 
Filastin’, ‘we will endeavour to assist and facilitate their departure by sea’ 
moderate its meaning. The ethics of forced repatriation are highly problematic, 
even in the context of colonial-settler societies, but it is not the genocide 
implied by the Zionist representation of Shuqayri statement as ‘throwing all 
the Jews into the sea’. In the cases where the Zionist propaganda does 
faithfully reflected the violent language used in the Arab propaganda: 
arguably, this Arab propaganda was designed for the eyes and ears of an 
Israeli public, with the specific intention of de-moralising them. The mere fact 
this language existed does not automatically mean that it was intended 
literally.  
  
However, whether it was intended or not, the existence of this material, 
its distortion and dissemination by Zionist organisations and the fact that the 
Holocaust was a singularity that structured post-1945 British Jewish culture 
meant the unfolding Middle East Crisis had a profound effect on the British 
Jewish community. In DeLandian-Deleuzian terms it triggered an intensive 
process that would eventually lead to the change in the extensive properties 
that are the subject of the rest of this thesis. 
 
4.2. Intensive process: terror 
 
“I can understand the intertwined terror and the exultation out of which 
Zionism has been nourished…” 
 
[My emphasis] (Said, 1979, p. 60) 
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 DeLanda introduces two further conceptual terms in his discussion of 
affect: intensity and quality. Intensity refers to the force with which the affect is 
being exerted. Quality refers to the qualitative nature of the specific affect – 
happiness, sadness etc. The intensive process triggered in the British Jewish 
community during the Middle East Crisis occurred in two phases. The first 
phase was the terror triggered by the thought of the repetition of the 
Holocaust. The second was the elation/exultation triggered by the perception 
that Israel had successfully fended off this threat – (terror and exultation being 
the affects which nourish Zionism, according to Said). Although qualitatively 
these phases are opposed to each other, they were of an equally high 
intensity. As will be demonstrated this high intensity surpassed the critical 
threshold required to trigger the becoming B-w-O of the British Jewish 
community and the phase transition in which the extensive properties of that 
community are altered. 
 
The representation of the Middle East Crisis as the potential genocide 
of Israel’s Jews triggered, what can be described broadly as, intense terror in 
the interviewees. The following words were used to describe the reaction they 
had: “fear” (Vivien, p. 625; Stephen, p. 361; Sarah, p. 525), “frightening” 
(Vivien, p. 625), “very worried” (Vivien, p. 625), “horrifying” (Evelyn, p. 492), 
“tension”, “feeling of being surrounded”, “helpless”, “dread”, “sick”, (Stephen, 
p. 361), “horrendous”, “trauma” (Sarah, p. 525), “very, very afraid”, “anxiety” 
(Brian, p. 576). All the interviewees related this, in different ways, to the threat 
of annihilation they felt Israel faced. The fact that all these words are 
essentially different descriptions of the same affective response is evidence of 
the social nature of Deleuzo-Guattarian affect – the same affect circulating 
around the British Jewish assemblage. The fact that its is essentially only one 
affect as opposed to a more complex assemblage of different affects that has 
important consequences for the type of Body-without-Organs that emerges at 
this time and the extensive properties that emerge after the war as a result. 
This is discussed below. 
 
 The interviewees also point to the intense force with which they 
experienced the terror that was sustained through the duration of the crisis. 
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The British Jewish writer Louis Marks describes the “sheer horror” that took 
hold during the crisis (1967, p. 12). Evelyn describes the intensity of the affect 
she felt in the following quote: 
 
“What did you think would happen if Israel… if war broke out? 
It was too horrifying. I think it was too horrifying to actually anticipate. I think it 
was back of your mind always, couldn’t be anything else.”  
 
(Evelyn, p. 492) 
 
In the following quote, Stephen describes how the affect was ‘overpowering’ 
and ‘took over’: 
 
“So there was this real overpowering feeling and sense of dread and fear 
around my household… that did, kind of take over on the lead up. That was 
the over-riding feeling… most of the memories I have were of fear, of fear.” 
 
 (p. 371) 
 
For Sarah, simply the act of remembering the ‘total’, ‘absolute’ fear made her 
emotional during the interview: 
 
“Total fear. Absolute fear, that my country… ooh I’m getting quite emotional… 
yeah, driven into the sea. I mean, it was a horrendous thought at that […] 
They might be wiped out. It was an absolute trauma.” 
 
 (p. 525) 
 
British Jewish writer Louis Marks describes the intensity of his reaction in an 
article he wrote for literary journal Jewish Quarterly: 
 
“Thinking back to those sticky June nights… the total commitment to Israel’s 
survival – the emotional strength of which, I think, surprised and engulfed us.” 
 
[My emphasis] (1967, p. 12) 
 
That this was affect in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense can also be 
demonstrated in the way it appeared as a bodily, as well as psychological 
reaction. In the same article Louis Marks writes: 
 
“It was the start of that tea and biscuits week when the crisis hit us in our 
stomachs”  
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(1967, p. 12) 
 
Stephen gives a vivid description of a similar bodily reaction that he had 
during the crisis: 
 
“It’s a sick feeling in your stomach. That low, sort of sickness that you think… 
it’s a fear, but it’s not all encompassing because you still live your life but it’s 
there the whole time. It’s that fear. I can only imagine it’s a bit like someone 
who’s been diagnosed with cancer. It’s in the background the whole time. So 
in the period, the leading up to it.” 
 
(p. 361) 
 
4.3. The becoming Body-without-Organs of the British Jewish 
assemblage 
 
 That this intense terror reached a critical threshold is evidenced by the 
becoming B-w-O of the British Jewish assemblage during May/June 1967. To 
illustrate how a variation in intensity produces a B-w-O it will be useful to 
return to DeLanda’s example of H20. What determines whether H20 is either 
steam, water or ice is the degree of fixity/fluidity between the H20 molecules in 
the specific state they are in: H20 molecules are most fixed as ice and most 
fluid as steam. When H20 reaches either of its critical thresholds of intensity 
(0° or 100°) and begins its phase transition, the relations between the 
molecules begin to simultaneously deterritorialise and reterritorialise i.e. the 
old relations which previously held them together disintegrate as they enter 
into new relations. This process is the phase transition and it is when the H20 
molecules are at their most disorganised and most active. 
 
  Whilst human populations and the cultures that bind them are far more 
complex as multiplicities than H20 molecules, according to the logic of 
Deleuze’s ontology both are subject to broadly similar processes of change. If 
a collectivity of people are charged to a sufficient degree of intensity the social 
relations that had held them together disintegrate, whilst new ones begin to 
forge amidst frenetic activity. To give an example: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia and its dynamic conception of ontological de- and re-
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assemblage was, in part, inspired by the events of May 1968, which is itself a 
moment of the B-w-O. Charged to the requisite degree of intensity, students, 
workers, academics and political radicals – groups who had not operated 
collectively before – began to work in concert through frenetic cultural and 
political activity. Old social relations disintegrated and in the brief moment 
before new ones were formed, the collectivity, charged by the same intense 
affectivity, operates as one. This is a phase transition at the intersection of the 
planes of culture and politics, or a Body-without-Organs. A similar process 
occurs a year earlier in the British Jewish community but because of the 
specific way the community is assembled (see Chapter 4) and the different 
type of affectivity running across it as a result of the crisis and the war, a 
different type of B-w-O is produced than that of May ‘68, with different political 
consequences. 
 
 That the British Jewish community becomes a B-w-O in May/June 
1967 is evidenced by the frenetic activity it became involved in during this 
period. What makes this activity particularly striking is that in the 1945–1967 
period Jewish political activity was in decline, not simply in terms of Zionism 
but also compared to the left wing activity of the organised Jewish proletariat 
in the first half of the twentieth century. By the 1960s, Jewish post-war social 
mobility into the bourgeoisie meant Jews in Britain had less to actively 
struggle for (see Chapter 4). The activity that occurred during the Six Day War 
represents an intense form of political dynamism in comparison to the 
sedimentation that was occurring in the 1960s.  
 
‘The Great Togetherness’  
 
The first step in the creation of the B-w-O is the organisation of the 
‘organs’ into a single surface so the intensity flows across it uninterrupted. 
That this occurred in the British Jewish community is evident from both the 
archival materials and the interviews. First, the fact that the British Jewish 
response was almost uniform in the types of affective response and types of 
activity it generated suggests a single surface being created during May and 
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June 1967.105 The creation of a single surface is also explicitly articulated in 
the archives and the interviews. For instance, in a sympathetic piece about 
young British Jews volunteering to go to Israel to fill the civilian jobs of IDF 
reservists, left wing activist and journalist John Pilger describes what was 
happening in the Jewish community at the time as the ‘Great Togetherness’ 
(1967, p. 9). Jeremy, corroborates this in his interview:  
 
“…all of sudden you were all joined up in one week.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 425) 
 
Earlier in the interview he highlights this ‘joined-upness’ in terms of the 
communications technology of the late 1960s: 
 
“It really was the air-strikes, and it was quite early in the morning some time, 
either going to work or at work and hearing it on the news thinking, ‘Blimey’. 
And then everybody phoning one another. Mobiles weren’t really in then. I 
don’t remember them then. And everybody put televisions on.” 
 
[My emphasis] (Jeremy, p. 422) 
 
 
Louis Marks describes Pilger’s ‘Great Togetherness’ in terms of the ‘Writer’s 
for Israel’ group that he formed with colleagues in solidarity with Israel as a 
result of the war. 
 
 
“’Writers for Israel’ was formed last June by a group of Jewish writers who 
came together spontaneously out of a sense of commitment to Israel’s 
survival. Whatever the reservations of individuals on many issues, this did not 
alter the fact that a new situation had called forth a wholly new response. 
Never before had so many Anglo-Jewish writers stood together on one 
                                            
105 Even Jews of the New Left, the most significant politically organised group of Jews to be 
explicitly anti-Zionist in this period (‘Old Left’, pro-Soviet, communism had been in decline in 
Britain since 1956) participated in this response: “During the Six Day War … all of Jewry 
abroad underwent a tremendous shock. Even the most remote and most placid of world 
Jewry felt as if caught in the center of an earthquake. The consciously assimilated 
intellectuals who belong to the ‘life of the entire world”, the prophets of universalism, 
dreamers envisioning the end of the “era of nationalism”, even these were for a moment 
inflamed by a sense of identification with the State of Israel threatened by annihilation at the 
hands of militant Arab nationalism with the aid of the totalitarian-Soviet nationalism. This 
feeling flashed for a moment then passed.” (Bar-Nir, 1969, pp. 35–36). The interview with 
anarchist Brian, confirms this, although he claims his sympathy was equally distributed 
amongst all sides. 
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platform as writers and as Jews. It seemed at the time suddenly the natural 
and right thing to do.”  
 
[My emphasis] (Marks, 1967/1968, p. 10) 
 
Solidarity Demonstrations 
 
The most explicit manifestation of Pilger’s ‘Great Togetherness’ was 
the solidarity demonstrations that occurred in all parts of Great Britain as a 
demonstration of support and way to raise finance. The following is not a 
conclusive list of all the solidarity meetings that occurred within Britain during 
this period, rather just an attempt to provide a snapshot of the different forms 
and scales these demonstrations took.  
 
The largest demonstration of all was organised by the Zionist 
Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. It was called ‘Solidarity with Israel: A 
Public Demonstration’ and was held on Monday 5th June 1967 (the day the 
war started, though the ZF would not have known this at the time of 
organisation). 10,000 people attended. Three British MPs addressed the 
crowd, as did the Chief Rabbi and Lord Sieff, chairman of Marks and Spencer 
and notable Zionist. In a letter to the event’s organiser the Chief Rabbi 
described the rally in a way that demonstrates the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
dynamics under discussion: 
 
“The rally was certainly one of the most stirring experiences of my life, and I 
want to commend you and your colleagues on the magnificent arrangements. 
I shall be forever thankful for the opportunity and privilege to have contributed 
in some small measure to arousing and representing the united feelings of 
our people at that historic moment of Israel’s supreme trial. May we now 
succeed in maintaining this sense of passionate Jewish identification and 
unity among our community.”106  
 
Lord Jakobivitz describes the intense affectivity that bought about the meeting 
and was sustained by it: “one of the most stirring experiences of my life”. He 
also describes the uniformity of this intense affectivity – “united feelings” and 
                                            
106   (CZA: F13/555 Mass Demonstration Royal Albert Hall) 
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points towards the change in the extensive properties that this intense 
affectivity brings about “a sense of passionate Jewish identification and unity”.  
 
 Similar events with similar types of affectivity happened all over 
London. The Jewish socialist group Poale Zion hosted a ‘Solidarity with Israel 
Demonstration’ at Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park on 1st June 1967.107 A 
‘Solidarity with Israel’ conference was held at Woburn House in London on 
Sunday 11th June.108 An event advertised as ‘An Emergency Appeal to 
Express Solidarity with Israel’ took place at North Finchley and Woodside 
Park Synagogue. The most detailed archival evidence of the frenetic activity 
occurring within the British Jewish Body-without-Organs is in a report filed by 
the Manchester and District Zionist Central Council detailing their activity from 
October 1966 – November 1967 including the “dozens of meetings… in 
Synagogues, clubs, private homes and public halls…” that occurred during 
the crisis and the build up. These included mass meetings at New Century 
Hall, Manchester’s Great Synagogue, Steel Memorial Hall and the Opera 
House. It also lists dozens of smaller scale events organised during the crisis 
by various Jewish and Zionist organisations all over the North-West of Britain, 
such as coffee mornings and card evenings organised by the Didsbury 
Women’s Zionist Society and a thrift shop set up by Manchester Mizrachi’s 
Women’s Organization.109 
 
Both Harvey and wife Vivien (p. 615) recall attending a synagogue meeting: 
 
“I remember this one guy got up. He was in the kitchen manufacturing 
business and after they’d given the spiel: “Israel was in a desperate state, 
blah, blah and they need money”. This guy got up and said, “I’ll give £3,000”, 
which was a lot of money. And then another guy got up and said, “I’ll give 
£10,000”. [...] And by this stage the rest of the community was in uproar 
because no one had that sort of money to give. And I could see things were 
getting out of hand so I got up and I said, ‘I’m going to give £100’, which is 
what I did. And that helped simmer it down.” 
 
(Harvey, p. 598) 
                                            
107 (CZA: F13/559 Middle East Crisis 1967 Poale Zion and Labour Friends of Israel) 
 
108 (CZA: F13/557 Emergency Conference and Delegation) 
 
109   (CZA: KH4/12959 Manchester Report 1967) 
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In this account intensity and activity are interwoven. The meeting occurs out 
of a mutual “concern” shared by the congregants of the synagogue. At the 
meeting increased intensity is matched by increased donating until the 
community is in “uproar” and Harvey has to “simmer… down” the intensity that 
has been building. Jeremy recounts a similar experience whereby a young 
woman, in what is presumably an emotive decision, donates her engagement 
ring to Israel (Jeremy, p. 421). 
 
Fundraising 
 
The intense affectivity surging through the British Jewish B–w–O not 
only unleashed frenetic activity in terms of bodies but it also, as the above 
anecdotes point to, unleashed flows of capital in the form of fundraising. The 
fundraising drive was headed by Israel’s Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir, and 
was organised through various Zionist organisations in Israel and in the 
Diaspora, mainly the Joint Palestine Appeal JPA, Keren Heyesod and (in 
Britain) the Zionist Federation in Great Britain and Ireland and its subsidiary 
organisations. The fund was called the JPA Emergency Fund and raised a 
total of £14,638,000. This is nearly seven times as much as had been raised 
by British Jewry for Israel in the previous year.110 (In 1968, Keren Heyesod 
attempts to organise a JPA Emergency Appeal Stage 2 but without the British 
Jewish assemblage charged with the requisite intensity it only manges to 
raise £1,662,206). 
 
 The report filed by Manchester District Zionist Council describes the 
typically Deleuzo-Guattarian interweaving of intensity, activity and 
organisation in a B-w-O in relation to the huge flows of capital that were 
unleashed across the Plane of Organisation by the crisis and the war: 
 
“The most successful appeal ever witnessed in this city… It would need a 
lengthy volume to describe in detail the intense activity in Manchester during 
the Emergency Appeal… From the start Achdut-JPA workers played their 
                                            
110 (ISA: 6588/2 Emergency Fund 1967) 
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part. Their key workers were available in all sections of the appeal, playing a 
leading part in creating an atmosphere, which soon involved the whole 
community. The emergency committee was formed under the leadership of 
the Zionist Central Council, JP, JNF, and WIZO organisations in the city. This 
created a sense of solidarity, which never previously existed.”111  
 
[My emphasis] 
 
Of the interviewees Sarah, Rose and David (as well as Vivien, Harvey and 
Jeremy) spoke about fundraising activity. Sarah, sixteen at the time, found a 
job in a local chip shop in order to send money to Israel (p. 526). Rose talks 
about spontaneous acts of donation and in doing so relates to the change in 
the extensive properties of the British Jewish community that occurs as a 
result of the war i.e. the ‘discovering of Jewishness’ by previously secular 
Jews. 
 
 
“My father had a group of Czech friends called the Czech Chevra and he 
used to meet up with them. Many of them were non-religious, but in 1967 
suddenly many of them were in great danger… it was the most amazing thing 
– people knocked on the door to give my mother jewelry, to give my mother 
money, because they knew that WIZO was collecting money to go to Israel 
and all these people, their Jewishness … some of them […] had no Jewish 
background, most of them were married to non Jews […] Completely 
unexpected; and that was one of the things in 1967. People discovered their 
Jewishness, and that was an overall thing.” 
 
(Rose, p. 641) 
Volunteers 
 
 Arguably the most unexpected activity, which saw largely sedimented 
bourgeois Jews unleashed into a frenetically charged molecular multiplicity 
was the decision to volunteer to work in Israel. Of the 7,215 volunteers who 
had arrived in Israel by 25th September 1967, 1,940 of them were British. At 
27% of all volunteers, British Jews were the largest group from a Diasporic 
community. (The second largest were from South Africa at 801 and 11%).112 
Many had signed up with the intention of fighting, but having had no military 
                                            
111 (CZA: KH4/12959 Manchester and District Council Report for October 1966–November 
1967) 
112   (CZA: F13/722 Volunteers) 
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training ended up undertaking the civilian jobs of the IDF reservists who had 
been called up to fight.  
 
Of the interviewees, Evelyn’s foster child wanted to go but was too 
young so had to go the year after (p. 490).  David remembers writing to the 
Israeli Embassy to volunteer (p. 456). Sarah went to Eder farm – Habonim’s 
collective farm in East Sussex – to replace the Habonim members who had 
been temporarily living there but had chosen to volunteer. Joseph worked in 
Habonim’s office in Manchester signing up volunteers. Rose actually 
volunteered herself and stayed in Kibbutz Hagoshrim for a period of three 
months. She talks about the experience on pp. 649–652 of her transcript. 
 
Revealingly, in John Pilger’s article mentioned above he describes the 
motives of the Jewish volunteers as primarily affective: 
 
“They all say they feel Israel’s cause deep in their Jewish hearts, and perhaps 
they feel it with the same bellicosity that Egyptians, Syrians and Iraqis feel for 
their cause deep in their hearts” 
 
[Emphasis in original] (Pilger, 1967, p. 9) 
 
 
Miscellaneous: ‘Glued to the Media’, Letters, Marks and Spencer, Blood Drive 
 
 Demonstrating, fundraising and volunteering were the main forms of 
activity that occurred within the British Jewish community in May/June of 
1967. The archival research and interviews did also reveal other activity that 
occurred on a smaller scale. For instance, Stephen (p. 359, p. 367, p. 372), 
David (p. 459) and Jeremy (p. 416) talk about their avid media consumption. 
Jeremy’s radio was ‘always on’ and Stephen watched the news ‘non-stop, 
virtually’. Evelyn tried donating blood at Marble Arch Synagogue (p. 494). A 
number of Jews wrote letters of support to the Israeli Embassy. There are 337 
in the Israeli State Archive113 and some were collected into a book – Letters to 
Israel Summer 1967 (Robson, 1968) – that was published a year later. 
                                            
113   (ISA: 1385/2 Letters that came with donations) 
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Rose spoke at length about how the Marks and Spencer head office 
(where she worked) turned into a hive of pro-Israel activity during the crisis 
and the war. The families who headed the board of Marks and Spencer (the 
Marks, the Sieffs and the Sachers) were noted Zionists. Rose claims that 
during the war Michael House was a lynchpin of communications because 
they feared Rex House was being monitored and because Marks and 
Spencer had the latest communications technology. She also claims that 
Marks and Spencer’s employees were told a proportion of their cheques 
would go to the Emergency Appeal. When she went to Israel as a volunteer, 
Marks and Spencer continued to pay her salary for six months and sent 
weekly food parcels to her and other Marks and Spencer’s employees. (p. 
641, p. 660). The general thrust of Rose’s claims appear to be corroborated 
by a telegram sent by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to Lord Sieff on 2nd 
June 1967.114 
 
4.4. Intensive processes: exultation 
 
“I can only say that we were shown conclusively that Diaspora Jewry – every 
sector and generation of it – lives by its link with Israel. This war for them was 
a period of anxiety, which Zahal’s115 victory transmuted to pride. I saw them in 
the days before the decision and on the first day of the war. They were sad, 
despondent, anxious about what the morrow would be bring, and many of 
them went with tear-filled eyes. After the first days passed these tears turned 
to tears of joy, jubilation, pride… It is a pity that as yet no poet or scribe has 
arisen to portray the manner in which the Jewish people rose up and all the 
anxiety and concern then the joy and pride, they passed through…” 
 
Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir describes the affective response to the 
war and the crisis that precipitated it, in a speech to the Knesset reproduced 
in the Jerusalem Post, 2nd July, 1967116   
 
 The majority of the activity just described stretched over the period of 
the crisis to the six days of the war itself. The British Jewish B-w-O could be 
                                                                                                                             
 
114 (ISA: 1396/17 British Jewry) 
 
115  One of the Hebrew names for the Israeli Defence Force 
 
116   (ISA: 6588/2 Emergency Fund 1967) 
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maintained throughout the duration of the period because the intensity of the 
affective response never diminished. What did change was the quality of this 
response. In Pinhas Sapir’s words anxiety transmuted into pride, joy and 
jubilation. This change began as soon as British Jews became aware of the 
success of Israel’s strike against the Arab airfields and was cemented at first 
with the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem and secondly after the speed and 
scale of the victory became apparent at the end of the war. The affective 
response to this impressive military victory was intensified by the British 
Jewish perception that the war had meant that Israel had fended off a 
genocide of Israel’s Jews. This section demonstrates how this representation 
of the war and the victory generated an equally intense affective response to 
that which emerged prior to the war but whose content was qualitatively 
opposite.  
 
Of all the events of the war itself, the following aspects of the appear to 
have had the greatest affective impact on the interviewees: i) the shock of the 
Israeli strike on the Arab airfields on the morning of 5th June 1967; ii) Israeli 
Defence Minister, Moshe Dayan as an inspirational military leader, and 
implicitly a new type of Jew; iii) the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem, 
specifically the Western Wall which is understood in almost messianic terms; 
and iv) the speed and scale of the Israeli victory. 
 
Shock  
 
The first instance when the anxiety of the crisis began to transmute into 
something qualitatively different was after the IAF struck the Arab airfields. 
 
 Stephen remembers the moment he heard that Israel had started the 
war from the news, and in doing so describes the quality and intensity of 
affect he felt as a result: 
 
“‘In a fantastic stroke this morning, Israel had struck…’ Pundits couldn’t 
believe it. Newscasters couldn’t believe it. […] No one had forecast that they 
would do this. No one had predicted it. I was completely and utterly shocked. 
I was only a 12 year old but I never met anyone that said ‘Oh I knew they 
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were going to do that’. It was out of leftfield. It wasn’t anything that had 
happened in history. Do you see what I mean? […] Unheard of. Bravery and 
not only bravery but who would have thought they would have the bottle to 
even think that. It turned out it was just a brilliant move and changed the 
whole course of the war.” 
 
[My emphasis] (p. 368) 
 
Jeremy re-calls a similar reaction: 
 
“No they haven’t, I don’t believe it” 
(Jeremy, p. 422) 
 
Stephen’s perception of the Israeli strike as ‘brave’ and ‘just a brilliant move’ is 
typical of the British Jewish interpretation of Israel starting the war, which was 
primarily structured by populist notions of jingoistic ‘derring-do’. Even David 
who had been involved in anti-Vietnam student politics compares his 
involvement in the war as similar to that in his involvement with his football 
team (p. 448). Stephen’s phrase, ‘I was completely and utterly shocked’ points 
to both the intensity and the quality of the affectivity triggered by this 
perception. 
 
 Shock turns to an equally intense sense of elation when British Jewry 
understands that the consequence of the air strike and how it would 
determine the course of the war. This ‘elation’ spreads to Britain after the BBC 
announce the effect of the air strike at 4am on 6th June 1967 (Churchill, 1967, 
p. 231). Stephen provides the most detailed description: 
 
“Choked up. Delighted. The build up, the tension of the days leading up and 
how bad it was going to be and the Tiran Straits and the UN forces. You knew 
it was coming and you feared this devastation and you feared what was going 
to happen because you couldn’t trust [does finger/quotation mark gesture] the 
‘dirty Arabs’ to do the honourable thing […] I tell you what you’d liken it to. 
You’re up on drink-driving charges. You could go to prison, you stand up in 
the dock to tell your story and you wait for the jury to give their decision. And 
that feeling as your waiting must be horrendous. And then someone says 
‘Right, innocent’ and then it’s like [acts sighing in relief and body losing its 
stiffness/collapsing] That feeling […] This huge weight comes off your 
shoulders.  
 
(p. 368) 
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Here Stephen describes in the intensely visceral response he had to the war 
after Israel’s surprise attack. During the interview he re-enacted the switch in 
the quality of affectivity from fear to delight he experienced as it registered 
across his body. The intensity, however, remains the same. Other 
interviewees do not give as detailed responses as Stephen but they do point 
to similar experiences of affectivity. Jeremy describes the euphoria he felt 
during the war and the change in extensive properties it generated (the 
changed self-perception of British Jews): 
 
“It’s terrible to say but there was a sort of Europhobia [sic] … what’s the 
word? You were really excited it was happening and that’s wrong because it’s 
a war but each time they whacked them somewhere you thought ‘aarr’ 
[proud/impressed sigh: as if to say ‘wow’] that’s gonna stop them hurting us. 
A lot of people respected the Jewish people after that. It changed your 
opinion. Normally they were weak old people with their shoulders down 
buying and selling and all of sudden, hello, they can look after themselves.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 420) 
 
Harvey said he was ‘more happy’ (p. 601). David said it was ‘really exciting’ 
(p. 457) 
 
Jerusalem 
 
 The intensity reaches its height on the third day of the war when the 
Israeli army takes Jerusalem. Segev and Oren describe different aspects of 
the genesis of this intensity triggered in the Israeli government and the 
soldiers in Jerusalem (described in detail in Chapter 5). An unsigned letter 
found in the Central Zionist Archive and addressed to S L Shipton in Hendon 
(North London) describes the capturing of the wall and the intensely affective 
reaction to it: 
 
“Above all, of course, there was the surrender of the Old City, and the 
reaction to it was something that goes beyond words. It is not even something 
rational; some of it has been described in the Jewish and the general press, 
such as burly paratroopers with tears streaming down their faces as they 
were standing in front of the Western Wall. I wish a tape of the radio newsreel 
on which Rabbi Goren’s conducting of the first prayer and sounding of the 
shofar was relayed could be made available to everybody. The reporter was 
practically incoherent with emotion and this was something which went down 
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to the marrow. I heard this tape repeated a few times and every time I got a 
choking feeling in my throat.”117 
 
In this account the affective reaction is highly intense (“goes beyond words”, 
the reporter is incoherent with emotion) and it registers across the body 
(soldiers cry, it goes down to the marrow and there’s a choking in the throat) – 
both defining aspects of Deleuzo-Guattarian affect.  
 
The most vivid description of the intense affective response to the 
capturing of the Western Wall from the interviewees is from Sarah. Merely 
recounting the memory of this became so intense for Sarah, she started to cry 
during the interview: 
 
“I can remember the recapturing of Jerusalem, or the recapturing as we 
called it at that time. I remember the picture of the soldiers going to the wall, 
and the fight for the wall. I can remember this anxiety about were they going 
to do it and then they’re in. They’ve captured Jerusalem and the soldiers… 
[voice breaks on soldiers]… Oh I’m crying now… [laughs]. [Continues to cry 
and as she speaks her voice breaks] I can remember the soldiers… and their 
guns… at that wall and the picture of that wall and… weeping. […] 
 
Do you remember reacting similarly at the time? Having a very strong 
emotional reaction? 
[Nods. She can’t speak because she’s so choked up]” 
 
(Sarah, p. 527) 
 
Joseph talks about the euphoria that existed in relation to Jerusalem (p. 563) 
as does Stephen (p. 371).  
 
Moshe Dayan 
 
 The key Israeli figure in the representation of the war and a central 
locus for British Jewish affective investment was Israel’s Defence Minister 
Moshe Dayan. Almost all of the interviewees spoke about him in their 
interviews, being the only figure from the Israeli political establishment at the 
time any of them remembered. Only one remembered Israeli Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol and only after prompting. This is, in large part, because of 
                                            
117 (CZA: S5/1247 'England' (Material relating to War)) 
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Dayan’s iconic presence in global media at the time, something he was very 
conscious of cultivating.118  
 
 Before, during and after the war Dayan was perceived by British Jews 
as a glamorous, daring and unpredictable political maverick, qualities that 
came to be embodied in his eye-patch.  A typical example of this 
representation is in a Daily Mirror news story printed two days after he was 
made Defence Minister. The article was headlined, ‘Dayan, a Shot in The Arm 
for Israelis’: 
 
“One gleaming eye slices through you like a laser beam. The other is covered 
by a black patch…The last time I saw him… he was lolling on a pavement 
café chair with his arms round two giggling army privates – girls… Virtually 
every woman in Israel is in love with him… Now he has the job there is a new 
feeling in the country. It’s what teenagers would feel if Michael Caine took 
over from Harold Wilson. He is the shot in the arm Israel needs after being in 
the latest stage of the Middle East war game… most of all he is a man of 
action. So there is little doubt now in any Jews mind what will happen to 
Nasser’s crew when Moshe Dayan chooses a time and a place.” 
 
(Wise, 1967, p. 7) 
 
 
Dayan and the effect he has on the Israeli public is being described in 
intensely affective terms in this article. Not only is he being constructed as a 
locus for sexual desire – “Virtually every woman in Israel is in love with him” – 
his appointment as Defence Minister produces “a new feeling” in Israel.  
 
The interviewees had a similarly romanticised perception. Both David 
(p. 461) and Sarah (p. 533) compare him to a pirate as a result of his eye 
patch. Sarah goes as far as comparing him to Hollywood actor Johnny Depp 
in the feature film Pirates of The Caribbean (ibid.). Zena compares him to 
Nelson (p. 407), Stephen to Churchill, a superhero and “leader of the pack” (p. 
                                            
118  Segev recounts how Dayan told Levi Eshkol that the Western Wall was too dangerous to 
visit on the day it was captured, so that he could have his photograph taken entering 
Jerusalem and therefore be associated with its capture. The photograph (Dayan flanked by 
Rabin and Narkis) was carefully staged under Dayan’s instruction and widely circulated. It 
became one of the iconic images of the conflict, helping cement the articulation between 
Dayan, the war and the ‘re-capturing’ of Jerusalem in the minds of the Jewish public (2005, 
pp. 369–370). 
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377). The intense affective investment that British Jews made in Dayan can 
be seen in a statement made by Jeremy: 
 
“You’d felt that you’d like to know him. I’d seen Sharon, you know the one 
who is Prime Minister now119, the one that they say is still in the coma. I saw 
him about thirty years ago, twenty-five years ago when he was a general. And 
he came walking into the Akadia120 and he had such an air of power and 
respect, you just stood with your mouth open watching him walk past, you 
know. You’d think if anybody is going to lead you, I’d like to be behind him 
[…] But that respect you felt for Israel, you felt for Dayan. And of course the 
patch, all the things to remind you… I can’t say it’s good PR… it just suited it. 
The patch itself reminds you that he’s prepared to lose an eye and that he’s 
still battling on and ‘don’t start with me’.” 
 
[Emphasis in original] (Jeremy, p. 428) 
 
The broader cultural dynamics which allow Dayan to be represented in 
this way and the intense affectivity his image generates as a result is touched 
upon in a New Statesman article entitled “Israel’s Coriolanus” written by Paul 
Johnson and published in the 29th August 1969 edition: 
 
“… to the gross-minded Western public [Dayan is] a glamorous and daunting 
figure, who has erased the traditional archetype of the Jew… At a popular 
level he has completely altered the Israeli image, both for better and for 
worse… [Israelis] feel safer when he’s around” 
 
(Johnson, 1969, p. 27) 
 
The successful entry of a new archetype of Jewish masculinity, 
embodied by Dayan, into popular culture is one of the key outcomes of the Six 
Day War on the plane of representation. This archetype had existed since the 
early days of Zionism as the ‘New Jew’ (Boyarin, 1997) and had been 
popularised in Ari Ben Canaan – the hero of the film Exodus (1960) (see 
Chapter 4). It was, however, only after the Israeli victory of the Six Day War 
that Diasporic Jewish communities were persuaded of this representation’s 
veracity. After the war the representation of the ‘New Jew’ successfully 
migrates from Zionism into popular culture and is incorporated into British 
Jewish identity (“After the Six-Day-War… you didn’t have to associate yourself 
with Woody Allen; you could identify with Paul Newman”(cited in Loshitzky, 
                                            
119 This is factually incorrect. Benjamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister at the time of Jeremy’s 
interview, whilst Ariel Sharon was reportedly in a coma. 
120 The Dan Akadia is a hotel in Herzliya that is popular with British Jewish tourists. 
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2001, p. 1)). Dayan is not the only figure through which this process occurs – 
it also happens through the figure of the Israeli soldier and the representation 
of the Israeli army more generally. This process is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
The speed and scale of the victory 
 
 The final element of the war that generates an intense sense of elation 
is the speed and the scale of the Israeli victory. British Jews were stunned 
that in fighting five Arab armies Israel had tripled its land mass in six days. 
This was even more stunning in the context of how British Jews had 
perceived Israel in the build up to the war. David remembers his perception of 
the victory: 
 
“It just seemed so bizarre, that it could happen as quickly as that. Don’t forget 
that part of the context was Vietnam, which was going on for year after year 
after year with not much happening. Suddenly this thing goes [clicks fingers] 
blink of an eye. Umm… Had I believed in God ‘miraculous’ would have come 
into it because it just seemed bizarre.”  
 
(p. 460) 
 
Sarah uses a biblical reference that was common at the time: 
 
“I think it was seen as a real David and Goliath story and David won and I 
think as far as I know it was presented as little Israel has survived this terrible 
threat. And how brave and how strong, and in seven days [sic] and what a 
feat.” 
 
(p. 531) 
 
Evelyn, one of the interviewees who identified as religious, understood the 
victory in religious terms: 
 
“Do you remember… what did you think of them winning. What did you 
think it meant for Israel? 
Je: That heaven above was looking after them. 
E: Yeah I suppose you do as a religious Jew, that someone up there must be 
looking after them and how did they survive such intense bombardments and 
God knows what. 
 
So it was a religious reaction? 
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Je: I think so 
E: In a way, I think it was a religious reaction yeah.” 
 
(p. 500) 
 
 
This scale of the victory was impressive by any measure, and the fact 
that British Jews were surprised by it and accounted for it using biblical or 
religious explanations makes sense in the context of the general ignorance of 
Israel’s overwhelming military strength in the Middle East in the late 1960s. 
The Israeli government exploited this ignorance in their pre-war propaganda 
drive. Israel as ‘David against Goliath’ is, as previously demonstrated, a mis-
perception as the intelligence community knew at the time (Segev, 2005, pp. 
252–3). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the victory was so large and so fast 
because by 1967, the IDF were better equipped, funded, trained and 
motivated than the Arab coalition that was hastily put together during the 
crisis. Another major contributing factor was the fact that Israel started the war 
unexpectedly, destroying the Arab air forces putting them at a severe 
disadvantage from the outset.  
 
 The use of religious language by the interviewees is interesting. Of all 
the interviewees only Evelyn, Stephen and Sarah appeared to have been 
highly religiously observant at any time of their life. Anti-Zionists Brian and 
David do not practice Judaism at all and the rest are what is termed ‘High 
Holy Days Jews’ (see Chapter 4). Taking this into account how do we make 
sense of the religious explanations offered for the victory? One explanation 
could be the war mobilised what small part of their religious identity remained 
in 1967. Another might be, that religious or biblical discourses are often 
adopted in largely secular British Jewish culture when British Jews are unable 
to make sense of something using the dominant rational discourses. Religious 
language is also used to account for intense experiences that similarly exceed 
conventional rationality. 
 
 Arguably all these explanations played their part. The last two 
explanations particularly point to an affectivity of exceptional intensity being 
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generated by the victory and this is addressed explicitly by the interviewees: 
Evelyn was “exuberant” and “so excited” (p. 500). Stephen describes how 
after Israel occupied the Golan Heights, the final act of the war, “the intensity 
of the first day just grew. The furore…” (p. 369). Stephen also describes a 
bodily reaction: a “weight off your shoulders” (p. 375) Sarah recalls “dancing 
in the streets” (p. 530). Harvey was “delighted” (p. 603), Jeremy “really happy” 
(p. 421). 
 
  Although the intensity of the affective states dissipates after the war 
ends, it alters the affective landscape within the British Jewish community 
afterwards. This is discussed in the following two chapters, but Rose gives an 
indication of how it was changed, and how long it lasted: 
 
“I knew that there had been an amazing victory and I knew that the whole of 
Sinai and the West Bank was under Israeli control and the Golan Heights and 
the map had expanded tremendously but I can’t honestly say that the 
implications of that occupation were very strong. You just were living on a 
high that Israel still existed […] I mean everybody was walking around two 
feet above the ground cos everybody had felt what they’d done. And when we 
got to England we were heroes [Rose was a volunteer in Israel for 3 months 
after the war]. There was no doubt about it. Up until the Yom Kippur War […] 
the feeling in the country was amazing and then the Yom Kippur war 
happened and then that was [claps her hands together] it killed the feeling. 
Terrible, it was ghastly. And we were all aware of it.” 
 
[Emphasis in original] (Rose, p. 660) 
 
 
4.5. The cancerous Body-without-Organs of the fascist  
 
 As outlined above the B-w-O is only ever a transitionary moment 
(corresponding to DeLanda’s phase transition) and the question for any 
Deleuzo-Guattarian cultural analysis is what new form does the assemblage 
assume after it re-organises (what new extensive properties are created), 
what encounters does it enter into with other assemblages, what lines of flight 
are potentialised and to what consequence? The answer to these questions 
depends on the sort of B-w-O that was created. The new extensive properties 
that were created by the phase transition triggered by the Zionist 
representation of the war are the focus of Chapters 7 and 8. The final section 
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of this chapter uses evidence touched upon throughout previous sections to 
argue that the B-w-O generated by the Six Day War was the cancerous B-w-
O of the fascist. 
 
 According to Deleuze and Guattari, the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist 
is defined by the function it performs on the stratums of significance and 
subjectification, i.e. the serialisation of subjectivity and meaning-production. 
That both these things occurred is most strongly evidenced by the uniformity 
of the British Jewish reaction to the crisis and the war. For instance, all the 
interviewees perceived the crisis as threatening the annihilation of the State of 
Israel and the genocide of its Jewish population, often using the language of 
the Holocaust to express themselves. Rose articulates the shutting down of 
other possible interpretations of what the crisis could mean most strongly: 
“Everybody you spoke to said that […] How could it possibly not happen” 
[Emphasis in the original] (p. 648). Even anti-Zionists Brian and David (and 
Ralp Milliband), both of whom claimed to exist outside the networks of 
mainstream Jewry and both of whom were involved in anti-war politics at the 
time and therefore exposed to the sort of anti-Imperialist discourse that was 
used by pro-Palestinian groups in the post-1967 period, interpreted the crisis 
in this way. Other aspects of the war were also interpreted with the same 
uniformity and as a result the activity it inspired was similarly uniform in 
intention. 
 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, the stratas of significance and 
subjectification, produced a variety of different meanings and subject positions 
in the British Jewish assemblage. Prior to 1948, anti-Zionism and non-Zionism 
were both prominent in British Jewish culture. In between 1948 and 1967 
groups such as the Liberal and Progressive synagogues, orthodox Jews and 
Jews within the New Left were critical of Zionism and the State of Israel (Bar-
Nir, 1969; Jakobovitz, 1991; Alderman, 1992). In that moment of becoming a 
B-w-O in May-June 1967 all of these groups were pro-Israel, with only Jews in 
the New Left resuming their pre-67 position after the war ended (Bar-Nir, 
1969). The dominant position of British Jewry in relation to Israel in the post 
1967 period is overwhelmingly pro-Israel: a 1970 National Opinion Poll puts 
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Jewish support of Israel at 80% (Alderman, 1992). This near uniformity of 
meaning and subjectivity production in relation to Israel is a key feature of 
British Jewish culture until the Lebanon war of 1982 (Sacks, 1991), and only 
reaches a critical mass (i.e. it becomes an identifiable political movement) 
after the Second Intifada with the emergence of groups like Jews for Justice 
for Palestine and Independent Jewish Voices.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This chapter has sought to use a DeLandian-Deleuzian theoretical 
framework to analyse what occurred in the British Jewish community in May 
and June 1967 as a result of witnessing the Middle East crisis and the war it 
precipitated. Using the interview data and archival material, this chapter has 
argued that representing the 1967 war as a quasi-religious fending off of a 
potential genocide of Israel’s Jews triggered a morphogenetic process that 
altered the formal attributes of British Jewish culture, many of which last until 
the present day. It does this in the following way: the perception of the Middle 
East crisis as a potential genocide for Israeli Jewry triggered an intensely 
affective response within the British Jewish community – terror. The reason 
that this representation of the war successfully triggered an intensely affective 
response is because the Holocaust is a singularity that structures British 
Jewish culture in the post-1945 period. The response was so intense that it 
reached the critical threshold necessary for the community to undergo a 
phase transition or what Deleuze has called with Guattari in the context of 
social formations, a Body-without-Organs. This is evidenced by the frenetic, 
affectively charged activity that the British Jewish community was involved 
with during May and June 1967. Once the war started and it quickly became 
clear that Israel will win, the intensity of affect that circulated across the British 
Jewish community remained the same (and it therefore remained in the form 
of a B-w-O) but the quality transmuted from terror to elation. Once the war 
ended, so did the intensive process. The singularity of the Holocaust, and 
what it meant for British Jews, dislodged in that it became articulated to 
Zionist representation of a militarily strong Israel. This caused the following 
changes in the extensive properties of British Jewish culture: i) the 
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incorporation of the idea of a militarily strong Israel into British Jewish identity 
and the way this made British Jews feel as Jews in Britain and ii) the rise of 
Popular Zionism as the major discourse governing the British Jewish 
relationship with the State of Israel. These changes are the focus of the 
following two chapters.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The Production of Hegemonic British Jewish Cultural Identity 
after the Six Day War 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“On the one hand, Marxism can degenerate into economic determinism. This 
may appear very materialist, because it is dealing with the ‘hard’ realities of 
money and work, but it deals with these realities in an abstracted, idealist 
way… It fails to understand how economic structures are lived and affected 
[my emphasis] in the skin and bones of people working. On the other hand, 
recent Marxist theorists have rightly rejected such economic reductionism. 
But in their search for an alternative theory have come with one equally prone 
to idealism. Working from theories of language and from a psycho-analysis 
[sic] of a certain kind they have put a valuable stress on the role of ideology in 
history, and in particular, on the way people are socially formed into what we 
understand people to be – what is called ‘the construction of the subject’. Yet 
their theory leads to a position where being ‘a person’ or ‘a subject’ is only a 
construction in language and ideology. Granted that society fashions us 
through words and representations of humanness, but it fashions us out of 
flesh and blood, not thin air.” 
  
(Dyer, 1981, p.66) 
 
“French structuralists of the sixties in effect established a kind of religious 
trinity comprised of the symbolic, real and imaginary… But we know quite well 
that no trinity… has been or ever will be able to take into account… the 
singular being of an ordinary sliver in desiring flesh”  
 
(Guattari, 1986, p.282) 
 
“It is no wonder that to very many Jews all these momentous world changes 
which reached culmination in the events of last June should present 
themselves on the personal level as a simple question: What does it signify to 
be a Jew? It is a question of identity.”  
 
(Marks, 1968, p.10) 
 
 
It was in 1981, just at the point that British cultural studies was 
spreading outside the CCCS, that Richard Dyer perceptively mapped the blind 
spot of the theories of the subject that would dominate the discipline for the 
next twenty years. 1981 was the point at which Althusserians were jostling 
with Lacanians in order to provide the most persuasive account of subject 
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formation (Hall, 1980 (a)). Despite their differences, Dyer critiques both these 
approaches for being too idealist and for not fully accounting for the way that 
being interpellated by ideology or entering the symbolic is experienced 
materially by the subjects produced by those actions. Here, material refers not 
only to the Marxist materialism of economic structures but also the 
materialism of the body – what ‘corporeal feminists’ would come to call 
corporeality over a decade later (Creed, 1993; Grosz, 1994) or what Guattari 
calls “the singular being of an ordinary sliver in desiring flesh” (op cit.). 
 
 This thirty-year-old critique of subject formation continues to be 
relevant. Cultural studies still uses post-structuralism, and its emphasis on the 
linguistic, as the dominant approach to understand the construction of cultural 
identity.121 For example, the most influential work on cultural identity carried 
out within the mainstream of cultural studies is Stuart Hall’s writing in the 
1980s and 1990s (1987, 1988, 1992 (a), 1993, 1996). Based on the work of a 
range of poststructuralist theorists (Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, Butler etc.), 
one of Hall’s most important theoretical positions on cultural identity is most 
succinctly articulated in the statement “identities are therefore constituted 
within, not outside, representation” (Hall, 1996, p. 4), postulating a notion of 
identity which is constructed in and as language. Elsewhere Hall does 
address the material aspects of identity (Hall, 1992 (a), p. 281), but his focus 
has remained on identity as ideological/discursive/representational/semiotic 
(depending on the theory, or combination of theories, he is using in the 
different work).  
 
At the end of Dyer’s essay, he implies that a Foucauldian approach to 
identity might offer a way out of the theoretical impasse he outlines. However, 
following Grossberg  (1992) and, implicitly, Dyer according to Gilbert (2006), 
this chapter argues a more productive way out would be to follow a Deleuzo-
Guattarian approach to subjectivity and identity formation, as this addresses 
the material in all its senses: the means of production and the corporeal, or in 
                                            
121 Theories of the subject are equally applicable to analyzing cultural identity. If the subject is 
the sense an individual as of her or himself, cultural identity is how that individual makes 
sense of him/herself situated within the cultures they inhabit. 
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Dyer’s terms, the economic structures and the skins and bones of people 
working.  
 
The specific approach used in this chapter on the changes in British 
Jewish cultural identity after the Six Day War is a strand of Felix Guattari’s 
solo authored work, which focuses on the formation of subjectivity. The 
keystone essay of this strand of work is ‘On The Production of Subjectivity’ 
(1992). Guattari had been writing on this theme during the same historical 
moment that Dyer was criticising leftist cultural criticism for not fully 
accounting for all the materialist aspects of subjectivity and identity formation. 
Guattari’s work on subjectivity does precisely that, but does so in a way that 
also includes the representational. Guattari’s theoretical framework posits 
three ‘fluxes’ that work together to produce subjectivity – the material, the 
social and the semiotic (Guattari, 1977, p. 223). The inclusion of all three 
fluxes is important in order to fully understand what happens to British Jewish 
identity after the Six Day War. Chapter 3 has outlined at length the socio-
economic aspects that provide the context for this change in identity. Chapter 
5 has outlined the interplay of the semiotic (the representation of the war) and 
the material (the affective response generated by this representation) that 
bring about this change. This chapter will analyse how these different fluxes 
came to bear on hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity in the post-1967 
conjuncture. The key change was the way that Israel was represented in 
British Jewish culture (the semiotic) and the way this made them feel as Jews 
in Britain as a result (the material). 
 
2. Existing approaches to the place of Israel and Zionism in British 
Jewish cultural identity 
 
 Using a Guattarian approach will be a significant departure from the 
way that the place of Israel and Zionism in British Jewish identity has been 
analysed thus far. The effect of the Six Day War on British Jewish identity has 
so far only been analysed historically (Sacks, 1991; Jakobovitz, 1991; 
Alderman, 1992; Endelman, 2002; Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007) or 
sociologically (Gould, 1984) or both (Lederhendler, 2000). There is currently 
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no scholarship that uses cultural theory to analyse the effect of the Six Day 
War on Diaspora Jewry, British or otherwise. Rose (1996; 2005; 2007) and 
Said (1979) have used psychoanalysis and postcolonial cultural theory to 
analyse the relationship between Jewish identity and Zionism/Israel, in a 
general sense. There is also a tradition of British Jewish sociology that has 
tried to account for shifts in the ‘attachment’ British Jews have had to Israel 
(Kosmin and Grizzard, 1974; Kosmin and Levy 1983; Kosmin et al, 1997; 
Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 1974; Graham and Boyd, 2010). Within this body of 
literature, the affective dimensions of the relationship between Jewish identity 
and Zionism/Israel is touched up but remains undetailed and under-theorised 
(with the exception of Rose whose approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 
2). 
 
2.1. Jewish cultural studies 
 
In the past fifteen years there has been a growth in Jewish cultural 
studies (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1997; Bronner, 2008; Silberstein, 2000; 
Stratton, 2000, 2008).  All of these use the traditional cultural studies 
emphasis on the discursive/representational/semiotic and are interested in 
how Jewish cultural identities have been discursively constructed in relation to 
textual representations of Jewishness and Jews. For example Stratton argues 
that, “like all subjectivities that of the ‘Jew’ is discursively constructed” 
(Stratton, 2000, p. 35). This approach, has been important in bringing 
questions of Jewish culture and cultural identity into cultural studies but the 
emphasis on the discursive means that crucial questions of the materiality of 
Jewishness – how it is lived, felt and experienced – has been overlooked in 
this work.122 As will be demonstrated in the rest of this chapter, a (Deleuzo-) 
                                            
122 To give an example: Stratton defines the Holocaust as ‘the representational violence of 
total extermination” (Stratton, 2008, p. 1). While the discursive construction of Jews as sub-
human was instrumental in enabling the genocide of Jews (and others) between 1933–45, 
Stratton’s over-emphasis on the discursive occludes the materiality of the Holocaust – the 
ghettos, trains and death camps (not to mention the corpses), the terror, disease and 
starvation etc. – out of which the Holocaust is primarily constituted. It seems absurd to only 
understand the Holocaust in terms of representation, yet this is the tendency of the dominant 
cultural studies approach. This is an extreme example, but does illustrate what is missed by 
Jewish cultural studies current emphasis on the discursive.  
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Guattarian approach begins to remedy this oversight in Jewish cultural 
studies.   
 
3. Deleuze and Guattari against cultural identity 
 
 To use a (Deleuzo-) Guattarian approach to analyse cultural identity, in 
many ways, goes against the grain of Deleuze and Guattari’s politico-
theoretical project. The reason for this is that in Deleuze’s solo authored work, 
and in his work with Guattari (t)he(y) have tended to eschew the notions of 
both cultural identity and subjectivity. In Negotiations Deleuze goes so far as 
to say, “there is no subject” (1990, p. 86). In place of the subject, they instead 
focus on the ‘molecular’ forces ‘beneath’ the subject (affects, perceptions, 
desire) and the ‘molar’ forces ‘above’ it (the social structures, collectivities, the 
physical environments etc.). In Anti-Oedipus the term ‘desiring-machines’ is 
used in places where humanist philosophy might use the term subject 
(Stagoll, 1998, p.165) to emphasise the machinic nature of the construction of 
a human being out of these various molar and molecular forces.  
 
 Deleuze and Guattari have also eschewed the notion of ‘cultural 
identity’. Guattari has argued that, “the notion of ‘cultural identity’ has 
disastrous political and micropolitical implications, because what it fails to 
grasp is precisely the whole wealth of the semiotic production of an ethnic or 
social group or society” (Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 100). Deleuze and 
Guattari, arguably, set out their theoretical position on ‘cultural identity’ 
(though never explicitly stating as such) in the chapter ‘1730: Becoming-
Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…’ in A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980, pp. 256–341). In this chapter they look at the power relations 
that organise the Plane of Organisation at the moment of writing (phallocratic, 
colonialist and bourgeois) and then argue that rather than using cultural 
identities like ‘woman’, ‘gay’, ‘Jew’ etc. as the basis for political action, they 
should instead be used as stages in a deterritorialising progression away from 
the molar identity ‘man’ (and by implication, white and bourgeouis) towards 
the ideal Deleuzo-Guattarian state of becoming-imperceptible. All cultural 
identities are something to be escaped in favour of a state of endless, fluid 
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becomings that completely evades the possibility of fascistic organisation of 
power relations. The implication here is that cultural identity in itself is a 
molarity that blocks the potential becomings inherent in all machinic 
assemblages, and one that, in turn, tends to produce fascistic and exclusive 
social relations.123 This might explain why Deleuzo-Guattarian cultural 
analysis has tended to focus on questions of aesthetics, cultural practice, 
experience and social movements than cultural identity per se.  
  
 Despite the objections raised by Deleuze and Guattari to questions of 
cultural identity and subjectivity, this chapter is based on the premise that not 
only is it possible to use a Deleuzo-Guattarian approach to these questions 
but it is beneficial to do so in order to fully account for the changes that 
happen in British Jewish identity after the Six Day War. As Bogard has 
argued, “against a common interpretation of post-structuralist thought, 
Deleuze and Guattari never deny the possibility of the subject” (1998, p. 53). 
Stagoll’s Becoming Subject: Difference and The Human Individual, writes 
against ‘common interpretation’ and teases out of Deleuze’s work (with and 
without Guattari) ways in which it might be used to think through questions of 
subjectivity. He argues that Deleuze is not against the subject per se, rather 
                                            
123 Deleuze and Guattari apply this logic of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ more explicitly in the 
context of cultural identities in their discussion of minor/minoritarian and major/majoritarian 
(1975; 1980). In keeping with this logic, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of these concepts 
produces a different definition to their common-sense (almost) namesakes – minority or 
majority. For Deleuze and Guattari, ‘minoritarian’ is a molecular process – a becoming that 
deterritorialises molar assemblages. Conversely the majoritarian is the molarization of a, 
more-or-less, deterritorialised assemblage. A minority, in the sense of the organisation of a 
collective of people under the sign ‘ethnic minority’/’sexual minority’ etc., is a territorialised 
assemblage that functions in a molar capacity. It is a state rather than a process. The 
examples they use to illustrate this difference are the ethnic minorities Jews and Gypsies. 
“Under certain conditions” they argue, Jews and Gypsies “may constitute minorities” but this 
does not make these groups inherently minoritarian (1980, p. 321). In fact, Deleuze and 
Guattari single out Zionism as an example of the non-minoritarian disposition that a minority 
can assume: “Even Jews must become-Jewish (it certainly takes more than a state).” (ibid.). 
Zionism as a majoritarian practice can be counterposed by Deleuze and Guattari’s notion in 
Kafka: A Minor Literature (1975) that Yiddish is a minor language. Again, it is not because 
Yiddish is spoken by a minority community that means it is minor; rather Yiddish is minor, 
specifically because, its mixing of (primarily) German, Hebrew and Slavic languages amounts 
to a deterritorialisation of German – a molar language. Major and minor/molecular and molar 
are not absolutely distinct categories and, typically of these Deleuzo-Guattarian dyads often 
work together in the same assemblage at the same time. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that in order for feminism to function successfully at the time of A Thousand Plateaus it 
needs to be put molar categories (the cultural identity ‘woman’) in the service of the molecular 
(the dissolution of patriarchy) (1980, p. 304). 
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he is against liberal humanist conceptions of the subject (e.g. Descartes’ 
Cogito, Kant’s transcendental subject and Husserl’s intentional ego) that 
conceive of subjectivity as a “relatively stable, objective and universally 
rational centre of identity” (Stagoll, 1998, p. 2).  
 
In a similar fashion, Deleuze and Guattari’s objections to cultural 
identity are not objections to the idea that cultural identities exist at all, but 
objections against the organisation of cultural and political practice around 
distinct cultural identities – for example, the identity politics that was emerging 
in the period that A Thousand Plateaus was being written. Whilst this makes a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian identity politics oxymoronic, a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
analytics of cultural identities as they exist on the Plane of Organisation (what 
they consist of, how they are formed and how they change) is entirely 
possible. Braidotti (2002), Colebrook (2000) and Grosz (1994; 1995) explore 
this very problematic in relationship to feminism and the cultural identity 
‘woman’. Guattari also addresses questions of subjectivity and, by implication, 
cultural identity in much of his solo authored work after A Thousand Plateaus, 
most notably in his essay ‘On The Production of Subjectivity’. It is this 
approach, outlined below, that will be used in this chapter in order to make 
sense of the changes in hegemonic British Jewish identity after the Six Day 
War. 
 
4. A Guattarian approach to cultural identity 
 
“[Integrated World Capitalism] understands that the production of subjectivity 
is possibly more important than any other kind of production, more essential 
than the production of petroleum and energy.” 
 
(Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 36) 
  
Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative reticence towards 
questions of subjectivity and cultural identity, Guattari places these questions 
at the centre of his late work (1977, 1989, 1992, 1996 (a)), largely as a 
response to what he sees as the central place of the production of subjectivity 
by Integrated World Capitalism – his term for globalised capitalism.  
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 In keeping with the Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology of assembly, Guattari 
understands cultural identity/subjectivity as a ‘machinic assemblage’ defined 
by the elements it is assembled from and its relations of exteriority to other 
assemblages on the Plane of Organisation. Guattari experiments with a 
number of terms for subjectivity to communicate its assembled nature: first 
‘Collectivities of Utterance Formations’ (Guattari, 1977), then ‘Collective 
Assemblage of Enunciation’ (1989) – both emphasizing the semiotic nature of 
subjectivity. In later work he de-emphasises the semiotic by using the more 
materialist term ‘Existential Territory’. Throughout his work, however, these 
terms never completely replace the term ‘subject’. 
 
What then is subjectivity assembled from? According to Guattari, 
subjectivity can be assembled from anything across the Plane of Immanence 
– “no more than to the cosmos do I recognise any limit to myself” (Guattari, 
1996 (a), p. 168) – meaning he argues for “a polyphonic and heterogenetic 
comprehension of subjectivity” (Guattari, 1992, p. 6). Guattari’s monism 
means that substances which other philosophical approaches see as 
incompatible can be brought together into one machinic assemblage. 
 
“The process… of subjectivation … involve machines of expression that can 
be of an extra-personal, extra-individual nature (machinic, economic, social, 
technological, iconic, ecological, ethological, media systems, in other words, 
systems that are no longer immediately anthropological), or of an infrahuman, 
infrapsychic, infrapersonal nature (systems of perception, sensibility, affect, 
desire, representation, image and value, modes of memorization and 
production of ideas, systems of inhibition and automation, corporeal, organic, 
biologic or physiological systems and so on).”  
 
(Guattari and Rolnik, 1986, p. 43) 
 
 For Guattari, the nature of subjectivity is vastly complex involving a 
host of heterogeneous elements that are both extra- and infra-personal. Our 
sense of selves is constituted as much by, for example, our affective 
dispositions as it is to our location within supra-national systems of global 
capital; the effect of the physical environment we grew up in (a farm, a 
suburb, a slum) as much as the signifying systems with which we identify.  
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For Guattari, subjectivity is a constant dialogue between the cosmic and the 
molecular and all the various scales in between. ‘Ecology’ is a term Guattari 
uses in his later work (1989) in order to communicate the continuous and 
complex interplay between the heterogeneous elements that constitute 
subjectivity (and will be the term that is used through the remainder of the 
chapter). Elsewhere he categorises these subjective elements into three types 
– the semiotic, the social and the material: “It is never a human being who is 
working… but an agency composed of organs and machines… which takes 
part in a machinic ‘assembly’ which puts together semiotic links and a great 
interweaving of material and social fluxes” (Guattari, 1977, p. 223). 
 
If subjectivity and cultural identity are constituted by heterogeneous 
elements (broadly material, social and semiotic) from across the scales of the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology (the cosmic to the molecular) what are the 
processes by which these elements are draw together into a specific form of 
subjectivity, or in Guattari’s terms an existential territory? This question cuts to 
the heart of Deleuzo-Guattarian thought. If A Thousand Plateaus has a 
recurring theme it is outlining the processes by which matter achieves form. 
Double articulation, territorialisation, the refrain, becoming, consistency… 
these are some of A Thousand Plateaus key concepts and all of which outline 
processes of ontogenesis.  
 
For Guattari, the ontogenetic process that constitutes subjectivity (a 
subjectivity constituted out of affect as well as social and semiotic elements) is 
the ‘refrain’. The ‘refrain’ is first discussed in a Deleuzo-Guattarian context in 
A Thousand Plateaus in “1837: Of the Refrain” (1980, pp. 342–386). Deleuze 
and Guattari illustrate the concept with the example of how birds use the 
repeated motifs – the refrains – of birdsong to mark out their territory. Guattari 
applies the notion of a refrain in a more generalised sense – a process that 
constitutes territory – to subjectivity, or what he calls existential territories.  
 
He defines refrains as “reiterative discursive sequences that are closed 
in upon themselves and whose function is an extrinsic catalysing of affects” 
(Guattari, 1996 (a), p.162). One of the examples he uses to illustrate this 
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concept of the refrain in relation to subjectivity is taken from his clinical 
practice. In patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder, the obsessive 
activity that they are reiteratively compelled to perform is what assembles the 
heterogeneous elements that constitute subjectivity into a cohesive form. The 
affects that are catalysed by obsessive-compulsive refrains are, primarily, sad 
in the Spinozist sense – they diminish the capacity for that subjectivity to act. 
Guattari argues that to simply remove the obsessive-compulsive refrain would 
not re-arrange the subjectivity into catalysing more joyous affects. It would 
instead cause the subjectivity to deterritorialise in a way that would cause the 
patient to enter psychosis. A clinical practitioner should instead introduce 
another refrain that would catalyse joyous affects. This new refrain is case-
specific but could include simple things like driving lessons (Guattari, 1992). 
Guattari is once again, defining subjectivity in a way that interweaves the 
semiotic, the affective (material) and the social (driving lessons are culturally 
specific). 
 
In keeping with Guattari’s notion of the heterogenetic and polyphonic 
nature of subjectivity he claims that refrains “can find substance in rhythmic 
and plastic forms, in prosodic segments, in facial traits, in the emblems of 
recognition, in leitmotifs, in signatures…” (Guattari, 1989, p. 79). What form 
do the reiterative discursive sequences that catalyse the affects that constitute 
British Jewish identity after the Six Day War take? The interviews and archival 
research would suggest it was the Zionist propaganda that filtered into the 
British Jewish community in the build-up to the war and appears reiteratively 
through the interviews. These include a variety of statements: e.g. i) Israel 
always faces its extinction, ii) Jews in the Diaspora perpetually face anti-
Semitism, iii) the existence of a strong Israel protects Jews against these 
threats, iv) Palestinians and Arabs124 are only interested in killing Jews and 
are therefore no different from the European anti-Semites… Articulated 
together these statements amount to a discursive sequence that appears 
reiteratively in the interview transcripts (reflecting their more widespread 
appearance in the cultural production of the British Jewish community). This 
                                            
124 And at the moment of writing – Iran. 
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refrain appears most strongly in the interviews in the form of a new 
representation of Israel and Israelis. This catalyses a complex arrangement of 
affects within British Jewish culture after the war – a way of feeling about 
Israel and a way of feeling as Jews in Britain (outlined in detail below). This, in 
turn, gives form to the matter that constitutes British Jewish identity post 1967. 
 
5. A Guattarian analysis of the shifting position of Israel in hegemonic 
British Jewish identity 
 
The aim of this chapter is not to give a Guattarian account of 
hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity, but to give a Guattarian account of 
the changes that occur within this identity as a result of the Six Day War. The 
war does not radically alter the hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology, 
just the position of Israel within it. The chapter therefore begins by briefly 
outlining the heterogeneous elements that constitute the hegemonic British 
Jewish subjective ecology before the Six Day War. It then identifies the 
refrains present within the interview data (the discursive sequences used by 
the British Jews to represent Israel) the affects they catalyse (the way British 
Jews feel towards Israel and as Jews in Britain as a result) in order to 
ascertain the position of Israel within the hegemonic British Jewish subjective 
ecology. It finds the representation of Israel that the majority of British Jews 
subscribed to was vague and the resultant affectivity it generated was low-
intensity. It therefore does very little affective work within the hegemonic 
British Jewish subjective ecology i.e. it has negligible impact on the way 
British Jews feel as Jews in Britain. The chapter then repeats this procedure 
for hegemonic British Jewish identity after the war, demonstrating how the 
refrains of Zionist propaganda produce a representation of a strong, brave 
dynamic Israel capable of fending off a genocide of Israel’s Jews within the 
subjective ecologies of the majority of British Jewry. This catalyses a complex 
and intense ‘affective assemblage’ in relation to Israel, that combines pride, a 
sense of security, excitement and sexual desire but also a sense of threat and 
fear. It also finds that this complex affective assemblage is maintained, in part, 
by its encounter with the Palestinians who it goes some way in brutally 
disempowering. 
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The chapter then uses these findings to argue that the reason British 
Jewish support for Israel has been so rigid and intractable is because of the 
way that a post-1967 representation of Israel has made the majority of Jews 
feel as Jews in Britain. Like Guattari’s example of the refrains that hold 
together obsessive compulsive subjectivities, if the refrains of Zionism were to 
be removed altogether, hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity would 
rapidly deterritorialise in a way that panics those British Jews who consent to 
it. Arguably the overreaction to criticism of Israel125 is evidence of this. It is an 
attempt to urgently reterritorialise a cultural identity that makes them feel safe 
and strong in a world they still believe threatens them as a Jews. The 
Guattarian question then is what refrain might replace Zionism that would 
produce more joyous affects for British Jews and the other bodies they 
encounter – one that is not undercut by a sense of perpetual fear and one that 
is mutually empowering for the Palestinians? This question is addressed at 
the end of the chapter. 
 
Before beginning the analysis, it is very important to stress that what is 
being discussed in this chapter is the place of Israel within hegemonic British 
Jewish cultural identity. There are and have been a multiplicity of British 
Jewish identities whose content and relation to each other continuously shifts 
in time and space. For example, there are ethnic differences (Sephardi, 
Mizrahi, Ashkenazi), denominational differences (e.g. progressive, reform, 
ultra-orthodox) and differences in regional Jewish identity (even in regions as 
spatially proximate as North-West and North-East London differences in 
cultural identity are produced). There has also been a multiplicity of shifting 
ways that British Jews have related to the State of Israel. As chapter 4 argues 
non and anti-Zionism were legitimate positions to adopt within the mainstream 
of the British Jewish community up until 1948 and as Brian’s interview 
suggests there were anti-Zionist British Jews operating in British radical 
politics even when this position had been delegitimized within the mainstream 
of British Jewish life after 1948. Within Zionism itself there has also been a 
                                            
125 The Jewish community’s elision of anti-Zionist critique with anti-Semitic attack is typical of 
this reaction – see (Julius, 2010).  
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multiplicity of positions on issues such as where Israel’s borders should lie, 
what sort of political system the State of Israel should have and, post-1948, 
what sort of settlement it should have reached with the Arab world and the 
Palestinians. Indeed one can be Zionist but also critical of Israel – the British 
Jewish columnist from The Guardian Jonathan Freedland is a high-profile 
example of such a position. However, following the post-Marxist (specifically 
Gramscian) work of British cultural studies just because there is a multiplicity 
of political positions, ideologies and identities within a cultural formation this 
does not mean that they exist in an egalitarian relationship to one another. 
According to this Gramscian work cultural formations are always criss-crossed 
by power relations where different political positions, identities and ideologies 
are vying for hegemony in a “constant battlefield” (Hall, 1998, p.447). So 
whilst this chapter recognises the heterogeneity of ways that Israel has 
appeared in British Jewish identities since 1967  (particularly noting the 
growth of Jewish criticism of Israel since at least the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon (Sacks, 1991; Landy, 2011) its main concern is the dominant way 
that the Zionist representation of Israel has appeared in hegemonic British 
Jewish cultural identity in the post-1967 conjuncture i.e. how the majority of 
British Jews have related to Israel between 1967 and 2012. This chapter will 
evidence this claim by supporting quotes from the interviews with statistical 
data from quantitative studies within British Jewish sociology relating to this 
period.  
 
5.1. The heterogeneous elements that constitute British Jewish identity 
 
In keeping with Guattari’s insistence on the immense complexity of the 
subjective ecology, it would be impossible to list all the various elements that 
constitute British Jewish identity, before, during and after the 1967 war. 
However, in order to give some sense of that complexity here is an 
inconclusive list of characteristics (gleaned from various sociology, cultural 
studies and history scholarship) that can be understood as some of the 
material out of which British Jewish identity has been produced: 
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Synagogue affiliation, religious observance, keeping kosher, friendship 
patterns, religious belief, cultural and charitable involvement, attachment to 
Israel, loyalty to Jews, feelings of Jewishness, the use of Yiddish, involvement 
with Zionism, the red string worn by devotees to Kabbalah, architecture of the 
synagogue, Jewish folk music, Jewish literature, Jewish cinema, the 
Holocaust, Jewish delicatessen, subscription to the racial ethnic 
classifications of (post)modernity, attitudes to Jewish others, suffering, 
relationship to means of production, job (market trading and taxi driving) anti-
Semitism, political affiliation, synagogue attendance, Jewish charity, 
communal life, living in a Jewish neighbourhood, going on holiday to 
destinations popular with Jewish people, Jewish humour… 
 
This selection is both heterogeneous (cultural practice, attitudes, material 
culture, representation…) and is comprised of elements from across the 
various scales (Molecular: feelings of Jewishness, Molar: Zionist 
ideology/relation to the means of production).126  
 
5.2. The place of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity  
 
How does Israel figure within the pre-1967 subjective ecology of 
hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity? In order to answer this question 
the following section will look at the reiterative discursive sequences by which 
Israel is represented and the affects they catalyse as a result. The Deleuzo-
Guattarian definition of affect is not solely about sensation, but how the 
sensation affects a body’s capacity to act so this section will also look at the 
activity mobilised by the pre-1967 representation of Israel.  
 
 
                                            
126 What’s important to note is that many of the characteristics on the list do not have to do 
with religion. This reflects a recurring theme within the literature on British Jewish identity that 
‘secular Jewishness’ has been a common way of being Jewish in Britain in the twentieth 
Century (Cohen and Horencznk, 1999; Gitelman et al, 2003: Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007; 
Endelman, 2011; Krausz, 1969 (b)). Julius Gould simply states that a religious definition of 
Jewry is “impossible” (1984, p. 4). 
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5.2.1. Representations of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish 
identity 
 
The representation of Israel before the 1967 war that emerged from the 
interviews is basic at best. All the interviewees were aware of Israel’s 
existence, but only self-defined pre-1967 Zionists Sarah, Joseph and Evelyn 
were aware of Israel in any detail – its culture, the people etc.. Sarah and 
Joseph had visited Israel pre-1967 (Joseph had lived there between 1959 and 
1966) and both were involved in Habonim and had quickly become involved in 
Zionism as an ideology. A more typical response from the interviewees was 
as follows: 
 
“It was a Jewish country that’s all.”  
 
(Jeremy, p. 418) 
 
“I had no sense of anyone not thinking that Israel was as much of a social fact 
as France.”  
 
(David, p. 452) 
 
 
Harvey, recounts an interesting story when he was at school aged around 
thirteen or fourteen (1952/53) in which he was corrected by a Zionist speaker 
for referring to Israel as Palestine.  
 
“A guy came to my school when I was probably about thirteen or fourteen 
and I talked about Palestine and he corrected me to say Israel […] Because 
that time it was Israel. And I felt bad about it. But I didn’t become more 
conscious […] I wasn’t that knowledgeable about it.” 
 
[My emphasis] (Harvey, p. 592) 
 
5.2.2. The affectivity catalysed by the pre-1967 representation of Israel 
 
As a result of the vague and ill-defined representation of Israel, the 
affects that are catalysed are notably low-intensity. Harvey continues the 
above story: 
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“It didn’t touch me very much.  
 
[…] so you weren’t massively emotionally involved in the idea of Israel? 
No, no.” 
 
 (Harvey, p. 592) 
 
Other interviewees repeat the low-level affective intensity described by 
Harvey: 
 
“What were your feelings towards Israel before the war? 
Nothing specific. 
 
Indifference? 
Yes. Not a great deal. It was a Jewish country that’s all.  
 
[Overlapping] You didn’t feel any strong emotional attachment? 
[Overlapping] No… no…. no… no… “ 
  
(Jeremy, p. 418) 
 
“I had a sense that there was this place called Israel where my cousins would 
go on holiday and bring back boring photos.” 
 
(David, p. 449) 
 
“I would have thought rather passively that Israel is a good thing.”   
 
(David, p. 451) 
 
 
5.2.3. Pre-1967 Zionist activity 
 
 The relative neutrality of the affective investment in the idea of Israel 
produced a moderate degree of mobilization within British Jewry towards 
Israel, both culturally and politically. Zionist activity in the British Jewish 
community at this time has been discussed at length in Chapter 4, using 
Ernest Krausz’s ground-breaking studies on Edgware and Leeds Jewry in the 
1960s. In his study on Leeds Jewry Krausz concludes, “even the enthusiasm 
for the Zionist ideal as a form of nationalism, which not so long ago reached 
great heights, appears to be on the wane” (1964, p. 115). Aside from Joseph 
and Sarah, both members of Habonim for ideological reasons, this lack of 
Zionist activity was reflected in the interviews. 
 
 
223 
For example, the majority of interviewees were not involved in Zionist 
organisations. Some were involved in Jewish social or cultural organisations 
but Zionism and Israel did not figure prominently within the activities carried 
out within these organisations. Harvey and wife Vivien ran a Jewish youth 
group in Manchester and neither of them could remember Israel or Zionism 
figuring in their schedule of activities (Vivien, p. 613). In Harvey’s interview 
affectivity and Zionist activity (aliyah) are related:   
 
“There was a lot of lukewarm people like me: ‘I’m glad Israel exists but that’s 
for someone else. I’m happy where I am’.” 
 
(Harvey, p. 595) 
 
The intensity of his relationship to Israel is lukewarm and so his capacity to 
act as a Zionist (make aliyah) remains unmobilized. 
 
Even, superficially Zionist activity does not always reflect a mobilization 
inspired by the affectivity generated by a particular idea of Israel. For example 
Rose was an active member of Zionist youth group FZY eventually becoming 
membership chairman for her local branch. In the interview she says the 
following of her reasons to join:  
 
“And so how come you were involved in FZY?  
Because it was our local youth movement.  
 
But was it important that it was Zionist? 
No, no. [Light laughing] We say at WIZO, we’ve got lots of groups and if they 
weren’t raising money for WIZO they’d probably be raising money for the 
cat’s home – it’s just a nice group of people who like to get together and like 
raising money. I went to FZY because a friend took me along to an FZY 
meeting and I liked the people and I got very involved.”  
 
(Rose, p. 645)  
 
This quote reflects the following of Krausz’s findings in his study of Leeds 
Jewry: “even the attendance at Zionist functions is no more significant for the 
individual than attendance at other Jewish functions”(1964, p. 114). Zionist 
organisations, events and functions in the 1960s very often just provided a 
 
 
224 
framework for the Jewish community to socialize as opposed to a framework 
for the mobilization of Zionism (though the two did overlap).  
 
5.2.4. The place of Israel in pre-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity 
 
Two of the interviewees talked about the affectivity catalyzed by the 
pre-1967 representation of Israel, explicitly in terms of their cultural identity. 
Jeremy insists in identifying as ‘English or British’ within a broader discussion 
about his feelings towards Israel before the war. 
 
“You didn’t feel any strong emotional attachment? 
No… no…. no…. no…  I would have been just as happy being English or 
British, shall we say. No.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 419) 
 
In Stephen’s interview he establishes a self/other binary between himself and 
the, in his words, ‘hardcore’ of British Jews who might have considered Israel 
in ideologically Zionist terms (they considered making aliyah). 
 
 
“… most people didn’t think about this Israel in terms of this is where I’m 
going to grow up or I’m going to migrate there. There were the few and there 
were the hardcore who did want to go back there. And mainly they were the 
religious […] None of my crowd. 
 
 (p. 356) 
 
From this quote we get a sense of a dominant British Jewish self being 
constructed against a Zionist Other. This Zionist Other were ‘the few’ and a 
‘hardcore’. They were ‘religious’ in a time when religious activity was declining 
in British Jewry (Lipman and Lipman, 1981). For Stephen, Israel is articulated 
to Yeshivas (Jewish religious seminaries). This misrepresents the 
predominantly secular nature of pre-1967 Zionist culture and the motivations 
of British Jews migrating to Israel. It does however fix a sense of Zionist 
otherness because orthodoxy is also Othered in relation to an increasingly 
secular and assimilated hegemonic British Jewish self. 
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5.2.5. Conclusion: Israel in hegemonic British Jewish pre-1967 identity 
 
 From the data collected for this thesis it would be fair to summarize the 
position of Israel in the ecology of hegemonic British Jewish identity in the 
following way: before 1967, Israel did not figure prominently in the sense the 
majority of British Jews had of themselves as British Jews. The Israel that was 
represented was undetailed and vague. British Jews, in the main, just were 
not knowledgeable about Israel. It therefore catalysed a low-level, arguably 
neutral degree of affective intensity, which inspired little in the way of political 
or cultural mobilization in British Jewry. Even when Jews were involved in 
Zionist activity, this did not necessarily mean they were being inspired to do 
so because they felt a certain way about Israel as British Jews – rather it was 
another form for the Jewish community to socialize. 
 
5.3. The effect of the Six Day War on hegemonic British Jewish identity 
 
“The crisis of 1967 seems to have had something of a catalytic effect in 
respect of Jewish identification in Britain.”  
 
[My emphasis] (Wasserstein, 1971, p. 150)  
 
 
“The emergence of the State of the Israel in 1948 and, later and more 
especially, the Six Day War in 1967, ended the indifference of the vast 
majority of Jews.”  
 
[My emphasis] (Braude, 1981, p. 119)  
 
 
As the above quotes illustrate, it is a widely accepted thesis within 
Jewish studies and contemporary Jewish historiography that the 1967 war 
had an instrumental effect on the place of Israel within British Jewish identity 
(as well as Jewish identity all over the world). There is currently limited 
scholarship that details the specific ways that the Six Day War changes that 
identity of ordinary British Jews (Gould, 1984). This section attempts to add 
important detail to the already existing scholarship. Following the same outline 
as the previous section, this section will first look at the changed 
representation of Israel within the collective imagination of the British Jewish 
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community, the affective investment that the majority of British Jews make in 
this representation and the overall change in hegemonic British Jewish 
identity as a result. The activity inspired by the new affective investment made 
is outlined in Chapter 8. 
 
5.3.1. Post-1967 representation of Israel and Israelis 
 
 
“Incidentally Israel at war destroys the prototype of the pale scrawny Jew; the 
soldiers I saw were tough, muscular and sunburned”  
 
Taken from a communiqué sent by Presidential adviser Harry McPherson to 
US President Johnson, dated 11th June 1967  
(Segev, 2005, p.352)  
  
 
From having a vague impression of Israel prior to the war, it is clear 
from the interviews that a very particular idea of Israel emerges in the British 
Jewish community after it, and this is mainly expressed through the 
representation of Israelis. Israelis were represented as soldiers, military 
heroes (sometimes superheroes), powerful, masculine and aggressive. Each 
of the interviewees that articulated this representation of Israelis always 
compared it to the dominant representation of Jewishness that prevailed 
before the war – Jews as weak, and powerless to protect themselves in the 
face of perpetual anti-Semitism. 
 
Jeremy invokes a classic Jewish archetype – the ghetto Jew – in his 
description of the new representation of Jewishness that the Six Day War 
produced.   
 
“A lot of people respected the Jewish people after [the Israeli victory]. It 
changed your opinion. Normally they were weak old people with their 
shoulder’s down buying and selling and all of sudden, hello, they can look 
after themselves.” 
 
[My emphasis] (Jeremy, p. 420)  
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Sarah sets the emergence of a new powerful post-1967 idea of Jewishness 
against another Jewish archetype related to the ghetto Jew – the Jewish 
refugee. 
 
 
“… I think it was really Israel coming out of victimhood and that we are a force 
to be reckoned with. ‘Watch it!’ It was sort of us raising our heads… you see 
so much was associated with Israel, in terms of being a place for refugees 
you know this was a place for victims […] and they turned that over so that 
Israel could say, ‘yeah, and look, we’re not going to be bullied anymore by 
you lot’. I think it was a real statement to do with their strength from these 
poor refugees that came off the boat, Exodus, the ones you see in that 
picture have bred these strong men, these good looking hunky men with 
intelligence and drive and will not be beaten. This was the turning point in 
terms of Israel making its mark, ‘we are a land and we’re going to stay’. “ 
 
(p. 532) 
 
 
For Sarah, Jews before the war Jews were ‘victims’, ‘poor refugees’ and after 
the war Jews as Israelis were, ‘good looking hunky men with intelligence and 
drive and will not be beaten’. 
 
Stephen vividly describes another Jew-as-victim archetype – the 
Holocuast victim – and the way it was replaced by the Jew as ‘giant’. 
 
“You’ve got to think you have this picture in your mind of millions of Jews 
going tamely to their deaths. Tamely. If I say to you, ‘the Holocaust’, conjure 
up a picture and what do you see? You see camps, you see ovens […] what 
do they look like? Emaciated. And you think to yourself why didn’t they stand 
up for themselves? […] and this was the complete opposite. You’ve taken a 
guy who is cowering in the corner to his masters and you’ve turned him into 
this guy who’s a giant. 
 
 (p. 381) 
 
Earlier on in his interview, Stephen uses an evocative term that was 
widespread in the press at the time and the commemoration of the war since 
– the comparison of Israel beating the allied Arab forces to David and Goliath. 
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“I mean David had just beaten Goliath. We were the heroes. Israel were the 
heroes of the world. If you went to a shop you would buy Israeli soldiers 
because they were the toughest… to play with. Yeah.” 
 
 (p. 355) 
 
Sarah described the Israelis as “superheroes” (Sarah, p. 532). David, an anti-
Zionist activist now (although “passively” pro-Israel in 1967) and someone 
familiar with the language of identity politics explicitly makes the connection 
between the switch from the representation of the Jew as bookish to the 
representation of Jew as a ‘sabra’ and the effect this had on his cultural 
identity as a Jew in Britain. 
 
“The Israelis were obviously very tough and the Arabs couldn’t fight for shit 
[light laugh]. 
 
Did it contribute to a different sense of Israel? 
I mean yes, it reinforced this macho… that the Sabras were something 
different. 
 
Can you explain… the Sabras are… 
The people born in Israel. 
 
And they were different because… 
They were tougher. They were tougher than the Jews I knew. The Jews I 
knew read books, they didn’t fire rifles. […] 
 
And, did it effect how you felt as a Jew in Britain? 
[Pause] I’m sure it made me feel more Jewish. But not more religious. It didn’t 
make me believe in any sort of God.  
 
So then how does one feel Jewish if that isn’t through religion? 
Cultural identity. A way of understanding the world.”  
 
 (p. 461) 
 
 
The reason that this particular representation of Israelis emerges in the 
hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology is because the Israeli victory 
was perceived to be such a surprising military achievement. If British Jews 
represented Jews as refugees, ghetto Jews and Holocaust victims how could 
they imagine that a Jewish nation could become an effective military force? In 
representing Jewishness in this way, British Jews draw on two related 
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discourses. The first is the ‘lachrymose’ version of Jewish historiography that 
views Jewish history solely in terms of suffering and victimhood (a history 
solely constituted by ghettoes, pogroms, anti-Semitism etc.) whilst occluding 
periods in European and Middle Eastern history when Jewish communities 
experienced a comfortable or successful existence (Shenhav, 2006; Baum, 
2011; Benbassa, 2007). The second discourse is anti-Semitism. A key anti-
Semitic representation of Jews is of their sick and unhealthy bodies (Gilman, 
1991). For Jeremy pre-1967 Jews are ‘weak’ for Stephen they are 
‘emaciated’.  
 
The Israeli victory meant that British Jews imagined Jews and 
Jewishness differently. The post-1967 representation of Jewishness reversed 
the terms that Jews and Jewishness had been traditionally understood: strong 
not weak, powerful not powerless, a military power actively determining their 
own destiny, not the passive victims of military power having their destiny 
decided for them. This is Jewishness as represented in Zionist discourse, 
(which itself articulates elements of both the lachrymose discourse of Jewish 
historiography and anti-Semitism). Zionism had been representing 
Jewishness in this way, as the ‘new Jew’, since the 1890s but this 
representation remained marginal in British Jewish culture until 1967. How did 
it come to replace the dominant pre-1967 representation of Jewishness in 
British Jewish culture? This process is described at length in Chapter 6 but to 
briefly recapitulate: according to Deleuze and Guattari, one of the processes 
through which an element (semiotic, social or material) becomes more or less 
dominant in the constitution of an assemblage is through the 
deterritorialisation that occurs after a surge of affectivity across that 
assemblage. This surge of affectivity causes the relations of exteriority that 
hold the elements of an assemblage in a particular arrangement to undo; 
when the surge of affectivity ends, the elements re-join but in a different 
arrangement. This new arrangement depends on what caused the affective 
surge and the relationship of the assemblage to the complex network of 
assemblages to which it is connected. The surge of affectivity in this context is 
described in Chapter 6 but can be briefly summarised by, “it was the palpable 
fear of Israel’s elimination and the pure joy at its survival that placed Israel 
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squarely in the identity of world Jewry” (Ben-Moshe, 2007, p. 9). Its 
connection to the complex network of assemblages that surround it is 
described in Chapter 4. What is important to state here is that from the 
interviews it is clear that in terms of hegemonic British Jewish identity, the 
result of this surge of affectivity was the increased prominence of the Zionist 
representation of Jewishness within the complex ecology that was British 
Jewish identity.  
 
5.3.2.  The place of Israel in post-1967 hegemonic British Jewish identity 
 
That the Zionist representation of Israel becomes more prominent in 
the complex ecology of British Jewish identity is clear from the interviews and 
also from archival evidence and sociological research undertaken at the time. 
For example not long after the victory, British Jewish writer Louis Marks writes 
about how the intense affectivity generated by witnessing the war created a 
sense of ‘nearness’ between him, his colleagues from the newly formed 
‘Writers for Israel’ advocacy group and the State of Israel.  
 
“Thinking back to those sticky June nights, the formation of the group 
emerges as one detail among many of the changes brought about by the 
crisis. The total commitment to Israel’s survival – the emotional strength of 
which, I think surprised and engulfed us – has left a residue of involvement 
and ‘nearness’ which must certainly persist”  
 
[My emphasis] (Marks, 1967, p. 12)  
 
The spatial metaphor of ‘nearness’ can be read in relation to the ‘space’ Israel 
occupies in hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity. Marks also mentions 
involvement with Israel, and therefore links affect (being engulfed by 
emotional intensity), the shifting position of Israel in his imagination 
(nearness) and their capacity to act in the interests of Israel (involvement). 
 
Jeremy describes the effect the war had on his Jewish identity: 
 
“It didn’t make me more religious, it made me more Jewish race. More aware 
and proud. 
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So did Israel become part of your Jewish identity? 
Yes, it did. Before it was just a little country where some Jewish people lived 
and now I felt I was part of it.” 
 
 (Jeremy, p. 429) [My emphasis] 
Stephen describes it in similar terms: 
 
“The first big Israel thing was the Six Day War. It bought it to light. Right the 
way around the world. And it brought it to my attention that much more.” 
 
(p. 352) 
Even David, a self-defined anti-Zionist now, says: 
 
“My only flirtation with Zionism was for a few weeks in ‘67” 
 
(p. 467) 
 
Sarah, already a Zionist talks about the part of her life that was to do with 
Israel ‘crystalizing’ after the Six Day War. 
 
“I think up until that point I kept my Habonim life and my school life very 
separate. […] and there the whole thing came together and […] I think the 
Jewish part of me just had to come out. […] It crystallised something.”  
 
 (Sarah, p. 530) 
 
Rose also uses a spatial metaphor in talking about Israel ‘merging’ with 
Jewishness and the Zionist activity it generated in people you would not have 
expected to be Zionist: 
 
“… my friend’s parents for example, we knew some of them were Jewish, but 
suddenly their feeling came to the top […] you did feel that the Jewish bit and 
the Israel bit merged […] Previously […] almost the two things hadn’t anything 
to do with each other and they merged and suddenly you weren’t only Jewish 
but you went to fundraising things for Israel and you belonged to Israel 
oriented groups of Israel and you went to talks about Israel and you know… 
people who you didn’t even expect.” 
 
(Rose, p. 662) 
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The greater prominence of Israel in the ecology of hegemonic British Jewish 
identity is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in the interview both 
Stephen and Harvey (p. 597) elide British Jewish and Israeli Identity. Both say 
‘we’ when they mean the Israelis. This is more understandable in Stephen, 
who was born in Israel (having emigrated to Britain at the age of three) but as 
he says in the quote below he saw himself as a British Jew and not an Israeli. 
 
“You say ‘we’… 
(interrupts) The general perception was that we were heroic and they were 
seen generally in a good light.  
 
Did that effect the way you saw yourself? 
No, because I never really saw myself as an Israeli. I felt proud as a Jew. I 
couldn’t possibly feel proud as an Israeli because that would be stealing their 
thunder. What did I do? [light laugh] 
 
Sure. Did it give you the possibility of identifying with heroes? 
Just because you were Jewish. Yeah absolutely.” 
 
[My emphasis] (p. 374) 
 
There is confusion in Stephen’s use of pronouns here indicating an instability 
in the way a British Jew could identify with Israel after the war. He uses ‘we’ 
and then ‘they’ in the same sentence when referring to Israelis. When asked 
explicitly if the war changed the way he saw himself he says that he never 
saw himself as an Israeli despite using we in reference to Israel the sentence 
before. 
 
The increased prominence of Israel and Israelis in hegemonic British 
Jewish cultural identity is corroborated in the historical and sociological 
research. For instance, Todd Endelman argues that, “only in the late 1960s, 
after the Six Day War in June 1967, when the existence of the state and the 
lives of it’s Jewish citizens seemed to hang in the balance, did concern for 
and identification with Israel’s fate become central to what it meant to be a 
Jew in Britain” thereby “becoming the most potent force for keeping Jews in 
the communal fold” [My emphasis] (2002, p. 235). This is confirmed across 
the literature: (Davidson, 1968; Wasserstein, 1971; Sacks, 1991; Sheffer and 
Bayne, 2007).  
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 The most in-depth research on the question of the place of Israel in 
British Jewish identity before, during and after the war was undertaken by a 
research team lead by sociologist Julius Gould (1984). He carried out a 
survey of 217 Jews who lived in London in 1969 to try and ascertain the key 
features of Jewish identification at the time. One set of questions that was 
asked in the survey related to the identification of Jews with Israel before, 
during and after the war. His findings are reproduced in the table below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sample is broken down into three groups: i) those with high ‘overall’ 
identification with Israel; ii) those with medium identification and iii) those with 
a low identification. The degree of overall identification was measured by 
asking participants to score on a scale of 0–9 how closely they were identified 
with Israel, i) before, ii) during and iii) after the war and how important they felt 
the continued existence of the State of Israel is for the British Jews. Overall 
identification was calculated by taking an average of the four scores. Gould 
and his team then allocated each individual to the three above groups 
according to this average score. 
 
Unsurprisingly, those with a high overall identification with Israel were 
extremely closely identified with Israel before the war and maintained this 
level of identification, during and after it. Those moderately identified, were 
Identification with Israel No % No % No % No % No % No % No % No % No %
Extremely closely (9 points) 72 100 72 100 72 100 6 8 65 88 41 55 0 0 21 30 3 4
Very  closely (8 points) 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 26 7 9 21 28 1 1 15 21 9 13
Fairly closely (7 points) 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 59 2 3 10 14 16 23 27 38 37 52
All others (0‐6 and don't know) 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 0 0 2 3 54 76 8 11 22 31
TOTAL 72 100 72 100 72 100 74 100 74 100 74 100 71 100 71 100 71 100
Adapted from (Gould, 1984)
TABLE 26: 'IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAEL' IN TERMS OF THE ISRAEL INDEX
High Medium Low
Before June 
1967 June 1967
At time of 
survey
Before June 
1967 June 1967
At time of 
survey
Before June 
1967 June 1967
At time of 
survey
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either fairly or very closely identified with Israel before the war and then shift 
to extremely closely during it, where many remain afterwards. Those with low 
overall identification experience an increase in identification during the war 
with less remaining closely identified afterwards. These findings provides 
strong evidence that Israel shifts to a far more prominent position within in the 
hegemonic British Jewish subjective ecology after the war, as suggested in 
the interviews carried out for this thesis. 
 
5.3.3. The affects catalysed by the post-1967 representation of Israel 
 
The exact nature of the affectivity catalysed by this newly dominant 
representation of Israel is complex – itself assembled out of different and 
inter-related affects. The first is pride in Israel, its military achievement and 
what it means for Jewishness in Israel and in Britain. Secondly, and arguably 
most importantly, there is an increased feeling of security that British Jews 
feel as a result of a militarily strong Israel, again both inside Britain and in 
Israel itself. This feeling of security is expressed mainly in the idea that as a 
result of the victory Israel had ‘proved’ itself to be a safe haven for Jews 
should they be threatened by anti-Semitism. Israel also becomes exciting for 
British Jews and Israelis become sexually desirable. Sexual desirability is 
mentioned by only two of the interviewees, so should not be overplayed, but it 
is important nonetheless. The final aspect of this affective assemblage is not 
explicitly addressed by all the interviewees but often appears when they make 
statements about how they felt as Jews in Britain after the war and in doing so 
describe how they felt before the war. If post-1967 Israel made them feel safe, 
proud and excited, before the war they felt threatened and/or ashamed. These 
sad affects (in the Spinozist sense) do not disappear post-1967. Arguably 
they are what the joyous affects are rooted in giving the affective assemblage 
a complexity whose political and ethical consequences are discussed below. 
 
  Pride 
 
 Arguably the most straightforward of the affects catalysed by the post-
1967 representation of Israel was pride. British Jews were both proud of 
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Israel, and proud of what they saw the victory meaning for them as Jews in 
Britain. 
 
“I think it did increase my respect and pride that I felt… 
 
Of being a Jewish person in Britain or of pride in Israel?  
I think both. 
 
Both as a Jew in Britain… 
Yes I think so. Yes it did. It enhanced it. I don’t think I didn’t feel it before, but 
it did enhance it. It made me feel similar towards Israel.” 
 
(Harvey, p. 605) 
 
 
“… the next few questions are how it might have effected the British 
Jewish community. Do you think it did in any way? 
I think what it did, like with this person you met who wasn’t particularly 
religious but suddenly felt much more Jewish. I think it did, they felt much 
more Jewish. Felt much more akin to Israel. Felt they should help Israel. You 
know. 
 
When you say more Jewish do you mean more… 
Not particularly praying type but, you know, the feeling of being Jewish, proud 
of being Jewish I suppose.” 
 
 (Evelyn, p. 501) 
 
Security 
 
A slightly more complicated affect catalysed by the war was a feeling of 
safety and security. Not only is this a persistent refrain of the interviews but it 
also appears in Gould’s study of London Jews in 1969. The new feeling of 
security Jews felt after the war stems from the interpretation of the war as 
Israel successfully fending of a genocide of its Jewish population. It therefore 
‘proved’ itself to be a safe haven for world Jewry. None of Gould’s 
interviewees explicitly talk about the affectivity generated by this 
representation of Israel as safe haven, but by representing Israel in this way, 
the affectivity is implied. 
 
“In an emergency, in the case of persecution, the Jew should know that he 
has a home to go to, to live in freedom. It gives respect to the Jew in that he 
can show the world that he has a land and that he can fight for himself” 
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(‘Bernard’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 75) 
 
“It is some central place to look at and to feel that a Jewish person can go 
there if they want to. It is possible that there might be a time here when things 
are very bad and we could be forced out.” 
 
(‘Cecil’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 81) 
 
“If the Israelis were driven into the sea it would be a very sad day for British 
Jews who would lose … the security of their national home.” 
 
(‘Irving’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 99) 
 
The representation of Israel as safe haven also appeared repeatedly in the 
interviews carried out for this thesis with some of the interviewees speaking in 
depth about the affectivity this representation generates in them. 
 
“I’d say most of the Jews in Britain, most of the Jews of my generation; we 
feel that we need Israel as much as Israel needs us. You need somewhere to 
go.” 
(Harvey, p. 610) 
 
“… my parents [Holocaust survivors] were very worried about it because they 
felt it was very important to have Israel. 
 
So why were you parents… 
Because of their past you know, they… I think they felt a bit more secure.” 
 
(Vivien, p. 626) 
 
“But every time we go back to Israel there’s this feeling that you’re kind of 
totally… totally relaxed. I suppose looking back on what I’ve said to you: this 
hidden fear, this anti-Semitic pogrom fear that you have completely goes 
away when you’re in Israel. Completely. Because when you’re on the streets 
and in restaurants you haven’t got anyone looking at you the wrong way 
because you’re Jewish. […] It’s a great feeling not to be worried about that. 
That’s a big attraction to me. I really do feel at home there, I feel comfortable 
there. 
 
(Stephen, p. 354) 
 
 
 
Excitement and Desire 
 
Stephen and Sarah talked about a different sense of affectivity that the 
new representation of Israel and Israelis generated in the British Jewish 
community. The first is excitement: 
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“All of a sudden it became an exciting place to go to. Rather than frightening 
and surrounded by Arabs.” 
 
(Stephen, p. 381) 
 
 
The second is sexual desire. Stephen, who was born in Israel, and whose 
parents originated, unusually for a British Jew, from North Africa talks about 
how his Middle Eastern physical appearance was understood by his 
predominantly Ashkenazi peers after the war. 
 
“Within the Jewish community as soon as I say I was born in Israel it would 
add a bit of kudos. ‘Ooh, Stephen’s Israeli…’ you know it was like… So you’d 
never say it and get a derogatory comment back… Because I was a little bit 
different. Because I was a little bit dark skinned […] They had something 
about them. They had something that set them slightly apart. Something 
slightly sexy and slightly attractive. Because, as I say, we were the good guys 
in those days.” 
 
[My emphasis] (p. 360) 
 
Sarah, who visited Israel in 1968 with the Zionist youth group Habonim, 
recalls having a relationship with an Israeli soldier who had fought in the Six 
Day War. 
 
“Well I was working on kibbutz […] I just had a brief love affair, fling with a 
soldier at the time. 
 
Was it exciting to you that he was a soldier? 
Oh yes, of course […] It was partly that but partly because he arrived on the 
top of a tractor, this hugely hunky man [inhales as if she has been caught 
short of breath] who had just came back from war on a tractor [laughs]. This 
iconic Israeli, you know, ‘yes! Come to Israel with your blue hat and your 
kibbutz hat’ and he just arrived on this tractor. It was love at first… of course. 
And he happened to be, I think he was only doing his miluim,127 but he had 
been in the war. It was the whole package. But we were very caught up in the 
poignancy as well of these young men who were building a land, and building 
a country. And really heavily based on principles. And usually the Israelis we 
met were incredibly thoughtful and deep and considerate and really emotional 
effected by their experience.” 
 
(Sarah, p. 538) 
 
                                            
127 Miluim is the Hebrew word for reserve service in the IDF 
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Sarah is deploying one of the central ideas of Zionist discourse here in order 
to make sense of the relationship that she had with this Israeli soldier – the 
myth of the soldier who shoots and cries (a post-1967 Israeli attempt to render 
Zionism ethically sensitive (Loshitzky, 2011)). What is interesting about 
Sarah’s deployment of this discourse is its affective force upon her. During the 
interview she represented her affective response in the encounter by 
dramatically inhaling as if her breath was taken away. The man was ‘hugely 
hunky’, an ‘iconic Israeli’, who like most of the other Israelis she met was 
‘incredibly thoughtful and deep and considerate and really emotional effected 
by their experience [of the war]’. She ends up having a ‘fling’ with him.128  
 
5.3.3.1. The affectivity of being a Jew in Britain 
 
 This newly catalysed affective assemblage had important 
consequences outside of the way British Jews felt about the newly dominant 
representation of Israel. It also changed the way British Jews felt as Jews in 
Britain. Some of the interviews expressed this in straightforward terms: 
 
“I think it did increase my respect and pride that I felt… 
 
Of being a Jewish person in Britain or of pride in Israel? What were you 
proud of? 
I think both.” 
 
 (Harvey, p. 605) 
 
 “I think what it did, like with this person you met who wasn’t particularly 
religious but suddenly felt much more Jewish. I think it did, they felt much 
more Jewish. […] proud of being Jewish I suppose.” 
 
 (Evelyn, p. 501) 
 
“OK. And so you… How did it make you feel as a Jew watching the war? 
It made me feel more Jewish. “ 
 
(David, p. 459) 
                                            
128 It is arguable that sexual desire is more present in the affective complex than the 
interviews suggest. It is likely that the other interviewees may have been too embarrassed to 
speak about it. 
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One of Julius Gould’s interviewees talks about her post-war identity in 
similarly affective terms. 
 
“I suddenly got a very strong feeling of belonging and being a part of this 
race. I didn’t think I could ever feel like that about a place I hadn’t ever seen… 
I feel very proud of the fact that I am a Jew. I know that we are not practicing 
Jews but I still feel very proud of my religion. To be very honest I don’t know 
whether it is because of the war or because I have a growing family or just 
because I am getting older. I do know I feel much prouder of being Jewish 
than I felt before the war. I was frightened before and I tended not to let 
people know that I am Jewish. Now I tell people quite openly.” 
 
(‘Rose’ cited in Gould, 1984, p. 95) 
 
 
 In one of the most revealing anecdotes of the interviews, Jeremy also 
talks about feeling ashamed of being Jewish before the war and situates this 
affectivity in the context of anti-Semitism in Britain: 
 
“I wanted to ask did you experience anti-Semitism in Britain in the 
1960s. 
Yes, yes. Because it was Colin Jordan. And the Moseley one in Ridley Road. 
You’re at that age when you’re not a football hooligan but you’re of that 
mentality that is, ‘all the lads are gonna go and we’re going to upset them’. 
And it did, it managed to stop the Moseley one in Ridley Road and Colin 
Jordan didn’t get to speak very long because all the Jewish kids decided to 
make a bit of a noise. That was because of Israel coming along. I don’t think 
that would have happened had their been no Israel.  
 
Why do you say that? 
Because there’s something behind you. There’s something there, there’s 
more. You know, nowadays you are much more proud to be Jewish and pro-
Israeli because of the strength and the knowledge of the country. Their 
technology… they’re so advanced in everything, I can hold my head up now. 
Where us before you were a little bit embarrassed if somebody said, ‘are you 
Jewish?’ I remember once going to court, for speeding or something like that. 
I almost felt embarrassed about saying ‘Jewish, the Old Testament’ and that’s 
wrong. Now I purposely do it. And it’s different. 
 
And you think Israel existing has something to do with that? 
It has to mate. Listen: there would be very few Jews in the world without an 
Israel, in my opinion.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 416) 
 
 
 
240 
This quote reveals in great detail, precisely how the affectivity 
generated by the idea of a victorious Israel plays out in 1960s British Jewish 
culture. Before the war Jeremy felt ‘embarrassed’ by his Jewishness. After the 
war he is ‘proud’ enough to ‘hold his head up’ as a Jew because he thinks 
Israel is ‘strong’, ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘advanced’. He is so proud that he and 
his friends feel emboldened against British fascist anti-Semitism, in a way that 
successfully mobilizes them against a National Front rally in London’s East 
End. The final, ominous statement, “there would be very few Jews in the world 
without an Israel” is an expression of the idea that a militarily strong Israel 
keeps Jews safe in a dangerous world, whether as a safe haven should 
another Holocaust occur, or in the more intangible sense of emboldening 
British Jews to stand up to anti-Semitism in a way that was not possible 
before the war. 
 
The logic of this statement (a post-1967 Israel makes Jews proud and 
secure) is interesting because, despite being so strongly invested in by British 
Jews, it is highly inaccurate. The existence of a Zionist State of Israel, 
particularly in its 1967 formation, has arguably made the world more not less 
dangerous for Jews in Israel and in Jewish communities across the globe.129 
For example, pro-Palestinian ‘terrorist’ attacks on Jewish targets, both civilian 
and military, have substantially escalated since 1967, mostly in response to 
Israel’s post-war policies in the occupied territories. In terms of the idea that 
Israel is a safe haven for Jews: through mandatory conscription Israel 
compels the majority of its citizens130 to join an army that is routinely put to 
war or involved in life-threatening actions administering an occupation. For 
Israeli citizens who are not actively serving in the army, their lives have been 
demonstrably more at risk than those outside of Israel since 1967 – primarily 
from ‘terrorism’. Israelis are constantly reminded of this risk in their everyday 
lives: every time they enter the security point of an Israeli shopping mall or 
walk past the bomb shelters that, by law, are mandatorily installed in every 
                                            
129 The State of Israel has made the world exponentially more dangerous for Palestinians 
than it has for Jews. The relationship between the two is discussed below. 
130 Arab citizens of Israel are not required to perform military service. 
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Israeli residential building.  So whilst post-1967, Israel has made Jewish life 
less secure, the British Jewish interviewees feel precisely the opposite.  
 
The misrecognition that a militarily strong Israel makes the world a 
safer place for Jews is central to Zionist ideology, specifically its Revisionist 
variant. This idea had existed since Zionism’s inception but only becomes a 
refrain that structures hegemonic British Jewish identity after the Six Day War 
because the way the war was represented in Zionist discourse worked to 
‘prove’ it. The reason the idea was able to entrench itself so deeply within 
British Jewish culture is because it catalysed an affective assemblage that 
powerfully counteracted the all-pervasive fear of anti-Semitism that Jews had 
in a post-Holocaust world (this is paradoxical, considering the post-1945 
decline of British anti-Semitism (see Chapter 4)). Moreover, it never fully 
eradicates the sense of fear British Jews have of another Holocaust. The logic 
of Zionism internalised by the majority of British Jews after 1967 is that Jews 
persistently face the threat of anti-Semitism and only a militarily strong Israel 
will protect them from this threat. The fear of this threat is as much a part of 
the post-1967 affective assemblage catalysed by the war as pride, safety, 
excitement, and sexual desire.  
 
Understanding the Zionist representation of Israel and the affects it 
catalyses in post-1967 hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity in Guattarian 
terms gives an insight into why support for Israel has become so intractable in 
the mainstream of British Jewry in the post 1967 conjuncture despite Israel’s 
widely publicised human rights abuses. If this refrain were to be removed i.e. 
if the majority of British Jews accepted that far from making the world safer for 
Jews, Israel, in fact makes it more dangerous, hegemonic British cultural 
identity would deterritorialise in the way Guattari’s obsessive-compulsive 
patient does in the clinical example discussed above. This potentially explains 
why criticism of Israel often causes the British Jewish community (at both the 
institutional and popular levels) to defensively reiterate this refrain in order to 
territorialise their identity in a way that makes them feel safe. In the interviews, 
this was communicated most keenly in Jeremy’s statement “It has to mate. 
Listen: there would be very few Jews in the world without an Israel, in my 
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opinion”. Jeremy said the words ‘it has to mate’ with a sense of menace.131 If I 
have interpreted his tone correctly this, arguably, demonstrates that the 
removal of the Zionist refrain ‘Israel must exist or Jews are in danger’ implied 
by the question, “and you think Israel existing has something to do with that?” 
deterritorialises the post-1967 British Jewish subjective ecology in a way that 
panics Jeremy. In an attempt to reterritorialise this subjective ecology Jeremy 
has to aggressively re-iterate this refrain in his answer. 
 
6. The ethical implications of the position of Israel within post-67 
hegemonic British Jewish identity 
 
 So far this chapter has traced the re-organisation of the hegemonic 
subjective ecology of British Jewish identity after the Six Day War. It has 
shown how a certain representation of Israel emerged after the war and how 
this catalysed a complex affective assemblage that altered the way British 
Jews felt about Israel and how they felt as Jews in Britain. In order to fully 
carry out a (Deleuzo-) Guattarian analysis of this identity it is necessary not 
only to look at the refrains and affects that constitute this new identity but also 
the power relations that this new identity instantiates across the Plane of 
Organisation, both for the identity itself and the assemblages its constitution is 
dependent on. 
 
  Bogard asks a series of questions that highlight the socio-political 
consequences of a Deleuzo-Guattarian analytics of desire: “There are modes 
of social inscription that are exclusive, that separate bodies from what they 
are capable of doing, that demean their desire and distort their sense; and 
there are modes that inclusive and connective that liberate desire, destroy 
limits and draw positive ‘lines of flight’ or escape. The practical and ethical 
question, for Deleuze and Guattari is always which is which?” (Bogard, 1998, 
p. 58). Does the post-1967 social inscription of British Jewish identity, 
separate British Jewish bodies from what they are capable of doing, demean 
                                            
131 ‘Mate’ is a colloquial mode of address that Londoners use in different ways. In the 
interview, I felt it was being used in the ironic way that often starts a fight or argument i.e. ‘I 
want to threaten you, you are not my mate’. This was confirmed when I listened back to the 
recording of the interview.  
 
 
243 
their desire and distort their sense or is it inclusive, liberating of desire, 
destroying limits and drawing positive lines of flight?  
 
On the face of it, the case can be made for the latter. Todd Endelman 
ostensibly does just this when he explains the affective work that the State of 
Israel does in the British Jewish assemblage, “The establishment of the State 
and its remarkable achievements, military and otherwise, acted as an 
emotional counterweight to the Holocaust offering consolation, instilling pride 
and restoring confidence that life was not as bleak – or Jews as powerless as 
the Holocaust suggested” (Endelman, 2002, p. 238). In Deleuzo-Guattarian 
terms this could be explained as the Six Day War empowering British Jewry 
as Jews, augmenting their capacity to act, increasing their force of existing. 
This notion is corroborated by the interviews own sense of what the Six Day 
War does for them. 
 
 Endelman’s analysis however does not take into account the more 
complex affective assemblage revealed by the interviews. Post-1967 British 
Jewish cultural identity does not replace bleakness and powerlessness with 
pride and confidence as Endelman suggests. Instead it makes the latter 
dependent on the former, meaning British Jews are not truly empowered in 
the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense. A sense of paranoia of what would happen if 
Israel did not exist in its current form is evidenced across the interviews.  
 
Endelman’s analysis also divorces British Jewish identity from its social 
and historical context, a move that is out of step with Deleuzo-Guattarian 
analytics. His conclusion also does not take into account the other 
territorialisations that occur across the Plane of Organisation in tandem with 
British Jews feeling more, superficially, confident and powerful – namely the 
literal deterritorialisation of Palestinians, Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza 
strip that occurs as a result of their forced migration and the occupation of 
those who remained (Masalha, 1997, 1999, 2003). Remarkably a number of 
the interviewees claim they were not aware of the post-1967 Palestinian 
refugees (Harvey, p. 608; Evelyn p. 506; Stephen, p. 382; Brian, p. 581). This 
is remarkable because it was widely reported at the time (making the front 
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page of Britain’s best-selling paper the Daily Mirror on 13 June 1967). This 
possibly says more about how the Zionist memorialisation of the war has 
been internalised by British Jews, than it does about how aware the British 
Jews were of the refugees at the time. Nevertheless it does demonstrate a 
crucial way that Palestinians are represented in Zionism, popular or 
otherwise: they simply do not exist. This is an extraordinary act of symbolic 
violence that has enabled a vast range of actual violent practice against 
Palestinians since the Zionist colonisation of Palestine. The other important 
way that Palestinians have been represented in the British Jewish imaginary 
is through a mixture of classic orientalist archetypes and as a symbol onto 
which Jewish fears about Nazi anti-Semitism have been displaced (Zena, p. 
398; Jeremy, pp. 429–430; Evelyn, p. 503; Stephen, p. 349) (This is 
discussed in detail in the following chapter). In terms of British Jewish identity 
the Palestinians are constructed as a radical other around which the British 
Jewish self is structured. 
 
The terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are not part Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptual vocabulary, in part, because they propose an ontology comprised 
of multiplicities as opposed to binary oppositions. This approach critiques 
social relations based on organisations of the socius around self/other 
relations. This critique is given voice in Deleuze’s book Expressionism (1968 
(b)), in which he explains the affective consequences of a ‘body’ (in the 
Spinozist sense) engaging in social relations that not only ‘other’ a different 
body but also attempt to dominate it:  
 
“It would be all very well to prevail in various encounters with bodies opposed 
to me; but such triumphs, such joys of hate, would not eliminate the sadness 
involved in hatred; and above all, I could never be sure of winning the next 
encounter, and would thus be affected by a perpetual fear.”  
 
(Deleuze, 1968 (b), p. 260) 
 
This insight cuts to the heart of Zionism in general, but for the purposes of this 
chapter to the problems of hegemonic British Jewish identity after the war. It 
demonstrates the complicated way that the ultimately sad affective 
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assemblage catalysed by the war connects with the oppression of the 
Palestinians after 1967 (and by implication since the beginning of the Zionist 
colonisation of Palestine). British Jews think a militarily strong Israel makes 
them feel safer in the world, despite never entirely dispelling the idea that their 
lives are perpetually at risk from genocidal anti-Semitism. Post-1967 Israel 
actually makes Jewish lives more at risk, both in and outside Israel, largely as 
a result of violent resistance to Zionist colonisation i.e. the bodies that Zionism 
forces Jews in an oppressive encounter with. As a result British Jews 
misrepresent resistance to Zionism as an expression of genocidal anti-
Semitism (their perception of the Six Day War in these terms is a case in 
point), and the refrains of Zionism that organise hegemonic British Jewish 
cultural identity are thus ‘proved’ once again. 
 
What way out of this? According to Deleuze, the only way to live 
ethically is to engage in encounters that are mutually empowering for all the 
bodies involved in that encounter. There is no space here to get into the 
various debates about what form that encounter might take from the 
Palestinian point of view – a one state solution, a two state solution etc. In 
terms of the organisation of cultural identity, Guattari suggests the following: 
 
“The question which poses itself then is one of the conditions which allows 
the acceptance of the other, the acceptance of subjective pluralism. It is a 
matter not only of treating another group, another ethnicity, another sex, but 
also of a desire for dissensus, otherness and difference. Accepting otherness 
is a question not so much of right as desire. The acceptance is possible 
precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity within oneself”  
 
(Guattari, 1996 (a), p. 216)  
 
In the context of hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity the minimal starting 
point on the route to Guattari’s ideal subjectivity is the recognition that the 
Palestinians and the grievances done to them in the name of Zionism exist at 
all. Recognition in itself, however, will not deterritorialise the post-1967 British 
Jewish subjective ecology. If Israeli Jews are to remain in Palestine/Israel 
(and in the current conjuncture there is no mainstream political solution to the 
conflict that suggests they will or should not) and if the fact of a Jewish 
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presence in Israel remains an important element in hegemonic British Jewish 
cultural identity, that identity will only achieve an affective disposition that is 
truly empowering if it allows itself to desire subjective pluralism, otherness, 
dissensus and difference. What this means practically, is producing a cultural 
identity that incorporates not only Palestinian culture and identity but also anti- 
and non-Zionist Jewish identities as well.  
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Chapter 8 
 
The Rise of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish Community 
after 1967 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter attempted to detail the changes that occurred in 
hegemonic British Jewish cultural identity as a result of the intensive 
processes triggered in the British Jewish community through witnessing the 
war. This chapter looks at what happens to Zionist ideology as a result of the 
same processes. It does this by using the theoretical perspective formulated 
in the work of Lawrence Grossberg, specifically his book We Gotta Get Out of 
This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (1992). In this 
book he uses the CCCS reading of Gramsci alongside Deleuze and Guattari 
to account for the USA’s political shift to the right after the 1970s – what he 
terms ‘Popular Conservatism’. Using Grossberg’s theoretical approach, 
specifically the way he conceives of the CCCS/Gramscian ‘Popular’ via 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘affect’, this chapter argues that the Six Day War 
triggers the rise of Popular Zionism within the British Jewish community. As 
will be explained in more detail in this chapter, there are various reasons for 
calling it Popular Zionism as opposed to simply Zionism: i) Popular Zionism 
has a slightly different ideological content to ‘classical’ Zionism; ii) whereas 
Zionism is an ideology in the conventional sense,132 Popular Zionism is as 
much, if not more, an affective disposition towards Israel, and one that is 
charged with a high intensity; iii) Popular Zionism does not entail belonging to 
a Zionist organisation, or even identifying as a Zionist, but invariably its 
adherents will ‘spontaneously’ reproduce elements of Zionist ideology when 
they speak about Palestine/Israel; iv) Popular Zionism is ‘lived out’ in the 
British Jewish ‘everyday’, specifically the popular culture consumption 
(notably tourism and films), whereas classical Zionism is located on what 
                                            
132 “A systematic schema of ideas usu. relating to politics or society, or to the conduct of a 
class or group, and regarding as justifying actions…” (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 
622).  
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Grossberg calls the institutional and state planes. Finally Popular Zionism has 
not been the only ideology/affective disposition through which the British 
Jewish community has related to the State of Israel in the post-1967 
conjuncture, but it has been the hegemonic one. 
 
2. Ideology, the Popular and affect: Gramsci, CCCS and Grossberg  
 
As the leading exponent of cultural studies in the US, Lawrence 
Grossberg’s theoretical perspective is drawn mainly from the theoretical 
tendencies that emerged within the CCCS, where he trained in the 1970s. 
(The two theorists used by the CCCS that have been most influential on 
Grossberg’s work are Raymond Williams and Antonio Gramsci). Where he 
deviates from the way that cultural studies developed in Britain in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and what is useful for this chapter, is that since the 1980s he has 
used Deleuze and Guattari, specifically their concept of ‘affect’, alongside the 
more dominant CCCS theoretical approaches.133 Grossberg has argued that 
whereas in British cultural studies the tendency has been to understand 
popular culture as primarily a field of meaning, for him, popular culture is only 
properly understood if we also see how meaning is interwoven with affect. As 
demonstrated by the interview and archival data gathered for this thesis, 
conceiving popular culture as the intersection of the planes of meaning and 
affect is particularly useful if we want to understand the ways that Zionism has 
been ‘lived out’ in the everyday lives of British Jews after the Six Day War.  
 
The following section outlines the concepts that Grossberg uses to 
arrive at the position that we do not understand popular culture if we do not 
take into account both meaning and affect. It begins by outlining the 
Gramscian terms that were used by the CCCS to make sense of popular 
culture and then shows how Grossberg uses Deleuze and Guattari to build on 
these concepts. The focus of this chapter is Zionism as an ideology; therefore 
the concept ‘ideology’ will be the pivot upon which the rest of the exposition 
                                            
133 Which not only included Marxists like Williams, Gramsci and Althusser, but also Foucault 
(who Grossberg, also uses) and semiotics. See ‘Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms’ (Hall, 1986 
(a)) and ‘Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies’ (Hall, 1992) for the best exposition of 
the theoretical approaches used by the CCCS in the 1970s and after. 
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turns. To focus solely on ideology is not especially Gramscian. According to 
Gramsci, the way power operates in society is complex, working across the 
various levels of the base and superstructure as presented in classical 
Marxism: the socio-economic, the political, and the ideological. As argued 
below the rise of Popular Zionism does not occur across the political level of 
the British Jewish community – e.g. there is an insubstantial rise in 
membership of Zionist organisations – and neither does it affect the ‘means of 
production’. (The conception of Jews, Zionist or otherwise, as a class or class 
fraction is also highly problematic.) This chapter is not attempting a 
Gramscian account of Popular Zionism. What it is trying to do is show how 
Lawrence Grossberg builds on particular Gramscian concepts (some of which 
are explained in greater detail in chapter 2) to show the ways in which political 
ideologies organise the affective lives of ‘ordinary’ people. The following 
section will explain the Gramscian concepts used by Grossberg, and the 
section immediately after will show how he uses ‘affect’ to build on them to 
provide a more persuasive account of ‘popular’ ideologies.  
 
2.1. Gramsci and ideology 
 
Ideology appears in Gramsci’s work in two guises. The first is ideology 
in the more conventional sense i.e. systems of ideas that are formulated by 
intellectuals and philosophers (Simon, 1982). The second is Gramsci’s unique 
contribution to the definition of ideology – ideology as it is lived out by non-
intellectuals and non-philosophers in their everyday lives: what Gramsci calls 
common sense or “the philosophy of non-philosophers” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
422). In the context of Zionism (as will be explained in greater detail below), 
ideology would be Zionism as expounded by the likes of Theodor Herzl and 
Ahad Ha’am, through texts such a Der Judenstaat (1896), Altneuland (1902) 
and the Basel Programme of 1897. Common sense would be the way the 
precepts expounded by these ideologues are actually lived out by ‘non-
philosophers’ in their everyday lives, whether they be the Zionist immigrants 
to pre-1948 Palestine, Israeli Zionists in the State of Israel, or Popular Zionists 
in the Jewish Diaspora. Common sense is distinct from ideology in that it is 
both non-systematized and unconscious: “the critical and largely unconscious 
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way in which a person perceives the world, often confused and contradictory 
and compounded of folklore, myths and popular experience” (Simon, 1982, p. 
25). 
 
The relationship between ideology and common sense is crucial to 
Grasmci’s conception of the exercise of power: in order for a class or class 
fraction to achieve hegemony (explained in Chapter 2) its ideology needs to 
become the common sense of an historic bloc.134  That class or class fraction 
has to convince other classes that its ideology is going to work in their 
interests – what Gramsci calls the transition from the corporate phase to the 
national-popular phase. This is a process of negotiation between the 
classes/class fractions, whereby the class who ultimately leads the historic 
bloc has to make some ideological concessions in order for the classes it 
seeks to lead to consent to their rule. As will become clearer below, the major 
way this is applicable to Zionism is the concession it has had to make to Jews 
in the Diaspora over the issue of aliyah (immigrating to Israel). Aliyah is the 
key goal of classical Zionism. What this chapter will argue is that it is quite 
possible for Jews in Britain to have no intention of ever immigrating to Israel, 
and still be Zionists. If Zionism did not make this concession (which at various 
points it did not – in the early days of the state, Israeli Prime Minister Ben 
Gurion was particularly virulent in ‘negating the Diaspora’ (Avi-Hai, 1976, 
p.46; Schindler, 2007(b)), Zionists in Israel could not depend on the vital 
political and economic support of non-Israeli Jews, that it has continued to 
enjoy since 1948.  
 
The other important aspect of common sense is not only that it is 
contradictory, incoherent and negotiated – it is also ‘spontaneous’ (Hall at al., 
1978 (a)). What this means is that in order for an ideology to be truly 
successful in cementing an historic bloc, it has to appear in the thoughts and 
actions of all the classes of a society, as if it arrived there spontaneously, or 
as if these classes felt this system of ideas was their own. Freud’s notion of 
                                            
134 For Gramsci, hegemony is not only secured on the ideological plane, but across the social 
formation. For a class or class fraction to dominate an historic bloc, they have to become 
hegemonic across all aspects of the social formation, not only ideologically but also socio-
economically and politically etc. 
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the unconscious might be better deployed here (indeed Simon uses the term 
unconscious in place of spontaneous in his explanation of common sense 
(1982, p. 25)), but as an historical materialist whose emphasis is on macro 
historical forces and social structures Gramsci under-theorises the crucial role 
that individual and collective psychic agencies play in the formation of the 
social.135 Gramsci does superficially touch on psychological processes by 
using Marx’s theory of naturalisation and the role it plays in the becoming 
‘spontaneous’ of the leading ideology in its transformation into common 
sense. Naturalisation is when ideologies and social relations that emerge as a 
result of the successful manoeuvring of classes and class fractions within 
historically specific social arrangements, make themselves appear as if they 
are both eternal and universal – as if they had always existed and that no 
other ideology could possibly exist in its place – by occluding the historical 
conditions of their emergence.136 Marx’s example is the way capitalism makes 
itself seem as if it were the only possible ideology that could organise social 
relations and the distribution of the world’s resources.  
 
Naturalisation has successfully occurred in the context of (Popular) 
Zionism, in the way it has rendered invisible all the other possible 
relationships to Israel and the idea of Jewish national sovereignty in some or 
all parts of Eretz Israel.137138 Chapter 4 details the different positions taken by 
different groups in the British Jewish community towards Israel before 1967, 
and the interview data demonstrates the near impossibility of imagining any 
other ideological position that could plausibly exist towards Israel except 
Popular Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture. The interview data does not 
only demonstrate the occlusion of other political positions (non and anti-
                                            
135 Arguably, this is one of the reasons why a purely Gramscian approach to the problems this 
thesis tries to work through would be less successful than a Deleuzo-Guattarian one, and why 
Grossberg’s fusing of the two is particularly useful for this chapter. The more important 
reason is the focus on affect, which is explored in detail below. 
136 Neither Marx nor Gramsci propose exactly how naturalisation occurs; the previous 
chapter, on how a particular representation of Israel becomes incorporated into British Jewish 
cultural identity is ostensibly an attempt at doing this. 
137 This is a key argument in Anthony Lerman’s critique of the place of Zionism in the British 
Jewish community, although Lerman does not use either a Marxist or Gramscian framework 
to account for this (Lerman, 2008). 
138 This process paralells the ‘mad profileration’ of a single meaning across the stratum of 
signifcation engendered by the cancerous B-w-O of the fascist, outlined in Chapter 6. 
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Zionism) but additionally their becoming taboo – any non or anti-Zionist 
critique of Israel generates a highly affective response in the interviewees. 
This is part of the reason why the addition of affect to this Gramscian analysis 
is so important. 
 
This chapter is making the case for the emergence of Popular Zionism 
in the British Jewish Community as a result of the 1967 war. The term 
‘Popular’ is not used by Gramsci in a similar way i.e. to label a ‘popular’ 
variant of ‘classical’ ideology. The term ‘Popular’ only appears in Gramsci in 
the concept ‘National Popular’, i.e. when a class and its ideology achieves a 
hegemonic position in an historic bloc by, in part, persuading other classes 
that its interests are also their own. The emphasis on a Gramscian ‘Popular’ 
(as opposed to a ‘National-Popular’) comes about through the CCCS working 
through of Gramsci’s ideas in their theorising of popular culture.  
Stuart Hall defines the popular in the following way: 
 
“… there is a continuous and necessarily uneven and unequal struggle by the 
dominant culture, constantly to disorganise and re-organise popular culture… 
There are points of resistance; there are also moments of supersession… It 
goes on continuously in the complex lines of resistance and acceptance, 
refusal and capitulation, which make the field of culture a sort of constant 
battlefield.”  
(Hall, 1998, p.447)  
 
The ‘Popular’ as a “ field” constituted out of “complex lines of resistance and 
acceptance, refusal and capitulation” helps describes the passage of a 
political ideology from a marginal place in a social formation to the common 
sense that binds an entire historic bloc (and how that ideology might be 
resisted and ‘de-hegemonized’). An example, briefly touched upon by Hall in 
‘Deconstructing the Popular’ (the essay that the above quote is taken from), is 
Popular Imperialism. Hall does not define Popular Imperialism but its meaning 
can be inferred as the contradictory and diffuse form of Imperialist ideology 
that appears ‘spontaneously’ in the thoughts and actions of the majority of the 
British ‘people’139 during the period of the British Empire. Another example of 
‘popular’ ideology is Lawrence Grossberg’s Popular Conservatism – the 
                                            
139 Hall tends to mean the working class when he uses the Marxist inflected ‘people’. 
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organisation of significant swathes of North American common sense by New 
Right ideologies since the 1970s. The next section will take a more detailed 
look at Grossberg’s understanding of the Popular. 
 
2.2. Grossberg: affect and ‘the Popular’ 
 
Lawrence Grossberg does not deviate substantially from the CCCS’ 
reading of the popular and the Gramscian framework used to support it. 
Where his contribution is original and what makes it useful in understanding 
the place of Zionism in the British Jewish community post 1967, is his use of 
Deleuze and Guattari, specifically their concept of affect, alongside Gramsci: 
“Grossberg… has developed a methodology which draws on Deleuze and 
Guattari to develop an understanding of the affective elements at stake in 
relations of hegemony” (Gilbert, 2009, p. 31). Chapter 4 looks in detail at the 
use of affect in Grossberg’s fusing of British cultural studies with Deleuze and 
Guattari (and Foucault). What this section will do is look specifically at what 
introducing affect does to the Gramscian/British cultural studies terms outlined 
above – the popular, ideology, common sense, naturalisation, hegemony – 
and why using these terms in conjunction with affect is so useful in 
understanding the rise of Popular Zionism within the post-1967 conjuncture. 
 
Grossberg’s Cultural Marxist/Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology has already 
been detailed at length in Chapter 4. The most important aspect of 
Grossberg’s ontology is his introduction of ‘the affective plane’ and how it 
interacts with the other planes of human praxis. Other alumni of the CCCS 
omit the affective from their approaches. One of the tendencies of the CCCS 
was to focus on the operations of politics from a Gramscian perspective 
(Bennett et al., 1986). The other dominant tendency was to use Gramsci 
alongside various post-structuralists in a way that privileges the role of 
meaning in cultural analysis (Stuart Hall is exemplary of this tendency). 
Grossberg neither negates the importance of meaning or politics when 
analysing culture but argues that because the affective plane is as vital in 
constituting the totality as the other planes, culture is not fully accounted for if 
we omit the affective plane in our analyses.  
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One way this approach manifests itself is in Grossberg’s argument that 
by adding affect to the Gramscian model of ideology, we properly understand 
how an ideology is naturalized, internalized and eternalized: 
 
“Affect is the missing term in an adequate understanding of ideology, for it 
offers the possibility of a ‘psychology of belief’ which would explain how and 
why ideologies are sometimes, and only sometimes, effective and always to 
varying degrees. It is the affective investment in particular ideological sites 
that explains the power of the articulation which bonds particular 
representations and realities. It is the affective investment which enables 
ideological relations to be internalised and consequently naturalised.”  
 
(Grossberg, 1992, p. 83) 
 
This quote is rich in terms of what it adds to the CCCS reading of Gramsci. 
For Grossberg, affect explains not only the ‘effectivity’140 of ideology but also 
the way that representations and realities are ‘articulated’141 into a cohesive 
ideological viewpoint and the way that ideologies are internalised142 and 
naturalised by individuals and collectivities. Affect is what makes abstract 
systems of ideas work in the real; it is what animates ideas in history. If, for 
Gramsci, ideology is the cement that binds an historic bloc then, affect, for 
Grossberg, is the binding agent that gives that ideology traction in social 
formations. Affect ‘sticks’ ideology to people by transforming ideology into a 
person’s hopes, dreams and fears. Ideologies only work if people affectively 
invest in them. For example, Herzl may have advocated for Jewish national 
sovereignty in Der Judenstaat in 1896, but it is only when Jewish ‘non-
philosophers’ began to affectively invest in this idea – began to care about it in 
a way that mobilized them politically – that Zionism becomes a material force 
in history, affecting the various social formations around it. 
                                            
140 In Foucault’s terms i.e. the material effectivity of a discourse – or the social function of a 
discourse at a given moment in history (1966; 1972). 
141 In Laclau and Mouffe’s terms i.e. the connection of discursive elements into a cohesive 
discourse (1985). 
142 Deleuze and Guattari posit an ontology that is defined by its ‘relations of exteriority’, so 
strictly speaking, assemblages (ideological or otherwise) cannot be ‘internalised’ as such 
because there is no interior. Instead Deleuze and Guattari formulate a variety of processes 
through which different assemblages co-join e.g. double articulation, refrains etc. (1980). 
Nevertheless, Grossberg, who uses other theorists alongside Deleuze and Guattari, 
maintains the notion that ideology is internalised. 
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Adding affect to the cultural analysis of ideology also adds another 
important dimension that is missed out from the more traditional CCCS 
approach: 
 
“Of course, it’s that level at which Stuart Hall… might say, “Isn’t it the 
structures of meaning that make the relations?” I would say: ‘But, no, the 
difference is you could have ideological interpellations but people do not 
invest [emphasis in original] in them.” The meaning structure has to somehow 
be affectively charged for it to constitute your experience…[my emphasis]”  
 
(Grossberg, 2010, p. 328) 
 
Grossberg is not disputing the importance of ‘meaning’ in the 
operations of culture, or the way Stuart Hall deploys (Laclau’s reading of) 
Gramsci to do this. What he is saying is that, only when we have a sense of 
how individuals and collectivities affectively invest in ideologies, discourses 
and representations do we understand how they make a difference in the 
material world. To convey this sense of an ideology being affectively invested 
in, in a way that makes a difference to social formations, Grossberg 
formulates the concept of ‘mattering’ (1992). He uses the term ‘matter’ in both 
its senses as a noun (the substance possessed by a physical entity) and as a 
verb (having significance – the way something ‘matters’ to someone), once 
again intertwining meaning with affect (as materiality). Grossberg’s ‘mattering’ 
operates in the context of ideology in the following way: an ideology is, 
amongst other things, a system of signification. For that system of signification 
to have material effectivity within the social totality it has to be affectively 
invested in by a group of people – it has to matter to them, they have to care 
about it and when they care about it they begin to act in its name. When an 
ideology begins to matter to a significant number of people it is an indicator of 
it securing hegemony within the social totality. It is for this reason that 
Grossberg argues that the struggle for hegemony i.e. the struggle for an 
ideology to become ‘popular’, is located primarily on the affective plane: 
 
“Within the relations of and to popular culture, the determining moment is 
often the history of struggle within and over the affective plane. For it is in 
their affective lives that people constantly struggle to find the energy to 
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survive, to find the passion necessary to imagine and enact their own projects 
and possibilities”  
 
(Grossberg, 1992, p. 83) 
 
 
Grossberg’s ‘mattering’ therefore highlights the important ways that affect and 
meaning are interwoven in the becoming-effective of ideologies. This leads 
him to a slightly different conception of the Gramscian Popular to that 
developed in the CCCS, one that includes the affective: 
 
“The Popular is where social imagination is defined and changed, where 
people construct personal identities, identifications, priorities, and 
possibilities, where people form moral and political agendas for themselves 
and their societies, and where they decide whether and in what (or whom) to 
invest the power to speak for them. It is where people construct their hopes 
for the future in the light of their sense of the present. It is where they decide 
what matters, what is worth caring about, and what they are committed to.”  
 
[My emphasis] (Grossberg, 2005, pp. 220–221)  
 
There is a final way that affect and ideology in Grossberg’s work that is 
useful for this thesis. This is when affect almost entirely replaces ideology in 
the constitution of a popular ideology. Grossberg explores this in his notion of 
the ‘affective epidemic’ (1992). This notion is not directly applicable to Popular 
Zionism, however its insights into how politics can work affectively is highly 
instructive for this thesis. An affective epidemic is similar to a ‘moral panic’ 
(Cohen, 1972). In Grossberg’s terms it is when affect replaces ideology at the 
intersection of the planes of politics and everyday life. In an affective 
epidemic, “mattering places are transformed into vectors so that concerns and 
investments of real social history become the ruins of a displaced, perhaps 
even misplaced, paranoia” (1992, p. 284). His examples are the ‘war on 
drugs’, the family, ‘America’ and the economy: all vectors in America’s cultural 
landscape during the 1980s that were highly affectively charged but minimally 
invested with ideological content.  
 
“Knowledge no longer seems as important as other questions. People can be 
ignorant of the stakes in the dispute, or of what the competing positions are 
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yet in many cases, it does not matter. They may even know they are being 
lied to, but that does not matter. Affective issues – how positions ‘feel’ – these 
are what matter.”  
 
(Grossberg, 2005, p. 234) 
 
 
The consequences of an affective epidemic are as follows: 
 
“The effect of transforming the terrain of ideological sites into affective 
epidemics is that it is no longer possible to treat them as the occasion for 
public debates. Questions of fact and representation become secondary to 
the articulation of people’s emotional fears and hopes. This partly explains 
the new conservatism’s ‘ideological’ successes: they have been able to 
construct issues with enormous public passions (such as the current attacks 
on universities, curricula and ‘political correctness’) without leaving any space 
for public engagement.”  
 
(Grossberg, 1992, p. 292) 
 
This almost perfectly describes how Popular Zionism works within the British 
Jewish community post-1967. As demonstrated by the interviews, historical 
knowledge of both Zionism and Palestine/Israel is minimal, yet both continue 
to be invested in with a tremendous affectivity by Britain’s Jews. Affect has 
essentially replaced ideology in Popular Zionism and, as a result, Popular 
Zionism has been extraordinarily successful in organising both the common 
sense, and affective lives of this community, so much so that the room for 
public engagement has been significantly reduced. 
 
3. Thesis 
 
 Using the theoretical perspective formulated by Grossberg this chapter 
argues that what happens to Zionism in Britain as a result of the 1967 war is 
that it finally becomes the hegemonic way that the British Jewish community 
understand and relate to Palestine/Israel. Zionism becomes internalised, 
naturalised and eternalised into the British Jewish assemblage. In becoming 
hegemonic its content invariably alters, mainly around the importance of 
making aliyah and the negation of the diaspora. Most importantly Zionism and 
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the Zionist representation of Palestine/Israel becomes invested in with 
tremendous affectivity. This affectivity replaces much of Zionism’s ideological 
content in the minds of British Jews. It also makes it highly difficult to oppose 
on ideological grounds without the defensive mobilization of British Jewry. 
Finally, post-1967 Zionism is lived out in the every day lives and popular 
culture of British Jews as opposed to the political or institutional planes where 
it has mainly existed prior to 1967 – British Jews do not join Zionist 
organisations in large numbers or make aliyah, yet there is an increasing 
tendency to go to Israel on holiday, for example. For all these reasons it will 
be more accurate to call the type of Zionism that emerges in British Jewry 
after 1967 – Popular Zionism. In line with the evidence gathered for this 
thesis, this chapter will also be arguing that the hegemony of Popular Zionism 
continues to this day (2012, at the time of writing), and therefore in terms of 
the relationship that British Jews have with both Palestine/Israel and Zionism 
we are still in the post-1967 conjuncture. 
 
4. Classical Zionism 
 
In order to demonstrate what makes the form of Zionism that emerges 
in British Jewry after 1967, ‘popular’ it is necessary to provide a definition of 
‘classical’ Zionism to see what components appear in, are excluded by and 
are affectively invested in, in Popular Zionism. This is not straightforward. 
Classical Zionism is a term applied retrospectively by scholars of Zionism in 
an attempt to standardize the various ideological strands that existed in 
Zionism before 1948. It incorporates Political Zionism, Practical Zionism, 
Labour Zionism, Cultural Zionism, General Zionism, National Religious 
Zionism and Revisionist Zionism (Shimoni, 1995). It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to attempt a definitive account of Classical Zionism. Instead, what 
this section will attempt is, i) a general introduction to its fundamental precepts 
and ii) the aspects of its ideological assemblage which are most meaningful to 
the constitution of Popular Zionism in the post-1967 British Jewish community. 
 
According to the 1973 edition of the Encyclopaedia Judaica, “the 
modern term Zionism first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, 
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denoting “the movement whose goal was the return of the Jewish people to 
Eretz Israel” (Kressel, 1973, p. 1). Theodor Herzl is often thought to be the 
founding father of modern Zionism, though Herzl was not the first person to 
use the term, nor the first person to advocate some form of Jewish ‘return’ to 
‘Eretz Israel’ (Hertzberg, 1977, p.32; Laqueur, p. xxv). The intellectual context 
that gave rise to modern Zionism at the end of the nineteenth century 
emerges at the intersection of diverse philosophical currents: i) Jewish 
Messianism: the Jewish eschatological belief that during the age of the 
messiah the Jews who had been dispersed around the world would gather 
again in Eretz Israel; ii) the Jewish Emancipation: the post-French Revolution 
historical process that emancipated Jews as legally recognized citizens of the 
nation-states in which they were domiciled; iii) nationalism – the political 
ideology that posits that peoples can be grouped together through their 
shared connection to specific territories;  iii) anti-Semitism: the ideology, 
rooted in race science, that Jews were racially inferior to Aryan Europeans 
and/or a threat to the Aryan race. The historical events that galvanized these 
related intellectual currents into modern Zionism were, arguably, the Dreyfuss 
Affair in 1890s Paris and the Russian pogroms that spanned the late 
nineetenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
The most comprehensive exposition of Zionism as an ideology is by 
Gideon Shimoni in The Zionist Ideology (1995). In this book, Shimoni 
discusses various strands of Zionism and in attempting to “seek out the 
common denominators” of these various strands Shimoni arrives at arguably 
the best ‘umbrella’ definition of Zionist ideology: 
 
“First the situation of the Jewish entity under conditions of dispersion is 
critically defective, not just in a messianic sense but emphatically in a worldly 
sense; second, the solution lies in territorial ingathering of Jews in Eretz Israel 
(or failing that another territory) under conditions of autonomy at least and 
sovereignty at best; third these purposes should be effected by political 
diplomacy, settlement activities and the revival of Jewish National morale and 
culture.”  
(Shimoni, 1995, p. 85) 
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Shimoni expands on what ‘the Jewish entity’ means in Zionist ideology: 
“… that the Jews are a distinctive entity possessing attributes associated with 
the modern concept of nation as well as attributes associated with religion” (p. 
53). The conception of the Jews as a nation is a Zionist innovation. The 
dominant way for Jews to understand themselves prior to Zionism was as a 
religion. If modern nations are conceived as a group of people bound by a 
shared culture and language and rooted in a geographical territory then 
defining Jews as a nation gave intellectual substance to the claim that Eretz 
Israel is the Jewish national home. 
  
The idea that the ‘conditions of dispersion have been critically 
defective’ is an idea lifted from Jewish messianism. Dispersion refers to the 
traditional Jewish belief that the Jews were exiled from Eretz Israel after the 
destruction of the second Temple by the Roman Empire in the second century 
BC. The term ‘Diaspora’ refers to this dispersion. According to Jewish 
messianism, it is only during the age of the messiah that Jews can return from 
exile (galut) and achieve redemption (gelua) by their ingathering in the Land 
of Israel. According to this belief, the messiah will only come if the Jewish 
people are sufficiently committed to Jewish law and Talmudic study. Until then 
they will remain in galut. Modern Zionism secularises the notion of galut out of 
messianism and into the ‘worldly’. Whereas for messianism diaspora makes 
the Jewish people spiritually bereft, for modern Zionism it makes the Jewish 
nation materially bereft, not only in terms of their lower positions within the 
hierarchies of European society (socio-economically and racially) but also it 
makes them less culturally distinct as a people (Jewish assimilation is equally 
as dangerous for the Jewish people for some Zionists as anti-Semitism).  
 
 Like messianism, modern Zionism proposes that the solution to galut is 
the ingathering of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. When Shimoni 
refers to ‘another territory’ he’s referring to Herzl’s early consideration of an 
area of Argentina and the British government’s proposal of a Jewish national 
homeland in Uganda. The dominant tendency within Zionism has always been 
to advocate for some part of Eretz Israel as the Jewish homeland. When 
Shimoni says ‘autonomy at least and sovereignty at best’ he is referring to two 
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different tendencies within Zionism. The first is cultural Zionism, whose 
leading figure was Ahad Ha’am who felt Jewish political sovereignty in 
Palestine was unrealistic, considering the means at the Zionist movement’s 
disposal and the existence of an indigenous Palestinian population. Instead 
he advocated for Jewish autonomy in parts of Ottoman-era Palestine, which 
would be the centre of a Jewish cultural revival that would reinvigorate the 
once exiled Jewish people, both in Palestine and the Diaspora. Jewish 
sovereignty in Palestine was the goal of Herzl’s political Zionism.   
 
The final part of Shimoni’s definition refers to the means of how the 
ingathering of the Jewish people into Eretz Israel would be achieved. Political 
diplomacy was the means advocated by Herzl’s political Zionism. Herzl felt 
the best way to achieve Jewish sovereignty was via diplomatic activity with 
world leaders that would result in a legal basis for a Jewish state, and Jewish 
immigration to that state. For Herzl, the legal framework had to be secured 
before large-scale immigration could begin. So-called Practical Zionism 
argued that immigration and settlement activity (buying land from absentee 
Ottoman landlords, and working the land with Jewish labour) should take 
place regardless of a legal framework endorsed by some part of the 
international community. Cultural Zionism, with its call for Jewish autonomy as 
opposed to sovereignty, advocated the cultural revival of an ‘authentic’ Jewish 
culture, rooted in Eretz Israel, but also taken up in the Diaspora. Its 
interpretation of Jewish culture was broad but hinged, primarily, on the revival 
of ancient Hebrew as a modern language.  
 
4.1. Negation of the diaspora and Zionism as Colonialism 
 
 Thus far this section has attempted to outline the basic precepts of 
Classical Zionist ideology. What the remainder of this section will now do is 
outline the aspects of this ideology which are most meaningful to the 
constitution of post-1967 Popular Zionism in British Jewry, either through their 
presence or their absence. The first is the concept of Shlilat Ha-Gola, which 
translates as ‘negation of the Diaspora’. This has already been touched up on 
but is of key importance in the consideration of the popularity of an ideology 
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within a community that the ideology wants to negate. The second is Zionism 
as a colonial discourse (Said, 1979). This has not been touched upon in the 
above exposition because, as Said argues, Zionism as colonialism is 
something that Zionism sometimes cannot see and sometimes hides from 
itself. It is nevertheless a crucial part of Zionist ideology, both Classical and 
Popular. 
 
The Negation of the Diaspora and the Zionist imperative to make ‘Aliyah’ 
 
Most scholars of Zionism have argued that the negation of the 
Diaspora is ‘a central assumption in all currents of Zionist ideology’ (Schweid, 
1996, p. 133; Friesel, 1987, p. 173; Shimoni, 1980, p. 27). The most extreme 
expression of the negation of the Diaspora has been by Ben Gurion when he 
was the Prime Minister of Israel in the early years of the state. In 1959 he 
said: “Exile in which Jews lived and still live is to me a wretched, poor, 
backward and inadequate form of life. We must not be proud of it – on the 
contrary, we must reject it utterly and completely…” (cited in Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 
46). In 1961, at the twenty-fifth Zionist Congress he quotes the Talmud and 
says, “He who resides outside the Land of Israel is as one who has no God.” 
(cited in Schindler, 2007(b), p. 9). All forms of Zionism believed that “… 
separation from the native soil cannot but have a detrimental effect on the 
mental life of the nation… Zionists believe that the restoration of the Jewish 
people to its native soil will reawaken many latent mental and spiritual powers 
which have been atrophied by disuse…” (Heller, 1947, p. 138). ‘Separation 
from the soil’ results in either anti-Semitic persecution, a life consigned to 
poverty, or the disappearance of a distinct Jewish culture through the 
assimilation required of Jewish Emancipation. The ideal solution to this is the 
aliyah of all Jews to either a sovereign Jewish state in Eretz Israel, or cultural 
autonomy there.143 Friesel has argued that, “the fact that the majority of 
Diaspora Jews chose not to emigrate to Israel is seen as a failure of one of 
the major aims of Zionism” (1987, p.173). What is important to note here, is 
that this component of Zionist ideology is entirely ahistorical. Jewish life in 
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Diaspora has not always been ‘wretched [and] poor’. The periods in which it 
has, have been as a result of the impact of pre-modern anti-Judaism, or 
modern anti-Semitism on the social structures of the nations where Jews have 
been domiciled, not, as Zionism argues, because the quasi-mystical 
connections between a people and its alleged territory have been broken.144 
Part of the reason the concept of the ‘negation of the Diaspora’ has never fully 
resonated with post-Holocaust Diaspora Jewry is because, even now, their 
lives have been materially better off than Jews living in Israel – those in the 
West for material reasons and those in Middle East because they never faced 
European style anti-Semitism or anti-Judaism (until Zionists started provoking 
it post-1948 (Shenhav, 2011)). 
 
Zionism as Colonialism 
 
The final component of classical Zionism that plays an instrumental 
role in the construction of Popular Zionism is its colonial aspect. This aspect is 
illuminated by Edward Said in his ground-breaking essay ‘Zionism from the 
Standpoint of its Victims’ (1979). As its title suggests this essay looks at 
                                            
144 Interestingly Zionism saw itself not as a response to anti-Semitism, which is often argued 
by way of justification of its ‘excesses’, but instead as a response to the condition of Diaspora. 
For classic Zionism, anti-Semitism is the expected response of a nation who hosts a people 
made wretched by alienation from their territory. It is Diaspora that is the original sin for 
Zionism, not anti-Semitism. It is in this strange mis-recognition of the actuality of Jewish life in 
Diaspora (which has been both ‘successful’ and ‘not successful’ in different places at different 
times) and the historical conditions that produce this actuality that Zionism is most like 
fascism. Zionism is fascist in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense in that it conceives of the Jewish 
people and their relationship to territory in essentialist terms. It is also parallels twentieth 
century European fascism in that anti-Semitism becomes somehow justifiable within this 
essentialist framework. Classical Zionist ideology even uses anti-Semitic terms in its 
representation of Diaspora Jewry. All strands of Zionism talk of the ‘Jewish problem’ 
(Shimoni, 1995) instead of the problems bought to bear on European Jews by anti-Semitism. 
Most troublingly is Zionism’s talk of ‘the liquidation of the Diaspora’. In the essay, ‘Galut Jewry 
Cannot Survive’ Jacob Klatzkin, writes, “the Judaism of the Galut is not worthy of survival” 
(cited in Shimoni, 1980, p. 27). Halpern also characterises the approach of Zionism after 1948 
in the following way: “The time had come to ‘liquidate’ the Jewish Diaspora, to commence the 
ingathering of the exiles – to employ sovereignty of Israel as the means for the great purpose 
in whose name it had been won: for the final solution of ‘the problem of the Jews’; or the 
Jewish problem tout court” (Halpern, 1969, p. 50). This is not to suggest that Zionism, even 
when it was explicitly connected to sympathy for Hitler in Ahimeir’s extreme forms of 
maximalist revisionism, had ever proposed the genocide of Diaspora Jewry (this is patently 
absurd) but its repeated use of language like ‘liquidation’ and ‘Jewish Problem’ make it, at 
times, disturbingly complicit with aspects of the Nazi project, if only discursively.  
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Zionist ideology from the perspective of the indigenous Palestinian 
communities who were living in Palestine before the Nakbah in 1948 and in 
the West Bank and Gaza before 1967. This new perspective reveals aspects 
of Zionism that Zionist scholars fail to explore – namely the way that Zionism 
represents both Palestinians and Palestine in the long period it is not under 
Jewish sovereignty. According to Said, Zionism represents Palestinians as 
either not being there at all – as expressed in the famous Zionist dictum ‘a 
land without a people for a people without a land’ – or represented in typically 
‘orientalist’ (Said, 1978) fashion as dirty, slovenly and lazy and therefore 
having no right to sovereignty in Palestine: “Zionism essentially saw Palestine 
as the European Imperialist did, as an empty territory paradoxically ‘filled’ with 
ignoble or perhaps even dispensable natives (Said, 1979, p. 81). The 
invisibility of Palestinians to Zionism, though rarely touched up on by Zionist 
scholar’s exposition of their own ideology, is, Said argues, absolutely central 
to how Zionist ideology is constructed: “all the constitutive energies of Zionism 
were premised on the excluded presence, that is the functional absence of the 
“native people” in Palestine” (Said, 1979, p. 82). He goes onto argue that the 
epistemological construction of Palestine as an empty land had “an 
immensely traumatic Zionist effectiveness” (Said, 1979, p. 83) for Palestinian 
people, in that it provided the intellectual basis for its colonisation. The wilful 
occlusion of Palestinians within Zionist discourse also makes it far easier to 
convince Diaspora Jews that Zionism is not an affront to the rights of 
Palestine’s indigenous population – something has to exist in order to be 
affronted. The invisibility of Palestinians for British Jews is evidenced below; 
just to note here that many interviewees claimed not to know there were 
Palestinian refugees in 1967, despite it being a major news story at the time, 
and the issue’s continued importance to any settlement of the Palestine/Israel 
conflict.  
 
Of course, the Palestinians do exist, so when Zionist ideology 
encounters them, its strategy has been to deploy the racial hierarchies of 
European race science in order to delegitimize Palestinian sovereignty: 
“Those natives already fit a more or less acceptable classificatory grid, which 
made them sui generis inferior to western or white men – and it is this grid 
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that Zionists like Herzl appropriated, domesticating it from the general culture 
of their time to the unique needs of a developing Jewish Nationalism” (Said, 
1979, p. 72). Said lists many examples of this in ‘Zionism from the 
Standpoint…”145 Its presence in the ‘official’ Zionism expounded in Britain, is 
evidenced throughout Joseph E. Heller’s The Zionist Idea (1947), a book 
published by the Zionist Federation to explain Zionist ideology to British Jews. 
Examples include, Heller’s claims that Palestinian life under the Ottoman 
Empire was, “an outstanding example of lethargy and maladministration” 
(1947, p. 112) and that prior to the recent Jewish immigration, “the country 
was almost derelict” (ibid). Heller also claims that “since the Jews were 
expelled from Palestine it has remained neglected, uncultivated and under 
populated” (1947, p. 113). Similar ideas successfully make the transition from 
official Zionism to Popular Zionism, post-1967, as is evidenced below. 
 
5. Popular Zionism 
 
The previous section attempted to give an outline of the most salient 
points of Classic Zionist ideology, so that in the following section on Popular 
Zionism it is possible to show which elements are incorporated and 
naturalised into British Jewish ‘common sense’ post-1967, which elements 
were not and the ways in which these elements of Zionist ideology are 
affectively invested so that they both constitute British Jewish experience and 
also perform their effectivity within the social totality. Before this section does 
this, it is going to briefly look at, what could possibly be termed, the pre-
cursors of Popular Zionism i.e., the attempts at naming the various forms of 
Zionist ideology that emerge post 1948 and 1967. The primary reason for 
doing this is to demonstrate what previous attempts at naming post-1948 and 
                                            
145 For an early version of Said’s ‘orientalism’ applied specifically to the representation of 
Arabs in the 1967 war see his essay ‘The Arab Portrayed’ in (Said, 1970). In this essay Said 
notes the “depressing… ways in which the Arabs were portrayed” (p. 2) often as mobs of 
hysterical anonymous men compared to the representation of Israelis as heroic individual. 
Reflecting on this Said asks, “was not the June war the conflict between the white European 
bravely facing the amoral wildrness in the person of savage natives bent on destruction” (p. 
3).  
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post-1967 Zionism has failed to do, namely fully account for its affective 
dimensions. 
 
5.1. Pre-cursors to Popular Zionism: Philanthropic Zionism, Instant 
Zionism, New Zionism 
 
The notion that Classical Zionism changes in content in different 
historical periods has been addressed in the existing literature on Zionist 
ideology. The most crucial date that scholars argue that Zionism’s content 
changes is 1948. Laqueur (1972) and Shimoni (1995), arguably the leading 
scholars of Zionism, both argue that Zionism comes to an end once the State 
of Israel is realised. This conclusion is out of step with how others in the field 
view the history of Zionism. For instance, Schindler argues that 1948 does not 
signify the end of Zionism per se rather it signifies the end of classical 
Zionism: “While classical Zionism had ended with the establishment of the 
state in 1948, it was unclear what had emerged instead” (2007 (b), p. 9). 
Friesel agrees but calls what has emerged ‘New Zionism’ and roots it in 
classical Zionism, “in the sense that the meaning of the components and their 
relative strength within the Zionist idea became modified” (1987, p. 182), 
namely there is less emphasis on Diaspora Jews to make aliyah. 
 
There have also been various attempts at discerning what sort of 
Zionism exists in the Diaspora post-1967. In a 1980 book, Zionism in 
Transition, published by the State of Israel, Shimoni writes that in the 
diasporic communities of the post-Holocaust West it is possible to see, “a 
conceptual mutation of the Zionist idea itself” (1980, p. 30) which he argues is 
based around the idea to stay in the Diaspora. Graham and Boyd make the 
case that for British Jews in 2010 Zionism has even less ideological content, 
defining it as meaning “a supporter of Israel and its governments actions and 
policies” (2010, p. 12) as opposed to “a nationalist ideology espousing the 
right of the Jewish people to self-determination in their own sovereign state in 
the land of Israel” (p. 11). Schindler’s definition of Zionism is even emptier of 
ideology than this: “for Diaspora Jews, Zionism today means a broad 
identification with Israel” (2007 (b), p. 9).  
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Avi-Hai argues for a form of Zionism different from the classical version 
outlined above. Between 1948 and 1967, the most common form of Zionism 
in the Diaspora was ‘philanthropic Zionism’ which saw, “Zionism as a 
collective and political effort to support Israel… aliyah was for others” (Avi-Hai, 
1976, p. 44). Ben Gurion called this ‘pseudo-Zionism’ (Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 46) 
and was critical of it. He argues that as a result of the 1967 war, Zionism 
changes again in that it becomes hegemonic (though he does not use the 
term) – “a sense of common fate and oneness became a basic datum. The 
Zionist article of faith, we are a people – one people’ became the conventional 
wisdom possessed by all” (cited in Avi-Hai, 1976, p. 48). For Avi-Hai, 
‘Surrogate Zionism’ emerges on the institutional and economic planes of 
America’s Jewish community and is practiced through charitable donations 
and the organisation of community events by groups like the United Jewish 
Appeal and the Israel Bonds Organisation.  
 
Whilst there exists within the academic literature on Zionism, a strong 
sense of its shifting ideological content of Zionism according to world-
historical events, no-one so far mentioned has understood these shifts in 
terms of the affectivity it generates – arguably its defining feature in the post 
1967 conjuncture, at least in the British Jewish community. Only Avi-Hai, 
draws out the work the new ideological content performs in its social 
formation, i.e. hegemonizing the institutional plane of American Jewry. The 
only place within the existing literature that the affective properties of post 
1967 Zionism is addressed is in an article published in The New York Times 
by right wing journalist Norman Podhoretz called ‘Now, Instant Zionism’ 
(1974). Podhoretz locates the genesis of Instant Zionism, not in 1967 but in 
1973 after the Yom Kippur War, which, he (somewhat triumphalistically) 
argues, engendered “the complete Zionisation” of America’s Jewish 
community, 99% of whom he claims now support Israel. He defines Zionism in 
similar terms to (Graham and Boyd, 2010) as “supporting the idea of a 
sovereign Jewish state in Palestine”. Podhoretz’s description of this new form 
of Zionism, places affect at its centre. He defines it in terms of “depth of 
concern” and writes about its “astonishing intensity”. He notes how even 
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Jewish intellectual “indifferentists” (those who were indifferent to the State of 
Israel prior to the war) began to a feel a deep identification with Israel. 
Podhoretz theorises that this new form of Zionism was born out of the “hidden 
apocalyptic terror” of the Holocaust: 
 
““This is the deepest, most primitive fear of all, rarely articulated, often 
repressed, but printed on the nerves of many who were astonished to 
discover that they even cared about Israel, let alone that they believed 
themselves to be personally implicated in its destiny – they might disappear 
involuntarily… It is this very danger that has turned almost every Jew in 
America into a Zionist, and so long as it goes on hanging in the ominous 
political air, there will be no defections from the Zionism to which they have all 
by now been so thoroughly and passionately and unequivocally converted.” 
 
[My emphasis] 
 
Podhoretz is describing what this thesis is calling Popular Zionism. 
How this thesis differs is: i) it describes it in less triumphalistic terms, and as 
ultimately that something that should be opposed; ii) in order to oppose it tries 
to understand it Popular Zionism using the theoretical framework set out 
above; iii) it looks at the specificity of Popular Zionism in the British Jewish 
community, and historicises its origins in the 1967 war; iv) it provides 
empirical data to see how Popular Zionism is lived by ‘ordinary’ Jews and v) it 
looks at its racist dimension which is only ever touched upon by Zionist 
expositions of Zionism, if it is touched upon at all. 
 
5.2. Popular Zionism: The becoming hegemonic of Zionist ideology 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the Zionist representation of 
Israel and Israelis becomes not only incorporated into hegemonic British 
Jewish cultural identity but also becomes invested in with tremendous 
affective intensity. This therefore demonstrates that Zionist ideology is the 
primary way through which Israel as a sign is mediated within the British 
Jewish community. This is a crucial step in the becoming hegemonic of 
Zionist ideology within British Jewry in the post-67 conjuncture. The following 
section presents further evidence of Zionism-as-hegemonic, using the terms 
set out above. The first step is to use statistical data from British Jewish 
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sociology and historical studies to show how Zionism becomes the dominant 
political position in relation to Israel as a result of the war. This is ‘Popular 
Zionism’ in its simplest sense i.e. Zionism as the most popular (in numbers) 
discourse through which British Jews make sense of Israel. The second step 
is to understand the Popular in a more Gramscian sense i.e. the way the 
majority of British Jews ‘spontaneously’ reproduce Zionist ideology when they 
speak about Israel, thus achieving the status of Gramscian common sense. 
This will be demonstrated by looking at the way that Zionist ideology is 
spontaneously reproduced as if it were fact. This is particularly interesting in 
the case of interviewees who claim not to be Zionists.  
 
Chapter 4 narrated the vicissitudes of the popularity of Zionist ideology 
within the British Jewish community over the course of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. It argued that it was not inevitable that Zionism should 
become hegemonic within British Jewry after 1967, and that in fact prior to 
1948, it was a marginal and highly contested political force within the 
community. In 1948 this situation changes with the realisation of the State of 
Israel in the context of a post-Holocaust world. In Kosmin et al.’s (1997) brief 
history of the Zionist idea in the British Jewish community they cite Brook who 
argues that after 1948 “Israel had certainly become a focus of consensus, a 
strong unifying factor, and ‘a means of Jewish identification for those who 
[lack] religious belief” (p. 4). Hegemony is not entirely achieved in the 1948–
1967 period because there are still mainstream Jewish groups participating in 
the life of the community who define as either non or anti-Zionist, namely 
Orthodox Jewry and the Liberal and Progressive synagogues. As a result of 
the processes outlined in Chapter 6, this changes as a consequence of the 
British Jewish experience of witnessing the Six Day War. As Britain’s Chief 
Rabbi writes in a letter to Israel’s finance minister two weeks after the war 
ends: 
 
“Large numbers of religious Jews hitherto entirely indifferent or opposed to 
the JPA have been prevailed upon collectively and individually to suspend all 
other fund-raising drives in favour of the JPA campaign. As a result we have 
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achieved an unprecedented measure of unity and enthusiasm in the cause of 
Israel.”146 
 
According to various studies this ‘unprecedented measure of unity and 
enthusiasm in the cause of Israel’ is a persistent feature of the post-1967 
conjuncture. A National Opinion Poll undertaken in 1970 puts Jewish support 
for the State of Israel at 80% (Alderman, 1992, p. 342). A 1973 survey 
completed in the Jewish community of Newton Mearns concludes, “Zionism 
seems to be the new focal point of Jewish identity” (ibid). According to a 
survey undertaken in Redbridge’s Jewish community, “support for Israel is a 
given fact” (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 82), pointing towards the way in which 
Zionism has been naturalised. In a survey completed in 1995, Kosmin et al. 
conclude that 81% of British Jews have either a strong or moderate 
attachment to Israel (1997, p. 1), and in 2010, Graham and Boyd conclude 
that British Jews are, ‘monolithic147… in their caring and concern for Israel and 
its long term survival” (2010, p. 36) instructively framing Zionism in affective 
terms.  
 
A further way that Zionist ideology can be demonstrated as being 
hegemonic (and therefore Popular) within British Jewry post 1967 in a more 
strictly Gramscian sense is the way that it becomes naturalised i.e. 
‘spontaneously’ emerges in the common sense of British Jews. This is 
evidenced throughout the interviews in that all the interviewees, to varying 
degrees, reproduced Zionist ideology, unconsciously and as if it were the only 
possible framework through which events in Israel could be understood. This 
is most clearly illustrated in interviewees who explicitly do not identify as 
Zionist. 
 
All the interviewees were asked a question along the lines of, ‘do you 
consider yourself a Zionist?’ Harvey and Vivien, Zena and Stephen all 
answered negatively and did so according to the terms of the classical 
definition of Zionism outlined by Shimoni (1995) above. Harvey (p. 610), 
                                            
146 (ISA: 6303/1 Six Day War Correspondence)  
147 As argued in section 5.7. of this chapter, this thesis sees caring and concern for Israel as 
the hegemonic position not a monolithic one. 
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Stephen (p. 357) and Vivien (p. 634) refused to identify as Zionist because 
they felt making aliyah was Zionism’s defining property – they had all never 
considered moving to Israel. Zena refused to identify as Zionist because she 
was not involved in the up building of Israel (p. 397). Despite answering 
negatively, these participants (along with those who answered positively) 
continuously reproduced Zionist ideology throughout their interviews. There 
are too many examples to reproduce here, and arguably the previous chapter 
provides ample evidence to prove this claim. Below are just short examples 
from each of those participants who claim not to be Zionist but 
‘spontaneously’ reproduce Zionist ideology. Harvey reproduces Zionism’s 
lachrymose version of Jewish history in the following claim: 
 
“Jews had been kicked out of Arab countries. Which was part of the 
[inaudible]. Even then I was conscious of ¾ million Arabs who got displaced 
but easily ¾ million Jews got displaced.”  
(p. 604) 
 
The Revisionist Zionist claim that Zionism turns wretched Diasporic Jewish 
victims into warriors is reproduced by Zena, immediately after she claims she 
is not a Zionist: 
 
I wouldn’t call myself a Zionist but my love for Israel is next to none. […] 
[Israelis are] not the Jewry of Europe who went to the slaughter. These now, 
are the Jews from Israel from David and Jonathan’s time […] Israel are 
warriors and you can’t take that away from them. 
(p. 397) 
 
Stephen reproduces an iconic phrase of Zionist ideology: 
 
“I think that Israel has tried to build an oasis in the desert and […] they’ve 
worked an absolute miracle there.” 
[My emphasis] (p. 353) 
 
 
It is through the ‘spontaneous’ reproduction of Zionist ideology in the common 
sense of British Jews who explicitly refuse to define as Zionist that we see the 
naturalization of the ideology.  
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5.3. Popular Zionism and Colonialism 
 
One of the key components of classical Zionist ideology that was 
spontaneously reproduced in the common sense of the interviewees was 
Zionism as colonialism/orientalism/racism with regards to the Palestinians, as 
outlined by Said. For the interviewees, Palestinians were either rendered 
invisible in their narrating of the history of Palestine/Israel or they appeared as 
slovenly, lazy, treacherous natives whose only motivation for opposing 
Zionism was anti-Semitism. 
 
Interviewed between 2008 and 2011, all of the interviewees were 
aware of the Palestinians as a people and a political movement. However 
Evelyn and David claim that prior to 1967, they were unaware that the 
Palestinians existed: 
 
“I knew nothing of Palestinians or Arabs.” 
(David, p. 451) 
 
 
 
“… how aware of the Palestinians were you during that period? […] 
No it was just Arabs as far as we were concerned at that time. Just Arabs, I don’t 
think we thought about Palestinians then, no.” 
 (Evelyn, p. 506) 
 
 
 
During their interviews, both Jeremy and Rose deploy a comic book form of 
orientalism to describe their first hand experience of Arabs and Arab culture 
during different visits to the Middle East. 
 
“We went to Hebron and then we went to Gaza […] two girls and two boys… 
we stood on the bloody side of the road and thumbed a lift and then a great 
big Arab Mercedes stopped, with four Arabs with their tea towels on their 
head and we got a lift with them to Gaza City. And then they were negotiating 
with the boys how many camels us two girls were worth. So they dropped us 
off in 1967, which was disgusting in 1967 with raw sewage running down the 
streets.” 
(Rose, p. 655) 
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“The only impression is that they were as backwards as I thought they were. 
Because when I went there it was like pre-historic times when you drove 
through areas, not towns, but down towards Cairo, and it was like people 
from the bible, walking with an ass and women walking behind with jugs on 
their shoulders and I thought, ‘Blimey, they are hundreds of years behind us’.“ 
 
(Jeremy, p. 430) 
 
Evelyn deploys the classic Zionist trope of a Palestine left to rot prior to 
Jewish sovereignty. 
 
“And I do remember places and you’d see what parts the Jewish people had 
taken over from the Arabs, because the Arab part that they’d taken over was 
brown and the Jewish part was green where they cultivated before hand, 
because the Arabs just don’t cultivate do they? They just you know… 
Je: Just look at a Jew and go, ‘Oh look what he’s got!’” 
(Evelyn, p. 502) 
 
 
Evelyn also reproduces the orientalist stereotype of an Arab as both fickle and 
dangerous. 
 
“[…] you wonder why they’re doing it because one minute they’re there and 
your friend and the next minute, they’re, you know. That’s the danger I 
suppose.” 
(Evelyn, p. 508) 
 
Finally, there were a number of instances when Orientalism also appeared in 
discussions of Islam in the context of the post-9/11 geo-political situation. This 
mainly manifested itself in paranoid remarks in which interviewees spoke of 
‘Muslims taking over the world’ in similar language to that used by anti-
Semites in relation to Jews (Zena, p. 387). Jeremy and Stephen related these 
ideas to Israel and British Jews.  
 
 
“But now you’ve got people coming in saying, ‘no, we want Islam and you’re 
an infidel if you don’t’ […] In the long run, I don’t think there is a future for 
Jews in the UK. 
  
(Jeremy, p. 443) 
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“In France where there’s a voting block of five million Arabs and the Jewish 
community there is diminishing because they’re buying up large swathes of 
Eilat because they don’t feel comfortable in Paris. Anything is possible. You 
saw it happen in a relatively modern era in Germany.” 
 
(Stephen, p. 349) 
 
5.4. Popular Zionism not Classical Zionism 
 
 Despite the fact that the dominant position of British Jewry has been 
supportive of Israel since 1967 and that British Jews spontaneously reproduce 
Zionist ideology when they speak about Palestine/Israel, this does not mean 
that the majority of British Jews are Zionists in the classical sense. This 
section looks at the reasons why not: i) very few British Jews subscribe to 
classical Zionism’s chief characteristic – the imperative to make aliyah; ii) very 
few of them are involved with Classical Zionist praxis – either joining a Zionist 
organisation or making aliyah.  
 
This can be viewed in Grossberg’s terms: Zionism does become 
hegemonic but Zionist ideology does not hegemonise the ‘planes’ necessary 
to secure the ascendance of classical Zionism in British Jewry, in the post 
1967 conjuncture. Zionist ideology would have to hegemonize the institutional, 
the political and the everyday planes in order for this to happen. The planes 
that are hegemonized instead are the affective, the everyday and the pop 
cultural. It is at the intersection of these planes of the British Jewish social 
formation that Zionism comes to ‘matter’ post-1967 – the same place where 
Grossberg locates the effectivity of new right ideologies in America in a similar 
period. 
 
The following section provides evidence to prove this claim. It begins 
by looking at the lack of Zionist activity on the institutional plane post-1967. It 
then looks at the absence of aliyah from the complex of ideas that is Popular 
Zionist ideology and how this means very few British Jews incorporate aliyah 
into their Zionist praxis. The section that follows moves on to show how the 
affective plane has been successfully hegemonized by Zionist ideology and 
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the sorts of praxis that emerge on the planes of the everyday and popular 
culture as a result.  
 
5.4.1. Zionism and the institutional plane  
 
 The intensity of activity – both qualitatively and quantitatively – that 
occurred on British Jewry’s institutional plane during the war (outlined in 
chapter six) had little in the way of longevity. As discussed in chapter six the 
JPA organised another Emergency Fund in 1968 but only achieved 
approximately 10% of what it raised in 1967. There is a fluttering of activity on 
the institutional plane in the immediate post-war period. For instance, a 
handful of new Zionist organisations are formed as a direct response to the 
war: the Volunteers Union was established in 1967 to try and maintain the 
sorts of numbers of British Jewish volunteers who went during the war.148 The 
Aliyah Movement was established during the 27th World Zionist Congress in 
June 1968 of which the British Aliyah Movement was a part.149 In general, 
however, the long-term effect on the institutional plane was minimal. In a 
survey conducted within the Redbridge Jewish community in 1978, 89.7% of 
participants did not belong to any Zionist group at all (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, 
p.  26). Kosmin and Levy’s reflection on this low statistic is highly instructive in 
terms of the argument being made in this chapter: 
 
“Both our enumerators and respondents had real difficulty in recognising 
Zionist organisations and distinguishing them from other ‘Jewish’ groups. This 
perhaps reflects both the integration of Zionism into Anglo-Jewish life in 
recent decades as well as lack of perception of a separate Zionist ideology.” 
 
(Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 26) 
 
What they are saying here is that these very low membership figures are not 
necessarily as a result of a lack of Zionist ideology within the community, but 
that this ideology has become so naturalised within this community it is 
indiscernible as a separate ideology at all. Levenberg agrees with this 
conclusion in an article about Zionism in Britain in the same period – “Some 
                                            
148 (CZA: F13/722 Material Relating to the Volunteers Union) 
149 (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement) 
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Jews do not feel the need to affiliate with the Zionist movement on the 
premise ‘we are all Zionists anyway’” (Levenberg, 1981,  p. 110). Even more 
instructive is that Kosmin and Levy argue that the 10.3% of Redbridge Jews 
who did belong to Zionist organisations in 1978 had joined for social and 
cultural reasons as opposed to ideological reasons (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, 
p. 27). This conclusion bears out in the interview data collected for this thesis. 
Although Sarah joined Habonim for ideological reasons, her parents, 
“primarily thought of it as a thinking person’s way of meeting nice Jewish 
youngsters” (Sarah, p. 508).  Kosmin and Levy’s 89.7% of Redbridge Jews 
who do not belong to a Zionist organisation is probably best represented in 
the following statement by Harvey:  
 
“So there’s always a sense of that there is a connection between 
Jewishness and Israel. 
Yes, yes… having said that it hasn’t made them do an awful lot except maybe 
give a £100 here and there. People haven’t done an awful lot. At least I 
haven’t done an awful lot.” 
 
(Harvey, p. 605) 
 
Harvey’s statement points to where the most ‘traditional’ Zionist activity has 
taken place within British Jewry, the area of fundraising, (the economic plane). 
Kosmin and Levy found that in 1978, 86.7% (1983, p. 26) of Redbridge Jews 
had donated to an Israeli charity – a dramatically higher figure compared to 
the 10.3% who belonged to a Zionist organisation – and therefore conclude 
that the most significant relationship this community had was via charity. Once 
again their reflections on this statistic are instructive for this thesis: 
 
“One had the impression that this question related more to general attitudes 
over philanthropy and the traditional mitzvah (good deed) of tzedakka 
(charity) rather to anything connected with politics of Jewish nationalism.”  
 
(ibid.) 
 
Arguably, what they are saying here is that economic activity towards Israel is 
being mobilized at its intersection with the affective plane and not the 
institutional plane i.e. its not out of a sense of ideological commitment towards 
Israel but out of a more diffuse sense of ‘Jewish’ ethics. 
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5.4.2. Aliyah 
 
If Classical Zionist ideology had become hegemonic in Britain as a 
result of the war, there would have been an increase in the amount of British 
Jews making aliyah. As is demonstrated below, this is not the case, but this is 
not for lack of trying on the part of Zionism. During the 27th Zionist Congress 
of June 1968, the World Zionist Organisation reformulates the Jerusalem 
Program of 1951150 in direct response to the 1967 war. The reformulated 
programme includes the following statement: 
 
“This program expresses and symbolizes the tremendous change which 
occurred in the Jewish world in recent years and particularly following the 
shock and the awakening caused by the Six Days War. This is a change both 
in the attitude of the entire Jewish people towards the State of Israel and the 
definition of the duties and the tasks of the Zionist movement. The major 
change in the new program places the centrality of Israel and future of the 
Jewish people at the forefront of Zionist aims and tasks and unequivocally 
stresses immigration from all countries as the supreme command for the 
Zionist movement as a whole and each Zionist as well.”151 
[My emphasis] 
 
In line with this injunction, the WZO redoubles its worldwide efforts to 
capitalise on the overwhelming Diasporic support of Israel during the war in 
an attempt to convert it into aliyah. For example, in November 1967 the 
Zionist Federation in Britain ran ‘The Aliyah Campaign’, and in 1968 the 
British Aliyah Movement was set up. Despite these efforts on the institutional 
plane, the plane of the popular and everyday life remain relatively unaffected, 
meaning, very few Jews make aliyah, or consider it an important part of either 
their Jewish or even Zionist identities.  
 
 In a report written in February 1968 on a series of university meetings 
organised as part of the Aliyah Campaign in November 1967, Zvi Jagendorf 
writes the following: 
 
                                            
150 The ideological platform of the Zionist movement, written as a replacement of the Basel 
Programme for the post-1948 era. 
151 (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement) 
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“Aliyah was not a subject of immediate concern for the majority of those who 
came to the meetings. I found my audiences conservative in outlook, 
concerned about what it means to be and remain a Jew, but not committed to 
any radical change in their present way of life. Apart from those who had 
been members of Zionist youth organisations they were not confronted by a 
choice between Israel and England at the beginning of their careers. However 
recent events, by posing the question of Israel’s very existence, had disturbed 
the equilibrium. It was agreed that Israel had been taken too much for 
granted. Young people previously passive had become aware that the 
existence of Israel was important to them personally. They were therefore 
ready to make a personal contribution. Leaving aside the question of aliyah, 
there seemed to be little disagreement on the desirability of all who could take 
physical part in the work going on in Israel.”152 
 
Here we get a sense of the shifts in the affectivity that Israel generates and its 
renewed position in the identity of the university students – ‘young people 
previously passive had become aware that the existence of Israel was 
important to them personally’. However, just five months after the war, and 
amongst a cohort who Kosmin and Levy argue are the most likely of the 
British Jewish community to make aliyah (1978), the largest Zionist institution 
in Britain is only able to stimulate an interest in volunteering, not immigration 
in any permanent sense. 
 
Aliyah from Britain remains low throughout the post-1967 conjuncture. 
Its peak was in 1969 with 1,763 British Jews making aliyah, approximately 
0.5% of the community (Della Pergola et al., 2000, p. 19). Throughout the 
1970s British olim153 average around 1,000 a year (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 
25) and fluctuated between 500 and 1,000 olim throughout the 1980s 
(Alderman, 1992, p. 342). Nor are British Jews ideologically committed to the 
idea of aliyah. 71.2% of Redbridge Jews had never thought about making 
aliyah, with as many as 53% of members of Zionist organisations never 
considering it (Kosmin and Levy, 1983, p. 27) – a striking figure in a 
conjuncture where the World Zionist Organisation has re-insisted on the 
absolute centrality of aliyah for all Zionists. Aliyah remains a low priority into 
the late 2000s with 70% of British Jews saying it was either ‘not at all likely’, or 
‘not very likely’ that they would live in Israel in the future (Graham and Boyd, 
2010, p.18). 
                                            
152 (CZA: F13/681 Various Materials for Aliyah) 
153 Hebrew for people who make aliyah. 
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These statistics are reflected in the decisions of the interviewees. Only 
Joseph, self-defined Zionist in the classical sense, even made aliyah, but 
(significantly perhaps) he returned to Britain after seven years. Sarah, who 
was also highly involved in Habonim during and immediately after the war – 
spending time with the organisation in Israel in 1967 – did consider making 
aliyah but ultimately decides against because she was not sure if the kibbutz 
lifestyle agreed with her (p. 535). The most common reasons for the 
interviewees deciding to remain in Britain was either that they had children in 
Britain (Zena, Rose) or it would reduce their quality of life (Zena, Stephen, 
Jeremy), demonstrating how weak an ideological commitment to aliyah had 
been inside the community since 1967.  
 
Despite the lack of interest in aliyah in the context of the central place it 
has in Classical Zionist ideology and the WZO’s redoubled efforts to stimulate 
it after the war – Zionism still became hegemonic within the British Jewish 
community, just a different form of Zionism, one that hegemonised different 
planes within the British Jewish assemblage. In becoming Popular in a 
Diaspora community, Zionism lost one of its key components – the injunction 
for Diaspora Jews to make aliyah. Nevertheless, since 1967 there has not 
been any organised part of the Jewish community who opposes the existence 
of a secular State in some part of Eretz Israel as a Jewish national homeland 
(the Israel-critic Diaspora Jewish groups are not anti-Zionist). Moreover, 
British Jews reproduce Zionist ideology as if it were ‘spontaneously’ their own 
– it becomes part of their common sense. The next section will look at, 
arguably the most important aspect of Popular Zionism – its instrumental 
relationship with affect and how Zionist ideology territorialises the affective 
plane of the British Jewish community. 
 
 
5.5. Popular Zionism as affect 
 
That Zionism hegemonises the affective plane has already been 
touched upon in relation to British Jewish identity in chapter seven i.e. in the 
intensely affective way British Jews invest in the Zionist representation of 
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Israel and Israelis and the way it makes them feel as Jews in Britain as a 
result. Zionism as primarily affective, as opposed to ideological, manifests 
itself in other ways.  
 
One of the most interesting ways this manifests itself is in how some of 
the interviewees defined Zionism. Three of them defined it almost exclusively 
in affective terms, with very minimal ideological content.  
 
“A Zionist, very simply, is someone who is devoted to Israel” 
(Harry, p. 397) 
 
“What does being a Zionist mean? 
Love of Israel, for Zion. There must be an Israel.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 438) 
 
“What makes you a Zionist? 
I don’t know. Now you’ve got me [laugh]. Love of Israel? Love of the fact that 
we have Israel. Love of the importance of Israel. I don’t know.” 
(Evelyn, p. 488) 
 
Others claimed they were not Zionist (according to some variation of 
Shimoni’s definition) but qualified that statement with a demonstration of how 
intensely invested they were in some part of Zionist discourse: 
 
“What does it mean being a Zionist? [she laughs] [Long pause]. I don’t 
probably do enough. I feel very strongly… I belong to B’nai Brith but I don’t… 
it’s a failing on my part that I don’t do as much as I can. I buy Israeli goods 
when I can, I do that sort of thing, I don’t say that I want to be a Zionist and 
live there. 
 
So is that for you the defining, kind of definition. 
I think so, I think a true Zionist wants to live there and be part of the society.” 
 
[My emphasis] (Vivien, p. 634) 
Arguably the most interesting example of this is in a short exchange between 
Harry and Zena: 
 
“Zionists are like, it’s upper, it’s a very high way of communism and things like 
that. Their belief… 
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They’re very ideological.  
Zena: Yeah. A proper Zionist is [to herself] is probably not a farmer. [Back to 
me]… When they went over and they were given the land, the schnooks, as 
they call them, if you ever saw General Marcus.  
 
No. 
You never saw Cast A Giant Shadow? 
 
Oh yes! I did. 
Now that was Israel, how those schnooks154 built a road with their bare 
hands. You wouldn’t get that here. They worked day night, they were being 
killed left, right and centre, enemies were shooting them. Because those 
schnooks made that mountain and that’s how Jerusalem became free. Not 
because of darling England or any other countries but because of the Israelis 
themselves. […] To be a true Zionist, is a thing going. If I went to Israel and I 
lived in Israel, I’d be there because I wanted to be there. I like the people, I 
like the weather, I love the beaches… ah dear (sighs)… I like the honey cake, 
I like everything about Israel. 
Harry: See she is a Zionist 
Zena: No I’m not a Zionist 
Harry: Yes, you are. 
Zena: No, no, no, no, no 
Harry: You might not know it but you are. 
Zena: [Insistent] No. I feel for Israel, I’ve got compassion for Israel.” 
[My emphasis] (pp. 397–398) 
 
In this exchange Harry is defining Zionism, using the definition of Popular 
Zionism set out in this thesis i.e. Zionism as primarily affective and practiced 
in popular culture. Zena, on the other hand, is defining it in accordance with 
some parts of the classical definition: it is a political ideology, ‘a very high way 
of communism’ and is practiced by warrior/farmer Jews up building the land in 
acts of Jewish national autonomy – “because those schnooks made that 
mountain and that’s how Jerusalem became free. Not because of darling 
England or any other countries but because of the Israelis themselves”. Zena 
is not one of ‘those schnooks’ so insistently refuses to call herself Zionist. 
Looking at the sum of her interview, however, it is possible to argue that Zena 
is the most Zionist of the interviewees. Not only is her transcript full of Zionist 
ideology ‘spontaneously’ reproduced, but the degree of commitment she 
claims to have towards Israel is extraordinary. She, paradoxically, reveals this 
degree of commitment in refusing to define as a Zionist and in doing so offers 
a more appropriate definition for Zionism in Britain in the post-1967 
                                            
154 Yiddish for stupid or gullible people. The way Zena is using it here suggests that she is 
mis-using it. 
 
 
282 
conjuncture. This is a Zionism which is primarily affective as opposed to 
ideological –  “I feel for Israel, I’ve got compassion for Israel” – and one that is 
practiced in popular culture and the every day as opposed to politically or 
institutionally – “I like the people, I like the weather, I love the beaches… ah 
dear (sighs)… I like the honey cake, I like everything about Israel”. (Even the 
act of talking about Israel in the interview causes an affective response in 
Zena – ‘ah dear (sighs)’). Harry is correct in this exchange: Zena is, arguably, 
an ideal subject of Popular Zionism.  
 
 That post-1967 Zionism was primarily affective as opposed to 
ideological is evidenced as early as 1968 in a report filed for the British Aliyah 
movement called: “Manchester Aliya [sic]: A Blueprint for an Effective Aliya 
movement”: 
 
“The majority of British Jews are emotionally on the side of Israel, and take 
pride in her existence and military and social achievements, but even among 
those who have visited the country there is a widespread ignorance of the 
historical, economic and social realities. The result of a hasty two week tour 
gives a very distorted view (through the windows of a luxury hotel and of a 
tourist bus) and of the people, the climate and the ways of life […] It is not 
true, as most Israelis seem to believe, that most British Jews contribute to 
J.P.A as conscience money… Most Jews have little or no guilt feeling 
because they remain in the country of their birth… the mass of uncommitted 
Jews feel sympathy, fellow feeling and emotional identification rather than 
guilt or a sense of unfulfilled duty which are the product of knowledge rather 
than ignorance.”155 
 
This report is describing the hegemony of Popular Zionism in Manchester 
Jewry in 1968 – ‘the majority of British Jews are emotionally on the side of 
Israel’. It describes a Zionism practiced mainly through tourism as opposed to 
aliyah. It also describes a Zionism where emotion almost entirely replaces 
knowledge/ideology, in the way that Grossberg describes an affective 
epidemic, as outlined above – “Questions of fact and representation become 
secondary to the articulation of people’s emotional fears and hopes” 
(Grossberg, 1992, p. 292). (Popular Zionism is not an ‘affective epidemic’ in 
itself, but operates in a similar fashion, and often produces them). The 
implication of this report is that Zionism is not fully successful because it has 
                                            
155 (CZA: F13/814 British Aliyah Movement) 
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yet to inspire Manchester Jews to make aliyah. However, just like Grossberg 
writes of the new conservatism – “This partly explains the new conservatism’s 
‘ideological’ successes: they have been able to construct issues with 
enormous public passions… without leaving any space for public 
engagement” (ibid.) – Zionism has been tremendously successful in British 
Jewry post-1967, in that despite it not being able to stimulate aliyah, it has 
British Jewry affectively invested in it with so much passion, that the idea that 
there maybe other ways to organise a Jewish political presence in 
Palestine/Israel aside from the current Zionist system, has been rendered 
unthinkable and for anyone, Jewish or otherwise, to suggest other solutions 
provokes the anger of Britain’s Jewish community.156 This aspect of Popular 
Zionism – its success and how it might be opposed – is discussed in greater 
detail in the conclusion of this thesis. What is important to note here, is that 
Zionism is primarily affective as opposed to ideological – it is Popular, in 
Grossberg’s definition of the term. 
   
 That Zionism is primarily affective manifests itself in other ways aside 
from how British Jews define Zionism. Some of the interviewees talked, not so 
much about Zionism as affect, but about their own affective engagement with 
the ideology. Most interestingly, perhaps, were the two anti-Zionists on this 
matter. Both David and Brian talked about the passionate conflict their anti-
Zionism has generated in them and in their relations with other people. Brian 
spoke about arguing with his family (p. 576). David agreed that his 
engagement with anti-Zionism was passionate:  
 
“I’m incapable of having a peaceful discourse with Zionists. Sometimes they 
shout first sometimes I shout first but I always do my share of shouting. 
 
                                            
156 An example of this was a roundtable discussion published in the 2010 ‘New Year 
Supplement’ of The Jewish Chronicle called, ‘Why shouldn’t we be free to criticize Israel?’ 
(2010, pp. 2–7). This edition is the most widely read of the whole year, and running over five 
pages, the discussion was the edition’s flagship article. The very fact that a newspaper run in 
accordance with liberal democratic principles even has to pose this question points to how 
undemocratic the hegemonic British Jewish political tendencies towards Israel are. The right 
for a community and its media to criticize the nation-state supposedly acting in its name is a 
fundamental principle of liberal democracy. The fact that the published version of the 
discussion ostensibly concludes ‘no’ to the question it poses confirms this. 
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[…] Is your engagement with Anti-Zionism is it a passionate 
engagement? 
Yeah! 
 
(p. 469) 
 
Sarah, previously a Zionist in the classical sense (she was actively involved in 
Habonim as a teenager) speaks of the more complicated affective relationship 
she has with Zionism and Israel as a result of the State of Israel’s post 1967 
policies (broadly the ethics of the occupation, and the siege of Gaza, post 
Sharon’s withdrawal): 
 
“So the emotion you just felt is from memory as opposed to any strong 
emotion you feel now about the wall and Jerusalem? 
[…] I’ve tried to feel the same way […] I want to feel that sense of love of 
Israel that I felt the first time, or the second time and when I lived in Israel in 
‘67 for a period. I want to feel that same fervour and love of the land, and 
belief and I feel something’s different and I struggle with that. […] And I’m 
envious of my best friend who’s just made aliyah recently and … you know… 
and had has this yearning for years to live in Israel and I’m envious that she’s 
still managed to maintain that fervour all these years and still feel the same 
way. And I’m saddened that I’m feeling slightly differently towards to Israel.” 
 
(Sarah, p. 530) 
 
This quote is interesting in different ways (Sarah argues elsewhere in the 
interview that her falling out of love with Israel came as a result of precisely 
the sort of principles – her commitment to ethics, politics and social justice – 
that inspired her involvement with Zionism in the first place). What is important 
to note here is that she is describing her current complicated relationship with 
Israel in affective terms – “I want to feel that sense of love of Israel that I felt 
the first time… I’m envious that she’s still managed to maintain that fervour all 
these years and still feel the same way. And I’m saddened that I’m feeling 
slightly differently towards to Israel”. Sarah’s struggle with Zionism, 
specifically as a result of policies set in motion as a result of the 1967 war, is 
an affective as much as an ideological struggle. 
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5.5.1. Affect and physically being in Israel 
 
 Another aspect of Popular Zionism’s primarily affective qualities, and 
one that shows that the sort of affect operative within Popular Zionism is 
Deleuzo-Guattarian, is the many descriptions the interviewees gave of their 
intensive affective response of physically being in Israel. Both Evelyn and 
Rose talked about an ‘amazing feeling’ as soon as they get off the plane in 
Israel: 
 
“So when you went to Israel, how did you feel when you got off the 
plane in Tel Aviv? 
Je: Oh wonderful 
E: Oh! 
Je: Absolutely wonderful. 
E: […] it was fantastic. The feeling was fantastic, that was a great feeling. 
Yeah. I mean I’d never thought I’d get there. It was wonderful. 
(Evelyn, p. 503) 
 
 
“And we visit very often and we love it when we’re there and we love 
everything about it when we’re there. 
 
So do you still… do you get… 
Yeah. Every time I get off the plane. 
 
Can you describe how you feel? 
You can never go to Israel for the first time more than once. So when I went 
in 1967 that was the first time I went and that was an amazing, amazing 
feeling that I’m actually here.” 
(Rose, p. 669) 
 
Zena and Evelyn talked about the intense affectivity of their lived experience 
of being in Israel, specifically in relation to Zionism; Zena in terms of being 
there for the State of Israel’s sixtieth anniversary and Evelyn in terms of 
visiting significant Zionist locations. 
 
“A whole coach load of us were there for their sixtieth. Which was their 
diamond anniversary, which was absolutely magnificent. And unless you 
were there you cannot… even I talked to you for hours… to be there … and 
that’s it.” 
 
(Zena, p. 395) 
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“We went up Scopus yes. We went up Masada. We went to all the places. It’s 
a wonderful feeling because we never thought… you read about these 
places, let’s face it. I used to read about Israel, Palestine… and these are 
places I’d never thought I’d be at. It’s a wonderful feeling.” 
 
(Evelyn, p. 505) 
 
Sarah, Stephen and Jeremy talked about their intensely affective responses in 
relation to physically being in Jerusalem – Stephen and Jeremy specifically 
about the Western Wall – a place that ‘matters’ (in Grossberg’s terms) as 
much in the discursive formations of religious Judaism as in those of modern 
Zionism.  
 
“Jerusalem is a beautiful city and it does still evoke tremendously strong 
feelings. It was, I’ve got some wonderful music, ‘Jerusalem the Golden’, and it 
really did sparkle with that glow of the golden city and surrounded by these 
wonderful hills, they’ve been built up with these wonderful posh places now. 
In those days it was an incredibly evocative and beautiful place to be and it 
did have very special sort of magic. And I was very affected by that. And it 
also has that very … oriental, seductive power to… there’s something very 
exciting about that city. And so much history, just the history…” 
(Sarah, p. 530) 
 
“… as I walk up to the wall, that last metre or so, the emotion comes over me, 
I see their faces and I just break up. I don’t get that anywhere else.  
 
Oh really, but you define… 
I’m not religious. […] 
 
So what is it about the wall that makes you emotional if you’re not 
religious? 
I don’t know 
 
Is it religious do you think? 
No. It can’t be. It’s a place for me to release my feelings. It just triggers it. 
Maybe it’s just me. Maybe they’re in there anyway, my emotions. And this is 
somebody saying you can do it here, you’re allowed. Maybe I keep it bottled 
up, I don’t know. 
 
And there you… 
And there I feel it’s the right to place to feel it. 
 
That’s interesting. And why do you think that is? 
I don’t know. Because that’s where everybody says is the spiritual home of 
the Jewish people, the temple, the original temple. Maybe it is, maybe He’s 
there. I don’t know. 
 
Maybe he’s there – maybe God’s there? 
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Maybe God’s, maybe Hashem is actually looking down on that wall, ready for 
you.”  
 
(Jeremy, p. 433) 
 
“I’ve been to Jerusalem two or three times now. I absolutely love it there. […] 
Did it have any religious significance to me? No. Not at all. It wasn’t the 
centre of my universe. I did feel quite tearful and emotional by the wall.  
 
Oh you did. You were tearful and emotional? 
I wasn’t balling, which [my friend] was. But certainly there’s a feeling around it 
that you get. Especially the first time. But no, the rest of Jerusalem no. I found 
it… 
 
[interrupts] Why was it so emotional? 
No real reason at all. Because it’s the most prized object in Jewish modern 
day Judaism. That wall is 2,000 odd years old and it’s a symbol of the Jewish 
people. The last remaining symbol. And there’s loads of people there 
shochelling157 away and you go up to it and you put your little message like 
this [gestures] into the wall. Usually it would be a little something […] I think 
every time I go there I feel a bit emotional around the wall, because people 
are praying.” 
(Stephen, p. 379) 
 
Stephen and Jeremy’s affective response to the wall is particularly interesting, 
because both claim not to be religious (Jeremy questions the existence of 
God in an earlier part of his interview). Stephen refuses to define as Zionist 
and Jeremy defines as a Zionist but in non-classical terms. There is a strand 
within Deleuze and Guattari that argues that affect works directly on the 
nervous systems of bodies, without being discursively mediated (1980; 1981). 
If we understand Jeremy and Stephen’s claims on their own terms, it is 
possible to argue that this is what happens when they visit the wall: simply 
being a Jew in the physical presence of the Wailing Wall produces an 
inexplicable and intense affective response. This analysis, however, produces 
an essentialist link between Jews and the physicality of Eretz Israel, quite out 
of step with Deleuzo-Guattarian metaphysics. Affect can work on the nervous 
system unmediated (although the individual or collective response to affect as 
sensation is always culturally specific) but that is not what is happening here. 
The Wailing Wall can only produce the intense affective response that it does 
in Jeremy and Stephen (Jeremy cries, Stephen is tearful) if they subscribe in 
some way to either Jewish religious or modern Zionist discourses. Jews who 
                                            
157 The swaying motion that sometimes accompanies Jewish prayer. 
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do not subscribe to these discourses do not have these reactions. For 
instance, anti-Zionist, David talked about feeling immense relief on leaving 
Israel (p. 463). The model of affect operative here is the one formulated by 
Guattari (outlined in the previous chapter) in which reiterative discursive 
sequences catalyse affective responses in a subjective ecology that is 
interwoven with both the physical and the socio-cultural in complex ways. 
From their affective responses to being in the physical presence of the wall it 
is clear, that whether they realise it or not Jeremy and Stephen have been 
territorialised by the discursive refrains of either religious Judaism, or the parts 
of it which modern Zionism have secularised. Having been territorialised by 
Zionism in a way that produces an intensely affective response they, like 
Zena, become ideal subjects of Popular Zionism, as defined using 
Grossberg’s theoretical approach. 
 
 Adjectives like ‘wonderful’, ‘amazing’ and Zena’s claim that language 
itself cannot do justice to the feeling of being in Israel during its sixtieth 
anniversary all point to the intensity of affect triggered by physically being in 
Israel. Three of the interviewees describe the quality of this affective 
assemblage: 
 
“…even now it’s a lovely feeling. You feel at home.” 
(Evelyn, p. 504) 
 
Jeremy expands on ‘feeling at home’ by suggesting that it means being free 
from anti-Semitism. 
 
“I just feel at home there. The minute I get off the plane. The minute I see all 
these Jewish people along the beach. The little kids all healthy and smiling 
and no-ones starting on them because they’re Jewish. Like my son says, he 
likes going because he can wear his Magen David158 outside his t-shirt and 
not inside his t-shirt. He’s not worried about getting a whack, which he can do 
in England, if he wears it on the tube and some Arab decides he doesn’t like 
him. Or get knived. It doesn’t happen there. There is some crime, yes, but it’s 
not in the same way. It’s not in the same way at all.” 
 
(Jeremy, p. 441) 
                                            
158 A Magen David literally means Star of David. As one of the most iconic signifiers of 
Judaism, it is often worn as jewellery. 
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This is the same affectivity, discussed in the previous chapter – a strong Israel 
making British Jews feel safe against an anti-Semitism that barely exists. The 
following statement from Stephen describes the other dimension of this 
affectivity, also described in the previous chapter, the aspect that makes the 
affectivity that British Jews feel in relation to Israel both highly complex and 
contradictory. First Stephen says: 
 
“They are living in a state of standby as far as the army is concerned or 
bombs. They’re just waiting. You’ve got that fear the whole time that there’s 
going to be another attack, or bomb or whatever. So they’ve had to harden 
up, the Israelis are far harder, harsher and they’ve had to be…” 
 
This statement is shortly followed by: 
 
“But every time we go back to Israel there’s this feeling that you’re kind of 
totally… Totally relaxed. I suppose looking back on what I’ve said to you… 
This hidden fear, this anti-Semitic, pogrom fear that you have completely 
goes away when you’re in Israel. Completely. Because when you’re on the 
streets and in restaurants you haven’t got anyone looking at you the wrong 
way because you’re Jewish. Having been part of that, whether it was the odd 
occasion as a youngster, I have witnessed anti-Semitism and it’s totally 
uncalled for and unjust and just out of the blue, it’s not like we attacked you. 
Like you could level something at Israel because they attacked you. We’re 
just sitting here, minding our own business. It’s a great feeling not to be 
worried about that. That’s a big attraction to me. I really do feel at home there, 
I feel comfortable there.” 
(p. 354) 
 
On a discursive level, these statements are entirely contradictory – Israel is 
both in permanent danger and Israelis are permanently fearful, yet Stephen 
feels totally relaxed when he is in Israel, because he doesn’t have to face the 
anti-Semitism in Britain, (which is empirically at an all time low). In its 
discursive contradictions these statements are a perfect example of Gramsci’s 
common sense. In terms of the affectivity he is describing, Stephen as 
Popular Zionist demonstrates the same complex affective assemblage 
outlined in the last chapter – incorporating the Zionist representation of Israel 
into your identity makes you feel both secure and at threat at the same time. 
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5.6. Popular Zionism and popular culture 
 
 If, for Grossberg, popular variants of ideologies hegemonise the 
affective as opposed to the ideological plane, the practice they inspire 
happens at the intersection of the planes of everyday life and popular culture 
and not of the institutional and the political. This is true of Popular Zionism. In 
the most general terms, Graham and Boyd found that 76% of the British Jews 
they surveyed in 2010 felt that Israel was relevant to their day-to-day lives 
(2010, p. 10). According to the interviews, this everyday Zionist practice 
manifested itself most commonly, not in belonging to Zionist organisations 
(although some do) but in their media and pop cultural consumption and the 
consumer decisions they made as tourists. 
 
5.6.1. Pop cultural consumption 
 
One of the findings of Kosmin and Levy’s survey of Redbridge Jewry 
was, “… it is clearly evident that the majority of Redbridge Jews do not have 
first hand experience or direct contact with Israel or Zionism. Apparently their 
image of Israel is formed from second hand or third hand opinions and from 
the general media” (1983, p. 29). Though changes in British tourism mean 
British Jews have much more first-hand experience of Israel than they did in 
1978 (see below), simply by being Jews who remain in Britain, this statement 
is as applicable to British Jewry in the contemporary moment as it was in 
1978.  
  
One of the key ways Popular Zionism is practiced is in relation to the 
consumption of Hollywood feature films. Exodus (1960), one of Hollywood’s 
most successful Zionist feature films (Loshitzky, 2001) is mentioned by two 
interviewees as having a definitive effect on their or their relatives’ becoming-
Zionist. 
 
“So you didn’t have a perception of Israel or Israelis. It was just a place 
and there were some Jewish people there. 
Yes, yes. Yes. 
 
 
291 
V: You didn’t think it was a homeland? That it was a place where people 
could always go to… 
H. Well I did, but that was probably through things like Exodus, the film. That 
made it more conscious to me actually. 
 
So Exodus… it comes up a lot, the film Exodus, in the interviews that 
I’ve done, the film Exodus played apart for you… 
I think it did actually.” 
(Harvey, p. 593) 
 
“He wasn’t a Zionist that was the strangest thing. That was the strangest thing 
ever because we were Zionists and he wasn’t a Zionist, his wife wasn’t a 
Zionist. She saw the film Exodus, I don’t know if you’ve ever seen the film 
Exodus. 
 
Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
And she suddenly said,  “we’re all going to Israel”, and she took her whole 
family. […] 
 
So Exodus made her want to go to Israel? 
Made her want to go to Israel. Yeah. Amazing. They weren’t Zionists, we 
were.” 
(Evelyn, p. 488) 
 
Zena was the interviewee whose interview suggested she practiced Zionism 
as cultural consumption most strongly. In it she mentioned Exodus, Cast A 
Giant Shadow (1966), Leonard Bernstein conducting an orchestra on Mount 
Scopus, Raid on Entebbe (1976), Evergreen (1985), Schindler’s List (1993), 
Israeli singer Dudi Fischer, a Yedhiot Arahanot commemorative book of Israeli 
history, and her own journalistic practice in the service of Zionism. In her 
interview she told an interesting story which weaves together pop cultural 
consumption, tourism, and the Zionisation of the Holocaust: 
 
“Julie: Did you tell them we went to Schindler’s grave? 
 
She did, yeah. [Laughs] 
Julie: Oh [soft laugh] How did we schlap that day? 
 
She said. 
Harry: He’s buried on the mount. 
Julie: [with evident pride] We saw him. Zena made sure the taxi driver got us 
there. 
Zena: We got there. I made sure. 
Julie: Like the end of the film with all the stones on. 
Harry: He’s buried near Herzl. 
Zena: It’s right opposite the Dan.” 
(p. 404) 
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As Popular Zionist tourists in Israel, Zena and her friends feel moved to visit 
Oskar Schindler’s grave because, one can safely presume, of the Steven 
Spielberg film Schindler’s List. In the collective retelling of the story a 
Hollywood narrative of the Holocaust gets interwoven with classical Zionism – 
“he’s buried near Herzl” – partly because post-1967, Zionism becomes fused 
with the Holocaust in Western culture (see chapter seven) and partly because 
Spielberg interweaves the Holocaust with Zionism in Schindler’s List 
(Loshitzky, 1997). The excerpt above provides a perfect example of Popular 
Zionist praxis: the articulation of the Holocaust and Zionism, producing an 
emotive ritual (visiting a grave) at the intersection of two pop cultural practices 
(Hollywood cinema and tourism).  
 
 Jeremy, whose membership to the 1,000 club (an all male organisation 
that donates charity to different sectors of Israeli society) arguably makes him 
a Classical Zionist (at least partially), recounted an interesting moment of pop 
cultural practice that was instrumental in his becoming-Zionist: 
 
“Then when did… 
Then when did I feel it? Really? I felt it most through Maccabiah. That’s what I 
felt. My solicitor, about sixteen years ago, said, “I had just been to the 
Maccabiah, let me show you the film” and I hadn’t felt anything. And his wife’s 
taking the film at the stadium and I can hear her crying and she’s saying, 
“there’s John, there’s John” and she zooms down and he’s waving and I see 
all these Jewish people and they sing Hatikvah159 and I thought, ‘I’d love to be 
part of that’. So I trained for the next three years and went in for the tennis 
[…] I’m a Maccabean type of person […] It’s just all these different 
nationalities come together. It’s a fantastic feeling. Just sitting there and 
hearing the Swedish boys, all blond hair and blue eyes, talking about salt 
beef and latkes […] You’ve got Spanish speaking ones going, ‘where’s my 
chicken soup?’ and Los Angeles and from Buenos Aires. You think, ‘what a 
family this is.’[…] And then when they stand… Sharon… I think it was him 
who actually said it. He said, ‘You are all our people. Welcome to Israel. I’d 
like you to come in four years time but in four years time you’ll be competing 
for Israel instead of against Israel’ And things like that and it just gets your 
emotions…. It is emotional for me.” 
(Jeremy, p. 432) 
 
The Maccabiah Games is a large-scale Jewish sports event, similar to the 
Olympic games, held in Israel every four years. Organised by the Israeli State 
                                            
159 The Israeli national anthem 
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the Maccabiah Games is, arguably, Zionist in the conventional sense. 
However the fact that it is a sports event, means it appeals to Diaspora Jews 
regardless of their relationship to Zionist ideology. It was Zionism interwoven 
with a pop cultural practice like sport that triggered an affective response in 
Jeremy that began his greater practical involvement with Zionism in later life.  
 
 One of the most significant cultural practices through which Popular 
Zionism is practiced is tourism to Israel. Almost immediately after the 1967 
war there is an increase in tourism to Israel from around the world of 48% 
(Bar-Nir, 1973, p. 56). In terms of British Jewish tourists to Israel, 16% had 
visited by 1968 (Krausz, 1969 (a)), 26% had visited by 1978 (Kosmin and 
Levy, 1983), 78% had visited by 1995 (Kosmin et al., 1997), 91% had visited 
by 2004 (Cohen and Kahn-Harris, 2004, p. 44) and 95% had visited by 2010 
(Boyd and Graham, 2010, p. 7). This steady and substantial growth is the 
result of a variety of factors aside from the British Jewish relationship to Israel 
and Zionism (i.e. the tremendous growth in British tourism since the 1970s). 
However, of the effect of the 1967 war on tourism, Della Pergola et al. argue 
that, “it can be assumed, however, that the Six Day War played a particularly 
significant role with regard to tourism, by making Israel definitely better known 
and visible on the international scene” (2001, p. 30). In 1981, Levenberg 
argued that, “tourism to Israel, therefore, has become a powerful factor 
influencing the Anglo-Jewish community” (1981, p. 176).  
 
 Zena, argues for tourism to Israel as a form of Popular Zionist praxis: 
 
“Zena: Well Israel has got to be number 1. I personally feel that if more 
people went to Israel instead of supporting… oh no this is terrible, forget it. 
 
Oh no, say it, say it… 
Zena: Say it, say it... They should forget their Spains and Portugals and 
Americas… 
Harry: And cruises 
Zena: And cruises and really give Israel the best turnover they can have with 
tourism. 
Harry: You’ve also got to think, Zena, of the financial situation. 
Zena: I realize that. I’m just saying that when you see where people go to, 
they should go to Israel more. I had… 
Harry: I agree with you.” 
(p. 402) 
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5.7. Postscript 
 
This chapter has analysed the form of Zionism – Popular Zionism – 
that has been hegemonic within the British Jewish community in the post-
1967 conjuncture. The analysis has also contended that in 2012 Popular 
Zionism remains hegemonic and has used quotes from the interviewees that 
relate to the present as well as other forms of data from 1967–2012 to support 
this claim. However, whilst making this claim it is vitally important to note that, 
in line with the Grasmcian theorisation of hegemony as never totally secure, 
the post-1967 conjuncture has seen the hegemony of Popular Zionism within 
the British Jewish community challenged in a number of ways.  
 
The earliest challenge to the hegemony of Popular Zionism emerged 
as a direct consequence of Israel’s victory in the 1967 war. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, pro-Palestinian and other politically radical groups in Britain 
begin to deploy anti-colonial discourses in order to represent Israel as an 
imperialist agressor. A tiny minority of Jews in Britain, like interviewee Brian, 
advocated these representations in order to challenge the hegemony of 
Popular Zionism, though not as Jews per se and not from inside British Jewry. 
Counter-hegemonic movement began within the community itself in 1982 as a 
result of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (Sacks, 1991; Landy 1991). This 
emerged mainly in the form of criticism of specific Israeli policies rather than a 
questioning of the fundamentals of Zionist ideology and was located within the 
community’s slightly more socially progressive institutions like the Reform 
synagogue. Whilst this criticism did not seek to challenge Zionism’s central 
position within the community it is still significant in that it is the first time since 
1967 that the hegemony of Popular Zionism is contested to some degree from 
within British Jewry. 
 
 The most important post-1967 contestation of the hegemony of 
Popular Zionism by British Jews as British Jews and directed towards the 
British Jewish community (amongst others) is from what David Landy terms 
“Israel-critical Jewish groups” (2011) like Jews for Justice for Palestinians 
(JfJfP) and Independent Jewish Voices (IJV). These groups emerged in 
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response to the second intifada (2000-2005), the 2006 war in Lebanon and 
Operation Cast Lead in 2008. In Landy’s assessment these groups have 
offered the most successful contestation of the hegemony of Popular Zionism 
within the British Jewish community in that they have “loosened the automatic 
correspondence between Jewishness and Zionism” (p. 212) and have made 
“criticism of Israel… appear respectable and almost mainstream among 
segments of British Jewry” (p. 90). However, Landy supports the argument 
made in this chapter that “Zionist ideology is hegemonic among Jews” (p. 4) 
and that, “it is important not to overemphasise the power of the [Israel-critical 
Diaspora Jewish] movement; it is still a small marginalised group of people160 
whose claim to speak out as Jews on Israel/Palestine is subject to constant 
attack” (p. 6). 161 In line with the argument made throughout this thesis, Landy 
argues that in the post-second intifada period, “Diaspora Jewish identity has 
become even more defensive – more closed, right-wing and hostile to the 
outside world” (p. 8). In sum, whilst the focus of this chapter is the hegemonic 
way that the majority of Brtitish Jews have related to Israel via Popular 
Zionism in the post-1967 conjuncture, it is analytically and politically important 
to stress that Popular Zionism has not been monolithic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has sought to analyse the effect of the 1967 war on the 
place of Zionist ideology in the British Jewish community. It has done this 
using the theoretical perspective developed by Lawrence Grossberg (1992) in 
bringing Deleuze and Guattari’s affect to bear on the CCCS’s reading of the 
following Gramscian concepts – the Popular, hegemony, ideology and 
common sense. It continues chapter four’s narrative of the history of Zionism 
within the British Jewish community by arguing the effect of the war was the 
                                            
160 Landy reports that in 2010 JfJfP had 1, 625 signatories and IJV had 645 signatories. He 
argues that in the case of JfJfP the amount of signatories “are a somewhat flattering portrayal 
of its actual strength” (p. 95) noting that numbers of attendees at its meetings have not really 
changed since the organisation’s inception. 
161 Joseph’s is a typical British Jewish reaction to these groups: “I just, ha, I just don’t take 
much notice of them. They might as well be Jews for Jesus. […] What they do is of no 
consequence whatsoever” (p. 555). 
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total hegemony of Zionist ideology within the British Jewish community. This 
is evidenced in different ways: i) by the numbers of British Jews who both 
support Israel and accept its existence as a given fact; ii) the way that 
fragments of Zionist ideology appear ‘spontaneously’ in the common sense of 
British Jews, particularly in those who say they are not Zionists. The Zionism 
that becomes hegemonic in the post-1967 conjuncture, however, is not 
Zionism in the classical sense (Shimoni, 1995). First, it omits Classical 
Zionism’s defining ideological component – the negation of the Diaspora/the 
imperative to make aliyah. As a result of this omission, it does not inspire 
Classical Zionist praxis: actually making aliyah or joining a Zionist 
organisation. In Grossberg’s terms Zionist ideology does not hegemonize the 
institutional or political planes. It does, however, hegemonize the affective 
plane of the British Jewish social formation. This can be seen in i) the way 
Zionism is defined by some of the interviewees as ‘love of Israel’; ii) the 
intense affective engagement British Jews have with (parts of) Zionist 
ideology and iii) the intense affectivity triggered by physically being in Israel. 
Most importantly it can be seen as the way that Zionism exists in the post-
1967 British Jewish social formation more as an affective disposition towards 
Israel than as an ideology. The praxis this sort of Zionism inspires occurs 
largely on the planes of everyday life and popular culture – primarily media 
consumption and tourism. For all the reasons, it is more accurate to call the 
Zionism that dominates British Jewry in the post 1967 conjuncture Popular 
Zionism.  
 
The purpose of this chapter has not simply been to name Popular 
Zionism. Rather, in providing a more accurate label for the sort of Zionism that 
has dominated the British Jewish social formation post-1967, it has been 
necessary to i) identify its distinctive characteristics, ii) describe the conditions 
of their possibility and iii) locate their material effectivity – i.e. its tremendous 
success – within the social formation, so that it can be successfully opposed 
and resisted. If the CCCS defined the Gramscian ‘Popular’ as a constantly 
negotiated ‘field’ defined by ‘complex lines of resistance and acceptance, 
refusal and capitulation’, it becomes possible to imagine scenarios in which 
Zionism is successfully resisted and refused within the British Jewish Popular 
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in a similar fashion to the way it was before 1948. These are scenarios where 
Zionism ceases to become hegemonic, its historicity is revealed, the majority 
of British Jews do not affectively invest in it in the intense way they have post 
1967, and the possibility of other ideologies aside from Zionism organising the 
affective lives and common sense of British Jews in relation to Palestine/Israel 
becomes a reality. Popular anti-Zionism might be one of these ideologies, as 
might yet to be conceived of ideologies that imagine mutually beneifical 
Jewish and Arab co-existence outside any sort of Zionist framework, pro, anti- 
or otherwise. What is important to note here is that because affect has played 
such a central role in the becoming-hegemonic of Zionism within in British 
Jewry – it is precisely because witnessing the 1967 war triggered such an 
intensely affective response in the British Jewish community that it was the 
affective plane that becomes hegemonized by a compromised form of Zionist 
ideology – that it is on the affective plane that resistance to Popular Zionism 
need occur. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
The beginning of this thesis noted that in current Jewish Studies 
scholarship there is a broad consensus that not only did the Six Day War 
generate an intensely emotional response in the British Jewish community but 
also that after the war the British Jewish relationship with Israel changed in 
important ways.162 What this scholarship has yet to provide is i) a detailed 
account of the community’s emotional response to the war and the 
mobilisation that it stimulated and the changes that occurred as a result or ii) a 
sustained theorisation of precisely how the representation of a world-historical 
event like the Six Day War can bring about cultural changes like those that 
occurred in British Jewry in the post-1967 conjuncture. This thesis has 
attempted to address both these gaps by using a cultural studies approach 
rooted primarily in the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. By using 
this approach, this thesis has been able to reveal two things: i) the central role 
that affect has played in bringing about the cultural changes that occurred in 
the British Jewish community after the war and ii) the crucial position that 
affect occupies in the constitution of these cultural changes. It has therefore 
been possible to argue that, contrary to claims within current scholarship, 
since 1967 Zionism in Britain has worked in a primarily affective manner and 
is ‘lived out’ in the identities, cultural practices and everyday lives of British 
Jews. For reasons outlined in Chapter 8, this thesis has called this sort of 
Zionism, Popular Zionism. To evidence these claims, it has been necessary to 
conduct twelve in-depth interviews with British Jews about their experience of 
the community’s response to the war. Supplementing these interviews with 
                                            
162 (Alderman, 1992; Bar-Nir, 1969; Benbassa, 2007; Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007; Cohen 
and Kahn-Harris, 2004; Davidson, 1967/1968; Endleman, 2002; Gould, 1984; Gross, 
1967/1968, Kosmin et al., 1997; Lederhandler, 2000; Mankowitz, 1967/1968; Marks, 1967, 
1967/1968; Oren, 2002; Sacks, 1991; Schindler, 2007 (a); Segev, 2005; Staub, 2004). It 
should be reiterated that discussion of the British Jewish emotional reponse to the war and 
the mobilisation it stimulated are fleeting in all these accounts. 
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original archival research has added detail that was previously missing from 
the historical record. 
 
This thesis has made the above argument in the following way. 
Chapter 2 made the case that a cultural studies approach rooted primarily in 
Deleuzo-Guattarian thought was best placed to make sense of the impact of 
the war on the British Jewish community. This approach privileges the place 
of affect in the constitution of social and cultural formations so, this chapter 
argued, it provided the necessary theoretical tools to fully account for a 
moment in Jewish history in which, according to the interviews and archival 
research, affect had played a crucial role. Chapter 3 outlined the necessary 
methodology to deploy this theoretical approach in this specific context. 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the various ‘territorialisations’ and ‘codings’ that took 
place within the British Jewish assemblage between 1880 and 1967 that 
organised it this assemblage in such a way that meant it was pre-disposed to 
making the intense affective investments in the Zionist representation of Israel 
that were ‘catalysed’ by the Six Day War. This chapter showed that Zionism 
was a marginal and highly contested force within the British Jewish 
assemblage prior to 1948 after which, the idea that a Jewish national home 
should exist in ‘Eretz Israel’ becomes naturalised though elicits weak support. 
Up until 1967 it had been respectable (in differing degrees) for British Jews 
and their institutions to be anti- and non- Zionist. The reason this changed 
after the war, this chapter argued, is because although during the 1960s 
British Jews were experiencing unprecedented measures of status and 
power, both socio-economically and within Britain’s racial hierarchies, they still 
felt vulnerable to anti-Semitism. This produced a contradictory affective 
economy within the assemblage that was reinforced in the ways that 
Jewishness was being coded in popular culture at the time. The successful 
attempt by Zionist institutions in coding the 1967 war as a (super-) heroic 
Israel fending off its annihilation and the genocide of its Jewish population 
resolved these contradictions by reflecting the increased status of British Jews 
in British society whilst also making them feel protected against the threat of 
anti-Semitism (which was, paradoxically, at an historic low).  
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Chapter 6 attempted to detail the role played by the war in doing this. It 
used a Delandian-Deleuzian/Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical model that 
argues that changes in the ‘formal properties’ of cultural and social formations 
occur through intensifications and dissipations in affect. In believing the 
Zionist claim that the war threatened Israel’s Jews with a genocide, British 
Jewry was overcome by an intense terror. In their belief that a super heroic 
army fended off this threat this terror ‘transmuted’ to an equally intense sense 
of elation.163 In experiencing these intensely charged affective states British 
Jewry became the ‘cancerous Body-without-Organs of the fascist’. This could 
be evidenced by the community acting in concert in a way that closed down 
the possibility of difference in either understanding what the war might mean 
or how one might be a British Jew in relation to the war. This has important 
consequences for the cultural changes that occur in post-1967 British Jewry 
discussed in the following chapters. 
 
 Chapters 7 and 8 discussed the cultural changes bought about by the 
intense affectivity generated by the war. Chapter 7 looked at the changes at 
the level of cultural identity. It did this by using Guattari’s argument that 
discursive ‘refrains’ are what cause the heterogeneous components of 
subjectivity (which include affects) to cohere into a functioning whole. Using 
interview and archival data, this chapter argued that the British Jewish 
reaction to the war introduced the discursive ‘refrains’ of Zionism into British 
Jewish cultural identity. These refrains include the notion that ‘the Jewish 
people’ always face an existential threat from which they can only can be 
protected by a strong, militarised and aggressive State of Israel. These 
refrains ‘catalysed’ an affective assemblage comprised out of a sense of 
pride, security, excitement, and sexual desire that is thoroughly dependent on 
and perpetually undercut by paranoia. This chapter then argued that when 
these refrains are removed through, for example, the questioning of Zionist 
precepts, British Jewish cultural identity begins to deterritorialise in a way that 
causes panic. This might explain why British Jews respond so defensively to 
criticisms of Israel. This chapter then wondered what refrains might replace 
                                            
163 Said argues that terror and elation are what give birth to Zionism (1979). 
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Zionism in order that a more properly ‘joyous’ affective assemblage might be 
catalysed within British Jewish cultural identity than the one which currently 
exists and is not dependent on dominance over other assemblages, most 
importantly the Palestinians. 
 
Chapter 8 discussed the cultural changes triggered by the war at the 
levels of ideology and cultural practice. In order to do this, it used Lawrence 
Grossberg’s Gramscian/Deleuzo-Guattarian theoretical framework which 
argues for the important role affect plays in the becoming hegemonic of 
ideologies in complex cultural formations. Using this framework this chapter 
argued that the Zionism that emerged in Britain’s Jewish community after 
1967 was Popular as opposed to Classical Zionism. The key reason 
underlying this claim was that whereas Zionism, in its classical sense, is an 
ideology practiced on the institutional and state planes, Popular Zionism is 
primarily a (highly charged) affective disposition practiced on the planes of 
everyday life, pop cultural consumption and cultural identity (as discussed in 
Chapter 7) and used archival and interview data to support this claim. 
 
 The concluding remarks of Chapter 8 re-iterated the claim made in the 
introductory chapter that the purpose of this thesis was not simply to name the 
sort of Zionism that emerged in British Jewry after the 1967 war and outline 
the processes which produced it. In keeping with the foundational principles of 
cultural studies (Gilbert, 2012),164 the purpose of this thesis has been to make 
visible the contingency of the supposedly natural relationship Zionism claims 
exists between ‘the Jewish people’ and the State of Israel. It has attempted 
this by both pin-pointing the historical moment when, in Stuart Hall’s definition 
of cultural change, “some cultural forms and practices” – in this context anti-
Zionism, non-Zionism or less intensely charged affective investments in the 
State of Israel –  “[were] driven out of the centre of popular life, actively 
marginalised” (Hall, 1998, p. 443) and also outlining the processes through 
which this took place. In doing this, the hope of this thesis has, in its own 
                                            
164 “to put into question what is apparently fixed, to bring it out into the open, to de-sediment it, 
to make it public and to make visible its contingency, to put it up for discussion” (Gilbert, 
2012) 
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limited way, been to resist Zionism in a general sense and, more specifically, 
the hegemonic position Zionism has enjoyed in the affective lives and 
‘common sense’ of the British Jewish community since 1967.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to propose precisely what 
ideology/affective disposition/Guattarian refrain might replace Popular Zionism 
within the British Jewish community. Chapter 8 suggested Popular anti-
Zionism but did not imagine what that might constitute. A possible area of 
academic enquiry opened up by this thesis might be to imagine precisely what 
Popular anti-Zionism might look like. Grounding Popular anti-Zionism, or 
indeed any other political formation seeking to organise life in Palestine/Israel 
in a just and equitable way for all the people who seek to live there, within 
Deleuzo-Guattarian ethics would be an appropriate starting point. This would 
entail the promotion of “joyous affect” (Protevi, 2009) in ‘encounters’ that are 
mutually empowering for all the ‘bodies’ involved in them. Of all the current 
solutions to the Palestine/Israel conflict the one state solution, I would argue, 
seems to most readily fit this bill.165 In the context of the hegemonic British 
Jewish relationship to Israel, at a very minimum it means being able to 
partake in the democratic principle (both liberal and radical) of criticising state 
policy without incurring over-reaction on the part of mainstream British Jewish 
institutions. It also means being able to countenance the dissolution of the 
State of Israel in its current formation i.e. – one whose structuring principle is 
the privileging of one ethnic group over the others who inhabit ‘Eretz Israel’ – 
without making Zionism’s false equation between the reorganisation of the 
institutional, political and economic planes and destruction on the plane of the 
corporeal i.e. the genocide of Israel’s Jewish community, and the Popular 
Zionist belief that this would lead to a more dangerous world for Diaspora 
Jewry when the evidence suggests precisely the opposite. Only then will the 
possibility of the British Jewish assemblage existing on the Plane of 
                                            
165 At the most fundamental level this is because there is, arguably, no realistic way of 
dividing the territory Palestine/Israel (however defined) that enables the just and equitable 
distribution of its resources between its various inhabitants. Fair and equal access to the 
resources of the territory that you inhabit is one of the most basic ways in which mutually 
empowering encounters emerge between bodies across the Plane of Organisation. See, for 
example, (Tilley, 2005; Abunimah, 2006; Halwani and Kapitan, 2008; Loewenstein and Moor, 
2012) for recent discussions on a one state solution for the Palestine/Israel conflict. 
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Organisation in a way that is truly empowering for itself and the other 
assemblages on which its constitution depends begin. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewee Profiles 
 
Stephen 
 Stephen is a personal contact. Born in Israel he has lived in London 
most of his life. He is the youngest of the interviewees and was thirteen during 
the time of the war. His interview reflects this – he remembers the war with a 
child’s sense of wonder. He lived in Stamford Hill in 1967. His parents were 
working class, although poorer than the rest of the community, largely as a 
result of their migrant status. He speculated that if his parents voted at all they 
would have voted Labour. He is now middle class and lives in Hertsmere. He 
has never belonged to a Zionist organisation, but has been moderately active 
in the life of the Jewish community – in 1967 he belonged to a Jewish youth 
club in Stamford Hill and sung in the choir in Synagogue there, meaning he 
went once a week. The norm at the time was to go only on the High Holy 
Days so aside from this and his Israeli migrant background, Stephen is typical 
of London’s Jewish community. 
 
 Zena and Harry 
 Zena and Harry are personal contacts. The interview had only been 
organised with Zena but her friend Harry was in the flat where the interview 
was taking place (our mutual friend Julie) so asked if I wanted to interview 
him. As a result the interview with Harry was ad hoc so did not include a 
section with background information. He is a personal contact as well, so I 
know that he was born in 1925 and lived in Petticoat Lane in London’s East 
End. As an adult he moved to Redbridge where he lived during the war. He 
was a cab driver for the whole of his adult life, except when he joined the 
Navy during the Second World War. He attends Synagogue once a week. He 
has never belonged to a Zionist organisation but since his war service 
belonged to a Jewish soldier’s organisations, where he is now the chairman of 
his local branch, and which is pro-Zionist. He is typical of London’s Jewish 
Community. 
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 Zena was born in Bethnal Green in 1935 and now lives in Redbridge. 
She was the interviewee that was the most difficult to direct and so the 
biographical information I was able to elicit was minimal. Because she is a 
personal contact I know she has worked as sales assistant at jewellery 
warehouse since 1979. She is currently the press officer for the branch of the 
ex-soldiers organisation where Harry is chairman. From the minimal 
biographical information I have from Zena, I have surmised that she has a 
typical profile of a Jewish women born in 1935 and who has remained in 
London throughout her life. The interviews with Zena and Harry were not 
particularly useful with regards to details of the 1967 war: Zena did not 
remember anything and Harry’s memories seemed highly inaccurate. 
Because Zena did not remember anything I was surprised she agreed to the 
interview. It shortly became clear that she wanted to use the interview to 
display how much she loved Israel and as such her interview is rich with data 
that was useful for Chapter 8, the chapter on Popular Zionism. 
 
 Jeremy 
 Jeremy is a friend of Stephen’s. Born in the East End in 1944 he was 
living in Bounds Green during the Six Day War. In 1967 he was a manager in 
his father’s lighting manufacturers. He does not believe in God, but goes to 
synagogue on the High Holy Days. He joined the 1,000 club at some point in 
the 1990s/2000s – an all male charitable organisation that collects money for 
different causes in Israel. Prior to that Jeremy had not belonged to a Zionist 
organisation. As a teenager he went to a Jewish youth club and played 
football in a Jewish youth league. Aside from Jeremy’s explicit disavowal of 
God’s existence, he has a highly typical demographic profile of a London Jew. 
 
 David 
 David is a contact of one of my supervisors. I approached him on the 
basis of wanting to interview an anti-Zionist. In many ways he has existed 
outside the currents of mainstream British Jewry for most of his life. He was 
born in Acton in 1942, an area of West London where very few Jews live. He 
was at the University of York during the war and so was not near a large 
Jewish community as the war was taking place. Politically he self-defined as 
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"left of the Labour party, right of the Trotskyists" (p. 446) and was heavily 
involved in student politics. Despite his minimal involvement in the Jewish 
community he was pro-Israel during the war, though was largely indifferent to 
the politics of Palestine/Israel afterwards despite being involved in anti-
colonial politics through the 1970s and 1980s. This changes after the Second 
Intifada when he develops an explicitly anti-Zionist position on 
Palestine/Israel, and in 2002 joined Jews for Justice for Palestinians but left 
because he wanted to be more involved in BDS than JfJfP would have 
allowed. He is now active in a BDS oriented group. In many ways he is highly 
atypical as a British Jew. 
 
 Evelyn (and Jeffrey) 
 Evelyn is the contact of a University of East London PhD student. 
When I arrived at her house to do the interview it seemed as if she would 
have been uncomfortable doing the interview had her husband Jeffrey not 
been by her side. Jeffrey has a severe speech impediment so made a minimal 
contribution to the interview. Evelyn was born in Hackney in 1932. In 1932, 
Hackney was transforming from a middle class to working class suburb of 
London. During the 1967 war, she lived in Norwood, a south London suburb 
that had a small Jewish community though she lived in a house on the 
grounds of a Jewish orphanage where she fostered Jewish children. Evelyn 
and Jeffrey have always been highly religious. She had belonged to Habonim 
as a child and professed to be Zionist before 1967, and remembered having 
the sort of affective response to Israel’s Declaration of Independence that 
most British Jews had to the Six Day War. She is, arguably ‘more Jewish’ 
than the typical British Jew in 1967 because of the frequency of her religious 
practice and her high involvement with a Jewish institution. Her pre-1967 
emotional involvement with Israel is also not that typical according to the 
sociological data being produced in the 1950s and 1960s (Krausz, 1964; 1969 
(a); 1969 (b)) . 
 
 Sarah 
 I recruited Sarah through the Habonim circular e-mail. She was born in 
1952 and was living in Southgate in 1967, a North London suburb with a large 
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Jewish community. Her family were “quite orthodox” in that they would walk to 
Synagogue every Sabbath166. She was heavily involved in Habonim, which 
she explained as her way into the burgeoning identity politics of the 1960s. In 
the interview she explained that her involvement with Habonim separated her 
from mainstream Jewish youth because she was more “meaningful[ly]” 
engaged with the world: “we rather despised the other more materialistic, 
more dressy-uppy people who hung around discos. Rejected all of that…” 
She is currently a drama therapist living in New Barnet and is ambivalent 
about a post-1967 Israel as a result of the principles that first got her involved 
in Zionism as a teenager. Her demographic profile is not easily categorisable.  
 
 Joseph 
 Joseph was the second Habonim alumni that I interviewed. He was 
born in Salford in 1945. He was the interviewee most strongly involved with 
Zionism, having moved to Israel in 1959 for seven years. When he came back 
to Salford (a suburb of Manchester with a large Jewish population) in 1966 he 
began working for his father-in-law’s textile business. He read The 
Manchester Guardian in 1967. He has never been particularly religious. He is 
now retired and still lives in Salford. Aside from the highly unusual move to 
Israel in 1959, Joseph is in many ways typical of Manchester Jewry. 
 
 Brian 
 Brian was a personal contact of one of my supervisors, again 
approached because he was an anti-Zionist. Brian was the least typical of all 
the interviewees having been an anarchist in the 1960s and explicitly anti-
Zionist prior to 1967. He was bought up in Hendon (a middle class London 
suburb with a large Jewish population) but moved to Notting Hill immediately 
after leaving home, and worked for John Lewis. At this point he was married 
to a non-Jewish woman. He defines as a secular Jew, explaining that he 
would never deny his Jewish background, still claiming Jewish ‘ethnicity’ but is 
an atheist and opposed to organised religion on political grounds. 
 
                                            
166 Modern orthodox interpretation of ancient Jewish law forbids driving on Sabbath. 
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 Harvey 
 Harvey is the contact of a colleague at the University of East London. 
He was born in Stamford Hill in 1938, but lived most of his young life in 
London’s West End. He moved to Manchester in 1963 for a job in a computer 
firm. He was highly involved in Manchester’s Jewish community, organising 
the youth club affiliated to his synagogue. He has never belonged to a Zionist 
organisation and cannot recall organising any Zionist activity at his youth club. 
He defines as not very religious. Harvey shares many of the typical 
demographic traits of Britain’s Jewish community. 
 
 Vivien 
 Vivien is Harvey’s wife. She agreed to be interviewed when I met her 
on the day I interviewed Harvey. I came back a week later to interview her. 
She was born in South Manchester in 1945, the child of a German and 
Austrian Holocaust refugees (Alderman (1992) estimates there were between 
50–60, 000 such refugees). She was a housewife. She ran the youth club with 
Harvey and was similarly observant of Jewish law. She has never been 
particularly involved in Zionism but claims that her family history in the 
Holocaust always gave her a strong sense of Israel’s importance as a safe 
haven for Diaspora Jews. 
 
 Rose 
 Rose responded to the advert I had placed in the Jewish Chronicle. 
She was born in Kladno, Czechoslovakia in 1946. Her family immigrated to 
Great Britain in 1948 after the country’s Communist coup. They lived in 
Croydon – a London suburb with an insignificantly sized Jewish population. 
She defines as traditionally Jewish but, “very much a three-times a year shul 
and cheder once a week” Jew (Rose, p. 639). She was working as a buyer in 
Marks and Spencer at the time of the war. She belonged to the Federation of 
Zionist Youth for, she claims, social not political reasons, but felt sufficiently 
moved by the Six Day War that she would have volunteered to go to Israel 
had her father agreed to sign the consent forms. She did volunteer in the 
summer after the war had finished. She currently lives in Wembley (an area 
with a large Jewish population), is a housewife (her husband is a lawyer) and 
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has children living in settlements in the occupied territories. She is involved in 
women’s Zionist organisation – WIZO, for whom she occasionally carries out 
publicity work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
